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CIVIL SERVICE REFORM IN POST-COMMUNIST 
COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
 
 
                                               “Every revolution evaporates and leaves behind only  
                   the slime of a new bureaucracy”.  
                                                                                                                Franz Kafka 
 
 
CHAPTER I:  INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1    Transformation of the State and Public Sector Reforms in Central 
and Eastern Europe 
 
The late eighties and early nineties of the 20th century saw unprecedented 
changes in the political and economic systems of the Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries. Hardly anywhere else did so many countries undertake  
transformation of their basic political and economic institutions on such a scale. The 
retreat from one party rule, bureaucratic centralism and central planning towards a 
new system characterized by market economy, democratic institutions and developed 
civil society posed a formidable challenge for the nations in question.  
The countries in transition faced the task of establishing the basics of a 
democratic society: in particular adopting new constitutions, transferring power to 
elected representatives, creating a multi-party system, establishing a favourable and 
competitive environment for free market operators, encouraging development of 
civil society organizations and promoting independence of mass media.     
The task of such enormity necessitated a profound transformation of the 
state administration and the overall system of governance. This pertains in particular 
to the re-orientation of the civil service towards an impartial execution of policy 
mapped out by the political party in power, ensuring the rule of law and eliminating 
possibilities for arbitrary use of public authority. This also means introduction of 
appropriate internal and external control procedures and establishing permanent 
dialogue between public servants and citizens as well as maintaining strong 
accountability of the former to democratic institutions and civil society.  
The formation of an efficient, cost effective, accountable, based on merit 
and corruption immune civil service turned out to be an extremely complicated task 
in virtually all post-communist countries. Notwithstanding progress in some areas 
the bulk of this work still lies ahead in the majority of CEE countries.  
Although civil service reform issues were put high on the agenda of CEE 
governments, in many cases reform processes were slow, delayed or delivering other 
than planned results. By the mid 1990s state bureaucracy in many Central and 
Eastern European countries appeared to have been least of all affected in real terms 
by the transformation when compared to other public institutions and sectors of the 
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difficulties and problems of post-communist transition are to a considerable extent 
rooted in the essentially unreformed nature of the bureaucracies in the countries 
concerned started to grow among politicians, experts and international donor 
organizations in the second half of the 1990s.  
 
 
1.2  Сivil Service Reform: International and Regional Context  
 
 Civil service and administrative reforms appear to be in fashion nowadays. 
The latest wave of reforms has been launched first across a limited number of 
countries in the mid-1980s (Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain and the USA are 
most often cited) spreading then further to other countries and continents. Many 
prominent politicians and scholars argue that reform and modernisation of 
contemporary state bureaucracy should become a permanent non-stop process.  
Obviously there are good reasons for the renewed interest in modernisation 
and transformation of state administration. The development of modern society 
places much greater demand on the quality, efficiency and orientation of the 
activities of civil servants. Much higher priority has been recently attached 
worldwide to the issues of civil servants’ performance, transparency, accountability, 
client orientation, integrity and responsiveness.    
 In spite of certain commonalities inherent to the majority of reform 
processes it is possible to distinguish at least two distinct trends in the reform of 
public management in the industrially developed countries over the recent decade. 
Using the phraseology and rationale provided by Pollitt and Bouckaert we can refer 
to the New Public Management (NPM) and the New Weberian State (NWS) as 
major reform trends. According to the same authors the adherents of the NWS model 
give priority to the modernization of the Weberian tradition, whereas NPM 
proponents largely reject this tradition and promote approaches widely used in the 
private sector (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004: 46).   
World-wide experience also demonstrates that reform of civil service 
systems is a complex process involving competing and conflicting interests and is 
subject to a multitude of exogenous and endogenous factors. “We are convinced that 
a conceptually identical, or at least very similar, reform develops differently in one 
national context as compared with another.” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004:39). 
In Central and Eastern Europe transition to a new political, economic and 
social reality in the 1990s has been highly uneven and overall characterised by 
advances and setbacks in practically all countries in the region. The political and 
economic transformation challenged the capacity of the governments and 
administrative structures to manage the reform processes and react to a constantly 
changing environment.  
 The timing, contents, pace and outcomes of administrative reform efforts 
were unique in each country of the region. At the same time one can notice certain 
general tendencies and commonalities. To a considerable extent they stem from 
jointly shared historical legacies but there are also other factors. These similarities 
are above all manifested in the specific features of state bureaucracies in the CEE 
region – widespread clientelistic networks and abuse of public office, high 
politicisation, considerable policy making opportunities and weak enforcement of 
civil service legislation, to name just a few.  
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 By the late 1990s transformation of the public administration system has 
been acknowledged to be a crucial element of the transition process in CEE states.  
The agenda of in-depth reform of the civil service in post-communist countries 
incorporates measures aimed at streamlining their institutional role; enhancing 
accountability and efficiency, transparency and responsiveness; enforcing political 
neutrality and strict adherence to the rule of law; introducing modern management 
techniques and effective anti-corruption strategy; and strengthening performance and 
client orientation.  
Preparation for EU membership and subsequent accession has been a 
separate and quite significant factor that affected the political, economic and 
institutional development of many CEE countries. This factor has served as an 
additional stimulus for speeding up modernisation and reform of the civil services in 
the region.  
 
 
1.3   Rationale for the Selection of Cases 
  
Studying institutional change, in particular reforms of administrative 
systems, is essential for gaining full understanding of the process of transformation 
that has been taking place in Central and Eastern Europe since the late 1980s-early 
1990s. Available evidence demonstrates that institutions have become influential 
actors in modern political systems and they define the framework within which 
politics takes place (see Chapter II for more information).     
 In recent years many scholars and researchers have increasingly pointed to 
the importance of studying the process of administrative transformation in Central 
and Eastern Europe as this offers “the most exciting prospect for comparativists: the 
study of de-bureaucratization in Eastern Europe” (Fried, 1990:339). In spite of 
generally high interest and demand for comparative research, "the number of 
genuinely comparative studies of public service systems remains small" 
(Raadschelders, 1998:160), “the study of civil service reform in Central and Eastern 
Europe is still in an early state of development” (Meyer-Sahling, 2002:5) and 
“questions referring to the timing, progress and outcomes of civil service reforms in 
Central and Eastern Europe are far from being answered.” (ibid).  
The overall objective of the present research is to explore the process of 
transformation of civil service systems in selected post-communist states. The 
selection of countries for the research was therefore confined to Central and Eastern 
Europe. Within the region the choice of the Russian Federation and the Czech 
Republic has been deliberate and is explained as much for their differences as for 
their similarities. In particular, the following points are worth noting:  
- In the early 1990s in the atmosphere of overall fascination with market 
reforms in Central and Eastern Europe there was general lack of apprehension of the 
importance of creating a competent, effective and accountable state administration. 
Though quality of public management has been gradually recognized by the Russian 
and Czech politicians as a key factor in ensuring success of crucial reforms, this 
awareness has not been followed by sustained and well coordinated actions to design 
and implement an effective strategy of civil service reform. In essence a kind of 
contradiction has gradually grown in both Russia and the Czech Republic. The 
political and the economic systems of both countries have drastically changed but the 
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way these countries had been managed administratively was largely retained. This 
contradiction appears to have influenced many political, economic and social 
processes in the countries concerned; 
         - Both Russia and the Czech Republic have gone through the so called 
“triple transformation” – a specific form of de-institutionalization in politics, 
economy and nationhood in the early 1990s and this combination differentiates them 
from the absolute majority of other post-communist countries; 
  - The Russian Federation and the Czech Republic stand out from the 
majority of other CEE countries in that their civil service reform was considerably 
delayed. One of the objectives that guided the author’s research effort was intention 
to contribute to the identification of principal causes of such delays;  
   - In view of the considerable delay in start-up of civil service reforms in 
both countries it is of high academic and practical interest to explore how factors of 
similarity (e.g. the recent communist past manifested in the dominating ideology and 
mentality, prevailing administrative practices and attitudes, complicated economic 
situation, etc) and variance (e.g. size of the territory and population, availability of 
natural resources, constitutional arrangements, traditions and culture, external 
influence, etc) typical of each country affected the process of preparation and 
implementation of reform;  
  - The demand to improve governmental performance and to adjust state 
administration to the vastly changed role of the state and no less important to the new 
needs and expectations of the society has become more urgent in recent years and 
was made evident in significant developments in both countries. In the Czech 
Republic noted were the approval by the Czech Parliament of the Civil Service Act 
in 2002 and endorsement by the Czech Government of the Programme of Reform of 
Central State Administration in 2004. In the Russian Federation marked were the 
approval in 2002 by the Russian President of the Programme of Civil Service 
Reform for the years 2003- 2005 and adoption by the State Duma of the new Laws 
on Civil Service in 2003 and 2004;    
   - General shortage of studies devoted to various aspects of administrative 
transition in the researched countries and in particular actual absence of 
comprehensive comparative research, which considers reforms of the Russian and 
Czech civil services as its subject matter.    
 The appropriateness of these and other considerations and questions with 
regard to civil service reforms in Russia and the Czech Republic have been noted by 
observers and experts in the field: “It remains puzzling why a country (Czech 
Republic-A.K.) with good records in economic and political reforms and new 
member of the European Union has been unable for a long time to produce major 
progress in the area of civil service reform” (Meyer-Sahling, 2002:5).  
In a similar way far reaching administrative reform launched in 2003 in 
Russia, in a country with deeply rooted traditions of “untamed bureaucracy”, came 
somewhat as a surprise for most observers. The World Bank 2004 Russian Economic 
Report noted “In March 2004, the authorities announced – and immediately moved 
to implement – a blueprint for restructuring the Federal Government, which was far 
more radical than commentators or most public officials have been expecting” 
(World Bank, 2004:2). 
What are the roots of these significant developments in both countries? Are 
the declared objectives and tasks of the reforms feasible? Are the reform plans being 
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realized? What are the driving forces and constraints which either facilitate or 
complicate the advance of reform? What are current results of reform 
implementation? These and other questions arouse considerable interest and guided 
the author’s effort throughout all the research work.  
Although the programmes for large scale reform of core civil service appear 
to have been launched only recently in both Russia and the Czech Republic, it would 
be wrong to assume that no relevant developments took place in each country 
throughout the 1990s. In fact, preparation of the reform continued to a greater or 
lesser degree during all this period and was accompanied by debate, contradictions, 
conflicts, advances and setbacks, partial improvements and separate practical 
measures aimed at modernization of respective civil services. Analysis of these 
developments, together with comparison with the experience of other countries, may 
be helpful in avoiding difficulties and pitfalls in future and facilitating practical 
implementation of the reforms in Russia, the Czech Republic and other post-
communist countries.  
 
 
1.4   Objective, Research Questions and Structure of the Study  
  
 The focus of the research is on the identification, analysis and comparison 
of civil service reform initiatives and processes in the two selected countries starting 
from the early 1990s.  
The principal research question is formulated as:  
‘What have been the experiences with the preparation, launching and 
implementation of national civil service reform in the Russian Federation and the 
Czech Republic following the fall of the communist regimes and which factors can 
explain the relative success or failure of the reform proposals’. 
The following research sub-questions defined directions and contents of the 
thesis: 
1) What were the main characteristics and prevailing features of each of the two 
civil service systems (Russian and Czech) before the reform was designed and 
launched?;  
2) What are the dynamics of change and contents of reform of the Russian and 
Czech civil service systems?;  
3) What are the essential factors that influenced the pace and current results of 
reform?; 
4) How can the differences and similarities in the development and reform of the 
two civil services be compared and explained in order to define possible causes 
of similarities and variations?  
In finding answers to the above mentioned principal questions of the 
research a number of related aspects of civil service reform preparation and 
implementation will need to be clarified, in particular: a) Who or what initiates 
reform and why?; b) What are the dimensions of reform?; c) What is the extent of 
external influence?; d) What are the differences and similarities in launching and 
implementing reform?;    
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The research also aims to contribute to the debate of why some post-
communist countries made notable advance in reforming their state administrations 
while others have been delaying these reforms or putting them on hold. 
The composition of the thesis is determined by its objectives and research 
questions as well as by the selected methodological approach. The first chapter 
introduces the reader into the topic, explains the selection of cases, defines the 
structure of the thesis and research questions. The second chapter provides an 
overview of the theoretical and methodological basis of research. The third and the 
fourth chapters comprise an analysis of the Russian civil service system and reform 
of the Russian civil service respectively. The fifth and the sixth chapters offer a 
similar analysis of the Czech civil service system and reform of the Czech civil 
service. Country specific chapters are structured to a common format to facilitate 
comparison. The seventh chapter compares selected features of the Russian and 
Czech civil service systems in line with the internationally recognized protocol for 
comparative studies. The main objective of the eighth chapter is to draw together the 
findings of the previous chapters, to carry out comparison and to make on that basis 
certain conclusions. The ninth chapter summarizes principal results and inferences of 
the research, matching them against original assumptions and hypotheses as well as 
against developed theoretical approaches and propositions. Each chapter begins with 
a short introduction and ends with a brief conclusion. 
The analysis focuses both on a 10-year period since the fall of communist 
regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and on recent events linked to the reform of 
civil service systems in both Russia and the Czech Republic to the extent latest 
information is available.  
 
1.5  Sources of Information/Data and Related Constraints  
  
Apart from traditional sources of data – various studies, monographs, 
analytical reports on the status of public administration and civil service, relevant 
legislation and other normative regulation - the author also used interviews with the 
Russian and Czech high and middle ranking civil servants, politicians and experts. 
The interviews were carried out by independent foreign and local consultants and 
also by the author at conferences, workshops, at specially organized meetings in 
Russia and during his numerous visits to the Czech Republic.   
For the purpose of this research the findings of sociological studies, surveys 
and opinion polls have also been widely used. The author conducted a special 
standardized structured interview of Russian civil servants similar to the one made in 
the Czech Republic by a group of scholars within the framework of  the Civil Service 
Research Project funded by CERGE-EI (a think tank affiliated to Charles University, 
Prague).   
In spite of recent improvements, there still exists a shortage of reliable 
statistical data on the civil services in both countries. As a rule, information available 
from the various sources is incomplete and conflicting. Therefore in many cases 
presented data serve the purpose of outlining only general dimensions and 
highlighting prominent cases. “…Despite the heroic efforts of organisations such as 
the OECD, there are still many issues for which relevant data are either non existent, 
of doubtful reliability, or of doubtful comparability” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004:21). 
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One of the difficulties faced by the author was the fact that preparation of 
civil service reforms in Russia and the Czech Republic took much more time than 
originally anticipated. The actual start of reforms occurred several years after this 
research was launched. The author considered that analysis of only the preparatory 
stage of reforms would be detrimental to the overall quality of the study and 
prolonged the work sufficient to see the initial results of the reforms to emerge.    
Another constraint consisted in different, often contradictory understanding 
of the terms “public administration reform” and “civil service reform” in the 
countries concerned. For example, throughout the 1990s public administration 
reform in the Czech Republic was perceived exclusively as reform of the regional 
and local government.  
For pragmatic reasons the analysis was focused mainly on the central 
government level of the Russian and Czech civil services, although attention to 
various levels of regional government was drawn whenever it was considered to be 
appropriate. Major findings and inferences of the research were included in various 
publications written by the author in course of preparation of the thesis.   
In the absence of a universally acknowledged methodological approach to 
the comparative analysis of civil service reforms much attention has been paid to the 
identification of the proper theoretical basis of the research and the selection of 
appropriate methodological tools. This search led the author to join an international 
team of researchers from various countries led by academics and experts from 
Leiden (the Netherlands) and Indiana (USA) Universities. This team/consortium 
designed a Protocol for comparative studies of national civil service systems. The 
protocol constitutes a common methodological platform (framework) for making 
meaningful comparisons of these systems across different nations. The key elements 
of this framework were presented in the publication edited by Bekke, Perry and 
Toonen “Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective” (1996).      
The members of the research consortium initiated a number of comparative 
studies resulting in a series of publications (issued in the late 1990s to the early 
2000s) on the comparison of civil service systems in Northern America, Western 
Europe, Central and Eastern Europe and Asia. The author took active part in the 
preparation and co-edited one of these publications “Civil Service Systems in Central 
and Eastern Europe”. Involvement in this common undertaking served as a source of 
inspiration for continuation of these activities and encouraged the author to start 
writing this book.  Therefore, this study may be viewed as continuation of a broader 
research project. 
The author hopes that apart from pure academic interest, the presented work 
will also have certain practical significance in particular for those who design and 
manage civil service reforms in the post-communist countries and elsewhere.  
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CHAPTER II  
COMPARISON OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS:  ISSUES OF 
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
2.1    Introduction 
 
  This chapter provides an overview of the theoretical basis of the research and 
defines methodological instruments which are applied to reach its objectives. The 
first part of the chapter is devoted to the analysis of modern theoretical and 
methodological approaches to comparative public administration. It starts with the 
review of the current stage of development of the administrative science. This is 
followed by the study of methodological concepts and tools that are applied in the 
research of public administration.  
    We proceed further with the examination of the peculiarities of comparative 
studies, focusing on constraints and difficulties related to such studies in particular 
in public administration.  We explain the choice of institutional concept and 
approach as the principal methodological tool. The relevance of institutional 
analysis is emphasized, underlining the significant role of formal and informal 
institutions (rules, norms, traditions, behavioral patterns) in enabling or constraining 
policy formulation and implementation. Subsequently, we highlight the usefulness 
of the Protocol for comparative studies of national civil service systems (designed in 
the mid 1990s by a group of mainly Dutch and American scholars) as a 
methodological platform and principal framework for our comparative research and 
determine a list of potential variables.  
  The second part of the chapter starts with a summary of contemporary views 
on civil service reform. Existing opinions on reform dimensions and outcomes are 
reviewed and administrative reform processes in the Central and Eastern European 
region are considered in terms of their main specific features. Then we outline a 
rationale for the selection of key topics and structure of the study and explain the 
chosen model of analysis.  
    The chapter ends with a list of definitions of basic terms widely used in the 
research and a number of hypotheses and assertions stemming from the preliminary 
analysis.    
 
 
2.2  Theoretical and Methodological Approaches in Comparative         
Public Administration   
        
2.2.1   Administrative Science – Status and Prospects 
 The overall objective of this research is to study and compare civil service 
reforms in two selected countries. Setting this objective does not automatically mean 
acknowledgment of the existence of developed civil service systems in the above 
mentioned countries. Rather it encourages search for arguments that would either 
confirm or reject this assumption.  
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Civil service is a complex and multifunctional social institution and 
therefore can be studied from the point of view of various sciences - political 
science, sociology, law, psychology, history, management science etc. depending on 
a particular objective and subject of research as well as viewpoint taken.   
However it is widely acknowledged that a comprehensive study of civil 
service systems is carried out primarily within the framework of a scientific 
discipline named public administration science or administrative science. The 
maturity of this science is sometimes questioned. This can be explained by failure so 
far to develop a sound conceptual framework accommodating the diversity of 
phenomena related to present day administrative process and transformation, and 
elaborate effective theoretical approaches for empirical country based or cross 
national analysis of administrative systems. Hence one may find statements that 
traditional public administration could not withstand new challenges and therefore 
“has been discredited theoretically and practically” (Hughes, 1994: 15). This led 
some authors to claim that public administration science experiences an 'identity 
crisis', the field lacks 'discipline'..." Rutgers points out that there are scholars who 
argue that "in order to become a respected field or discipline, the study of public 
administration should (re)gain an underlying coherence by means of a shared, 
generally accepted unifying paradigm" (Rutgers, 1998:8). In connection with this "a 
universal theory of public management will have to wait" (Peters, 1996: 19). 
At the same time there exists a view that public administration will or 
should never be an integrated discipline. Reference is often made to the difficulty of 
establishing a standard paradigm "in a field that continued to value diversity rather 
than orthodoxy" (Heady, 1998: 34). Others reckon that the best way for 
administrative science to be useful for both academia and practitioners is “to 
develop differentiated integration” (Raadschelders, Rutgers, 2001: 15). In other 
words public administration should be perceived as “a multi-or interdisciplinary 
study that aims for differentiated integration of knowledge and that serves to provide 
a comprehensive view of government for all those that labor in the real world…” 
(Raadschelders, Rutgers, 2001: 3). 
Looking at the problem from somewhat different angle it is difficult not to 
agree with the same authors that “the study of Public Administration is healthy, for 
it does not turn away from continuously raising fundamental questions about its 
identity” (Raadschelders, Rutgers, 2001: 2).   
 
 
2.2.2  Developing Methodological Approaches in Administrative Research  
Research methodology, broadly interpreted, encompasses various stages of 
the research process, and may be defined as the “system of explicit rules and 
procedures upon which research is based and against which claims for knowledge 
are evaluated” (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1982: 15). 
There have been numerous attempts to develop a methodological and 
theoretical framework for public administration research. Some of these attempts are 
considered to have made notable advances in separate directions, but none is 
acknowledged as having a universal value. Diversity and pluralism of applied 
research concepts continues to be a typical feature of administrative science. 
Viewed from a historical perspective the development of research in public 
administration, at least in the recent four decades, is often presented as a shift from a 
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‘traditional’ approach (focus on organisation) to 'neo-organisational' approach (with 
more attention to policy analysis and decision-making) and then to ‘neo-
institutional’ approach (with considerable accent on path dependency and role of 
institutional setting).  
In view of existing difficulties in creating a theoretical framework for 
public administration research, the idea of "searching at this stage for thicker and 
more useful descriptive statements about systems with the hope of producing first 
some descriptive generalizations and then perhaps science" (Peters, 1996: 33) 
appears sensible. Ideally these generalizations should be practice and comparison 
oriented i.e. they should give us some insight into “what works and what is best” 
(Peters, 1996: 33).  
Furthermore, "...studying processes of change in several, individual 
countries in order to discover similarities and differences" may "give us elements for 
basic theory - building" (Bekke, 1999: 12). It may turn out that instead of a single, 
general theory on civil service systems on a high level of abstraction we will need 
"...several theories either directed to special aspects or single basic problems or built 
for separated collections of countries of the same kind" (Bekke, 1999: 12). 
The appropriateness of going beyond structure and elements of civil service 
systems in question to incorporate their historical evolution and interface with the 
political system and other social systems and institutions has recently become more 
obvious. "Clearly there is something to be gained by a particular focus on 
administration, but we also need something of the big picture of the total system of 
politics and government" (Peters,1996: 29).  
In connection with this Bekke stresses that "comparative research on civil 
service systems needs a strong link with both political theory and theories of societal 
structure and development" (Bekke, 1999: 11). For understanding why these 
differences and similarities exist, “we need to search for explanatory factors, not 
only directly given from within civil service systems as such, but also - and probably 
mainly - derived from the political and societal environment of the civil service 
systems in question" (ibid).  
Speaking about the specific research methods in studying the development 
and transformation of civil service systems Bekke concludes "... we have to work 
mainly by inductive methodology, that is by studying processes of change in 
several, individual countries in order to discover similarities and differences" 
(Bekke, 1999: 11). 
The inductive method relies heavily on descriptive data about actual 
situations and behaviour. It presupposes advance from specific observation to 
identify differences and commonalities leading to explanations and interpretations. 
The process concludes with generalizations explaining relationships among units 
observed.   
 Similarly Rutgers points to the existence of two methodological approaches 
in comparative research - quantitative and interpretative (Rutgers, 2004: 153). 
 The present research rests largely within the boundaries of macro-level of 
comparative analysis where our attention is focused primarily on the connectedness 
of administrative institutions to other political and social institutions in society. 
Micro-level analysis where the principal accent is placed on the individual public 
servant is applied occasionally wherever appropriate.  
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One of the frequently used methods of conducting specific comparative 
analysis of administrative systems pre-supposes application of typologies. The 
following typologies are usually singled out:  
- Ideal types (Weber's ideal type model often taken as a starting point);  
- Configuration analysis (Heady, Morgan);  
- Theoretical case study (Peters); 
The development of typologies (ideal types) may be helpful in setting "a 
standard against which the real world can be compared" (Peters, 1996: 29). Heady 
defines comparative studies of public bureaucracies based to a considerable extent 
on Max Weber's ideal-type model of bureaucracy as "the most utilized and the most 
frequently preferred alternative among the available frameworks for study..." 
(Heady, 1998: 34). However, many scholars share the view that this method does 
not help to identify the dynamics of change in social systems.  
One of the well known typological frameworks for the comparative cross-
country analysis of civil service systems was designed by Heady. In essence he 
developed a conceptual configuration that seeks to identify commonly occurring 
clusters of civil service system attributes. Heady introduced three sets of criteria - 
relation to the political regime, focus for personnel management and qualification 
requirements as central for defining the overall character of the system. Heady 
admitted also that he did not consider his set of configurations either ultimate or 
comprehensive. In our view, the research built on typologies and ideal types can be 
complimentary to our mainstream methodological approach.  
 
 
2.2.3   Comparative Studies in Public Administration  
Comparative research is one of the most general and commonly used 
strategies in the social sciences. “Comparison is the only laboratory open to most 
social scientists…” (Peters, 1996: 15). It involves examination of several similar 
units of analysis, taken as a rule in various environmental and historical contexts, in 
order to identify common and unique features inherent to them.  
 As a rule the comparative method enables:  
- to formulate and test hypotheses;  
- to improve classifications;  
- to prescribe the future. 
By focusing on patterns of administrative activities and the characteristics 
of the systems performing them, comparative research extends our understanding of 
conditions conducive to successful or unsuccessful administrative performance. It is 
not surprising, therefore that “the comparative approach is inherently inclined to 
center on administrative reform and capacity building” (Jreisat, 2002: 2).  
The authors of ‘Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective’ single 
out three basic objectives of comparative research on civil service systems – 1) 
identification of key concepts, of relations among concepts, and of the underlying 
logic or dynamic of the relations; 2) development of better understanding of 
historical evolution of civil service systems; 3) enhancement of policymakers’ 
capacity to design civil service systems (Bekke, Perry, Toonen, eds. 1996: 7-8). 
In spite of generally high interest and demand for comparative research, 
"the number of genuinely comparative studies of public service systems remains 
small" (Raadschelders, 1998: 160). To a considerable extent such a situation can be 
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explained by the difficulties and problems encountered by scholars and practitioners 
in undertaking comparative research. They appear to face several problems and 
challenges. Among those difficulties (some already mentioned above) are:   
a)  lack of reliable and more or less precise data;  
b)  absence of universal theoretical approach;  
c) still limited number of genuine comparative studies and a generally 
fragmented nature of their findings.   
With regard to the variety of intellectual problems that comparative public 
administration faces, Peters writes that “we have not had the data bases nor the 
agreed upon conceptualisations necessary for more empirical work…” (Peters, 1996: 
16). Among other constraints faced by comparative researchers he distinguishes 
(ibid):  
a) absence of a single universally acknowledged agreement as to the 
meaning and contents of some key term and concepts, for instance 
“bureaucracy”;  
b)  lack of accepted and easily operationalizable dependent variables;  
c)   problems associated with levels of analysis.  
One of the difficulties of quantitative approaches in comparative research is 
that data on civil service systems are usually "dirty" and incomplete (McGregor & 
Solano, 1996: 43). Heady emphasizes that "... a sweeping comparison across 
national boundaries requires some organizing concept to avoid burial under an 
avalanche of data about a multitude of diverse administrative systems”. (Heady, 
1984: 60). In his view bureaucracy provides such an organizing concept.  
Another problem of comparative studies is that of “translation” singled out 
in particular by Rutgers. He argues that in order to ensure relevant comparison the 
researcher can either try to understand and capture the authentic or local meaning of 
social reality in another place, or may develop his own concepts to apply as criteria 
of this reality (Rutgers, 2004).  
In spite of all these difficulties we can witness a growing recognition that 
comparative public administration is a distinct field of research (Heady 1998, 
Drengsgaard 2003, Pollitt & Bouchaert, 2004). 
Summing up that "comparative empirical research on civil service systems 
requires methodological pluralism" we concur with one of the conclusions made in 
the book “Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective” that because of 
proven "...embeddedness of civil service systems within broader administrative, 
political and social systems... close observation of behaviour within context rather 
than survey analysis would be an appropriate research strategy" (Bekke, Perry, 
Toonen eds. 1996:  326).   
The same method but named differently is advocated by Hague who singles 
out three main techniques in the comparative research applied in particular by 
political scientists: case studies, statistical analysis and focused comparisons. The 
latter (in essence close observation of behavior – A.K.) "...has the strengths of both 
the other techniques but the weaknesses of neither."(Hague, 1992: 39).   
 In order to proceed further in our comparative research we need to adopt a 
framework that would allow systematic comparison between the two civil service 
systems and help deal with most of the difficulties linked with comparative studies 
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(referred to above). For that we turn to the institutional theory and approach and try 
to determine its appropriateness for our study. 
 
 
2.2.4   Institutional Concept and Institutional Approach 
Recent decades have witnessed broad acceptance of the institutional 
approach and method as principal tools in empirical research (including 
comparative) and theory building in the administrative science. The current period 
of development of public administration theory is therefore often referred to as a 
period of 'neo-institutionalism'.  
It is widely acknowledged that the dynamics of institutional and 
administrative transformation are linked to changes in the political, economic, social 
and legal environments in which public institutions operate and on whose material 
and non-material inputs they largely depend. "In many ways, civil service systems 
are shaped and stabilized by formal or informal norms and values, historically 
developed and adapted to particular societal experiences and beliefs" (Bekke, 1999: 
4). 
Proceeding from the name of the concept one may conclude that its primary 
focus is on institutions. More precisely, the concept gives at least as much attention 
to the institutional foundations of administrative developments as to individual 
action. The present day “institutionalism” is “new” because it provides a broader 
vision of institutions which includes apart from organisations proper also ideas, 
values and norms. The “new” approach overcomes opposition between institutional 
and actor-centred explanations and rather aims at defining the role and “weight” of 
institutions and actors in explaining administrative changes.  
In essence the institutional approach regards existing institutional 
configurations as independent explanatory variables in the analysis of political 
processes and institutional development. Hence, the process of institutional change 
is considered to be to a large extent affected by endogenous institutional dynamics 
of the existing institutional architecture. 
As far as study of administrative changes is concerned Pollitt and 
Bouckaert consider that “in the field of public management reform the broader 
forces of economics and politics are almost always mediated through networks of 
institutions. The specific characteristics of these networks, and of the individual 
institutions that compose them, frequently have a profound shaping effect upon what 
actually happens during the course of reform, and therefore upon the final results 
and outcomes of the change process ” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004: 23).   
Another approach, sometimes termed “agency based”, defines human 
action as the main explanatory factor in institutional change, while institutions are 
viewed as intervening rather than determining variables. Pollitt and Bouckaert 
emphasize “we acknowledge the frequent constraining importance of path 
dependency, but also repeatedly stress the role of agency and choice” (ibid).      
 In view of this some authors (e.g. Goetz) argue that application of neo-
institutional approaches for understanding post-communist governance has some 
limitations. Goetz points to “typicality of ‘actor centered institutionalism’ in post-
communist governance” where he asserts “individuals often come first, institutions 
second”. In the centre of this approach he places the process of elite decision making 
(Goetz, 1999: 26).  
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Occasionally this may be true, particularly at times when various 
institutions have not yet reached a sufficient level of maturity. However, it is our 
belief that even in societies undergoing drastic transformation, policies of change or 
conservation are seriously institutions bound. Politicians and decision makers, who 
consistently pursue policies that are in conflict with requirements imposed by the 
existing institutional framework, sooner or later have to either adapt or go. “Path 
dependency limits the potential role of leadership as it “carves” the institutional 
niche, which becomes especially clear when changing conditions demand a change 
of course” (Boin, Christensen, 2004: 9).  
The same authors continue: “The path dependent nature of 
institutionalization is reinforced by the strong influence that institutionalized 
organizations can (and usually do) exert on individuals. People are, in principle, free 
to choose the public organization they want to work for, but once they are part of an 
institution they will feel a strong socializing pressure not only to learn and act within 
the formal structures, rules and roles but also to participate in creating or 
internalizing the informal norms and values” (ibid). 
There have been also attempts to combine various methodological 
approaches, or at least to reduce their actual or virtual differences. For example, 
Toonen proposed to adapt public choice, network analysis and institutional analysis. 
For that he made use of a meta-theoretical framework developed by Kaser and 
Ostrom in order to identify different approaches and forms of institutional analysis. 
This framework presupposes the existence of three zones of actions; (1) operational 
choice, (2) collective choice and (3) constitutional choice. This differentiation was 
further developed and directly applied to the study of civil service systems in the 
publication “Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective” edited by Bekke, 
Perry, Toonen (1996). Toonen asserts that this model "...represents an organizational 
frame for arranging various theoretical ways of looking at a given subject matter" 
(Toonen, 1998: 235).  
As the contributors to the above mentioned publication emphasize, and we 
concur, the institutional perspective presupposes acknowledgment of the persistence 
of rules, roles, behavioral patterns over time (Bekke, Perry, Toonen, eds. 1996:3). In 
other words it assigns an important role to the concept of path dependency.  The 
contents of the latter term is variously interpreted, but many agree that it embraces a 
comparative historical approach. For instance Raadschelders views the path 
dependency concept as the one providing "...the necessary dynamic angle to an 
otherwise static analysis of institutions". According to Raadschelders the term path 
dependency "captures ... (1) the historical notions of continuity, diversity and 
change; (2) the historians' sensitivity to time and context; (3) the social scientists’ 
preference for modelling and prediction" (Raadschelders, 1998: 570). Peters in his 
turn points out that methods of effective research on civil service systems should 
draw more from anthropology than from conventional social science (Peters, 
1996:326).  
Central to the institutional approach and broadly used in this context is the 
concept of institutionalisation - meaning formation, development, transformation 
and reform of civil service systems. "For many, institutional analysis in social 
sciences implies the notion of systems ruled by norms, culture and traditions rather 
than by organisational goals and rational perspectives." (Bekke, 1999: 3). 
 For the purpose of this research, the term 'institutionalisation' denotes the 
dynamics of the systemic change that is firmly 'embedded' in an environment of 
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social institutions (Bekke 1999: 14). The infrastructure of social institutions consists 
of particular institutions created in the past. This institutional environment restricts 
the 'portfolio' of possible decisions that political actors can make, whilst it also 
empowers them to make certain decisions.  
Administrative science literature, empirical studies and experts’ opinion 
provide sufficient evidence that success or failure of reform strategies in industrially 
developed countries is largely determined by a combination of institutional and 
leadership factors.   
In the political and administrative science the issue of “whether the primary 
explanation for the governmental performance is to be found in organizations and 
structures or in people” (Aberbach & Rockman, 1992:145) has been long debated. 
Recently there appeared a tendency to take a compromise perspective upon this 
question. The same authors assert “We cannot solve the organizations versus people 
problem other than to recognize the importance of each, and their interdependence” 
(ibid). 
 
2.2.5   Protocol for Comparative Studies 
In the mid 1990s an international team of researchers from various 
countries led by academics and experts from Leiden (the Netherlands) and Indiana 
(USA) Universities designed a Protocol (guidelines) for comparative studies of 
national civil service systems. The Protocol constituted a common methodological 
platform (framework) for making meaningful comparisons of these systems across a 
number of nations. The key elements of this framework were later presented in the 
publication edited by Bekke, Perry and Toonen “Civil Service Systems in 
Comparative Perspective”.   
The protocol regards civil service systems above all from the two main 
perspectives: performance and legitimacy. The general dissatisfaction with the state 
of affairs regarding these two aspects was the main driver for launching civil service 
reform in many countries in recent years. As the authors of the protocol correctly 
emphasize – no matter what type of reform has been implemented or attempted, and 
no matter in what political, economic and social context, civil service reform in 
general aims at improving performance of the civil service and the legitimacy of 
government action.  
In compliance with institutional concept and principles of institutional 
analysis the protocol aimed to find answers to the following main questions:  
- what social and legal rules determine the character of a civil service system; 
- what is the origin of these rules; 
- why the persist or change  
 To a considerable extent the research strategy and framework of this 
protocol determines the overall methodological approach to our study. The protocol 
serves as the base, which has been complemented and modified further for the 
purposes of our research. Our selection of topics for comparative analysis largely 
draws upon the contents and guidelines of this research protocol. The protocol 
defined the following topics, information on which needs to be collected and 
suitably processed to ensure appropriate analysis of single country cases:  
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Development of the Civil Service (history) with particular emphasis on the impact of 
changes in environment (political, economic, cultural, demographic and other) on 
the development of state administration;  
 
Internal Labour Market with special focus on identifying and understanding the 
rules which govern issues of civil servants’ entry, conditions of employment, reward 
mechanism, re-training etc; 
 
Representativeness with special attention to the extent to which particular groups of 
civil servants represent various categories of the population and act as advocates of 
various interest groups;  
 
Politicisation with particular stress laid upon interdependence existing between the 
political and administrative systems and degree of “clientelism” of civil servants in 
relation to the political elite and various lobbies; 
 
Public Opinion with particular accent on the prevailing general perception of the 
civil service and civil servants in the society;  
 
Reform and Diffusion - this aspect is central to our research and therefore deserves 
more attention. The Protocol for comparative studies of national civil service 
systems draws attention to the following three interrelated questions:   
 
o Who or what initiates reform and why? - with a particular emphasis on;  
Which is the dominant tradition (governance or management)? 
Which is the category of reform ( budgetary/financial, structural, 
procedural/technical, relational)? 
o What is the content of reform? - with a particular emphasis on; 
What are the specific objectives and outputs of reform that should be 
achieved?  
How are the objectives and outputs planned to be achieved?  
o Extent of external influence? - with a particular emphasis on; 
Borrowing of specific concept  
Borrowing of broad direction approach 
 
Apart from the mentioned above publication edited by Bekke, Perry and 
Toonen our study draws from contributions made by other prominent scholars in the 
field. In particular, “Public Management Reform. A Comparative Analysis“ by 
Pollitt and Bouckaert deserves in our opinion special attention in view of its high 
relevance to the objectives, substance and direction of our research.   
 
2.2.6  Significance of Historical Legacy, Traditions, Behavioral Patterns and 
Political Setting 
 Institutional analysis highlights the importance of interfaces between the 
strategies of the actors and the fundamental rules and norms that constrain or enable 
policy formulation and implementation. As we stated earlier institutions define and 
limit the set of choices available to policy-makers. However, this preposition does 
not rule out such factors as individual or collective human action.   
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 As far as institutions are concerned quite significant for our study are 
traditions and norms that have an impact on the contents and dynamics of changes 
within institutions and their environment.  Heady in connection with this writes that 
the behavioral tendencies in bureaucracies “are extremely significant and should be 
primary objects for analysis and comparison” (Heady, 2001:75).  
 The existing norms, behaviour patterns and traditions do not come from 
nowhere. They are the product of historical development. Institutions, and hence 
civil service systems, may be regarded as “…a more or less coherent and enduring 
whole made up of norms and values that have developed and persisted over time”. 
(Raadschelders and Rutgers, 1996: 68). Therefore it is hard to disagree with a view 
that “…historical perspective should be a standard element in all of the sub-fields in 
public administration” (Raadschelders, 2003: 162). 
 As we outlined above one of the best tools for “catching” the “right” 
historical perspective is the concept “path dependency”. Applied to the study of 
administrative institutions, the notion of path dependency helps ‘explaining patterns 
of institutional emergence, persistence and change’ (Pierson 2000: 256). For many 
years the path dependency concept was associated mainly with the study of 
resistance of institutions to change and persisting continuity within policy 
formulation.  
Our understanding of the path dependency concept has been recently 
expanded, in particular by Raadschelders. He argues that tradition thus far has been 
perceived mainly as inheritance, whereas much less attention has been given to the 
influence of tradition as creation or invention (Raadschelders, 2007:9). In other 
words tradition, in his view, may be regarded not only as a force of conservation, but 
also as a source of innovation. “It might very well be that tradition stifles change in 
one case, while, at the same time, it leads to change in another” (Raadschelders, 
2007: 10). 
No less important for our study are relationships between an administrative 
system and politics. Jones and Kettl observe “Politics lies at the core of management 
reform, not vice versa”. They suggest that we need to pay much more attention to 
the interaction of political/electoral institutions and administrative institutions and 
reforms (Jones & Kettl, 2004:463). Pollitt and Bouckaert argue that “public 
management is always a part of the broader agenda of public governance”. They 
advocate the idea of “integrating the study of management change with an analysis 
of political systems and contexts” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004:2). 
 In general it can be said that “the civil service system, as a system, shares 
some of the properties of the government and political regime as a whole, and that 
the government and political regime in turn share some attributes of the surrounding 
society, economy, and culture” (Peters, 1996:21). Hence, “…comparative public 
administration is linked closely to the study of comparative politics, and must start 
from the base provided by recent and current developments in the comparative study 
of whole political systems” (Heady, 2001:7).  
 Existing political and administrative systems exert significant influence on 
the process of reform and change, in particular on the adoption of certain reform 
ideas and strategies and feasibility of achieving reform objectives. “It is in these 
linkages and relationships between administrative systems and their contexts that we 
may be able to identify key factors that explain why there has been no great 
administrative reform accomplishments in many developing countries despite 
repeated attempts” (Jreisat, 2002:66).  
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In this connection the authors of a recent study argue that “CSS (civil 
service system – A.K.) needs to be considered in relation to its immediate 
institutional/organizational environment: the political system and its office holders” 
(Raadschelders, Meer & Toonen, 2007).  
Taking into consideration potential factors which may affect administrative 
change, Pollitt and Bouckaert identify five key elements that form the basis for 
comparing administrative systems and reforms:  
1. The state structure (including constitution); 
2. The nature of executive government at the central level (includes the nature 
of the political system); 
3. Relationship between political executives and top civil servants;  
4. The dominant administrative culture; 
5. Diversity among the main channels through which the ideas that fuel public 
management reform emerge. 
 Subsequently they define some basic dimensions of these key elements. 
With regard to: (1) state structure these dimensions are vertical dispersion of 
authority and horizontal coordination at central government level; (2) nature of 
executive government at central level the range is between ‘majoritarian’ and 
‘consensual’; (3) minister/mandarin relations these are ‘kind of bargain or deal’ 
existing between top politicians and top civil servants and the ‘extent of 
politicization of top bureaucrats’; (4) administrative culture consideration is given to 
two models - ‘Rechtsstaat’ and ‘Anglo-Saxon’ - plus intermediate models; (5) 
sources of advice concerning contents and strategy of reform, the variance may be in 
the range and diversity of these sources (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004:40). 
 As far as scenarios of reform or reform strategy are concerned they should 
comprise at least three elements: a) a vision of the desired future; b) analysis of the 
existing situation; and c) chain of measures or events in the direction of the desired 
future. The authors also point out that “fully worked out scenarios, with each of the 
three main elements clearly analyzed and described, are definitely the exception 
rather than the rule in public management reform” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004:66).  
Pollitt and Bouckaert also define three aspects of reform implementation: 
- the extent to which reform has been a top down or bottom up experience; 
- the extent to which new organizations and structures have been created 
specifically to advance reform; 
- the intensity of reform, that is, have governments barged ahead, trampling 
opposition underfoot, or have they tiptoed delicately, consulting and 
cooperating with the other stakeholders (such as public service unions) as 
they go? ((Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004:94). 
 
 Proceeding from the overview made above and the adopted institutional 
approach we can make preliminary conclusions set out in the following section as 
far as structure, priority topics and variables of the research are concerned.   
 
2.2.7   Defining Variables and Structure of the Study  
 Taking into account the above overview and the guidelines contained in the 
Protocol for comparative studies we may conclude that important for us variables 
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should be linked to the political, economic, social and legal environment of a civil 
service system, existing institutional arrangements (in their retrospective 
development) and historical legacy. Within these areas our special attention is drawn 
to rules, norms and traditions, as well as to political-administrative relations.  
 Therefore, a number of key variables could be identified in exploring such 
crucial characteristics as civil service reform capacity. The latter reflects in our view 
the prime parameter of the subject of the study and will help answer the key research 
questions and sub-questions - “…Whatever type of reform may be desired, not every 
country has an equal capacity to implement new arrangements in a coherent, broad 
scope way” (Manning & Parrison, 2003:4).   
 Civil service reform capacity can be defined as the ability and potential to 
launch and successfully implement civil service reform.  
 This capacity is largely determined by: a) existing formal and informal 
institutions and type of relationship between them, which can either constrain or 
facilitate reforms (including rules, norms, traditions, values and patterns of 
administrative behavior); b) collective or individual human action (willingness and 
readiness of the key agents – policy makers and stakeholders - to undertake action in 
the desired direction); and c) resources available (funds and expertise).  
 Study of civil service reform capacity may provide information on 
assessing existing potential for reform but is generally less helpful in assessing 
actual implementation of reform.   
 Rational judgments concerning the progress of reform implementation and 
the variables affecting this process can be made if reform results are matched 
against initial plans and intentions.  
 Finally, the degree of similarity and variance in the design and 
implementation of civil service reforms and subsequent conclusions as to the causes 
of their (relative) success or failure can be derived from the comparison proper of 
civil service reforms’ capacities, the reforms’ contents (dimensions), up-to-date 
results, related institutional settings (framework), internal or external pressure and 
leadership factor.   
In this connection we define our model of analysis as consistent exploration 
of capacities for civil service reform in each of the countries concerned, followed by 
the analysis of the extent to which the reform plans and intentions have been 
realized, and then finalized by the comparison of similarities and differences in 
reform preparation and implementation, which will allow define explanatory factors 
and answer research question and sub-questions. 
 The choice of the institutional concept as the methodological base of the 
study and our model of analysis determines the overall structure of the research. It 
incorporates three major themes and their respective key elements (as pointed out 
below) which are addressed in separate clusters of chapters of this research.  
 
 1. CIVIL SERVICE REFORM CAPACITY  
  
 Institutional framework – existing formal and informal institutions 
(combination/set of rules, norms, traditions, values and behavioral patterns) 
and historical legacy;  
 Collective or individual human action - willingness and readiness of the 
key agents –   policy makers and stakeholders to undertake action in the 
desired direction; 
 
 29
should be linked to the political, economic, social and legal environment of a civil 
service system, existing institutional arrangements (in their retrospective 
development) and historical legacy. Within these areas our special attention is drawn 
to rules, norms and traditions, as well as to political-administrative relations.  
 Therefore, a number of key variables could be identified in exploring such 
crucial characteristics as civil service reform capacity. The latter reflects in our view 
the prime parameter of the subject of the study and will help answer the key research 
questions and sub-questions - “…Whatever type of reform may be desired, not every 
country has an equal capacity to implement new arrangements in a coherent, broad 
scope way” (Manning & Parrison, 2003:4).   
 Civil service reform capacity can be defined as the ability and potential to 
launch and successfully implement civil service reform.  
 This capacity is largely determined by: a) existing formal and informal 
institutions and type of relationship between them, which can either constrain or 
facilitate reforms (including rules, norms, traditions, values and patterns of 
administrative behavior); b) collective or individual human action (willingness and 
readiness of the key agents – policy makers and stakeholders - to undertake action in 
the desired direction); and c) resources available (funds and expertise).  
 Study of civil service reform capacity may provide information on 
assessing existing potential for reform but is generally less helpful in assessing 
actual implementation of reform.   
 Rational judgments concerning the progress of reform implementation and 
the variables affecting this process can be made if reform results are matched 
against initial plans and intentions.  
 Finally, the degree of similarity and variance in the design and 
implementation of civil service reforms and subsequent conclusions as to the causes 
of their (relative) success or failure can be derived from the comparison proper of 
civil service reforms’ capacities, the reforms’ contents (dimensions), up-to-date 
results, related institutional settings (framework), internal or external pressure and 
leadership factor.   
In this connection we define our model of analysis as consistent exploration 
of capacities for civil service reform in each of the countries concerned, followed by 
the analysis of the extent to which the reform plans and intentions have been 
realized, and then finalized by the comparison of similarities and differences in 
reform preparation and implementation, which will allow define explanatory factors 
and answer research question and sub-questions. 
 The choice of the institutional concept as the methodological base of the 
study and our model of analysis determines the overall structure of the research. It 
incorporates three major themes and their respective key elements (as pointed out 
below) which are addressed in separate clusters of chapters of this research.  
 
 1. CIVIL SERVICE REFORM CAPACITY  
  
 Institutional framework – existing formal and informal institutions 
(combination/set of rules, norms, traditions, values and behavioral patterns) 
and historical legacy;  
 Collective or individual human action - willingness and readiness of the 
key agents –   policy makers and stakeholders to undertake action in the 
desired direction; 
  30
 Resources available - funds and expertise. 
 
 Thus, in compliance with the institutional approach and respectively our 
model of analysis, we intend to devote priority attention to the study of formal and 
informal rules, norms, traditions, values, culture, behavioral patterns, historical 
legacy prevailing in state administrations of each of the countries concerned, 
complemented by the analysis of agency (leadership) related factors and available 
resources. Exploration of these factors will allow us make certain assessment of the 
capacity for civil service reform in the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic.  
 Respectively country specific chapters will comprise sections dealing in 
particular with historical development of the nationhood and national state 
administrations; existing constitutional and political framework; economic situation; 
legal status of the civil service; political-administrative relations; societal and 
bureaucratic traditions, values and culture; civil servants’ management and incentive 
mechanisms; ethical standards and accountability of state officials; their relations 
with civil society, etc. 
 
 2. CIVIL SERVICE REFORM IMPLEMENTATION  
 
 Who or what initiates reform and why - reform’s major stakeholders; 
dominant administrative tradition (governance or management); category 
of reform (budgetary/financial, structural, procedural/technical, relational); 
 Dimensions (contents) of reform -  objectives of reform and outputs 
expected; methods of achieving planned objectives; reform management 
and pace of reform; results achieved up to date;  
 Possible external influence - borrowing of specific concept; borrowing of 
broad direction approach. 
 
 In line with the guidelines of the Protocol for comparative studies and our 
methodology, chapters dealing with the issues of civil service reform 
implementation in Russia and the Czech Republic will incorporate analysis of such 
issues as the reforms’ driving forces and stakeholders (both internal and external); 
reforms’ dimensions and management; processes and mechanisms of reform 
advance, encountered problems and results achieved so far.   
 
 3. CIVIL SERVICE REFORM COMPARISON   
 
 Similarities and differences - in reform capacities, contents, preparation and 
implementation, achieved results (including comparison of key independent  
variables); 
 Possible explanatory factors (of differences and similarities);  
 Concluding remarks (findings correlated with hypothesis and research sub-
questions). 
 
 In order to reach the research objectives (in particular with regard to 
finding answers to the research main question and sub-questions) we will need to 
carry out a comparison of the reform capacities and dimensions, processes of reform 
preparation and implementation in the two selected countries and their current 
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outcomes. Therefore, two separate chapters will be devoted to identification of 
major similarities and differences in reform capacities and reform implementation 
(including their dynamics and achieved results) respectively. Matching impact of 
key variables on the process of civil service reform and administrative change in 
each of the two countries will lead us to certain explanatory factors and 
subsequently permit to substantiate major findings and conclusions.   
 With regard to selected variables we may at this point assert that they may 
be directly or indirectly linked to factors including: the character and essence of the 
political regime and development of political institutions; resoluteness of political 
leadership either to be a driving force of changes or support other stakeholders; type 
of relations between the policy makers and top civil servants; extent of domination 
of interest groups; prevailing behavioral patterns and informal norms and rules; 
maturity of civil society; extent of internal and external pressure; and available 
resources (funds, expertise and others).  
      We hold the view that in cases when the existing administrative culture 
remains hostile to the goals and spirit of reform and there are no committed reform 
stakeholders (or they are few and weak) then reform implementation tends to be 
formal and minimalist with no real changes to be achieved in practice. This we 
anticipate in differing degrees in both Russia and the Czech Republic. We also 
reckon that political leadership as well as internal and external pressure often exert a 
decisive impact on the pace of advance and results of civil service reform.  
  
 
2.3   Civil Service Reform: Definition, Dimensions, Problems 
 
2.3.1  Contemporary Views on Civil Service Reform  
The civil service system is one of the core concepts of public 
administration science and as such has been drawing increased attention of the 
scholarly community in recent years. Our knowledge of civil service systems is still 
very insufficient and fragmented. Civil services have attracted the interest of 
comparative research scholars especially in the 1960s. However, this research was 
soon largely abandoned mainly because of failure to develop a convincing theory 
and subsequent period of “crisis of confidence”. There has been little follow-up to 
the early comparativists’ efforts since then.    
For the purpose of this research it would be appropriate to distinguish 
between civil service as an “institution” and as an “organisation” (originally 
proposed by the 1993 Economics Nobel prize winner Douglas North). As an 
“institution” it means “a set of formal and informal rules”, as a public organisation it 
“emerges to administer and enforce these rules”. This distinction is essential for 
understanding the problems of the institutionalisation and transformation of civil 
service systems in CEE countries.  
Our understanding of civil service “membership” (cadres, personnel) 
encompasses career, appointed functionaries at both central and sub-national levels 
of government and excludes elected, political officeholders. Military personnel, 
except civilians working for the armed forces, are not part of the civil service either.    
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In dealing with issues of civil service reform we proceed from the 
definition of a civil service system as “mediating institution that mobilizes human 
resources in the service of the affairs of the state” given in the publication “Civil 
Service Systems in Comparative Perspective” edited by Bekke, Perry and Toonen.   
"In many ways, civil service systems are shaped and stabilized by formal or 
informal norms and values, historically developed and adapted to particular societal 
experiences and beliefs" (Bekke,1999: 4). Offe argues that in those cases where 
institutional norms, embedded in specific organizational arrangements, deviate 
permanently and substantially from those held by people acting within an institution, 
institutionalization is precarious (Offe, 1996: 212). This means that although new 
institutions may be in place, they do not necessarily always perform the role 
assigned to them from the very beginning and sometimes have a counter productive 
effect.  
In reviewing modern theories and views on civil service reform we can not 
bypass two leading publications on the subject – “Civil Service Systems in 
Comparative Perspective” edited by Bekke, Perry and Toonen,  and “Public 
Management Reform. A Comparative Analysis” by Pollitt and Bouckaert. Both 
publications explore a set of key issues and themes related to public management 
reforms and make a fair contribution to further elaboration of methodological tools 
for comparing administrative systems.  
 In studying various aspects of civil service reform we start with the  
definition of public management reform as “deliberate changes to the structures and 
processes of public sector organizations with the objective of getting them to 
perform better” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004:16).  
It is generally recognized that the last two decades (at least) have seen 
waves of administrative and civil service reforms spreading across many 
industrialized and less industrialized nations in the world. Many prominent scholars 
in the field have argued that constraints, contradictions, limitations are already in-
built in practically any public administration reform initiative even before the reform 
actually starts. “It would be inadequate to conceive of reforms as simply a string of 
connected actions. If they are to be understood then they must also be considered as 
processes of debate to which different participants may bring, first, different 
objectives (including achievement of symbolic purposes) and, second, different 
frameworks and standards for identifying and accepting relevant ‘evidence’. (Pollitt 
& Bouckaert, 2004:16). 
In their study Pollitt and Bouckaert propose a model of reform meant to 
show a complex of factors (variables) that may influence (drive or constrain) public 
management reform and change. These factors are grouped into clusters depending 
on their relation to:  
- socio-economic and demographic forces; 
- political and intellectual trends; 
- elite decision making; 
- chance events;  
- administrative factors. 
 Pollitt and Bouckaert deliberately place the process of elite decision 
making at the centre of their model of public management reform. In their view 
“most of the changes we are concerned with have been predominantly ‘top down’ in 
the sense of having been conceived and executed by executive politicians and/or 
senior civil servants” and therefore being “essentially voluntaristic activities”. At the 
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same time the authors admit that the elites “may be heavily influenced by ideas and 
pressures from elsewhere and, furthermore, their plans may be blown off” (Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2004:26).   
Some comments made by the authors deserve special attention. First, “it is 
the exception rather than the rule for reform schemes to be comprehensive, even in 
intent”. Second, “it is easy to exaggerate the degree of intentionality in many 
reforms” (ibid). The second point is explained by Goodin who states “Institutions 
are often the product of intentional activities gone wrong – unintended by-products, 
the products of various intentional actions cutting across one another, misdirected 
intentions or just plain mistakes” (Goodin, 1996:28). Another note worth 
observation in connection with study of reform is that “remedies imposed for 
perceived problems often generate new, and opposite problems” (Hesse, Hood, 
Peters, 2000:14).  
Some reforms are top down, some are bottom up. Some are designed to 
enhance state legitimacy, while others attempt to raise administrative efficiency. 
Some are cost cutting exercises, others are aimed at raising the quality of public 
services. With regard to various models of civil service reforms Pollitt and 
Bouckaert point to the limitations of discussing reform exclusively in terms of 
“more or less NPM ” (“new public management” – A.K.) ….there are alternative 
and positive concepts of modernization, one of which we describe as the “Neo-
Weberian State” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004:3). 
The same authors emphasize that “we need to pay attention to the 
legitimation aspects of management reforms. Simply announcing, discussing and 
beginning to implement reforms may bring benefits to some politicians and public 
servants, even if the later, more ‘substantive’ effects are elusive or 
counterproductive” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004: 25). Speaking about potential 
implications of management reforms and causes of resistance they note “well-oiled 
networks of information and influence are disturbed, and new, less certain ones put 
in their place. Politicians who were used to one configuration of authority within the 
state agency that most interested them now have to get used to a new pattern, and 
possibly one that will be more difficult for them to influence or communicate 
through.” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004:34).   
Reformist minded politicians need to make allowances for the strength of 
the forces of tradition, inertia and habit. In connection with this it is necessary to 
bear in mind that reform related rhetoric, decisions and actions frequently diverge. 
Proponents of the ‘path dependency’ theory proceed from the assumption that heavy 
investments made over decades in the existing institutions, rules and the ways of 
doing things usually create a huge disincentive for change (although there may be 
also opposite cases, see Raadschelders, 2007). Still there exist countries where 
reform was launched and implemented reaching if not all but at least some of the 
main objectives. At the same time there are countries where, in spite of intensive 
rhetoric, reforms have virtually changed little or even made things worse.  
Finally we would like to underline once again that civil service reform is 
widely recognized to be a highly political issue, which affects the balance of power 
between various actors. “What has become more and more obvious is the extreme 
importance of variation among political regimes as a major explanatory factor for 
variation among public bureaucracies…” (Heady, 2001:444). Successful reforms 
require both political commitment at the highest level and the capacity to 
concentrate and manage resources in order to implement and sustain reform. Civil 
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service reform is a complex process that does not easily achieve its objectives by 
specific deadlines.  
 
 
2.3.2   Civil Service Reform Dimensions and Outcomes  
Universally acknowledged “standards” with regard to the dimensions and 
basic elements of civil service system and civil service reform do not appear to exist.  
As stated earlier an appropriate definition of a civil service system is a “…mediating 
institution that mobilizes human resources in the service of the affairs of the state in 
a given territory” (Bekke, Perry, Toonen, eds. 1996:2). In the opinion of the authors 
of this definition the essence of a civil service system is determined by social and 
legal rules (i.e. prescribed behaviour as well as explicit and implicit norms) which 
tend to persist.    
Other approaches to defining dimensions of a civil service system and civil 
service reform comprise in particular:  
 
- People, structures, behaviour, power (Peters ); 
- Relation to the political regime, focus for personnel management and 
qualification requirements (Heady); 
- Relationship with policy-makers, internal organisational dynamics, and 
relationship with civil society (Pierre);  
- Rules, structures, roles and norms (Morgan,  Perry);  
- External pressure, internal dissatisfaction, reform strategy, mechanism 
for managing reform, feedback and evaluation (Les Metcalfe); 
- Interests, actors, resources and “administrative” traditions (Goetz). 
 
Civil service reform is an organic process, which can not be studied in 
isolation from its complex environment. At the same time civil service reforms are 
subject to the process of bargaining where the essence, clarity and scale of proposals 
as well as their objectives may be frequently lost or replaced.  
Often civil service reforms are part of broader development programmes 
(in particular, administrative reforms) and are closely related and interdependent 
with judicial, municipal, budgetary, regulatory reforms, re-organization of central 
government and others.  
 A number of important observations are worth mentioning in this respect.  
 Pollitt and Bouckaert highlight the complexity of the reform 
implementation process and point to numerous cases (becoming rather a rule than 
exception) of departures from the original plans of reform in course of their 
execution. Even when reform itself and its implementation are appropriate it may 
contradict or detract from other reforms that are being carried simultaneously (Pollitt 
& Bouckaert, 2004:36).   
 In the opinion of Toonen, the largest impact on variation in reforms is made 
by the following two separate dimensions: 
a)   Substance: different subject matter of reform (managerial reform; 
policy reform; institutional reform; regime reform) and  
b) Process: different modes or approaches to public sector reform 
(comprehensive, functionalist, gradualist reforms). 
 
 34
service reform is a complex process that does not easily achieve its objectives by 
specific deadlines.  
 
 
2.3.2   Civil Service Reform Dimensions and Outcomes  
Universally acknowledged “standards” with regard to the dimensions and 
basic elements of civil service system and civil service reform do not appear to exist.  
As stated earlier an appropriate definition of a civil service system is a “…mediating 
institution that mobilizes human resources in the service of the affairs of the state in 
a given territory” (Bekke, Perry, Toonen, eds. 1996:2). In the opinion of the authors 
of this definition the essence of a civil service system is determined by social and 
legal rules (i.e. prescribed behaviour as well as explicit and implicit norms) which 
tend to persist.    
Other approaches to defining dimensions of a civil service system and civil 
service reform comprise in particular:  
 
- People, structures, behaviour, power (Peters ); 
- Relation to the political regime, focus for personnel management and 
qualification requirements (Heady); 
- Relationship with policy-makers, internal organisational dynamics, and 
relationship with civil society (Pierre);  
- Rules, structures, roles and norms (Morgan,  Perry);  
- External pressure, internal dissatisfaction, reform strategy, mechanism 
for managing reform, feedback and evaluation (Les Metcalfe); 
- Interests, actors, resources and “administrative” traditions (Goetz). 
 
Civil service reform is an organic process, which can not be studied in 
isolation from its complex environment. At the same time civil service reforms are 
subject to the process of bargaining where the essence, clarity and scale of proposals 
as well as their objectives may be frequently lost or replaced.  
Often civil service reforms are part of broader development programmes 
(in particular, administrative reforms) and are closely related and interdependent 
with judicial, municipal, budgetary, regulatory reforms, re-organization of central 
government and others.  
 A number of important observations are worth mentioning in this respect.  
 Pollitt and Bouckaert highlight the complexity of the reform 
implementation process and point to numerous cases (becoming rather a rule than 
exception) of departures from the original plans of reform in course of their 
execution. Even when reform itself and its implementation are appropriate it may 
contradict or detract from other reforms that are being carried simultaneously (Pollitt 
& Bouckaert, 2004:36).   
 In the opinion of Toonen, the largest impact on variation in reforms is made 
by the following two separate dimensions: 
a)   Substance: different subject matter of reform (managerial reform; 
policy reform; institutional reform; regime reform) and  
b) Process: different modes or approaches to public sector reform 
(comprehensive, functionalist, gradualist reforms). 
  35
 He further argues that the following factors are most relevant in explaining 
variation in public sector reform: 
1. External pressures e.g. economic reform and European integration; 
2. Political choice e.g. ideology and leadership; 
3. Internal dynamics e.g. reform logic and ‘path dependencies’; 
4. Institutional opportunities and constraints e.g. types of administrative systems; 
5. Historical context e.g. historical legacies and traditions  (Toonen, 2004). 
 We share these arguments, which derive from the institutional approach to 
the research of public sector reform. It is noteworthy that the structure of our study 
and the selected format for comparison (see section 2.2.7) largely reflect the 
existence of the above factors (singled out by Toonen). Similarly, in our study we 
define two basic characteristics of a civil service reform which deserve special 
attention – the extent (scope and dynamics) of reform and the character (dimensions) 
of reform.  
Concerning the eventual outcomes of public management reforms Pollitt 
and Bouckaert note that “in practice, the ‘final results’ of the reforms are frequently 
difficult to identify with any confidence” (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004:37).  
As many observers and experts indicate when expectations regarding 
reform goals and results are high and promises are far reaching, then in evaluating or 
assessing reform implementation it is very difficult to state anything else but good 
results. As far as information concerning reform results is concerned Pollitt and 
Bouckaert distinguish four levels of results ((Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004:105):  
a) operational (more outputs are obtained for the same inputs); 
b) improved processes of management or decision making or service provision 
(streamlining, reducing transaction costs, making more convenient etc);  
c) change in the overall capacity of the political or administrative system (e.g. 
redesigning a pattern of the institutions, higher potential to respond to and 
resolve problems etc); 
d) degree of advance of the system towards some ideal or desired state (criteria of 
that level are rather ideological or doctrinal). 
 
The last two levels of results are rather abstract and include also value 
shifts and cultural transformations.  
Some scholars and experts divide improvements in the system into two 
groups: structural improvements and cultural change. The former means various 
large scale reorganizations whereas the latter denotes such things as shift in civil 
servants’ values, changes in the accepted or prevailing standards of behaviour and 
attitudes, etc.  
 
  
2.3.3   Peculiarities of Post-Communist Administrative Development   
The Soviet system has been regarded by many experts to have the most 
“advanced” model of untamed bureaucracy. For example, Hough viewed the Soviet 
Union, "as a total bureaucratic system in which the leaders themselves rose through 
the bureaucracy and are part of it rather than a parliamentary system in which a 
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cabinet of generalist political leaders gives direction to a pliable bureaucracy" 
(Hough, 1973: 143).  
 Needless to say other countries of the Soviet block developed similar 
bureaucratic systems, in some cases even more rigid and less tolerant than the Soviet 
“model” proper. 
  In spite of profound changes in the political and economic systems of CEE 
countries in the 1990s the heritage of the bureaucratic past could not have been 
easily got rid of and repeatedly manifested itself in particular in the continued 
domination of old style informal rules and traditions in the administrative process. 
These rules and traditions largely defined the strength or weakness of major political 
actors and perspectives of success or failure of reform. Connected with the past was 
also the phenomenon of persistence of old elites and high level of politicization of 
the state bureaucracy in almost all CEE countries; 
The “communist type” patterns of governance appear to have reproduced 
themselves to various degrees in the changed context of the region. In connection 
with this Toonen remarks “Given the magnitude of the changes and transformations 
at the end of the last decade, the degree of continuity and influence of the past 
comes as somewhat of a surprise.” (Toonen, 1993:165).  
The establishment of new public and civil service institutions in the former 
communist countries occurred in the overall setting characterized in most cases by 
high degree of political, economic and social turbulence, increased personalization 
of politics, prevalence of uncertainty and short time horizons. The continuous 
instability and fluid situation in many areas of public life in these countries, as well 
as deeply rooted traditions of “selfish” bureaucratic behaviour, patronage and 
neglect of the interests of citizens served as distinct factors affecting the overall 
environment of reform.  
It appears that the bureaucracy in the majority of post-communist countries 
has been one of the major actors of the political and economic transformation of the 
1990s. Besides, it largely succeeded in transforming the administrative power into 
economic power through the semi- or quasi- privatization.  
Preparation and actual accession of many CEE countries to the European 
Union have been, beyond any doubt, an important factor affecting development of 
state administration in these countries. However, the assessment of practical impact 
of accession on the modernization of CEE states’ bureaucracies remains 
controversial. Some authors (e.g. Goetz, Meyer-Sahling) reckon that the impact of 
EU accession may have heightened rather than lessened incongruities and 
asymmetries in the development and functioning of public service institutions in 
CEE countries.   
Throughout the 1990s the civil society in the majority of CEE countries 
was still in the process of formation and in most cases turned out to be too weak to 
act as a powerful independent policy making factor. In connection with this Pierre 
remarked, in our view correctly,  that “the best guarantee for an improved public 
service is not internal administrative reforms but a stronger and more vibrant civil 
society that can hold public officials accountable” (Pierre 2001: 181). When such 
mechanism of accountability is absent then political actors in post-communist 
countries quite often either “deliberately fail to design institutions: thus building in 
enormous license and opportunity to seek rents” or “deliberately set up institutions 
with very limited enforcement powers that exist mainly on paper “(Grzymala-Busse, 
2004: 3).  
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Another noteworthy consideration concerns the role of budgetary 
constraints and pressure in stimulating administrative reforms in CEE countries, 
which appears to differ substantially from the experience of other industrially 
developed countries. There exists sufficient evidence for the claims that instead of 
encouraging reform and modernization of the state bureaucracy, severe budget 
deficit in the post-communist countries served as an additional obstacle 
complicating the start of reforms. “Economic pressure could at first glance be a 
catalyst for the initiation of administrative reform processes, as there still are serious 
budgetary pressures in all candidate states. … However, even though economic 
conditions at first glance constitute a potential incentive to politicians to move 
administrative development forward, the specific nature of the administrative reform 
processes in Central and Eastern Europe has so far created the reverse effect.” 
(Verheyen, 2001:40).   
The same author continues - “It is important to note that building a 
professional, stable and impartial administration is costly and requires a 
considerable investment, even if one opts for the creation of a limited ‘career’ civil 
service. The costs of recruitment, training and the employment conditions associated 
with a career civil service are considerable, both in the immediate term and for the 
future. The notion of administrative reform as used in Western Europe and other 
OECD states, the main objective of which is usually saving money, therefore does 
not apply to Central and Eastern European states. The economic conditions in these 
states thus make the implementation of reform strategies more difficult, rather than 
easier” (ibid). 
There exist basically two types or groups of issues that should be resolved 
in the transformation of state bureaucracies of CEE countries. 
One group is more technical – formation of a modern civil service as such, 
adoption of respective legal framework, introduction of principles of merit, 
enhancement of performance and efficiency of state bureaucracy, application of 
client oriented approaches, introduction of new IT technologies, etc. The other 
relates to more fundamental problems of the place, role, responsibility and 
relationship of the state bureaucracy to the society and politicians, as well as of 
prevailing within the bureaucracy informal rules, values and ethical standards. The 
second group in our opinion has greater significance in the case of post-communist 
countries as far as profound and sustainable reform of their civil services is 
concerned. Touching upon this issue Hesse writes “The challenge with which public 
institutions are faced in Central and Eastern Europe, is to redefine their role in 
society, or, more concretely, their relationships with politics, the economy and the 
civil community…”  (Hesse,1995: 5).  
 
 
2.3.4 Assertions and Hypotheses  
Our initial analysis enables to single out a number of assertions, which 
characterize developments in the post-communist countries, and in particular in 
Russia and the Czech Republic, related to the evolution and reform of their state 
administrative systems. These assertions and hypotheses concern the main question 
and sub-questions of the research and are linked to its major topical areas - capacity, 
implementation, comparison. 
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CAPACITY 
We consider that the capacity for civil service reform in both the Russian Federation 
and the Czech Republic was overall low throughout the 1990s. We assume that this 
capacity may have been weakened by:  
– persistence of outdated norms, traditions, behavioral patterns and 
relationships;  
– shortage of resources both financial and human; 
– lack of political will to launch reform; 
– deficit of committed stakeholders; 
– immature civil society. 
 
IMPLEMENTATION  
We may expect that implementation of civil service reforms in Russia and the Czech 
Republic: 
– will proceed along the directions and will set the objectives largely 
borrowed from the experience of the advanced industrial nations;   
– will meet notable resistance of the large part of state bureaucracy and 
“vested” interests;  
– will be more centered on the reform process than on achieving reform 
results;  
– will focus on less radical and more “convenient” elements of the reform 
agenda.  
 
COMPARISON  
We assume that:  
– there are more similarities than differences in the way reforms have been 
prepared and implemented in Russia and the Czech Republic;  
– a set of key variables affecting the process of reform preparation and 
implementation in both countries is to a large degree identical, though 
their actual impact may have differed;   
– reform implementation in both countries may have produced certain side 
effects and unforeseen results;   
– extent and intensity of reform implementation largely depend on the 
continuation of political support to the reform at the highest possible level;  
 
We proceed from the assumption that many informal rules and networks 
(widespread in the bureaucracies of the former communist countries) survived 
political upheavals and remain the base of relations across state administrative 
institutions in the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic. These networks may 
be “reinforced” by a high degree of politicization of the Russian and the Czech civil 
services. With all other factors being equal, the role of leadership will be crucial for 
the success of civil service reform. Therefore, preferences and personal qualities of 
politicians (who act under specific conditions and whose discretional power is also 
limited) do matter.  
We acknowledge the existence of considerable and often essential 
differences between the two countries. Russia is a federal state and presidential 
republic with huge territory, multinational multi-religion ethos, huge reserves of oil, 
gas and other natural resources, state budget proficit in recent years. In comparison 
the Czech Republic is a parliamentary unitary state with relatively small territory and 
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rather homogeneous population, budget deficit and scarcity of natural wealth (to 
mention just a few features). In spite of these differences we consider that the 
contents, pace of preparation, advance and initial results of civil service reforms in 
the two countries will have a lot of similarities.  
We assume that the similarities in reform preparation and implementation 
can be in particular attributed, firstly to the largely common roots of administrative 
culture and mentality traceable to the heritage of monarchist (Austro-Hungarian and 
Russian Empires) and recent communist regimes, and secondly to peculiarities of the 
political setting in these countries manifested above all in seriously constrained 
opportunity for competition between various political parties and groupings.  
Distinctions in reform preparation, advance and outcomes may result from 
such factors as external influence, differences in the constitutional order and political 
regime, as well as resources available.  
 
2.3.5    Defining Principal Terms and Concepts  
A clear definition of major/key concepts and terms that are widely used in 
this research is a precondition of a sound methodological approach. Most frequently 
used terms and notions comprise: 
 
Bureaucracy – one of the meanings of this notion most widely used here is “a corps 
of civil servants occupying top and mid-level management positions”;  
 
Bureaucratic accountability – is commonly understood as the answerability of 
civil servants to the “public” for their actions or inactions, for which they are 
subject to external or internal sanctions;  
 
Central government – central governing and administrative authority at the level of 
the nation-state (usually the highest or one of the highest levels of the executive 
branch of power); 
 
Civil society – “a wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations 
that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their 
members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or 
philanthropic considerations. Civil society organizations, therefore, refer to a wide 
of array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based 
organizations, professional associations, and foundations” (World Bank, 2005); 
 
Civil service – may be understood as “an institution of governance programmed by 
rules which are, by definition, reasonably stable over time and take on the character 
of roles, rules, norms and expectations about civil service attitudes, behaviors and 
functions in discharging state business” (Bekke et al., ed, 1996:49). 
 Three connotations of the term ‘civil service’ can be defined in our context: 
- social and legal state institution;  
- professional activities, aimed at exercising the authority of state organs of 
power; 
- organisation with relevant structure, personnel and allocated resources.   
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- organisation with relevant structure, personnel and allocated resources.   
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Note:  It is important to distinguish between “higher civil service” - a relatively 
small group of top bureaucrats and the ‘rank and file’ civil servants;  
 
Civil service reform  –  “deliberate changes to the structures and processes of public 
sector organizations (in our case civil service – A.K.) with the objective of getting 
them (in some sense) to perform better” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004:16); 
 
Civil service system – “mediating institutions that mobilize human resources in the 
service of the affairs of the state in a given territory” (Bekke et al, ed, 1996:2); 
 
Conflict of interest – a situation in which professional decisions or actions risk 
being influenced by personal interest or considerations; 
 
Context (environment) - in comparative analysis generally refers to all external 
influences that affect processes and management, such as societal values, norms, 
religion, political culture and economy;  
 
Deconcentration – delegation of the execution of state administration from the 
center to vertically lower tiers of state administration; 
 
Decentralization – delegation of the execution of public administration from state 
administration bodies to local government; 
 
Development - is viewed as an ability of a system to grow or adjust to new demands 
put upon it, or “an ability for movement from a less desirable to a more desirable 
general situation in the political system” (Heady, 2001:106);  
 
Good governance -  process or system of governing, which ensures that an 
organisation promotes generally recognized positive values such a legitimacy, rule 
of law, fairness, protection of human rights, efficiency, effectiveness and conduct 
excluding conflict of interest;   
 
Institution – a social organisation with an inherent set of formal and informal rules. 
Also “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe 
behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape expectations.” (Keohane,1989:163); 
 
Path dependence – a concept emphasizing the connectedness of the present and 
future with the past; in particular, that the past limits the range of choices, which are 
available at present;    
 
Political regime – a system of practical exercise of political authority, which 
determines real balance of power between the executive, legislature and judiciary 
and extent of accountability of the state to citizen/civil society;  
 
Public administration  
a) the activities of the government and public servants ; 
b) the totality of institutions, respective personnel, necessary resources 
and adopted procedures at all levels of government ;  
c) the study of  a) and b). 
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Public administration reform - reform of the ‘public administration’ perceived 
mainly in the second meaning (see above);  
 
Stakeholders – individuals or organizations with a distinct interest or concern in the 
outcome of a particular process;  
 
 
 
2.4        Conclusions  
 
The methodology applied in this research is largely based on the so-called 
institutional analysis, which implies "...the notion of systems ruled by norms, culture 
and traditions rather than by organizational goals and rational perspectives" (Bekke 
1999: 4), and hence attaches high importance to the environment, in which any 
institution, civil service inclusive, is embedded.  
 More specifically, institutional factors are seen as the main source of 
explanation for the peculiarities of political and social processes in general and of 
administrative reforms in particular. Institutions are viewed from a broad 
perspective so that they are considered to incorporate apart from organisations and 
structures also norms, rules, values, traditions and ideas. Furthermore, the 
institutional approach emphasizes persistence of rules, values and behavioral 
patterns over time. In other words, it assigns an important role to the concept of path 
dependency. The meaning of the latter can be condensed to a phrase "past choices 
limit future options". 
Civil service reform is a complex process, which cannot be studied in 
isolation from its environment. Therefore, particular attention in our research is paid 
to the retrospective study of the existing constitutional and political framework, 
economic situation, administrative system, culture and mentality, traditions and 
behavioral patterns which make up the actual setting of each of the civil services. 
The analysis of the relationship between an administrative system and its context is 
particularly important for identification of key factors/variables affecting the success 
or failure of reform.  
At the same time the particular path of civil service reform is usually a 
result of complex interactions of various actors and factors within certain boundaries 
imposed by the existing institutional setting and “path dependency”. Although we 
are far from accepting human action as the main determining factor, our approach 
(in compliance with neo-institutional concept) overcomes opposition of institutional 
factors and individual action. The latter will be given proper attention wherever 
appropriate.   
 The study draws widely upon the theory, methods and experience of 
comparative administration accumulated in the publications of most prominent 
scholars and experts in the field. In particular, the research widely applies inductive 
method that relies heavily on descriptive data about actual situations and behaviour. 
It presupposes advance from specific observation to identify differences and 
commonalities and then moving to explanations and interpretations. The process 
usually concludes with generalizations explaining relationships amongst units 
observed.   
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 In brief, our methodological and analytical framework implies that study of 
existing rules, norms, values, traditions and authority relationships which exert 
significant influence on formation of administrative systems and civil servants’ 
behaviour and that also persist in time is a necessary precondition for proper 
understanding of civil service systems and their transformation. It also implies that 
various institutions define and limit choices available for policy-makers but they do 
not deny the role of individual and collective human action.  
With regard to peculiarities of the development of administrative 
institutions in the CEE region it is necessary to take into account that in the 1990s 
this development in the absolute majority of post-communist countries was affected 
by instability and a fluid situation in many areas of public life, serious economic 
difficulties, absence of mature civil society, increased personalization of politics, 
prevalence of uncertainty and short time horizons. By the mid 1990s state 
bureaucracy in many CEE countries appeared to have been least of all affected in 
real terms by the transformation as compared to other public institutions and sectors 
of the economy.  
Two more remarks are noteworthy. First, preparation and actual accession 
to EU have influenced considerably administrative development in many countries 
of the region. Second, contrary to the experience of other industrially developed 
nations severe budgetary constrains in CEE states have served as an additional 
obstacle (not as a stimulus) in the way of initiation of civil service reforms.  
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CHAPTER III  
THE RUSSIAN CIVIL SERVICE: EVOLUTION, STATUS AND 
REFORM CAPACITY  
 
 
3.1   Introduction 
This chapter incorporates an analysis of the Russian civil service system 
and its capacity for reform. The methodology applied herein has been presented and 
explained in the previous chapter.  
 Particular attention in the chapter is paid to the study of institutional 
environment and historical development of the Russian state administration. We 
proceed from the premise that “historical and contemporary comparison must 
always take into account the context in which specific phenomena occur. Studying 
development over time, juridical, political, economic, social, cultural and even 
geographical conditions must be part of the analysis. If we want to compare specific 
administrative arrangements in time and place, it is only by reference to these 
contexts that we can appreciate the contingency of events” (Raadschelders & 
Rutgers, 1996: 92).    
First, we trace the development of the Russian state and its administration 
since the formation of the Moscow princedom and the unified Russian state in the 
10-14th centuries. Then, we study peculiarities of the constitutional order and 
political system in Russia, economic development in the 1990s, including 
repercussions of privatization. Afterwards, evolution of the Russian civil service 
during the post-communist period is analyzed with particular accent on the issues of 
legal framework, political-administrative relations, HR management, education and 
training.        
Further, we examine the existing administrative traditions and culture, 
prevailing in civil service ethical standards and the extent of accountability of civil 
servants. This is followed by an overview of the relations between civil service and 
civil society and estimation of resources available for implementing civil service 
reform.  The analysis culminates with conclusions regarding key problems and 
constraints in the development of the Russian civil service and an overall assessment 
of its reform capacity.  
Most of the information and data provided in this chapter covers the period 
from the early 1990s till mid 2000s, whereas overview of the recent changes in the 
Russian civil service is given in the following chapter.  
 
 
3.2  Evolution of the Russian State and its Administration  
 
The Russian history can be presented in a way as a succession of periods of 
enforced (as a rule top down) modernizations and periods of stagnation or decay in 
social, economic and political spheres. A number of factors significantly influenced 
this evolution: the existence of huge, largely unpopulated territory inhabited by 
multinational multi-religion ethnos; permanent external threats and frequent internal 
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conflicts; and the nature of the relationships within communes that were the basic 
element of social organization in Russia in the times of monarchy.  
The state bureaucracy has been one of the leading actors in Russian history 
and played a decisive role particularly during its crucial moments including the 
periods of sweeping reforms. The process of the evolution of the Russian 
bureaucracy deserves special attention because it is precisely here that we can find 
the origins of many of its present day features and peculiarities.1  
 
The Kievan Rus 
Civil servants in their very primitive form appeared on the territory of 
Russia as early as the 9-10th centuries. Around that time the southern and northern 
princedoms of the Slavs, situated on a huge territory from the Baltic Sea to the Black 
Sea, were united by Prince Oleg, who in A.D.880 conquered Kiev and made the city 
his capital. At that time the Russian state (Kievan Rus) consisted of principalities 
loyal to Prince Oleg and to his successors.  
With the appearance of a unified Russian state the need for the Sovereign 
and his closest circles to have a group of subordinates, who would assist them in 
running the state, became more than evident. Therefore, apart from servants who 
performed purely personal (hunters, cooks, housekeepers, etc.) and military 
functions, there gradually emerged servants responsible for broader tasks - tributes 
registration, arbitration of disputes, maintaining relations with neighbouring 
countries - although these servants were still considered personal servants of a ruler.      
In 988, Grand Duke Vladimir introduced Christianity to Russia. An attempt 
to create a comprehensive system of laws was made by Princess Olga (10th century). 
In executing governance Russian Princes discussed most important decisions at the 
meetings with their retainers (boyars), prominent warriors and most respected and 
wealthy citizens. Later these meetings led to a special advisory council (duma). 
Rivalry between the principalities never ceased and in the 12th century the country 
disintegrated.  From that time on the Moscow principality grew in size and 
significance and gradually started to play a central role among all other principalities. 
Introduction of Christianity contributed to further legitimization of Russian 
Dukes (Sovereigns), who in compliance with Byzantine tradition were presented as 
Holy nominees empowered by the Lord not only to organise defence against external 
threats, but also manage internal affairs and maintain public order.   
   
The Tatar-Mongol Domination and Strengthening of the Moscow 
Princedom 
The invasion by the Tatar-Mongols in the 13th century had a great impact 
on the development of the principalities and the whole Russian state.  The subsequent 
rule of the Golden Horde cut Russia off from the outside world for more than two 
centuries.  
It is interesting to note, that two northern princedoms - Novgorod and Pskov 
managed to preserve their independence in the face of the Mongols’ invasion. They 
established virtually a republican state of governance. Novgorod princes were elected 
                                                           
1Sources of information: www.russia.net/history, www.pts.mipt.ru, 
www.studyrussian.com/history.html  
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by citizens for a fixed period of time. The power of a prince was restricted by special 
agreements. All issues of great importance were solved at gatherings (vyeche) of 
citizens. That was in fact the first attempt to introduce elements of legitimacy of 
governance in Russia.  
In 1380 by the decisive battle on the river Don, Prince Dimity defeated the 
Mongols. However, it was not until 1480 that Moscow was strong enough to throw 
off the Mongol’s yoke. Russia became again a centralised state in late 15th century 
under the rule of Ivan III. During his reign the boyars (landed aristocracy) retained 
their overall influential role in the management of state affairs. Seniority among the 
boyars depended on the family history of service to the court and on landownership. 
Ivan III also opened membership of this elite group to anyone who held a high 
administrative post. In 1547 his grandson Ivan IV (The Terrible) was crowned the 
first tsar of all Russia and his power became absolute.  
 
The Reign of Ivan the Terrible 
The establishment of state administration in Russia as a distinct structure 
acting in line with certain norms and rules occurred during the 16th century in the 
reigns of Ivan III, Vasily III and Ivan IV. ‘Prikazy’, special organs of governance and 
control were established and organised along functional and territorial lines. There 
were prikazy responsible for search of criminals, for relations with other countries, 
for state finances, for mail and transportation, etc., as well as those in charge of 
different regions of Russia. New entrants to prikazy were recruited basically from 
two sources; either from princes’ ex-warriors and personal servants or from the 
families of noble landlords (boyars).  
Soon a true bureaucratic style developed in the prikazy with rigid vertical 
subordination and strict observance of instructions and orders in horizontal 
communications. A general rule was followed, such that the more noble a man was, 
the higher post he could get in the administrative structure.  Regional and local 
reform at that time introduced elements of self-governance by citizens (zemskiye and 
gubskiye izby). 
In his struggle against the influence of the feudal aristocracy (boyars), Ivan 
the Terrible confiscated much of their property and land, granting it to those who 
served him. These beneficiaries gradually formed a new social group or nobility 
(dvoryanstvo). In his late period of rule, Ivan IV established a regime of extreme 
terror, which brought the country to a state of almost total political and economic 
ruin.  
 
The Rule of Peter the Great   
After the so-called ‘time of troubles’ (most of the 17th century) Peter I (the 
Great), one of Russia’s most enlightened and controversial rulers, assumed the throne 
in 1696. As a young man he had spent two years in Western Europe (England, 
Holland, Sweden, Prussia) learning, among other things, state administration 
practices. Subsequently he became determined to carry out sweeping reforms in 
Russia and to extricate the country from its isolation.  
Unlike his predecessors, Peter the Great admired and respected the ideas 
and culture of Western Europe. The first reforms of the Russian state administration 
occurred during his reign. Peter the Great adopted a concept of the enlightened 
despot who served the state. During his rule boyars lost their privileged position.  
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Aristocratic origin was no longer taken into account when considering appointments 
to high level posts in state administration. Instead length of service, qualification, 
performance (for the first time) and loyalty to the sovereign counted.   
  In 1722 Peter I approved a Table of Ranks which introduced 14 ranks of 
state service and spelled out in detail its order and conditions. This was the first 
comprehensive legal document that created a sound basis for the development of the 
professional state administration in Russia. In preparing this document his 
experience of other countries, e.g. England, Denmark, Prussia, Sweden, the 
Netherlands was carefully analysed. The Table of Ranks introduced clear division 
between military and civil (public) service and imposed compulsory lifelong public 
service on the nobility. From that time onwards service to the monarch required 
appropriate education and provided for, although on a limited scale, ennoblement of 
commoners. During this period the state apparatus became more professional and 
specialised, but at the same time less flexible and more oriented towards meeting its 
own corporate interests. The hierarchical structure of governance, totally 
subordinated to the Emperor (Tsar), included the Senate (the highest organ of central 
governance), Collegia (displaced prikazy) and Governors in provinces (gubernyi). 
Peter the Great defined the distribution of authority, responsibility and functions 
within the administrative apparatus and forced public servants to work in accordance 
with state laws, standard norms and rules. It is interesting that according to a decree 
signed by Peter I on 17 December 1722, violation of state laws by a civil servant 
would immediately entail death sentence “regardless of his/her merit and record of 
service” (Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire, 1830). 
 
The Period of Enlightenment 
Two important processes dominated in Russia in the 18th century - 
territorial expansion southward, eastward and westward and cultural westernization 
of the Russian elites. This period is known as the period of ‘enlightened absolutism’. 
Catherine II (the Great) (1762-1796) tried in particular to promote the formation of a 
civil society in Russia. Though many of her ideas fell short of changing the existing 
practice, she did lay the foundations for subsequent reforms in the next century.  
Catherine II continued Peter the Great's reforms of the Russian state, 
further increasing central control over the provinces and contributing to the 
resurgence of the Russian nobility. The latter received expanded rights and 
authority, were no longer required to serve the central government, but took over 
most government functions in the provinces.    
Different social groups at that time attempted to introduce constitutionalism, 
to abolish favouritism and to enforce respect to the rule of law. This largely failed 
because of divisions among the nobility, its dependence on service to the ruler and 
fear of power being delegated to impersonal institutions. One of the remarkable 
developments concerning the state bureaucracy at that time (mid 1760’s) was 
introduction of fixed permanent remuneration to civil servants of all categories and 
granting the right for pension after 35 years of service. In accordance with the decree 
of Catherine II (1763), in performing their duties civil servants should be guided by 
“needs and benefits of the state”.  
In spite of these improvements the majority of the Russian civil servants as 
in many other countries were forced to extract rent from the exercise of their duties, 
since the government paid them fees below even subsistence level.  
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Developments in the 19th Century 
In the first half of the nineteenth century the ideas of individual and 
political freedom and social equality were penetrating Russia from Western Europe. 
Yielding to the expectations and demands of the society, Emperors Alexander I 
(1801-1825) and Alexander II (1855-1881) embarked upon far-reaching reforms. 
The architecture of the modern Russian state was largely drawn in the early 19th 
century, when Alexander I established in 1802 the first eight ministries, which 
incorporated real administrative power. This move was followed by the 
establishment of the State Council analogous to western parliaments (although the 
analogy was limited as its members were appointed by the Emperor who also 
approved its decisions). Later came judicial reform (the introduction of jury trials, 
independent judges and a professional class of lawyers) and the emergence of local 
self-government – ‘zemstvo’ - exempting local affairs from a considerable amount of 
central government control. In 1861, Alexander II abolished serfdom, which was a 
major obstacle to industrial revolution in Russia.  
Nonetheless, resistance to the reforms was enormous, particularly from the 
nobility which made up the core of the state apparatus. It took half a century to 
prepare and adopt a law on abolition of serfdom. The last two decades of the century 
were marked by virtual retreat from the progressive changes. Russia entered the 20th 
century with no legitimate government in place and performance of the state 
administration being considerably below expectations of the society. 
 Under the monarchy the role of state administration was constantly 
growing. The first half of the 19th century witnessed a large expansion of the corps 
of state administrators, the absolute majority of which represented nobility. By mid 
19th century the top state bureaucrats made up the largest part of the ruler’s closest 
circle and together with the Monarch were determining the internal and external 
policies of the country. The state bureaucracy enjoyed a privileged status and was 
actually exempt from effective social control. Among most typical features of the 
bureaucracy were strong authoritarian tendencies, neglect of the needs of common 
people, opposition to civil society and virtual absence of any ethical standards of 
conduct.  
 The conservative tendencies in the tsarist bureaucracy were sustained by its 
privileged position, absence of oversight by any representative organ, atmosphere of 
despotism, total obedience to the superior and suppression of independent thinking.  
 
Nicolas II and October Revolution 
The number of Russian civil servants in the 19th century increased seven 
times and amounted to about 385 000 by the year 1900 (Zaionchkovsky, 1978:221). 
In the early 20th century 14% of the state budget was allocated to finance the state 
administrative apparatus, compared with 3% in England, 5% in France and 7% in 
Italy and Germany (Zyrianov, 1994:147).  
In 1891, Nicholas II acceded to the throne. His government became 
increasingly unpopular because of opposition to any reform and because of the defeat 
of the Russian fleet in the war with Japan. General discontent and labour unrest 
culminated in the revolution of 1905 and forced Nicholas II to grant a constitution. 
Thereby Russia acquired a representative, legislative assembly (Duma), elected by 
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indirect suffrage. However, the executive remained accountable only to the Emperor 
who could invalidate any of the laws approved by the Duma. In 1906 Nicolas II 
signed a decree which allowed for free access to the civil service of all citizens 
regardless of their social origin.  
Russia joined World War I in 1914. The strains of the war led to a 
breakdown of the country’s political system and social fabric. Food riots in St. 
Petersburg and other cities toppled the monarchy in March 1917. The provisional 
government established by the Duma was short lived and dissolved when the 
Bolsheviks, headed by V..Lenin, seized power in November 1917.    
 
The Soviet Government 
  The revolution in 1917 brought about dismantling of the old state and 
governance structures.   A decree of the Soviet government of 11 November 1917 
“On the Abolition of All Estates and Service Ranks” (Grishkovets, 2002:71) 
cancelled all civil service ranks as well as formal division of employees into those 
hired by the state and those working in the private or cooperative sectors. Many of 
the old-regime cadres either left the country or refused to co-operate. They were 
replaced by new servants selected mainly in accordance with criteria of origin and 
ideological fidelity. As a result most vacancies in newly created Ministries 
(Narkomaty) and Councils (Soviets) were filled with people whose professional 
competence and performance were questionable.  
The original Marxist concept of building an absolutely new state apparatus 
in line with the slogan that every kitchen maid could manage the state shortly proved 
its absolute fruitlessness. The bolsheviks soon realized that they had to make use of 
“old” specialists and train “new”. As a result, instead of introducing radical changes 
into traditional administrative and behavioural culture the communist regime built 
upon it. The state apparatus increased quickly in size and adopted the worst traditions 
of tsarist bureaucracy. V. Lenin realized this, albeit too late, when he could no longer 
influence the events being encircled by a hostile environment created by I. Stalin and 
immobilized by sickness. He wrote in one of his last letters: “If we take Moscow 
with its 4,700 communists in responsible positions, and we take the huge 
bureaucratic machine, that gigantic heap, we must ask: who is directing whom? I 
doubt very much whether it can be truthfully said that the communists are directing 
that heap. To tell the truth, they are not directing, they are being directed”. (Lenin, 
vol.33, page 288).  
The evolution of the Soviet system of governance led to the creation of a 
rigidly bureaucratic and inward-looking administrative apparatus, performing strictly 
controlled functions and having a limited capacity for decision-making. The whole 
structure rested upon the Communist Party’s Politburo and Central Committee for its 
policy formulation, decision-making and overall performance review. The structure 
functioned from the centre with a network of Party Committees in republics, oblasts, 
towns, districts right down to the level of a factory, school, office etc.  
A typical feature of the Soviet governance structure was strict vertical 
subordination of all levels of authority with very weak, if any, horizontal links and no 
possibilities of independent decision making at levels below the Party’s Central 
Committee or a Ministerial Board. Decisions were usually taken at the very top and 
all elements of a ‘pyramid’ were obliged to exercise them. The party ‘functionaries’ 
were present in every large office and controlled the activities and conduct of 
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employees and compliance of management decisions with Party directives. 
Membership of the Communist Party was a minimum requirement for promotion to 
any post of significance in any state or public organisation. In general, the state 
apparatus in the Soviet Union was inefficient and accountable only to the Party top 
leadership. It consumed tremendous public resources and lacked the confidence of 
ordinary citizens.  
Though the rule of law, representative institutions, direct participation, 
individual rights formally existed, in reality the political leadership, which in fact 
was made up of top party and state bureaucrats, exercised absolute power through 
party representatives and bureaucratic centralism. This power was complemented by 
a system of privileges and formed the base of a kleptocracy called the 
“nomenklatura”. 
In the Soviet Union there was no formally constituted civil service as a 
legal and social institution. Employees of the government and different levels of 
state administration did not have a special status distinguishing them from the rest of 
hired personnel. Since over 95% of the industrial sector and that of provision of 
services belonged to the state almost all the employees were considered to be at the 
service of the state. Accordingly, the government had no central agency charged 
with the management or supervision of the civil service. Performance based career 
advance in its modern understanding was virtually absent. The Party organs decided 
which individual is suited best to different type of work on the basis of loyalty, 
political consciousness, knowledge of the tasks and organizational abilities. The 
state administrative elite made up an essential part of the communist party top 
bureaucracy and played an important role in the state policy formulation and 
implementation throughout the whole Soviet period. A Western researcher described 
the Soviet Union at the time as an “absolutist bureaucratic state” (Robinson 2002: 
43)  
 
Perestroyka  
The changes initiated by M. Gorbachev in the late 1980s and referred to 
later as “perestroyka” brought about fundamental transformation of the political and 
economic system of the Soviet Union, led to its break up in 2001 and formation of 
new independent states on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The Russian 
Federation inherited the bulk of the state apparatus of the former Soviet Union. 
Already in 1989 the Supreme Soviet, the country’s highest legislative organ, was 
considering draft legislation that provided for the establishment  of the Russian civil 
service. These plans were not realized at the time due to political turbulence and 
overall instability in the country.       
 
In summary, we may conclude that typical of Russia throughout most of its 
history was a special mechanism of formation of the political elite through the 
service to the state. As a rule the “list” of Russian political elite comprised a 
considerable part of top-level administrative bureaucracy. At the same time top and 
mid level state bureaucracy depended almost entirely on a will of a monarch or 
“politburo”. Such “construction” encouraged the formation of patron-client relations 
and development of highly politicized and centralized state administration.  
It is noteworthy that in his work “The Parliament and Government in the 
Transformed Germany” Max Weber assessed the administrative systems in Germany 
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and Russia in early 20th century as “the rule of bureaucrats” (Beamtenherrschaft) 
(Maslovsky, 2001:25). This rule is characterized by a considerable degree of 
appropriation of the policy-making function by bureaucrats. In M. Weber’s view this 
tendency is present in any bureaucratic organization but it develops notably only 
when effective control over bureaucracy is lacking.    
Although the history of Russia is predominantly a history of non-democratic 
forms of governance, it also incorporates many instances of broad but slow reforms 
(more or less successful) affecting to a greater or lesser extent the state 
administrative structures. As a rule reforms were initiated from the top under the 
influence of either internal (contesting opposition pressures, unrest and turmoil, 
territorial expansion...) or external (wars, cultural influence…) factors.  
 
 
3.3  Constitutional Framework 
 
In accordance with the Constitution adopted on December 12th 1993 the 
Russian Federation is a federal, presidential, democratic republic. The executive 
power is exercised by the Cabinet of Ministers, legislative functions by the 
bicameral Federal Assembly and judicial authority by the RF Constitutional and 
Supreme courts. The Article 10 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation states, 
that “organs of legislative, executive and judicial power are self-dependent". The 
President is the Head of State and serves mainly as the guarantor of constitutional 
order. He also defines major directions of internal and foreign policies of the state 
and ensures coordination and interaction of activities of all branches of power. In 
practice the President performs substantial executive functions.  
   The Constitution provides for wide powers in the President, who appoints 
and dismisses the Chairman of the Government (Prime Minister), Members of the 
Cabinet, top ranking State officials and Armed Forces officers, has the right to 
dissolve the State Duma and order new elections. Although the Parliament approves 
nomination of the Prime-Minister and some high-ranking officials, in reality the 
President can use many devices to enforce his will upon the Federal Assembly.  
 According to the new Constitution (in contrast to the previous one adopted 
in 1991) the powers of the Parliament to exercise effective control over the 
Government have been considerably reduced. A number of Ministries and Agencies 
have dual subordination – to the President and to the Cabinet of Ministers. The 
constitutional division of powers between the president, the executive and the 
legislature has not been properly defined yet. 
The state structure of the Russian Federation comprises three basic 
levels:  1) the Federation; 2) the Subjects of the Federation (regions); 3) the 
territorial entities which make up the Subjects of the Federation and which form 
the basis of local self-government system.    
Article 65, para.1 of the Constitution stipulates that the Russian Federation 
is composed of 89 Subjects of varying legal status (reduced recently to 87 Subjects). 
They differ from each other in population, territory and economic potential. 
However, firm criteria for defining the status of Subjects and distribution of 
authority between a Subject and the Federal Centre have not been defined. The 
Subjects of the Federation have their own legislative, judicial and executive bodies 
(administrations), the latter headed by a President or a Governor.  
 
 50
and Russia in early 20th century as “the rule of bureaucrats” (Beamtenherrschaft) 
(Maslovsky, 2001:25). This rule is characterized by a considerable degree of 
appropriation of the policy-making function by bureaucrats. In M. Weber’s view this 
tendency is present in any bureaucratic organization but it develops notably only 
when effective control over bureaucracy is lacking.    
Although the history of Russia is predominantly a history of non-democratic 
forms of governance, it also incorporates many instances of broad but slow reforms 
(more or less successful) affecting to a greater or lesser extent the state 
administrative structures. As a rule reforms were initiated from the top under the 
influence of either internal (contesting opposition pressures, unrest and turmoil, 
territorial expansion...) or external (wars, cultural influence…) factors.  
 
 
3.3  Constitutional Framework 
 
In accordance with the Constitution adopted on December 12th 1993 the 
Russian Federation is a federal, presidential, democratic republic. The executive 
power is exercised by the Cabinet of Ministers, legislative functions by the 
bicameral Federal Assembly and judicial authority by the RF Constitutional and 
Supreme courts. The Article 10 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation states, 
that “organs of legislative, executive and judicial power are self-dependent". The 
President is the Head of State and serves mainly as the guarantor of constitutional 
order. He also defines major directions of internal and foreign policies of the state 
and ensures coordination and interaction of activities of all branches of power. In 
practice the President performs substantial executive functions.  
   The Constitution provides for wide powers in the President, who appoints 
and dismisses the Chairman of the Government (Prime Minister), Members of the 
Cabinet, top ranking State officials and Armed Forces officers, has the right to 
dissolve the State Duma and order new elections. Although the Parliament approves 
nomination of the Prime-Minister and some high-ranking officials, in reality the 
President can use many devices to enforce his will upon the Federal Assembly.  
 According to the new Constitution (in contrast to the previous one adopted 
in 1991) the powers of the Parliament to exercise effective control over the 
Government have been considerably reduced. A number of Ministries and Agencies 
have dual subordination – to the President and to the Cabinet of Ministers. The 
constitutional division of powers between the president, the executive and the 
legislature has not been properly defined yet. 
The state structure of the Russian Federation comprises three basic 
levels:  1) the Federation; 2) the Subjects of the Federation (regions); 3) the 
territorial entities which make up the Subjects of the Federation and which form 
the basis of local self-government system.    
Article 65, para.1 of the Constitution stipulates that the Russian Federation 
is composed of 89 Subjects of varying legal status (reduced recently to 87 Subjects). 
They differ from each other in population, territory and economic potential. 
However, firm criteria for defining the status of Subjects and distribution of 
authority between a Subject and the Federal Centre have not been defined. The 
Subjects of the Federation have their own legislative, judicial and executive bodies 
(administrations), the latter headed by a President or a Governor.  
  51
The local self-governing authorities operate at the level of settlements, 
municipalities or districts in cities or large towns. Until recently the extent of self-
governing authority was determined by each region (Subject) since the Law 
provided for some flexibility in this respect (whether that is good or bad is a separate 
issue). In general self-governing authorities and central government act relatively 
independently from each other. However, some Subjects of the Federation 
established special branches of state administration at the level of municipalities and 
settlements which means that there exists a struggle for competence and authority 
between separate regional administrations and self-government bodies.  
A large number of Federal Ministries and Committees have their branches 
or representations in the Subjects of Federation (regional level) dealing with such 
matters as enforcement of federal law, management of federal property, maintenance 
of unified customs and taxation regulations, support for federal energy and transport 
systems, etc. 
As a rule both regional and federal authorities have joint jurisdiction over 
ownership of land, water and natural resources, educational and health-care 
institutions, and social protection systems. There are also areas where the regional 
authorities are quite self-dependent. Civil service related Laws from 1995 and 2004 
stipulate that organisation and management of the civil service of a Subject of 
Federation rests under its authority, whereas development and approval of the legal 
base for civil service activities remains a matter of joint jurisdiction with the 
Federation. 
 
 
3.4 Political System   
 
The peculiarities of the political system and political regime are of over 
riding interest as factors which have direct impact on the development and change of 
civil service systems. Following the demise of the communist system and 
dissolution of the Soviet Union the new political leadership voiced its commitment 
to the key principles of democracy and many of these principles became part of 
usual practice.  
Throughout the 1990s the Russian political system was evolving with 
occasional disruption by periods of instability or even crisis. The fragility of Russian 
democratic institutions was evident, for example, in the long- standing discord over 
the balance of power among the three key state institutions: the President’s 
Administration, the Government and the Parliament. This discord culminated in 
October 1993 when military troops loyal to the President stormed the building of the 
Russian Parliament.  
A distinguishing feature of the Russian constitutional and political system 
is that the government is formed not by a winning party/coalition, but by a Prime-
Minister appointed by the President. The Constitution does not oblige the President 
to select candidatures for the position of the Head of Government from only those 
representatives of the party/coalition which have won elections.  
The process of policy-making in Russia is rather complicated and is subject 
to excessive personalistic influences. In this connection it is difficult to disagree 
with those observers and experts who pointed to obvious authoritarian tendencies of 
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3.4 Political System   
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the Russian political leadership and defined the existing political regime, in 
particular during the times of President Yeltsin, as corporatist-autocratic.  
Notwithstanding recent changes in the legal framework, the authority, 
responsibility and reporting obligations of the executive have not been sufficiently 
defined and formulated yet. The RF Constitution and other legal acts provide for 
dual authority - of the President and of the Head of Government - over the executive 
power, and this creates duplication and lack of co-ordination. For instance, the 
President exercises direct supervision over “law enforcement” agencies and some 
others – Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Security Service - although their heads are members of the Government.  
The system of political parties in Russia remains largely underdeveloped. It 
can hardly be called representative and serves mainly to accommodate the interests 
of various lobbies. As one of the President’s assistants put it “In essence we do not 
have political parties” (Otechestvennyie Zapiski, 2004:95). The rule of law has been 
declared, but its occasional abuse in particular by top politicians and government 
officials largely undermines its practical value. Furthermore, leaders in post-
communist Russia do not deem themselves bound by constitutional provisions they 
find inconvenient or dislike. Arbitrary postponement of the Presidential elections to 
June 1996, as well as large-scale financial machinations during this elections 
campaign serve only as one out of many examples.  
The political and economic environment in Russia characterized during the 
recent decade by weak law enforcement, developed patron client relations, 
embedded corruption and immature civil society appears to have been ripe for abuse 
by politically connected groups. This period also witnessed gradual devolution of 
economic and political power from the federal to regional and local authorities. To 
address region-specific concerns and diffuse potentially disintegrating trends, Boris 
Yeltsin concluded bilateral power-sharing agreements with many of the 89 Subjects 
of the Federation which comprise the Russian Federation. So Russia in the 1990s 
became a much less centralised state than it was during Soviet times. 
Boris Yeltsin's resignation on December 31, 1999 and the election of 
President Vladimir Putin after the first round of voting on March 26, 2000 marked 
the first democratic transition of a leader in Russia's history. Vladimir Putin appears 
to have come to office with the main objective of consolidating central authority. He 
also voiced his commitment to reduce the powers of the Russian oligarchs and to 
reform the Russian bureaucracy.  
A series of measures adopted after the election of President V. Putin appear 
to have strengthened the central executive power, seriously undermined the powers 
of the oligarchs and consolidated dominant positions of the centrist parties which 
largely represent the interests of state bureaucracy.  
 
 
3.5 Economic Situation  
 
The economic development of the Soviet Union was characterised by 
centralized state planning, over-investment in heavy industry, low labour 
productivity in virtually all sectors of the national economy. There was 
underdevelopment of the service sector and light industry, unbalanced regional 
development and wasteful energy-consumption practices. 
 
 52
the Russian political leadership and defined the existing political regime, in 
particular during the times of President Yeltsin, as corporatist-autocratic.  
Notwithstanding recent changes in the legal framework, the authority, 
responsibility and reporting obligations of the executive have not been sufficiently 
defined and formulated yet. The RF Constitution and other legal acts provide for 
dual authority - of the President and of the Head of Government - over the executive 
power, and this creates duplication and lack of co-ordination. For instance, the 
President exercises direct supervision over “law enforcement” agencies and some 
others – Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Security Service - although their heads are members of the Government.  
The system of political parties in Russia remains largely underdeveloped. It 
can hardly be called representative and serves mainly to accommodate the interests 
of various lobbies. As one of the President’s assistants put it “In essence we do not 
have political parties” (Otechestvennyie Zapiski, 2004:95). The rule of law has been 
declared, but its occasional abuse in particular by top politicians and government 
officials largely undermines its practical value. Furthermore, leaders in post-
communist Russia do not deem themselves bound by constitutional provisions they 
find inconvenient or dislike. Arbitrary postponement of the Presidential elections to 
June 1996, as well as large-scale financial machinations during this elections 
campaign serve only as one out of many examples.  
The political and economic environment in Russia characterized during the 
recent decade by weak law enforcement, developed patron client relations, 
embedded corruption and immature civil society appears to have been ripe for abuse 
by politically connected groups. This period also witnessed gradual devolution of 
economic and political power from the federal to regional and local authorities. To 
address region-specific concerns and diffuse potentially disintegrating trends, Boris 
Yeltsin concluded bilateral power-sharing agreements with many of the 89 Subjects 
of the Federation which comprise the Russian Federation. So Russia in the 1990s 
became a much less centralised state than it was during Soviet times. 
Boris Yeltsin's resignation on December 31, 1999 and the election of 
President Vladimir Putin after the first round of voting on March 26, 2000 marked 
the first democratic transition of a leader in Russia's history. Vladimir Putin appears 
to have come to office with the main objective of consolidating central authority. He 
also voiced his commitment to reduce the powers of the Russian oligarchs and to 
reform the Russian bureaucracy.  
A series of measures adopted after the election of President V. Putin appear 
to have strengthened the central executive power, seriously undermined the powers 
of the oligarchs and consolidated dominant positions of the centrist parties which 
largely represent the interests of state bureaucracy.  
 
 
3.5 Economic Situation  
 
The economic development of the Soviet Union was characterised by 
centralized state planning, over-investment in heavy industry, low labour 
productivity in virtually all sectors of the national economy. There was 
underdevelopment of the service sector and light industry, unbalanced regional 
development and wasteful energy-consumption practices. 
  53
The economic reforms launched in Russia in the early 1990s followed a 
radical-liberal conception of market transformation said to be prescribed by IMF in 
line with the policies known as “Washington consensus” and often referred to as 
“shock therapy” concept.  
Although the reforms laid down the foundations of the market economy 
they also resulted in a sharp decline in national income, impoverished most of the 
population, led to sharp decrease in life expectancy, and contributed to growth of 
corruption and organized crime. 
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank Joseph 
Stiglitz in the lecture given at the annual session of the World Institute of 
Development and Economic Research (WIDER) in Helsinki in January 1998 said, 
that "the set of policies which underlay the Washington Consensus are neither 
necessary nor sufficient, either for macro-stability or longer-term development." He 
declared that these policies are "sometimes misguided", that they "neglect ... 
fundamental issues", are "sometimes even misleading", and “do not even address ... 
vital questions." (Bogomolov, 2000:4) 
In this connection one of the leading Russian economists wrote  “In the 
years of radical reform, Russia lost its erstwhile economic might, falling in terms of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) even behind such countries as Mexico, Brazil and 
Indonesia, with a five-fold lag behind China and a ten-fold lag behind the United 
States. The recession continued, year after year, despite government declarations to 
the contrary. As compared with the pre-reform level, the productivity of the Russian 
economy on the threshold of the new century was more than cut in half, industrial 
output fell to 40 per cent of what it had been, and in the light industry and the food 
industry it dropped by two-thirds”. (Bogomolov, 2000:2)  
 The devastating crisis in 1998 resulted in a situation when Russia defaulted 
on its debts and devalued its rouble by almost 75%. Poverty expanded further and 
remained one of the main obstacles for the country's progress. According to OECD 
data, between a quarter and a third of Russians live below the official poverty line, 
and this situation causes "continuing disturbing trends in some demographic and 
health statistics" (OECD, 2006:1). 
The main features of the economic situation throughout the 1990s were 
huge external debt ($ 145 billion on average), continuing slump in production and 
investment, and growing unemployment (12,4% in January 1999 - official statistics). 
Serious financial constraints forced the Government to cut even the most essential 
social programmes and to hold down the growth of salaries in the public sector. As a 
result remuneration of civil servants was downgraded to the level where in many 
cases it ceased to serve as a motivating factor.  
  Overall, the situation seemed to have notably changed for the better 
starting from 2000. The OECD noted Russia's economic growth of 15% in 2000-
2002. "The Russian economy has experienced a number of favourable trends and 
developments," the OECD report said. "Output, employment, consumption and 
investment have grown significantly." The OECD praised the Russian government's 
efforts in eliminating the chronic budget deficit and political stability that has 
enabled the Kremlin to push some crucial reforms through parliament. Many 
observers attributed this improvement to three major factors - high oil and gas 
prices, cheap national currency and important reforms implemented in the past two 
years.  
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 Other economists were much more reserved in their assessment. “Although 
the years 1999-2001 appeared to be the best for the Russian economy witnessing 
GNP growth by 19.7%, industrial production by 30.4%, and investment by 33.5% 
the subsequent period proved that the growth was not sustainable. The industrial 
growth slipped from 11.9% in 2000 to 3.5% in 2002. The rate of investment growth 
has fallen four times for the same period”. (Delyagin, 2002:11) 
 The unofficial drain of capital, which leaves the economy virtually 
bloodless, remained almost at the same level of USD 22 billion in 2000 and USD 21 
billion in 2001 (Delyagin, 2002:13). The number of unemployed amounted to 8.8% 
of the labour-capable population in 2001. The capital drain was caused not so much 
by inflation or by taxes, as by weak if any protection of property and the abuses of 
the state bureaucracy whose “bribe taking capacity” has increased two fold 
(assessment by businesses) during the period 2000-2002” (ibid). 
Sharp increases in the price of oil on the world market in the early 2000s 
created favourable conditions for the flow of considerably higher revenues to the 
state budget. Proficit of the federal budget equalling 1.5% of the GDP in 2000 had 
grown to 7.4% of the GDP in 2005. (Alliance Media, 3 April 2006). 
 
3.6  Privatisation  
 
The establishment of new political and economic institutions in Russia in 
the 1990s was accompanied by massive redistribution of state assets: this facilitated 
administrative corruption. New horizons for embezzlement and graft opened up with 
the launch of privatisation. While appropriate legislation, control and accountability 
were virtually absent, resource allocation had remained in the hands of government 
officials. They, in most cases, unilaterally decided which strategic enterprises were 
to be privatised and what were the rules of the divestment.  
What happened in reality was transformation of political 
(party/bureaucratic) power into economic/financial power and material wealth 
(realty, securities etc). Mass redistribution of property during the initial voucher 
privatisation and the loans-for-shares scheme of 1995-96 was marked by so many 
violations of the far from perfect laws and rules that any decent decision in this 
respect was regarded as an obvious exception.  
Distribution of property rights to a privileged group of people (as a rule a 
narrow group of former directors, party “functionaries” and loyal 
relatives/acquaintances) contributed to the concentration of economic power in the 
hands of influential oligarchs. From 1995 onwards privatisation was frequently 
achieved through the sale of state assets at below market prices to financial-
industrial groups with connections to the government. Later these groups pressed the 
state for special privileges and opposed reforms aimed at creating a more 
competitive environment. (Rakityansky, 2002:20).  
Privatisation has not brought the expected revitalisation of the private 
sector since it was not accompanied by an appropriate regulatory reform, changes in 
management and in the surrounding environment. As a rule the new owners 
preferred to squeeze immediate profits from their new property instead of investing 
in its long-term potential.  
The lack of transparency and numerous violations in the privatisation 
process have undermined further public confidence in the government's ability to 
 
 54
 Other economists were much more reserved in their assessment. “Although 
the years 1999-2001 appeared to be the best for the Russian economy witnessing 
GNP growth by 19.7%, industrial production by 30.4%, and investment by 33.5% 
the subsequent period proved that the growth was not sustainable. The industrial 
growth slipped from 11.9% in 2000 to 3.5% in 2002. The rate of investment growth 
has fallen four times for the same period”. (Delyagin, 2002:11) 
 The unofficial drain of capital, which leaves the economy virtually 
bloodless, remained almost at the same level of USD 22 billion in 2000 and USD 21 
billion in 2001 (Delyagin, 2002:13). The number of unemployed amounted to 8.8% 
of the labour-capable population in 2001. The capital drain was caused not so much 
by inflation or by taxes, as by weak if any protection of property and the abuses of 
the state bureaucracy whose “bribe taking capacity” has increased two fold 
(assessment by businesses) during the period 2000-2002” (ibid). 
Sharp increases in the price of oil on the world market in the early 2000s 
created favourable conditions for the flow of considerably higher revenues to the 
state budget. Proficit of the federal budget equalling 1.5% of the GDP in 2000 had 
grown to 7.4% of the GDP in 2005. (Alliance Media, 3 April 2006). 
 
3.6  Privatisation  
 
The establishment of new political and economic institutions in Russia in 
the 1990s was accompanied by massive redistribution of state assets: this facilitated 
administrative corruption. New horizons for embezzlement and graft opened up with 
the launch of privatisation. While appropriate legislation, control and accountability 
were virtually absent, resource allocation had remained in the hands of government 
officials. They, in most cases, unilaterally decided which strategic enterprises were 
to be privatised and what were the rules of the divestment.  
What happened in reality was transformation of political 
(party/bureaucratic) power into economic/financial power and material wealth 
(realty, securities etc). Mass redistribution of property during the initial voucher 
privatisation and the loans-for-shares scheme of 1995-96 was marked by so many 
violations of the far from perfect laws and rules that any decent decision in this 
respect was regarded as an obvious exception.  
Distribution of property rights to a privileged group of people (as a rule a 
narrow group of former directors, party “functionaries” and loyal 
relatives/acquaintances) contributed to the concentration of economic power in the 
hands of influential oligarchs. From 1995 onwards privatisation was frequently 
achieved through the sale of state assets at below market prices to financial-
industrial groups with connections to the government. Later these groups pressed the 
state for special privileges and opposed reforms aimed at creating a more 
competitive environment. (Rakityansky, 2002:20).  
Privatisation has not brought the expected revitalisation of the private 
sector since it was not accompanied by an appropriate regulatory reform, changes in 
management and in the surrounding environment. As a rule the new owners 
preferred to squeeze immediate profits from their new property instead of investing 
in its long-term potential.  
The lack of transparency and numerous violations in the privatisation 
process have undermined further public confidence in the government's ability to 
  55
manage the economy in an impartial manner and raised concerns over widespread 
corruption. The interests of influential business corporations were often (especially 
during the presidency of B.Yeltsin) equated to state interests and priorities and a 
large part of the cadre of senior civil servants acted as lobbyists of oligarch interests.  
Even after the privatisation of the 1990s, about fifty percent of the public 
wealth remained under state control.  “It is managed "amazingly poorly," said 
former Deputy Minister of Economy M. Dmitriev. “But even an efficient public 
administration could not successfully manage so much property. The state presence 
in the economy must be reduced, and the public administration must be streamlined 
to manage better what remains under state control”. (Dmitriev, 2004)  
 
3.7 Legal Framework  
 
In the times of the monarchy one of the principal normative acts that 
regulated the whole range of administrative service relations was the Civil Service 
Charter adopted in 1886. During Soviet rule a separate legal and normative base 
covering activities of civil servants and their status did not exist. Instead, provisions 
of the Labour Code and in-service regulations of each state agency were applied.   
The Constitution of the Russian Federation refers to the term “civil service” 
only three times – in Article 32, point 4, which says that “citizens of the Russian 
Federation have equal access to civil service employment”; in Article 71, point t) 
which says that “the federal civil service comes under authority of the Russian 
Federation” meaning that it shall be a unified service across the territory of Russia; 
and in Article 97, point 3, which says that “deputies of the State Duma shall not be 
acting civil servants”.  
The first legal documents that initiated the formal origin of the Russian 
Civil Service in modern times were the Presidential decrees “On Priority Measures 
to Organize a System of Civil Service in the Russian Federation” and “Regulations 
on the Federal Civil Service” signed by the President in 1993 respectively on 3 June 
and 22 December (Atamanchuk, 2002:63).  
The first basic legal act, which dealt with civil service issues in a 
comprehensive manner was the Federal Law “On the Basic Principles of Civil 
Service in the Russian Federation” (enacted in July 1995).  
The Law stressed “the priority of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation and the federal laws over other regulatory legal acts and service 
instructions related to the exercise of official functions by the civil servants and 
enforcement of the rights thereof” (Article 5, point 1) and provided for “mandatory 
compliance of all civil servants with the decisions taken by higher state bodies and 
authorities within the jurisdiction thereof and in keeping with the legislation of the 
Russian Federation” (Article 5, point 6).  
The law defined the legal status of civil servants; their employment rights 
and duties; determined recruitment and promotion procedures; envisaged 
arrangements for civil service management; introduced a disciplinary code and a 
code of ethics, declared “non-partisanship” of the civil service as one of its basic 
principles (Article 5, point 11). 
The law forbade civil servants in particular to be engaged in: 
- all paid work (except pedagogical and creative work); 
- ‘commercial activity’ or lobbying; 
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- misuse of state property; 
- the receipt of gifts in connection with the exercise of their duties; 
- strike action; 
- leaking of confidential information; 
- employment of relatives as subordinates. 
Overall the law provided for the introduction and enforcement in Russia of 
the principles of the classic ‘Weberian’ model of civil service. However, a package 
of subsequent normative acts (around 30) envisaged in the Law never materialized. 
Instead, a dozen Presidential decrees and Government enactments on various aspects 
of civil service activities were signed. However these legal documents did not 
proceed from a common concept. 
The fragmentary and often uncoordinated nature of legislation concerning 
the civil service at that time manifested itself for instance in the fact that such 
fundamental legal acts as the Law "On the Government of the Russian Federation" 
(approved by the State Duma on April 11th 1997) and the President's Decree "On the 
System of Federal Bodies of Executive Power" of August 14th 1996 did not include 
any reference to a civil service! 
      The situation started to improve in the early 2000s following election of the 
new President. The legislation regulating the civil service proper was considerably 
enhanced with the adoption of two new laws “On the System of Civil Service of the 
Russian Federation” (adopted on 27 May 2003) and “On the State Civil Service of 
the Russian Federation (adopted on 27 July 2004). A brief analysis of these laws 
will be carried out in the following chapter devoted to the reform of the Russian 
civil service.  
      Further, in the period 2000-2005 the government ensured passage of 
legislation which addressed in one way or another the issues of corruption and 
efficiency of state administration and artificial barriers for entrepreneurial activities. 
      The legislation included laws and other normative acts on: 
- deregulation targeted at facilitating registration and licensing 
procedures and reducing the number of inspections and certificates 
required of enterprises; 
- tax and customs administration reducing significantly 
opportunities for arbitrary actions by the authorities; 
- judicial reform in particular delineating roles of the various actors 
in the legal process and creating barriers for graft; 
- labour relations (labour code) eliminating some rigid constraints 
on employer-employee relations; 
- greater transparency and accountability of  the administrative 
apparatus. 
Although the legal and regulatory base for the civil service has been 
recently considerably improved as part of civil service reform efforts the 
institutional framework for implementation and enforcement of legislation remains 
weak. Overall the judicial system has not yet developed sufficiently and to the 
extent necessary to embed the rule of law. That requires among other things a 
change of mentality and practice. Many legislative acts have never been fully 
implemented due either to a lack of financial resources, low respect for the law or 
due to resistance of the bureaucrats affected by the novelties. 
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At the same time laws at the regional level sometimes contradict federal 
legislation. The sections of administrative law regulating civil service are not 
properly developed and the establishment of the system of as yet non existent 
administrative courts is in the very initial stage.  
An important feature of the normative environment in Russia is the internal 
in-service regulation adopted by each ministry or agency. Although these internal 
instructions and rules do not always fully comply with the federal legislation, they 
are regarded by most civil servants as having greater 'weight' for their work 
compared to federal laws. Once again it should be stressed that in Russia the 
adoption of regulatory norms and rules and their practical implementation and strict 
observance are often separated by considerable time delay.  
 
 
3.8  Central Government  
 
Throughout the 1990s the system of governance in Russia largely retained 
the overly centralised and strictly hierarchical ‘command’ structures typical of the 
Soviet period. Although the number of federal ministries and agencies has been 
reduced from around 140 sector-oriented institutions (in 1989) to approximately 65 
(in 1995) the composition proper of the Central Government has remained basically 
unchanged. As of September 2002 the Central Government comprised the following 
agencies: Federal Ministries (23), State Committees (13), Federal Commissions (2), 
Federal Services (13), RF Agencies (3), and Federal Inspectorates (2).  
A large number of Federal Ministries have their branches or representations 
in the Subjects of Federation dealing with such matters as enforcement of federal 
law, management of federal property, maintenance of unified customs and taxation 
regulations, support for federal energy and transport systems, etc. 
The administrative reform launched in 2003 led to further reduction of the 
number of ministries – from 23 to 16. Reorganisation of the Russian government in 
2004 is analyzed in more detail in the following chapter.  
The Government is the highest authority of executive power. The Law on 
the Government of the Russian Federation adopted in April 1997 (amended in 
December the same year) defines the basic functions of the government. In 
accordance with the law the Government: 
- determines and implements home and foreign policy of the Russian 
Federation; 
-   exercises regulation in social and economic spheres; 
- ensures the unity of the system of executive authority in the Russian 
Federation,     
-   directs and supervises the activities of executive bodies; 
-   elaborates targeted federal programmes and ensures their implementation.   
-   draws up and implements the federal budget; 
-   manages federal property; 
-   carries responsibility for home security and defense. 
The Government has the right of legislative initiative. Members of the 
Government (Cabinet of Ministers) meet formally at least once a week. Another 
distinguishing feature of the government system in Russia is the existence of 
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influential Apparatus of the Government which has so far executed a sizable part of 
policy making activity of the line ministries. 
The second half of the 1990s saw numerous reorganisations of the 
Executive branch at the federal level caused almost exclusively by political and 
severe budget deficit related factors. As a rule such operations were poorly 
organised and their implementation left much to be desired. Usually the planned 
downsizing of various ministries, departments and committees shortly resulted in the 
growth of the number of employed staff.  
Typical of the overall system of governance in Russia has been focus on 
inputs rather than outputs, functional overlaps, disputed division of responsibilities 
and rivalry between ministries and agencies.  
Decision-making at the level of central government has been flawed by 
poor demarcation of tasks and responsibilities between the President’s 
Administration and the Federal Government, between federal agencies, between 
central and regional governments and has been lacking capacity for sound policy 
analysis. Control over implementation of Government decisions is not effective, and 
accountability for poor performance is weak. The system of regular forecasting and 
surveys of public opinion on specific issues is undeveloped. Strategic plans for 
development of separate ministries and agencies have been the exception rather than 
the rule.  
Each ministry elaborates on its own state policy in its tasked area and most 
importantly usually without prior or post consultations with parliament, political 
parties, professional organizations, or representatives of civil society.  
The existing administrative culture gives preference to a system of 
decision-making that is far top-heavy. Many unimportant decisions are taken to the 
highest levels in the state apparatus resulting in slow, inefficient response and red 
tape. As a rule little or no explanation is given to the public why a particular 
decision was made and what benefit it would bring.  
The administrative reform launched in 2003 was designed to deal with all 
these problem areas. The extent to which it succeeded or failed is analyzed in the 
following chapter dealing with the reform of the Russian civil service.  
 
 
3.9 Civil Service: Status, Efficiency and Institutional Framework   
   
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation inherited 
an over-centralised, ideologically driven system of state administration and a corps 
of state administrators governed by a combination of modern and outdated rules, 
traditions and informal relationships, some of them dating back to the times of 
monarchy. As an institution the Russian civil service has been in the process of 
formation since the early 1990s.  The impetus to its establishment was given by the 
President of the Russian Federation in his decrees of 3 June and 22 December 1993 
announcing the creation of the Federal Civil Service and mapping out the principles 
of its organization. This process was further consolidated in 1995 when the 
Parliament adopted the Law ‘On the Basic Principles of Civil Service of the Russian 
Federation’.  
In spite of some obvious deficiencies, for the first time in the modern 
history of Russia this legal document gave an official definition of the civil service. 
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The document laid down the legal basis for its organisation, outlined the procedures 
of service and introduced Job Classification System as well as distinction between 
political appointees and career civil servants.  
Throughout the 1990s the formation of the civil service was taking place 
within the institutional framework which was heavily affected by the heritage of the 
Soviet times. In line with the principles of federalism and existing territorial 
structure the Russian civil service is divided into federal and regional services 
(Subjects of the Federation). Formally, local self-government and hence municipal 
service are not regarded as part of the system of state management although in 
practice they are largely financed from the budgets of the state and the Subjects of 
the Federation. 
The Russian civil service at both the federal and regional levels is further 
divided into civil services of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of 
power. The new law “On the System of State Service in the Russian Federation” 
adopted in 2003 introduced additional differentiation of the entire state service into 
civil (public), military and law enforcement services.  
At present the Russian civil service does not constitute a unified and 
homogenous system yet. In practice the civil services in the Subjects of the 
Federation (regional level) are governed by norms and rules that do not always 
comply with the Federal Law. A single management body or unit for the whole civil 
service, or at least for its federal level, is not yet established. The service lacks 
stability from both the institutional and human resources points of view. The 
legitimacy of the Russian civil service is undermined by lack of clear definition of 
its place in the context of institutional roles and division of powers existing since the 
1990s.    
The efficiency and effectiveness of the working of state administration is 
widely acknowledged to have dropped considerably compared even to the Soviet 
period. Partly this can be explained by overall weakness of the state and frequent 
inability of state institutions to perform many of their basic functions even up to the 
lowest standards. A further explanation is frequent underestimation of the crucial 
importance of a sound institutional and regulatory framework and efficient state 
administration for the country’s prospective development.  
It is estimated that Russia loses up to 2 % of its annual GDP because of the 
poor system of public management. Over third of interviewed civil servants in 2000 
consider that effectiveness (efficiency) of their work is low (RACS, 2002:11). The 
Chief Control Department of the Presidential Administration reported in 2002 that 
almost half of the Presidential orders and instructions given to the Government were 
not implemented on time (Nikolaev, ed. 2006:116).  
  The post communist period saw the appearance of further negative trends 
that affected the development of the civil service in Russia: 
- civil servants’ pay declined sharply compared with salaries in the private 
sector and even in comparison with average incomes in the country; 
- although the communist party rule was abolished the civil service remained 
highly politicized causing among other things a considerable degree of 
instability of the personnel; 
- overall professional level of the civil service corps declined, in particular, 
due to exodus of most experienced and qualified staff to the private sector;  
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- enforcement of civil service legislation and other normative acts remained 
weak. 
The turbulent political environment, frequent reorganisation of ministries, 
high turnover of cadres, low (until recently) prestige of the service, insignificant 
remuneration, and overall atmosphere of uncertainty hampered the identification of 
values that could define and cement a common sense of mission held by most 
members of the civil service.  
Besides, measures adopted to create foundations for the development of a 
modern, efficient, accountable and corruption immune civil service did not proceed 
from a single concept agreed among major stakeholders. By the mid 1990s a model 
of career based civil service gained a foothold in Russia with many elements 
borrowed from the French civil service system.  
 
3.10 Civil Service Management 
 
As can be seen from preceding subchapters the civil service system is a 
complex organization made up of various elements tied together by multilateral 
links and relationships. Therefore, management of this organization and 
coordination of its elements is essential for effective functioning of the whole 
system.  
From the early days of the establishment of modern Russian civil service 
there has been no effective central agency/body in charge of its management. 
Although article 26 of the law “On the Basic Principles of the Russian Civil Service” 
(adopted in 1995) stipulated, that “coordination of activities connected with the 
handling of the tasks ensuing from this Federal Law shall be effected by the Council 
on the Civil Service under the President of the Russian Federation”, this council 
never performed the management function. Furthermore, the Council was convened 
very irregularly, and soon ceased to exist.    
In practice, resolution of many issues related to the formation, management 
and normal functioning of the federal civil service were either distributed among key 
ministries and agencies (e.g. cross cutting issues of defining civil servants basic 
payment and funding of their in-service training were dealt with by the Ministry of 
Labour), or were the responsibility of the leadership of the respective parent 
ministry/institution. Sometimes the administration questions were simply 
unaddressed for many years. In the Subjects of the Federation almost all civil service 
related issues were resolved by the regional authorities.    
Generic issues related to the overall development of the civil service were 
usually addressed by the Duma, Presidential Administration and the Office of the 
Government.  
Management of various civil service units was affected by the peculiarities 
of the political and economic situation as well as by existing administrative 
traditions and culture. For example, numerous financial, human resource and 
circumstantial constraints often distracted attention from the issues of strategic 
management which were either ignored or attracted a secondary importance. The 
overall impact of management was reduced by excessive concentration on control 
and very limited attention if any to dialogue and participation.  
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Additional complexity stemmed from poorly defined and often overlapping 
authority, duplication of functions and competencies between various executive 
agencies. Excessive centralization of decision-making necessitated lifting of too 
many issues to a very high level in the system for resolution.   
Article 16 Chapter 3 of the new Law ‘On the System of State Service’ 
(adopted in 2003) provided for the creation of a Federal body in charge of managing 
the federal civil service and respective bodies in the Subjects of the Federation in 
charge of regional civil services. Thus, the law did not envisage a central 
management structure for the entire civil service. Such a structure has been regarded 
by many observers as one of the preconditions for the integrity and effectiveness of 
the Russian state administration. Furthermore, five years after approval of the law 
such a body at the federal level had not been established yet.     
 
 
3.11 Relations between Civil Servants and Politicians  
 
Complete subordination of the administrative agents to the political 
authority is deeply rooted in Russia and dates back to the period of the establishment 
of unified Russian state. Although traditionally the state bureaucracy in Russia used 
to regard itself as a body serving the interests of the ruling elite, the latter in fact was 
in part composed of top representatives of that bureaucracy.  
The nature of the relationship between the politicians and the state 
bureaucracy in Russia has hardly changed as compared to the communist past and 
even the pre-revolutionary (1917) period. These relationships have lost their 
ideological imperative but as in the past the bureaucracy remains an obedient tool in 
the hands of the political elite. Simultaneously the bureaucracy tries to impose its 
corporate interest on society and to present it as the latter’s common interest. 
The essence of such a relationship was defined by Niskanen who, although 
not referring specifically to Russia, characterized the power relations between 
bureaucrats and top politicians as a”bilateral monopoly” (Niskanen, 1971:56). 
However in his opinion, in practice the bureaucrats could generally pursue their 
interests and achieve their own objectives.  
Although the civil service law from 1995 established formal distinction 
between political and career posts this differentiation was not always clear-cut in 
practice. Throughout the 1990s and later, Russian senior civil servants as a rule had 
partisan links with the ruling political elite. It was common practice for covert and in 
some cases even undisguised involvement of civil servants in the election campaigns 
of governors, mayors, and heads of administration. Where there were changes of 
party or coalition in power or government, changes took place in the civil service 
cadre. “The political nature of administration and dependency on individual 
directors make the position of civil servants unstable…, career officials are also 
often replaced on political grounds”.  (Larjavaara, 2001:15). Replacements of top 
and mid level civil servants following elections have been particularly widespread at 
the regional level (Otechestvennyie Zapiski, 2004:54).  
It is noteworthy that the requirement for civil servants’ non partisanship 
imposed by the law adopted in 1995 was later dropped in the civil service law 
approved in 2003. Although Article 4 of another civil service related law (2004) 
defined one of the civil service guiding principles as “protection of civil servants 
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against undue interference in their professional service activity”, this principle has 
never really worked yet. Similarly, very weak enforcement is typical of another 
clause stipulated in Article 17 of the same law. With respect to civil servants this 
clause prohibits “use [of] official powers to the benefit of political parties, other 
public or religious associations and other organizations, or publicly express[ing] 
personal opinions in respect of such associations and organizations in his/her 
capacity as a civil servant, unless envisaged by his/her job responsibilities”. 
Political administrative relations in Russia have also been affected by 
absence of serious political competition among main political parties and coalitions.  
Influential political rivals were violently suppressed by President Yeltsin in 1993 
and since then there has been no strong political opposition in the country.  
The position of the bureaucracy versus politicians appears to have 
strengthened in the 1990s. The following example demonstrates the ability of the 
administrative apparatus to effectively ignore decisions of the political leadership in 
particular when they run counter to the interests of the bureaucracy. The President’s 
Decree of 1992 ”On Fighting Corruption in the Civil Service System” stipulated that 
all civil servants should regularly submit declarations of their income and assets. 
However, it took five years and required another President’s Decree in 1997 to 
enforce practical implementation of this requirement even on a limited scale. 
The bureaucracy continues to be a major player in selecting and supporting 
candidates for key political posts. In Russia the strength and influence of a politician 
are determined to a considerable extent by the number of high-ranking supporters he 
has in key administrative positions. A recent OECD report called Russia “a weak 
state with strong bureaucrats” (OECD, 2006:1)      
The formation of transparent and permanent rules guiding relations 
between politicians and civil servants is complicated by virtual absence of clearly 
defined constitutional roles for various institutions and agencies, by lack of long 
standing democratic traditions and above all by the patronage culture prevailing 
within the administrative establishment’s networks.  
 
 
3.12  Human Resource Management   
 
According to data provided by the Federal Service of State Statistics the 
total number of civil servants and other employees of federal state bodies, state 
bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, and other state bodies 
established under the Constitution of the Russian Federation (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as the state bodies), together with municipal servants in 2002 (i.e. close 
to the start of civil service reform) totalled 1,252.3 thousand, including a verified 
315.1 thousand civil servants and other employees of federal executive bodies. 
During the period of 1992 to 2002, the number of civil servants and other employees 
of these bodies grew by a factor of 1.8 (Federal Programme “Reform of the Russian 
Civil Service”, 2002).   
By 2007 the human resource base of the Russian civil service has increased 
further and reached 1, 624 thousand persons. The evolution of the number of 
employed personnel in the Russian state bodies since 1992 (following break up of 
the Soviet Union) is shown in Table 3.1 
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3.12  Human Resource Management   
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Table 3.1 The Cadres of the Organs of State Authority in the Russian Federation*  
 
   1992 1993 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Overall  
number of 
civil 
servants 
(thousands)  
 
816.1 
 
921.6 
 
1004.3 
 
1061.8 
 
1093 
 
1108.9 
 
1102.8 
 
1133.7 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Overall  
number of 
civil 
servants 
(thousands) 
 
1163.3 
 
1140.6 
 
1252.3 
 
1300.5 
 
1318.6 
 
1462 
 
1577.4 
 
1623.9 
 
Source: Annual Statistical Bulletin 2005 & 2007, Federal State Statistics Service; 
“Russia in Figures 2008”, Federal State Statistics Service. 
* The data from the Federal State Statistics Service and other sources (e.g. Federal 
Programme “Reform of the Russian Civil Service”, referred to here and in the following chapters) may 
differ. This can be explained by the fact that apart from civil servants proper these data may comprise 
also support and technical staff employed by the state bodies.   
 
Compared to state administration of other industrialized countries the 
Russian civil service does not seem to be overstaffed.  In 1999 Russia had 2.8 
federal civil servant per 1000 employed population, whereas the same ratio for USA 
was 3.9, and for UK 5.2. (Federal Programme “Reform of the Russian Civil 
Service”, 2002).   
Typical of the Russian civil service, throughout the 1990s but especially in 
its first half, was a high level of personnel turnover. For example, 58% of cadre in 
the federal executive bodies and 30% in the respective regional bodies were replaced 
in course of 1992-1993 (RACS, 2002:145). As a rule those who left were the best. 
By 1997 there had emerged an approximate numerical parity between civil servants 
with a record of government or party employment during Soviet period and those 
who joined the state administrative apparatus after the start of democratic 
transformation (Grishkovets, 2002:67).  
From the very start of its re-establishment in 1993 the Russian civil service 
adopted a rather complex hierarchical structure of grades and ranks reminiscent of 
the Table of Ranks introduced by Peter the Great in the 18th century.   
In accordance with the Law ‘On the Basic Principles of the Russian Civil 
Service’ (approved in 1995) all civil service positions were classified into categories 
(A,B,C) and groups (1-5). Further, all civil servants within each of five groups 
(supreme, key, major, senior and junior civil service positions) were assigned 
qualification ranks (five ranks all together) of the first, second and third class based 
on the results of a state qualification examination.  
Holders of Category A, civil service position, were considered to be 
political appointments and formally not part of the civil service. Category B position 
was established for directly facilitating the exercise of the authority of category A 
position holders. Therefore civil service in category B posts was limited to the term 
for which the respective holders of category A posts were appointed or elected 
 
 63
 
Table 3.1 The Cadres of the Organs of State Authority in the Russian Federation*  
 
   1992 1993 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Overall  
number of 
civil 
servants 
(thousands)  
 
816.1 
 
921.6 
 
1004.3 
 
1061.8 
 
1093 
 
1108.9 
 
1102.8 
 
1133.7 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Overall  
number of 
civil 
servants 
(thousands) 
 
1163.3 
 
1140.6 
 
1252.3 
 
1300.5 
 
1318.6 
 
1462 
 
1577.4 
 
1623.9 
 
Source: Annual Statistical Bulletin 2005 & 2007, Federal State Statistics Service; 
“Russia in Figures 2008”, Federal State Statistics Service. 
* The data from the Federal State Statistics Service and other sources (e.g. Federal 
Programme “Reform of the Russian Civil Service”, referred to here and in the following chapters) may 
differ. This can be explained by the fact that apart from civil servants proper these data may comprise 
also support and technical staff employed by the state bodies.   
 
Compared to state administration of other industrialized countries the 
Russian civil service does not seem to be overstaffed.  In 1999 Russia had 2.8 
federal civil servant per 1000 employed population, whereas the same ratio for USA 
was 3.9, and for UK 5.2. (Federal Programme “Reform of the Russian Civil 
Service”, 2002).   
Typical of the Russian civil service, throughout the 1990s but especially in 
its first half, was a high level of personnel turnover. For example, 58% of cadre in 
the federal executive bodies and 30% in the respective regional bodies were replaced 
in course of 1992-1993 (RACS, 2002:145). As a rule those who left were the best. 
By 1997 there had emerged an approximate numerical parity between civil servants 
with a record of government or party employment during Soviet period and those 
who joined the state administrative apparatus after the start of democratic 
transformation (Grishkovets, 2002:67).  
From the very start of its re-establishment in 1993 the Russian civil service 
adopted a rather complex hierarchical structure of grades and ranks reminiscent of 
the Table of Ranks introduced by Peter the Great in the 18th century.   
In accordance with the Law ‘On the Basic Principles of the Russian Civil 
Service’ (approved in 1995) all civil service positions were classified into categories 
(A,B,C) and groups (1-5). Further, all civil servants within each of five groups 
(supreme, key, major, senior and junior civil service positions) were assigned 
qualification ranks (five ranks all together) of the first, second and third class based 
on the results of a state qualification examination.  
Holders of Category A, civil service position, were considered to be 
political appointments and formally not part of the civil service. Category B position 
was established for directly facilitating the exercise of the authority of category A 
position holders. Therefore civil service in category B posts was limited to the term 
for which the respective holders of category A posts were appointed or elected 
  64
(Article II, point 2). The most numerous group of civil servants are holders of 
Category C positions, who are tenure (career) civil servants.   
The Law ‘On the State Civil Service of the Russian Federation’ adopted in 
2004 introduced certain changes into the classification of civil service positions. 
Instead of categories A,B,C the law established four categories of civil service 
positions: executives, advisors, specialists and support specialists. The existing 
differentiation of civil service positions into groups and the existing system of ranks 
and classes were preserved. Political appointments were no longer associated with 
holders of civil service positions since they now formed a special group - holders of 
state positions (posts).  
All civil service positions are included in the Roster of Civil Service 
Positions which is approved by the President of the Russian Federation. The roster 
of federal level civil service positions has existed since 2006.  
In the Soviet Union employment conditions of government personnel were 
regulated by the Labour Code, complemented in some cases by agency specific 
(internal) regulations.  The situation gradually changed during the 1990s together 
with adoption of civil service related legal and normative acts.  
Since 1995 Russian civil servants are employed on the basis of contracts 
either with an indefinite term or a period of no more than five years. Each ministry 
continues to manage all its personnel except at the level of Deputy Minister and 
above. The case of the latter is the prerogative of either the Presidential 
Administration or of the Head of Government and its office.  
Modern principles of merit based recruitment and career advance have been 
declared but their enforcement remains a problem. In spite of the fact that the civil 
service law from 1995 required holding competitive examination as part of 
recruitment and appointment procedures, in practice this has been rather an 
exception than a rule.  
The mechanism of progression to the upper echelons of civil service is still 
predominantly very informal and comprises as its most important element the ability 
of a candidate to establish good personal contacts, to prove one’s loyalty to superior 
management and to become associated with influential leaders or interest groups. 
Qualifications and competence have less significance “as it is personal loyalty that 
counts when it comes to appointments” (Nozdrachev, 1999:21). 
At the same time the absolute majority of the middle and low ranking civil 
servants identify themselves with a corps of professionals and as a rule give no 
preference to any particular political authority or interest group in their everyday 
work.  
 Overall, modern principles of personnel management such as modern job 
descriptions, personnel information system, performance appraisal strategies and 
others are only nascent in the Russian civil service.   
 Domination of outdated principles of personnel management leads to 
various contradictions. For example, there appears to be a contradiction between 
those civil servants who are oriented towards making a career through highly 
professional performance and have relevant attributes and those who are motivated 
exclusively towards getting privileges and benefits through the mechanism of 
protection and patronage.  
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3.13   Payment and Incentive Policy  
 
 The prevailing in Russia system of motivation, compensation and 
promotion of civil servants is insufficiently linked to actual performance and 
achievement of tangible results. In practice and in most cases modern performance 
management is substituted by a system of benefits, bonuses and career advance 
which almost entirely depend on length of service and subjectivity of the immediate 
chief’s opinion. Personal loyalty to the leadership and its disposition as well as 
“necessary connections and ties” are the most important factors which determine 
positive performance assessment of a civil servant.  
 In 2002, 59% of the interviewed civil servants expressed opinion that 
promotion based on personal ties and group interests (but not on merit) was the 
largest de-motivating factor impeding growth of professionalism and efficiency of 
the civil service cadre (Kotchegura, 2008:83).   
In Soviet times, pay was only one of the elements in the system of civil 
servants’ motivation since their status was largely derived from position in the 
hierarchy and respective access to various privileges (e.g. housing, foreign travel, 
special allowances, access to educational, health and leisure facilities, special 
shops). The present day situation may have changed in details and formalities but 
hardly so in essence.   
Various types of bonuses, allowances and benefits continue to occupy a 
substantial part of the overall remuneration package for most civil servants. 
Remuneration consists of basic salary plus various extras for service rank, length of 
service, special conditions and bonuses. At present the total remuneration package 
amounts on average to 1.75 – 2.5 multiple on basic salary for low and middle level 
servants respectively and 4-8 times basic salary for top level bureaucrats.  
Performance related pay has been declared one of the civil service reform’s 
principal objectives but its mechanism is still in an experimental phase. Absence of 
direct linkage between achieved results and pay, and between merit and promotion 
prospects encourages preservation of underdeveloped service delivery standards and 
limited interest in user feedback. 
As we already emphasized above, remuneration of an average Russian civil 
servant during the 1990s was unacceptably low. Average salary amounting to an 
equivalent of 200 USD in the mid 1990s increased to 400 USD in 1998 and then 
abruptly declined to 180-200 USD following the financial crisis and default of the 
rouble.  
The situation with civil servants’ pay began to improve in the early 2000s 
as a result of economic growth and sharp increase in state budget revenues following 
upsurge of international oil and gas prices.    
According to data provided by Russian audit and consulting company FBK, 
only in 2002-2003 nominal salaries of civil servants were increased by a factor of 
1.7 (Nikolaev, 2006:124). In 2004 the overall remuneration package including 
various bonuses and allowances was raised on average 5-8 times for Russian 
ministers and deputy ministers, 4 – 6 times for heads of departments and their 
deputies, 3-4 times for heads of section and their deputies, and 2-3 times for other 
civil servants (Vedomosti, 12 September 2004). It should be emphasized that the 
base-salary, transparent to the society and various control agencies, was increased at 
much slower rate in comparison with various types of bonuses.  
 
 65
3.13   Payment and Incentive Policy  
 
 The prevailing in Russia system of motivation, compensation and 
promotion of civil servants is insufficiently linked to actual performance and 
achievement of tangible results. In practice and in most cases modern performance 
management is substituted by a system of benefits, bonuses and career advance 
which almost entirely depend on length of service and subjectivity of the immediate 
chief’s opinion. Personal loyalty to the leadership and its disposition as well as 
“necessary connections and ties” are the most important factors which determine 
positive performance assessment of a civil servant.  
 In 2002, 59% of the interviewed civil servants expressed opinion that 
promotion based on personal ties and group interests (but not on merit) was the 
largest de-motivating factor impeding growth of professionalism and efficiency of 
the civil service cadre (Kotchegura, 2008:83).   
In Soviet times, pay was only one of the elements in the system of civil 
servants’ motivation since their status was largely derived from position in the 
hierarchy and respective access to various privileges (e.g. housing, foreign travel, 
special allowances, access to educational, health and leisure facilities, special 
shops). The present day situation may have changed in details and formalities but 
hardly so in essence.   
Various types of bonuses, allowances and benefits continue to occupy a 
substantial part of the overall remuneration package for most civil servants. 
Remuneration consists of basic salary plus various extras for service rank, length of 
service, special conditions and bonuses. At present the total remuneration package 
amounts on average to 1.75 – 2.5 multiple on basic salary for low and middle level 
servants respectively and 4-8 times basic salary for top level bureaucrats.  
Performance related pay has been declared one of the civil service reform’s 
principal objectives but its mechanism is still in an experimental phase. Absence of 
direct linkage between achieved results and pay, and between merit and promotion 
prospects encourages preservation of underdeveloped service delivery standards and 
limited interest in user feedback. 
As we already emphasized above, remuneration of an average Russian civil 
servant during the 1990s was unacceptably low. Average salary amounting to an 
equivalent of 200 USD in the mid 1990s increased to 400 USD in 1998 and then 
abruptly declined to 180-200 USD following the financial crisis and default of the 
rouble.  
The situation with civil servants’ pay began to improve in the early 2000s 
as a result of economic growth and sharp increase in state budget revenues following 
upsurge of international oil and gas prices.    
According to data provided by Russian audit and consulting company FBK, 
only in 2002-2003 nominal salaries of civil servants were increased by a factor of 
1.7 (Nikolaev, 2006:124). In 2004 the overall remuneration package including 
various bonuses and allowances was raised on average 5-8 times for Russian 
ministers and deputy ministers, 4 – 6 times for heads of departments and their 
deputies, 3-4 times for heads of section and their deputies, and 2-3 times for other 
civil servants (Vedomosti, 12 September 2004). It should be emphasized that the 
base-salary, transparent to the society and various control agencies, was increased at 
much slower rate in comparison with various types of bonuses.  
  66
The Federal State Statistics Service estimated an average monthly pay of a 
Moscow based federal civil servant in 2005 at the level of 24,124 rubles (approx. 
800 USD). Average civil servants’ pay in regional government across the country 
amounted to 16,612 rubles (approx. 570 USD). (Kommersant Daily, 27 March 
2006).  
 
 
3.13 Education and Training 
 
Russia has a sound human resource base with a well-developed educational 
system that is capable of imparting a wide variety of skills, both basic and advanced. 
Before the fall of the communist regime state administration employees were re-
trained and upgraded their qualification in the network of party schools and the 
Academy of National Economy.  
In 1995 a Presidential decree established the Russian Academy of Civil 
Service with a wide network of regional branches. The central office of the 
Academy in Moscow offers training courses mainly for mid and top level civil 
servants.   
In the same year the Russian Ministry of Education approved a standard of 
training for students enrolled on specialization N 0610 “State and municipal 
management”. In 2002 this programme was delivered in 58 state and 12 non-state 
educational institutions of higher learning. The total number of students enrolled in 
this specialization was 20,000. (RACS, 2002:164). 
However, the professional level of Russian civil servants in the 1990s and 
to a large extent at present is overall insufficient. For instance in 2004, in violation 
of the requirements of the federal law, 5.8% of civil servants in the category 
“advisors” and 25% in the category “specialists” did not have higher education. 
Among civil servants with higher education less than 5% graduated from “state and 
municipal management” faculties or departments. (Kotchegura, 2006:281)  
Current legislation requires that every civil servant should undergo re-
training or up-grading of qualifications at least once in three years. However, this 
requirement has never been fully met. For example, in 2004 only 15.7% of all civil 
servants passed through various types of training and up-grading of qualification 
(Federal State Statistics Service, 2005: 150).   
The existing system of post-entry training of civil servants was frequently 
criticized throughout the 1990s and later. The expert community and mass media 
singled out the following main drawbacks:  
- serious under-financing of training of civil servants; 
- low relevance of training to the real needs and demands of civil 
servants; 
- shortage of qualified teaching staff;  
- weak competition between training institutions; 
- no effective mechanism for identification of required skills and 
assessment of the training needs; 
- very weak, if any, impact of successful training on promotion.  
Among other weaknesses is shortage of specialized programmes for top 
level civil servants and of professional development programmes for every staff 
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member. The enforcement of the latter could reduce fragmentation and 
inconsistency of training throughout a civil servants’ career.  
Starting from 2004 funding from the state budget of civil servants’ post 
entry training has been increasing with overall positive impact on the quality and 
results of training programmes.  
 
 
3.15 Societal and Administrative Traditions, Values and Culture 
 
In exploring the essence of the Russian civil service system it is important 
to be aware of a long-standing tradition in Russia of domination of the state over 
society. The priority task in the 15-17th centuries was the formation of the 
centralised Russian state. Defending it against hostile neighbours required 
mobilisation of all resources leading to establishment of very close linkages between 
the state and the society. Consequently, all social groups had to provide direct 
services to the state and citizens were often regarded as “servicemen” of the state.  
The role of the state and state administration was constantly growing under 
the monarchy and particularly during the Soviet times. Although the communist 
ideological postulates advocated disappearance of the state but in reality the 
Bolsheviks created a system where the state dominated all spheres of social life and 
controlled to a substantial degree the life of individuals.  
Soviet state and society were characterised by a monopoly position of the 
communist party and excessive concentration of policy-making and planning 
functions in Moscow. Traditions and institutions associated with democracy and the 
rule of law were either weak or absent. The tsar’s and communist bureaucracies 
were largely responsible for the widespread alienation of citizens towards the state 
administrations and for their cynical attitude towards the law. 
Due to the dominant role of the state in the past and prevalence of 
entrenched patronage networks, the state is still considered by many citizens and 
civil servants as the main actor in resource allocation. The state is often perceived as 
a patron dealing with a select clientele. This is one of the reasons why many civil 
servants find it difficult to draw a clear distinction between public and private 
domains.   
Many experts emphasize the uniqueness of the Russian culture in many 
ways different to European and Asian models (Kulinchenko, 2002). In contrast to 
the West European culture, Russian culture is less rational and pragmatic and is 
more emotional. It is less individualistic and more community oriented. Whereas 
western culture gives priority to efficiency and material wealth, Russian culture 
promotes domination of moral and spiritual values. At the same time this culture 
leaves enough room for the development of individual personality (e.g. world 
famous Russian scientists, writers, composers, artists). One of the main sources of 
Russian uniqueness is orthodox Christianity. 
Orientation towards establishment of personal ties as the main instrument 
of solving various problems appears to be deeply rooted in the prevailing mentality. 
According to the findings of various representative polls up to 75% of the 
respondents consider good personal ties as an indispensable prerequisite for success 
in life (Otechestvennyie Zapiski, 2004:226).  
Russia has a very limited (even when compared to the Eastern European 
countries) record of democratic bourgeois development but a lengthy historical 
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legacy of absolutism and despotism. The monarchy was abolished in March 1917 
and already in November 1917 the Bolsheviks came to power. So the traditions of 
‘authoritarian, Byzantine type’ rule and of disregard of the law are strong and those 
of defending individual rights and making one’s demands known are not yet 
sufficiently developed.  
There has never really been a sustained tradition of “service for the public” 
and observing the principle of impartiality in the Russian state administration. The 
tendency towards behavioral conservatism in various organs of public 
administration is deeply rooted and democratic traditions are virtually absent. 
During Soviet times such fundamental principles of state administration as ethics, 
transparency and accountability were either unknown or understood quite differently 
to the way they are perceived in modern civil services.  
The existing administrative culture regards secrecy as a virtue, whereas 
responsiveness, transparency and dialogue with citizens are generally viewed as 
matters of secondary importance at best.    
Another significant feature of the administrative culture in Russia is rather 
low respect for law. A representative survey conducted by the Russian Academy of 
Civil Service among federal civil servants in 1999 showed that in performing their 
duties near 70% of civil servants gave priority to following the instructions of their 
superiors and only second priority to compliance with existing rules and regulations 
(Grishkovets, 2002).    
Russian society has changed dramatically during the last decade. Many of 
the above mentioned values and traditions appear to have been affected in recent 
years by new “standards” coming from the West and regretfully not always the best 
ones.  Even so, the legacy of the past continues to be a powerful factor exerting a 
strong impact on administrative developments in Russia as shown in the subsequent 
chapters of this study.  
 
 
3.16 Accountability and Responsibility  
 
Key principles of any democracy is the requirement that the bureaucracy 
should bear responsibility, must be subject to scrutiny, and made accountable to 
legislature, state controlling agencies, the electorate and civil society at large.  
The demise of the communist system created a situation when the former 
"master" - the communist party, which exercised strict control over conduct of its 
members and citizens - disappeared. The replacement system and democratic 
institutions were not sufficiently strong or mature to ensure that the bureaucracy 
effectively serves the democratic state and the people. As often happens, the reality 
has fallen well short of the ideal.  
The very first decree of President V. Putin, when he assumed office in 
2000, is remarkable in many ways. This decree granted the former President 
B.Yeltsin immunity from any type of criminal or administrative persecution. This 
legal act provides good illustration of the status of accountability of some state 
officials in Russia.  
Several points should be stressed here:  
(i) The Law on State Civil Service adopted in 2004 provides for several 
types of responsibility of civil servants. They are subject to disciplinary, 
 
 68
legacy of absolutism and despotism. The monarchy was abolished in March 1917 
and already in November 1917 the Bolsheviks came to power. So the traditions of 
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administrative, criminal and material (compensation of damage) responsibility. 
However, in reality this responsibility is almost exclusively internal;  
(ii) The recent decade saw a steady erosion of accountability and 
responsibility accepted by the Government and federal ministers. “Decisions in the 
executive branch in essence are taken collectively, nobody carries personal 
responsibility”. (Otechestvennyie Zapiski, 2004:86); 
(iii) Furthermore, within prevailing clientele/patronage networks 
responsibility and accountability of civil servants to the society and citizens have 
been replaced by accountability to those who authorises appointments and 
promotions. 
"The administration was never accountable to the general public," Mikhail 
Dmitriev, the first Deputy Minister for economic development, said in an interview 
to the "International Herald Tribune" on 19 July 2006. "It was never in fact 
responsible for delivering a high quality service to society. Ordinary citizens were 
considered subjects to be ruled who themselves should serve the state." 
During most of the 1990s and 2000s the President and the Government 
could largely control decision-making in the Parliament and the latter’s role of 
counter-weight in the system of "checks and balances" was seriously undermined. 
As a result accountability of the executive to the legislature has been weak. For 
example, the decision of the Parliament to carry out an audit of the activities of the 
government apparatus in 1994 was effectively blocked by the Prime-Minister. In 
another case, in January 2003 the deputies of the Duma were infuriated by the 
incapacity of the Government to cope with chronic failures of heating systems, 
which left over 50 thousand people in the Russian North defenseless against severe 
frost. The deputies requested the Prime Minister to come and report on the situation 
to the Parliament. The Head of the Government refused and send his Deputy instead.   
   
 
3.17  Ethical Standards and Corruption  
 
The latest decade has witnessed a considerable decline of moral and ethical 
standards in society and in the civil service. The excessive involvement of the state 
in economic activities, growth of mixed forms of public/private ownership, reduced 
oversight and control over the bureaucracy by the legislature and civil society 
exposed civil servants to wide opportunities for obtaining personal gain.  
Since the late 1980s corruption has grown considerably in scale and variety 
of forms it takes and at present poses a serious threat to the democratic gains and 
advance of reforms in Russia.  Apart from reaching new proportions it has become 
generally less risky, more cynical, cash oriented and profitable. In view of many 
experts corruption in Russia has become virtually “institutionalized” to the extent 
that there exists a market of state portfolio and services. Many civil servants are 
involved in commercial activities and in the 1990s some commercial entities have 
been defining state policy in certain areas.  
The notion of “conflict of interest” is only being introduced within the 
framework of the civil service reform and even now instances of its formal exposure 
are rare. Often civil servants do not realize that their conduct is improper. Such a 
situation is profitable for large businesses which benefit significantly from 
protectionist practices and government patronage. 
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Estimates made by experts of  “Technologies – XXI century” show that 
businesses in Russia spend minimum USD 500 million a month (USD 6 billion a 
year) on bribing federal and regional officials. A poll conducted by the Foundation 
“Public Opinion” in four regions of Russia in 2004 revealed that over 76% of 
citizens encountered cases of corruptive behavior of civil servants.  (Yuzhakov, 
2005).  
Already back in 1992 President B. Yeltsin signed a decree “On fighting 
corruption in the system of the civil service”. Failure to enforce its basic provisions 
became evident very soon. From the outset it was envisaged that the decree would 
be followed by a respective law. However, almost ten years of fight to get various 
anti-corruption draft laws passed through the Parliament has so far brought no result. 
Since 1998 several bills on fighting corruption were submitted by a group of 
deputies  to the Duma, each time to be rejected by the Duma committees. Another 
draft was tabled in 2007 and is still in the Parliament.  
In his annual address to the Federal Assembly in 2006 President V. Putin 
made the following statement  “despite all the efforts we have made, we have still 
not yet managed to remove one of the greatest obstacles facing our development, 
that of corruption.” 
The Presidential Administration and the Government have recently 
established an Anti-Corruption Board to elaborate and coordinate a programme of 
anti-corruption measures. However, the precise mission and authority of the Board 
has not been defined yet. Available information indicates that the Board had only two 
meetings during the two years following its formation.    
Many observers express scepticism over the prospects of steady advance of 
the anti-corruption campaign prior to the presidential elections in 2008.  
 
 
3.18  Assessment of Available Resources  
Successful operation of any civil service is contingent, among other things, 
upon adequate funding and availability of well educated and motivated professional 
staff. Throughout the 1990s the Russian civil service was operating under severe 
budget constraints. One of the implications was low remuneration which could no 
longer serve as a serious motivating factor for the majority of civil servants. At that 
time many government agencies experienced frequent shortages of even very basic 
items such as paper or funds for intercity telephone communications.  
In 2000 only 10% of interviewed civil servants were quite confident in the 
stability of their employment, 33% were somewhat confident and 47% pointed to 
their lack of confidence in this respect (RACS, 2002:187). As we have stressed 
above in the 1990s many professionals left the civil service for more lucrative jobs 
in the private sector. As a result, by the early 2000s there had grown serious deficit 
of specialists of up to 45 years of age knowledgeable in and capable of applying 
modern management technologies (Federal Programme ‘Reform of the Civil Service 
of the Russian Federation’, 2002). In his address to the Federal Assembly on the 
16th of May 2003, President V.Putin remarked that ‘despite a huge number of state 
officials… this country finds itself in dire need of modern managers.’ 
In the 1990s the percentage of the federal state budget expenditure 
allocated to finance the system of public administration in Russia amounted on 
average to 3% (RACS, 2002:148). In the majority of industrialized countries the 
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respective figure is on average 8-10%. In 2002 this percentage grew to 3.59% 
(Savchenko, 2006:19) and continued to increase in the subsequent years. However, 
in the view of some experts the official data do not reflect the real expenditure of the 
state in this area and suggest an under estimate by a factor of two (Nikolaev, 2006).   
Deficit of proper motivation of civil servants, in particular absence of direct 
linkage between pay and performance, is another factor which undermines the 
effectiveness of the Russian civil service and its potential for reform. As a result, for 
example, the state resources are either wasted at best, or used for enriching corrupt 
officials at worst.   
 
3.19 Civil Service and Civil Society 
 
One of the peculiarities of the Russian transition to market economy and 
democratic society consisted in the absence of a long term and steady interaction 
between the “new” political elite and the society at large as well as lack of a single 
uniform system of values accepted both by the elite and masses.  
The formation and development of the new political institutions in 
contemporary Russia was not so much the result of “bottom up” pressure from the 
society but rather emerged as the product of the “top down” policies pursued by 
relatively narrow but dynamic post-communist elites. This also contributed to 
widespread alienation of citizens to the political institutions imposed from above.  
 The civil society, which could have played a positive role in stimulating 
adherence to democratic principles and strict accountability across all levels of 
government, is still at an early stage of development. The widespread political 
apathy and abstention of the population created favourable conditions for the 
subordination of the public administration to narrowly based interests.   
The idea of a bureaucracy both responsive and accountable to the people 
has not yet penetrated the "social consciousness". Instead, the state apparatus is 
often viewed as a “thing in itself”, as a corps of professionals who in their activities 
are guided above all by the “corporate” interests of the bureaucracy and by wishes of 
the “powers that be”. The latest surveys show that 72% of civil servants reckon that 
their work should be assessed as good whereas 71% of citizens are not satisfied with 
civil servants’ activities (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2006:10).     
A poll conducted among Russian citizens and civil servants in 2001 to 
establish their assessment of moral qualities of civil servants gave the results shown 
in Table 3.2.   
 
Table 3.2   Assessment of the moral qualities of the Russian civil servants 
 
 Opinion of civil servants Opinion of citizens 
Majority of civil servants are 
honest, incorrupt and committed
 
 
22.8% 
 
13% 
Number of honest and dishonest 
civil servants is approx. equal  
 
 
58.6% 
 
51% 
Majority of civil servants are 
not quite honest and corruption 
resistant and few are committed 
 
8.9% 
 
30% 
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Source: the Russian Civil Service: Analysis of Formation and Personnel 
Development, RACS, 2002, Moscow, p.326    
 
The following arguments are most often used by citizens in explaining their 
rather negative perception of civil servants: a) majority of civil servants do not know 
real needs of the people; b) they enjoy special privileges although at the beginning 
were against such preferences themselves; c) they are preoccupied only with the 
fight for their place near the “feeding trough”; and d) they do not seek opinion of 
citizens. Among other factors that undermine positive image of civil servants in 
society are: lack of transparency, the gap between words and deeds, and the 
instances of corruptive behavior (RACS, 2004  b: 28-31).  
It would be incorrect to conclude that most civil servants in Russia are not 
dutiful and law abiding employees. However, prevailing in the Russian civil service, 
particularly in the 1990’s, instability and patronage practices, complemented until 
recently by highly unattractive remuneration conditions, have seriously distorted 
civil servants’ traditional incentives - patriotism, loyalty and sense of duty - and 
devaluated such merits as responsibility, honesty and respect for the law. 
The majority of the civil service cadre is not ready for performing their 
duties under the conditions of transparency and accountability and to treat citizens 
as clients. Opinion polls carried out in the 1990s among civil servants showed that 
on average only 10% of the respondents singled out “greater oversight from 
citizens” as one of the methods of removing shortcomings and deficiencies in the 
civil service. (RACS, 2002 a:14).    
A survey of the heads of personnel and training departments of the federal 
and regional executive agencies (autumn 1997) demonstrated that only 10% of those 
interviewed considered strengthening the public relations component as one of 
priority topics for training of civil servants. Analysis of the statutes of PR 
departments of regional administrations revealed that only 30% of them are tasked 
"to ensure transparency and openness of the activities of the administration" as one 
of the priority activities of the departments (RACS, 2002a:16).    
The deeply embedded culture of secrecy and treatment of citizens as 
subordinates is not easy to overcome. Certain measures have been introduced in 
recent years (though far from sufficient) to secure opportunities for ordinary citizen 
to gain some form of redress in situations of unfair treatment by authorities or 
material damage inflicted by the latter’s actions. Steps have also been taken to 
improve citizens’ access to the information about the administrative regulations and 
decision making. These include, inter alia, establishment of the Ombudsman office, 
approval of legislation that allows citizens to claim compensation for the damage 
inflicted by the state bodies and civil servants, and submission to the Duma of the 
draft Law ‘On Free Access to Information About Government Activities’.   
 
   
3.20  Conclusions  
 
Since the 16th century the Russian state administration has been developing 
within the political and cultural environment characterized by either strong elements 
of absolutism and despotism or non-democratic form of governance. The main 
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orientation of the state administrators has always been to the state and primarily to 
the ruler of the state. The state bureaucracy enjoyed a privileged status and was 
actually exempt from effective social control. Its most typical features were strong 
authoritarian tendencies, neglect of the needs of common people, and opposition to 
the society at large. The traditions of ‘authoritarian, Byzantine type’ rule and of 
structural and behavioural conservatism were deeply rooted and commitment to 
democratic principles was virtually absent.  
The situation in this respect did not change much under the Soviet system.  
The following bureaucratic characteristics were typical of the soviet state 
administration: rigid and complex hierarchy with decision making function only at 
the top of the command structure; authority derived from personal ties rather than 
merit; and prevalence of rigid rules undermined by vertically organized patronage. 
The Soviet Russia system of governance crumbled in the early 1990s when 
the new political leaders committed themselves to democratic principles, the 
economy was opened to the market and the Soviet Union ceased to exist. By 1991 
the system of nomenklatura in Russia was largerly demolished.  
The early 1990s were marked by some positive developments in the 
Russian public administration. These included adoption of a basic regulatory 
framework aimed at the formation of a modern civil service as a distinct legal and 
social institution, a set of specialized activities and functions, and unity of 
professional cadres with relevant resources. 
However, it appears that measures undertaken throughout the 1990s to 
modernize the civil service were episodic, inconsistent, uncoordinated, and with no 
sound strategy geared to perspective. The biggest drawback of the adopted 
legislation was its weak enforcement.  
In spite of the profound transformation of the political and economic 
system in the 1990s, many outdated structures and procedures within the state 
administration as well as inherited from the Soviet times incentive and motivation 
schemes have been left largely intact. A merit system has been declared a 
fundamental principle of the civil service but in practice has often been substituted 
by personal loyalty. Authoritarian tendencies and elements of clannish bureaucracy 
remained deeply rooted. 
The Russian bureaucracy managed to retain its influence, in fact 
strengthened it further by accumulating state property and resources and additionally 
reducing control to which the bureaucracy had been previously subject. 
Opportunities for promoting “corporate” interests of the bureaucratic establishment 
have eventually increased in scope.  
A prominent Russian economist made the following statement: “During 
recent 15 years of economic and political reforms, in spite of all turbulence and 
uncertainty, there has been only one steady and constantly advancing process in 
Russia, - the process of liberation of state bureaucracy from any control by the 
society and from any accountability to the society” (Delyagin, 2005). This statement 
may be regarded as exaggerated to a certain extent but is true in principle. A recent 
OECD report described Russia in a similar way as a “weak state with strong 
bureaucrats” (OECD, 2006:1).  
By the mid 1990s Russia had largely adopted a career based model of civil 
service.  Many elements of this model were borrowed from the French civil service 
system. This can be explained by both similarity of the Russian and French 
Constitutional orders, with a strong Presidency being one of their distinguishing 
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may be regarded as exaggerated to a certain extent but is true in principle. A recent 
OECD report described Russia in a similar way as a “weak state with strong 
bureaucrats” (OECD, 2006:1).  
By the mid 1990s Russia had largely adopted a career based model of civil 
service.  Many elements of this model were borrowed from the French civil service 
system. This can be explained by both similarity of the Russian and French 
Constitutional orders, with a strong Presidency being one of their distinguishing 
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common features, and by close collaboration between Russian and French officials 
and experts on public administration in the development of conceptual approaches 
and documents (Zaitseva, 2003:69). Contrary to the French model, the Russian 
model retained many outdated practices, rules and traditions. In practice the 
distinction is manifested above all in considerably lower extent of accountability of 
the bureaucracy to the parliament and to the citizens than in France.    
Throughout the decade that followed the demise of the communist rule the 
capacity for civil service reform in the Russian Federation remained overall low. 
This capacity was undermined by the following major factors: 
- excessive politicisation of the civil service; 
- domination of informal patronage networks; 
- widespread corruption; 
- absence throughout the 1990s of committed reform stakeholders, e.g. 
mature civil society, influential business sector, strong political 
opposition; 
- shortage of qualified expertise; 
- severe financial constrains (until early 2000s); 
- lack of political will to launch civil service reform until the election of 
the new President in 2000.  
The reform capacity was further affected by unpredictability and 
uncertainty of the political and economic situation in Russia and overall absence of a 
clear and sound long term strategy for the country’s development.    
Summing up, formation in modern Russia of an efficient, accountable and 
corruption immune civil service turned out to be an extremely complicated task and 
in spite of certain achievements by the early 2000s the bulk of the effort was still 
lying ahead.  
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CHAPTER IV  
REFORM OF THE RUSSIAN CIVIL SERVICE: WHO WILL WIN 
THIS TIME – BUREAUCRACY OR POLITICIANS?   
 
 
4.1   Introduction 
The previous chapter was devoted to the study of the status of the Russian 
civil service and its capacity for reform. Consistent with the logic of our research we 
now turn to the analysis of the actual preparation and implementation of civil service 
reform in the Russian Federation.  
Following our methodological approach we start with review of numerous 
attempts to modernize the state apparatus in the post-communist Russia during the 
1990s. Then we examine the reform driving forces and the circumstances, both 
favourable and unfavourable, for its initiation and implementation.  
The reform’s conceptual documents, its overall dimensions and directions 
are then analysed. This analysis is complemented by study of the reform related 
legislation and the processes of the administrative reform launched almost 
simultaneously with that of the civil service.   
Subsequently we explore the reform’s preliminary outcomes, as well as 
difficulties and constraints revealed during the process of its implementation.  
Through the course of the analysis special attention is paid to a set of issues 
relevant to the nature of civil service reform as defined in the Protocol for 
comparative studies of national civil service systems. These issues comprise, in 
particular, the reform’s major stakeholders, its objectives and implementation 
mechanisms, its results and the extent of external influence on the selection of the 
reform’s agenda and priorities.   
Positive and negative experience in implementing the reform of the Russian 
civil service is summarized in the conclusions to this chapter.  
 
 
4.2  Pressure for Change  
Systems of civil service are not static and evolve to reflect the social and 
economic pressures as well as the interplay of different political forces. By the late 
1990s it became clear to many observers that the outdated and practically unchanged 
paradigm of the Russian state administration not only failed to meet the new 
challenges but was actually in conflict with the requirements of Russia’s prospective 
development. In his 2005 annual address to the RF Federal Assembly President V. 
Putin emphasized that   “Our bureaucratic apparatus is still largely an exclusive and 
often arrogant caste viewing state service as an alternative form of business. 
Therefore, our priority remains making state management more effective, ensuring 
that officials strictly obey the law and quality public services are provided to the 
population”.  
The Russian Minister of Economic Development and Trade G.Gref stated in 
July 2002 “Russia is losing up to 2% of GDP because of poor public management”. 
Even more impressive are the losses caused by corruption in the state administration, 
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estimated by various sources to be in access of USD 35 billion annually (INDEM, 
2003).          
Public opinion polls conducted in 1999 showed that over half of 
respondents assessed negatively the work of Russian civil servants. Of those 
interviewed 66% attributed their negative attitude to widespread corruption in state 
administration, 48% to red tape and arrogance, and 48% to neglect of the interests of 
citizens (RACS, 2002:11).  Recent surveys point to further deterioration of these 
tendencies.  
Throughout most of the 1990s, in the absence of a clearly defined 
institutional framework for decision-making and authority, reform minded politicians 
and officials both in the Russian Government and the State Duma (Parliament) tried 
independently to develop initiatives aimed at modernization of state administration. 
The political and financial crisis in 1998, growing fragmentation of the state, upsurge 
of corruption, criminalization of the economy, steep decline of public’s confidence in 
the President and Government all made implementation of in-depth civil service and 
administrative reforms an even greater and more urgent priority than it was in the 
early 1990s.  
For many years there has been also lack of unity of political and social 
forces that could apply effective pressure to eventually achieve preparation and 
launch of civil service reform. Their capacity to influence political decision-making 
process was weak. Equally, civil society in Russia has not yet reached a sufficient 
state of maturity and therefore was not in a position to serve as a reform inducing 
factor. 
All this has led to the emergence of various contradictions. For example, one 
could note the contradiction between civil servants who were oriented to advance in 
their career by means of high professionalism and those who were relying mainly on 
the mechanism of protection and personal loyalty; contradiction between free market 
operators who expected fair competition and its inhibition by numerous 
administrative barriers artificially and selectively created by the bureaucrats; or 
contradiction between the declared objectives and tasks of the state administration 
and lack of clear division of authority among government agencies complemented by 
insufficient resources for their achievement.   
By the late 1990s considerable pressure for initiation of reform came from 
the distinct negative tendencies in the economic and social development of the 
country, worsening of practically all parameters of performance of the government 
and state agencies and lowering of living standards of the majority of the population. 
These tendencies could not have been disregarded by the politicians who wished to 
count on any respect and support of citizens.  
 
 
4.3  Preparation of Reform  
In Russia, where the state formerly performed all basic functions (many of 
which in a modern society are often executed by independent organisations and 
associations), the very notion of civil service and the role it should play within the 
context of new democratic institutions and market oriented economy have been 
subject of intensive debate and controversy. Following the break up of the Soviet 
Union in 1991 and subsequent collapse of the government infrastructure the new 
political leadership of Russia declared transformation of the communist state 
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apparatus into an efficient state administration capable of promoting and regulating 
market relations and acting in a new democratic environment as one of its top 
priorities. However, during the 1990s the reform of state administration lagged far 
behind political and economic reforms in the country.  
It should be noted that the first commission on the elaboration of a draft law 
on civil service was established in the Soviet Parliament (Supreme Soviet) in 1989 
i.e. already during the advanced stage of perestroika and prior to the ban on the 
communist party and break up of the Soviet Union. By 1991 the commission 
prepared the first draft Law “On the Federal Civil Service of the USSR”. That was 
an absolute innovation in the history of the Soviet state though one of whole series of 
new developments in various spheres of social and political life at the later stages of 
perestroika. The draft law stipulated the formation of the Commission of the Civil 
Service of the USSR as its managing and control body. This initiative did not 
materialize at that time though it laid the foundation for subsequent plans to develop 
civil service legislation. Nonetheless, in 1992-1993 the Russian Parliament continued 
its work on the preparation of draft civil service legislation. The political crisis in 
1993 put this process on hold.  
 Following the formation of the Russian Federation as a sovereign state in 
1991 the issue of transformation of the state administration and control over it 
became highly politicized. Different lobby groups attempted to push their schemes of 
the organisation and reform of the state administrative apparatus. At least three 
separate drafts of civil service reform were circulating during the period 1992-1995, 
each reflecting different interests of particular groups of players.  
An attempt was made in 1991 to set up a special central organ to manage 
state administration - Department on civil service issues under the President of the 
Russian Federation. However, due to a number of political and organizational 
constraints these plans failed. Already at that time the importance of full political 
support for the reform from the highest levels of state and government became quite 
evident.  
 In 1992, thanks to the efforts of the reformers, a new structural unit ‘The 
Chief Department on Personnel Training’ (Roskadry) was created under the 
Government of the Russian Federation. This Department was made responsible not 
only for training of government officials, but also for developing concepts of 
reforming state administration and respective legislation. Activities of Roskadry 
contributed to the adoption in 1993 of the first normative acts concerning the civil 
service. They were the Presidential decrees “On Priority Measures to Organize a 
System of Civil Service in the Russian Federation” and “Regulations on the Federal 
Civil Service” signed by the President respectively on 3 June and 22 December 1993 
(Atamanchuk, 2002:63). These documents outlined general provisions with regard to 
the organization and operation of the civil service at the federal and regional levels.    
Simultaneously experts of Roskadry worked on the elaboration of the 
concept of civil service reform. The guidelines of draft concept of reform of the 
Russian civil service were published for the first time in the Rossiyskaya Gazeta on 
23-24th December 1993. The concept was based on the assumption that legal, 
normative institutional establishment and development of the civil service will take 
at least several years and in view of overall political and economic uncertainty in the 
country the approach to reform should take a form of small steps rather than “big 
bang”. The contents of the document reflected largely the vision of a career based, 
state oriented civil service.   
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Regretfully from its very origin Roskadry lacked a clear-cut mandate and 
authority to ensure appropriate policy making capacity. Declining political support to 
its mission led to abolishment of Roskadry in early 1994. 
In February 1994 the Department of Federal Civil Service of the President 
of the RF was established (Zaitseva, ed., 2003:284).  This was followed in June 1994 
by the creation of the Russian Academy of Civil Service – a central national 
educational institution responsible for training of middle and top level civil servants.   
Following many years of controversy and debate, the Law “On the Basic 
Principles of the Civil Service of the Russian Federation” was finally adopted by the 
Parliament in summer 1995 (three years after the publication of the first draft). It 
became the first basic legal document which laid the foundation for the proper 
organization and functioning of the Russian civil service. The Law’s basic provisions 
stipulated the creation of a career civil service system.  
In the mid 1990s a debate on the future of the Russian civil service led to 
the emergence of two groups of experts each advocating essentially different 
approaches to the civil service and its reform. The first approach (often called 
institutional) was based on the assumption that civil service is a social and legal 
institution serving above all interests of citizens, society and the state. The second 
approach (called political) viewed civil service primarily as professional activities 
ensuring execution of authority of state bodies and realization of the policies mapped 
out by the political forces in power.  
By the mid 1990s Russia had largely adopted a model based on the second 
approach. In elaborating essential elements of this model experience of the French 
civil service was widely used. This could be explained both by similarity of the 
Russian and French Constitutional arrangements and by close cooperation of the 
Russian and French officials and experts on public administration in drafting the 
conceptual approaches and documents for the development of the Russian state 
administration (Zaitseva, ed. 2003:69).     
   In the late 1990s elaboration of civil service reform concepts in Russia was 
largely conducted as part of preparation of a broader administrative reform. A 
prominent role was played by a group of the closest advisors to President Yeltsin. 
They tried to push the President for the start of in depth transformation of the system 
of governance and civil service. This time the developers of the reform concept 
advocated creation of the model based on the first (institutional) approach.    
In March 1998 President Yeltsin made an announcement about the 
forthcoming administrative reform that would drastically transform the whole branch 
of executive power in Russia. He promised to make public the concept of the reform 
drafted by a team of his advisors and assistants. Although the text of this document 
was never published (which came as no surprise for the connoisseurs of bureaucratic 
behaviour), the available information about its contents allowed conclusion that it 
was in many ways a remarkable document.  
For the first time the programme of administrative reform (including reform 
of the civil service) was based on a comprehensive strategic approach that 
established priority issues and a sequence of actions in implementing reform. It 
comprised some rather ‘revolutionary’ (at least for Russia) measures. The concept 
envisaged, for instance, abolishment of the powerful Apparatus of the Government 
and considerable downsizing of the President’s Administration, as well as delegation 
of greater authority and responsibility to the ministries, the number of which was to 
be also reduced. The concept was generally in line with the modern trends in 
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administrative and civil service reform. It addressed such important and burning 
issues of civil service development in Russia as performance based pay, merit based 
evaluation and career advance, impartiality and accountability, fight against 
corruption, provision of quality services to citizens, enhancement of inter-agency co-
operation, improving relations between federal centre and regions, etc. The 
document stated that the transformation of the administrative apparatus would take 
around 8-10 years. However, as often happened to reform initiatives in Russia, in 
particular in the sphere of governance, these measures remained mostly on paper. 
“Even if there were no other reasons for the failure to implement the reform 
programme of 1998, there were no sufficient political desire and attention to support 
it. Although the programme was officially approved and acknowledged, the Yeltsin 
administration lacked sufficient understanding, stamina or willingness to implement 
it.” (Larjavaara, 2001:56). 
By the early 2000s the changes introduced into the Russian administrative 
system did not appear to have followed any specific pattern, were adhoc and largely 
cosmetic. These changes were not designed to alter the nature of the existing 
administrative system and were far from being comprehensive. Boris Yeltsin did 
little to change the essence of the previous administrative system and modernize the 
state apparatus because in this respect the prevailing situation suited him. He used 
the outdated structures and mechanisms to consolidate his position by acting as 
arbitrator in bureaucratic battles stemming from the poorly demarcated division of 
authority.  
 
4.4  Reform Driving Forces  
It is widely acknowledged (as we have shown in Chapter II) that political 
will and political leadership are the crucial factors in any far reaching changes 
affecting the administrative institutions, structures, styles and culture.  
In spite of President Yeltsin’s occasional lavish rhetoric regarding the need 
for civil service reform it was never followed by equally strong action. For example, 
in his state of the nation address in March 1997 President Yeltsin emphasised that it 
was time to restore order above all in the governing bodies at all levels: ‘The 
authorities are getting fat…, they are only concerned with their own well-being… 
There is corruption at every level of power … The Government, not circumstance, 
must lead the country”. He promised a fundamental reform of the executive power 
but gave no details how he intended to carry it out. The ‘reform’ itself was later 
confined to a limited set of measures, mainly liquidation of several ministries and 
appointment of new Deputies to the Prime Minister. True, there existed (as we have 
shown above) a small group of advisors and experts which tried to initiate reform but 
their policy making ability turned out to be limited. By 2000 the mandate of 
President Yeltsin to reform the civil service has been largely unfulfilled.  
Society was in clear need for a more consistent and objective approach 
regarding reform of the country’s numerous bureaucracy and this fact seems to have 
been clearly realized by the new political leadership, namely, President V.Putin. On 
24 November 2000, just six months after being elected, the new Russian President 
sent a letter to the Prime Minister M. Kasyanov requesting that proposals for the civil 
service reform be prepared by 1 May 2001 (Zaitseva, ed. 2003:172).  
 
 79
administrative and civil service reform. It addressed such important and burning 
issues of civil service development in Russia as performance based pay, merit based 
evaluation and career advance, impartiality and accountability, fight against 
corruption, provision of quality services to citizens, enhancement of inter-agency co-
operation, improving relations between federal centre and regions, etc. The 
document stated that the transformation of the administrative apparatus would take 
around 8-10 years. However, as often happened to reform initiatives in Russia, in 
particular in the sphere of governance, these measures remained mostly on paper. 
“Even if there were no other reasons for the failure to implement the reform 
programme of 1998, there were no sufficient political desire and attention to support 
it. Although the programme was officially approved and acknowledged, the Yeltsin 
administration lacked sufficient understanding, stamina or willingness to implement 
it.” (Larjavaara, 2001:56). 
By the early 2000s the changes introduced into the Russian administrative 
system did not appear to have followed any specific pattern, were adhoc and largely 
cosmetic. These changes were not designed to alter the nature of the existing 
administrative system and were far from being comprehensive. Boris Yeltsin did 
little to change the essence of the previous administrative system and modernize the 
state apparatus because in this respect the prevailing situation suited him. He used 
the outdated structures and mechanisms to consolidate his position by acting as 
arbitrator in bureaucratic battles stemming from the poorly demarcated division of 
authority.  
 
4.4  Reform Driving Forces  
It is widely acknowledged (as we have shown in Chapter II) that political 
will and political leadership are the crucial factors in any far reaching changes 
affecting the administrative institutions, structures, styles and culture.  
In spite of President Yeltsin’s occasional lavish rhetoric regarding the need 
for civil service reform it was never followed by equally strong action. For example, 
in his state of the nation address in March 1997 President Yeltsin emphasised that it 
was time to restore order above all in the governing bodies at all levels: ‘The 
authorities are getting fat…, they are only concerned with their own well-being… 
There is corruption at every level of power … The Government, not circumstance, 
must lead the country”. He promised a fundamental reform of the executive power 
but gave no details how he intended to carry it out. The ‘reform’ itself was later 
confined to a limited set of measures, mainly liquidation of several ministries and 
appointment of new Deputies to the Prime Minister. True, there existed (as we have 
shown above) a small group of advisors and experts which tried to initiate reform but 
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Society was in clear need for a more consistent and objective approach 
regarding reform of the country’s numerous bureaucracy and this fact seems to have 
been clearly realized by the new political leadership, namely, President V.Putin. On 
24 November 2000, just six months after being elected, the new Russian President 
sent a letter to the Prime Minister M. Kasyanov requesting that proposals for the civil 
service reform be prepared by 1 May 2001 (Zaitseva, ed. 2003:172).  
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Under President Putin preparation for reform was accelerated with the issue 
in December 2000 of a directive by the Presidential Administration on establishment 
of an inter-agency commission. This body was charged with drafting the Concept of 
Civil Service Reform and subsequent establishment of three subgroups to deal with 
reforms of the military service, law enforcement agencies and the civil service 
respectively.  
The President’s address to the Federal Assembly in April 2001 gave an 
important impulse to this work. The President pointed out that development of the 
huge potential of the country is blocked by the cumbersome, inert and inefficient 
government machinery, while officials who master modern management methods are 
few and far between. The President acknowledged that the officialdom resisted 
reforms, and that the current system of operation of executive and legislative 
authorities, oriented largely to extracting the so-called “status rent”, was dangerous 
to society and the state.  
Much of the conceptual and analytical work on the civil service and 
administrative reform was done at that time in the Gref”s Center for Strategic Studies 
(CSS) - one of the leading Russian think tanks (G.Gref was Minister of Economy 
from 2000 till 2007 – A.K.). This work was carried out within the framework of the 
efforts to elaborate the country’s strategy of economic and social development till 
2010. By summer 2000 experts of the Gref’s Center submitted a concept of civil 
service reform comprising a tentative action plan (Zaitseva, ed., 2003:209). This 
concept made up a large part of the special section of the above mentioned strategy 
devoted to the issues of proper governance and public management.  
The authors of this concept advocated preparation and launching of a series 
of institutional reforms covering: budgeting; public administration (mainly 
government re-structuring); civil service; deregulation; judicial matters; law 
enforcement agencies; military; and relations between the federal centre and subjects 
of the federation. The Administration of the President was supposed to play a leading 
role in managing the reform agenda.  
In August 2001 a presidential edict was issued on establishment of the 
Commission on Civil Service Reform headed by Prime Minister M. Kasyanov. In the 
same month the President approved the Concept and elaboration of the Program of 
Civil Service Reform got underway. Simultaneously, a legal act that would amend 
and improve the law ‘On the Basic Principles of the Civil Service in the Russian 
Federation’ (adopted in 1995) was being drafted.  
On 19 November 2002 the President signed the Presidential decree “On the 
Programme of Reform of the Russian Civil Service (2003-2005)” giving the “green 
light” to the actual implementation of the reform which started in early 2003.  
It is noteworthy that M. Dmitriev, First Deputy Minister of Economic 
Development and Trade remarked in one of his interviews in 2002 that three years 
ago it was senseless to put forward issues of civil service reform for consideration by 
the Government. “We simply would not have been heard” he stated.  
Simon Kordonsky, one of the President’s senior advisors said in an 
interview that “the main client and stakeholder of the administrative reform is the 
President”. When questioned whether there were forces inside the state apparatus 
which supported and pushed for administrative reform and if there was a team of 
reformers within the ruling elite he replied “I have not heard about such team” 
(Otechestvennyie Zapiski, 2004:94).   
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President Putin appears to have committed himself to reform the state 
administration but, as available evidence shows, he himself was not sure if his efforts 
would be successful. Celebrating his one year anniversary in office President Putin 
told a group of journalists that the main lesson he had learnt was “the extreme 
difficulty of fighting bureaucracy” (The Observer, 8 June 2003). The embedded 
conservatism and non-acceptance of the reform ideas by the bureaucratic 
establishment was clearly demonstrated when the above mentioned document 
‘Strategy of Economic and Social Development of the Russian Federation till 2010’ 
was published in the mass media. It transpired that the section on improving the 
existing system of governance was the only one missing in the text.    
Overall one may say that internal imperatives for reform stemmed from the 
apprehension amongst farseeing representatives in government, political and 
economic circles and large businesses that preservation of the largely unreformed 
and outdated state machinery will lead Russia into consolidation of its status as a raw 
materials supplier at best and to collapse of its political, economic and social fabric 
at worst. The Russian President was one of those who appear to have realized this to 
the fullest extent.   
  
 
4.5   Reform Preparation and Implementation Stages  
               The conducted analysis allows single out the following stages in the 
preparation and implementation of Russian civil service reform:              
 
I.   STAGES OF REFORM PREPARATION   1992– 2002  
a) 1992 – 1995:  during this period efforts were undertaken to develop a normative 
framework (Presidential decrees, Government resolutions, Federal laws) for the 
formal establishment of the civil service and transformation of the existing state 
administration culminating in the adoption of the Law ‘On the Basic Principles of the 
Russian Civil Service’ (1995); 
b) 1996 – 1998: in this period various concepts of civil service and administrative 
reform were elaborated by several groups of experts;  
c) 1999 – 2002: concept and programme of civil service reform elaborated by Gref’s 
Center of Strategic Studies and later further amended and improved by the Inter-
Agency working group, were finally approved by the President in August 2001 and 
November 2002 respectively.    
 
II.  STAGES OF REFORM IMPLEMENTATION  2003 – until present   
a) 2003 – 2005: the first stage of the Reform programme based on a federal targeted 
programme approach was implemented;   
b) 2006 – 2007: implementation of the programme of civil service reform continued 
further to its extension to 1 January 2008; 
c) 2008 – 2013: implementation until 2013 envisaged in the draft Programme of 
reform and development of the Russian civil service elaborated by the Presidential 
Administration.  
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4.6 Civil Service Law from 1995  
Adoption by the State Duma in July 1995 of the Law “On the Basic 
Principles of the Civil Service of the Russian Federation” was a prime landmark in 
the modern history of evolution and transformation of the Russian state 
administration and deserves special attention. In spite of some obvious deficiencies, 
this legal act gave for the first time in the modern history of Russia an official 
definition of the civil service, laid down the legal basis for its organisation, set a 
distinction between purely political and administrative appointments, outlined the 
procedures of service and introduced a Job Classification System. 
Elaboration of this law was accompanied by intensive political debate on 
what kind of civil service should exist in Russia and who should be granted direct 
authority over it. This indicates clearly the significance of the issue for major 
political actors. The controversy over the preparation and adoption of the law had an 
impact on its contents which combines modern and traditional (outdated in views of 
many observers) requirements for the civil service mission, status, activities, 
organization and procedures.    
Among the undoubtedly positive provisions introduced by the Law were 
formal requirements for holding qualification examinations, regular performance 
review, competitions to fill a vacancy, regular submission by civil servants of 
income declarations, and conforming to restrictions imposed on civil servants. The 
Law fixed the principle of impartiality and non-partisanship of civil service. 
Consistent and strict application of these requirements would have provided for the 
establishment of a “merit based” civil service in Russia.  
Regretfully, full enforcement of these provisions contained in the Law 
turned out to be problematic. This can be explained by both the overall weak 
institutional environment for law enforcement in Russia and by resistance of the 
bureaucracy and various lobbies whose interests were affected by the Law.     
On the other hand, the Law virtually restored an outdated and complicated 
bureaucratic “table of grades and ranks”. It also left unchanged (no effective 
mechanism envisaged against it) the system of almost total dependence of a civil 
servant on his/her superior who has discretion to decide the issues of career advance, 
level of take home pay and various granted privileges. Thus, the law did not remove 
fertile ground for the continuation of the “clientelistic” and “patronage” practices 
prevalent in the Russian civil service.  
The Law neither clearly defined the place of the civil service in the context 
of institutional roles and division of powers, nor differentiated clearly the authority 
and functions of civil services at the federal and regional levels. It did not provide a 
mechanism for the protection of the civil service from arbitrary political interference 
and the establishment of a single management body for the whole civil service. 
Although the Law reserved a place for trade unions within the system, collective 
bargaining was not envisaged. The Law retained reference to the Labour Code - 
“civil servants shall be subject to the labour legislation of the Russian Federation 
with account for the specific provisions hereof” (Article 4, point 3 of the Law). 
In essence these elements in the Law oriented development of the civil 
service towards consolidation of its “ruler dependent” and “patrimonial” 
characteristics.  
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4.7 Concept of Civil Service Reform 
International experience demonstrates that a uniform vision of the directions 
and contents of a civil service reform among its major stakeholders is a rather rare 
phenomenon and Russia is not an exception in this respect. However, by the late 
1990s there has built up at least an understanding among major political forces in 
Russia that unreformed state bureaucracy constitutes a serious obstacle in the path of 
the country’s economic and social development. In the opinion of many experts the 
planned transformation of the bureaucratic apparatus was to result in the creation of a 
professional, accountable and impartial civil service based on merit and immune to 
corruption.   
            One of the key priorities in Russia at that time was reform of the entire 
system of public management. This was considered important because reform of the 
civil service without appropriate transformation of the entire system of governance 
and public management does not make much sense. Indeed, real improvement of the 
efficiency of civil servants’ work and enhancement of their responsibility can hardly 
be achieved whilst there remains several decision-making centres working in parallel 
within the executive branch. Similarly, it is difficult to expect that the civil service 
would stand up to modern challenges if the issue of clear division of authority 
between the federal and regional executive bodies remains unresolved. Therefore, 
from the outset civil service reform was conceived as part of a wider administrative 
reform.  
As we have shown above the concept of civil service reform was developed 
in response to the letter signed by President V. Putin on 24 November 2000 
requesting that proposals on reforming the system of the Russian civil service be 
submitted to him by 1 May 2001. The contents of the concept approved by the 
President on 15 August  2001 was largely based on the workings and contributions 
made by the authors of Administrative reform concept (1998) and experts of the 
Gref’s Center for Strategic Studies who developed a draft concept of civil service 
reform in summer 2000.  
The concept’s basic idea was to gradually transform the Russian state 
administration into a legitimate and efficient institution serving above all the society 
and the state. The concept outlined the main objective of the reform which consisted 
in raising effectiveness of the civil service and creating an integral holistic system of 
civil service in the Russian Federation. The contents of this document reflected 
sensitive points of the status of the Russian civil service and proposed solutions to 
many longstanding problems. The stepwise approach chosen by the authors of the 
concept to be implemented during a lengthy period seemed to be rational. The 
concept outlined the following principal tasks of the reform: 
- adjustment of the civil service system and civil servants’ professional 
activities to the new social and economic reality;  
- development of comprehensive civil service legislation;  
- introduction of effective mechanisms of HR management; 
- formation of the system of management of civil service and coordination of 
its activities;  
- ensuring openness and transparency of civil servants’ activities; 
- enhancing quality of services rendered to citizens; 
- introduction of modern information technologies; 
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The Concept devoted much attention to the establishment of an integral and 
uniform system of civil service; regulation of civil servants’ activities on the basis of 
job descriptions; introduction of standards for delivery of services to people; 
interaction of civil service with civil society; removal of conditions conducive to 
corruption; improving staff training programmes, etc.    
Preparation of the reform concept as well as of other reform documents has 
been largely nontransparent and in this respect was no difference to the previous 
attempts to reform the civil service. For a long time the public was not given any 
information about who was preparing the reform, how this was being done, and what 
reform was all about. Four months elapsed between approval of the concept by the 
President and publication of its very general description. The full text of the concept 
was made available to the mass media almost a year after approval by the President 
(Grishkovets, 2002:126). 
 
 
4.8  Programme of Civil Service Reform  
The elaborated and approved concept of civil service reform served as the 
basis for the development of the reform programme. The latter was designed by 
members of the interagency working group on civil service reform issues set up on 
13 December 2000 (Savchenko, ed. 2006:77). On 19 November 2002 the President 
of the Russian Federation approved the Federal Programme ‘Reform of the Civil 
Service of the Russian Federation for the period 2003-2005’.  
Apart from the analysis of the existing situation and identification of the 
reform objectives and tasks the programme comprised a rather general action plan 
for the period 2003-2005. The plan outlined measures aimed at resolving the defined 
tasks, achieving overall programme objectives and keeping up with the time table for 
the reform implementation. The Russian Government committed to allocate 539 
million rubles (equivalent of approximately USD 17.4 million) for implementation of 
the Programme over 3 years (see detailed description of the Programme in Annex 1). 
The principal goal of the programme (as specified in section 2) was – 
improving efficiency of the civil service as a whole and of its structural elements, 
optimizing civil service maintenance costs and developing resources required for 
civil service activities. 
To achieve this goal, the programme (section 2) identified the following 
objectives: 
a) Creating conditions for optimal organizational and legal support of the civil 
service; 
b) Defining roles, powers, and responsibilities of civil servants based on job 
descriptions; 
c) Implementing new methods and techniques of planning, financing, 
stimulating, and assessing civil servants’ activities, and using civil service 
system resources in a rational manner; 
d) Ensuring openness of the civil service for the benefit of civil society 
development and strengthening of the state; 
e) Applying efficient methods for selecting skilled personnel for the civil 
service and for assessing performance of civil servants, as well as creating 
conditions for civil servant career advance; 
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f) Implementing staff training programs for the civil service and professional 
development programs for civil servants; 
g) Implementing mechanisms for identifying and solving civil service-related 
conflicts of interest, as well as introducing a legal regulation of professional 
ethics of civil servants; 
h) Creating optimal material and technical conditions for efficient functioning 
of the federal civil service and performance by civil servants of their official 
(service) duties; 
i) Ensuring the development of civil service management system. 
The programme paid particular attention to the application of result-oriented 
management; introduction of standards for state services and administrative 
regulations; ensuring openness and transparency of state institutions; rebuilding the 
incentives structure for civil servants; development of partnerships with civil society; 
recruitment and retaining of highly qualified and professional personnel; 
development of an efficient system of training of civil servants; enforcing effective 
anti-corruption policy.   
The so called federal targeted programme (FTP) was declared the key 
instrument of reform implementation. FTP is a result oriented mechanism of carrying 
out large scale programmes of social, economic and institutional development, which 
envisages close coordination of all stakeholders and agencies, detailed planning and 
funding from various sources including federal and regional governments.  
The programme (section 6) defined the following anticipated results:  
 Harmonization of the regulatory framework of the civil service with the 
existing social relations and new economic environment; 
 Establishment of a professional merit based civil service; 
 Introduction of modern job descriptions for civil servants; 
 Achievement of high-quality performance by civil servants of their official 
(service) duties and provision by them of public services to citizens and 
organizations; 
 Creation of conditions for openness and accountability of state bodies’ 
administrations and civil servants to the civil society; 
 Creation of a framework for improving allocation of financial and economic 
resources to the federal civil service; 
 Improvement of the efficiency of HR policy within the civil service system 
in order to improve the quality of civil service employees structure; 
 Implementation of mechanisms for identifying and resolving civil service 
related conflicts of interest, as well as introduction of legal regulation of 
professional ethics of civil servants; 
 Elevation of the professional level of federal civil servants; 
 Optimization of the number of federal civil servants; 
 Creation of a material and technical environment for efficient performance 
by civil servants of their official (service) duties; 
 Development of a new civil service management system. 
 
In the opinion of the Head of Civil Service Directorate of the RF 
Presidential Administration Mr. Savchenko realization of the Federal Programme 
should eventually provide for: a) creation of an integrated civil service system in the 
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In the opinion of the Head of Civil Service Directorate of the RF 
Presidential Administration Mr. Savchenko realization of the Federal Programme 
should eventually provide for: a) creation of an integrated civil service system in the 
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Russian Federation; b) considerable increase of the efficiency of activities of civil 
service; c) formation of highly skillful and qualified personnel in the civil service; 
and d) creation of a modern system of civil service management. (Savchenko, ed., 
2006:45).   
The programme envisaged that before full-scale implementation is 
attempted. pilot projects would be run in selected ministries and regions. In practical 
terms the stages of the realization of the programme (2003-2005) foresaw the 
following succession of major activities: a) adoption of the respective legislation and 
normative base, including the Law ‘On the Civil Service System of the Russian 
Federation’ and the Law ‘On the State Civil Service of the Russian Federation’; b) 
development of the methodological, organizational and financial mechanisms of the 
programme implementation; c) implementation of pilots and experiments in various 
government institutions and regions; and d) broad implementation of the reform 
ideas, principles and provisions across the entire civil service (Savchenko, ed., 
2006:39).    
More specifically the programme envisaged implementation of pilot projects 
targeted at: 
- approbation of new methods of planning of activities of federal government 
organs; 
- elaboration of criteria and indicators of assessment of activities of civil 
servants; 
- application of result-oriented principles of funding of selected state organs; 
- introduction of service contracts including fixed term; 
- testing new systems of career advance, professional training and up-
grading;  
- introduction of effective mechanisms of identification and prevention of 
conflict of interests.  
As we can see the programme incorporated objectives and tasks which fall 
largely in line with modern trends in civil service reform practiced world wide. 
However, the programme deliverables did not appear sufficiently specific which 
made assessment of the progress in its implementation rather difficult. Furthermore, 
an attachment to the programme pointed only to a particular year when a result or 
measure should be achieved: this cannot be considered as a proper deadline. Partly 
this could be explained by a prevailing diversity of opinions concerning reform 
contents. Deputy Minister of Economic Development and Trade M. Dmitriev stated 
in May 2002 that “consensus regarding this reform agenda was superficial” 
(Dmitriev, 2002).  
 
 
4.9  Reform Preparation and Implementation Milestones  
November 1991 -  Decision of the RF President (Presidential decree N 242) to set up 
the Main Directorate on Civil Servants Training (Roskadry) under the Government 
of the Russian Federation; this structure was made responsible for civil servants 
training and elaboration of conceptual documents related to civil service reform;  
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March 1992 - The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (Russian Parliament) adopted 
enactment N 2535/1 “On the draft law regarding civil service of the Russian 
Federation”;  
 
December 1993 - President signed a decree (N 2267) “On the Regulations of the 
Federal Civil Service”;    
 
June 1994 - Establishment of the Russian Academy of Civil Service by the 
Presidential Decree N 1140; 
 
July 1995  -  Adoption of the Federal Law N 119 “On the Basic Principles of the 
Civil Service of the Russian Federation”;   
 
October 1998 - Draft Concept of administrative reform developed by the 
Presidential advisors;  
 
July 2000  -  Draft Concept of civil service reform elaborated by Gref’s Center of 
strategic studies;   
 
November 2000 - President V. Putin signed a letter (poruchenie) to the Prime 
Minister requesting that proposals for the civil service reform be prepared by 1 May 
2001;  
 
December 2000 - Inter agency working group on civil service reform issues set up 
by resolution of the Presidential Administration N 1331;  
 
June 2001 - Commission of the RF Government on reducing administrative barriers 
in entrepreneurship and optimization of budget expenditures in public management 
(headed by the Minister of Finance A. Kudrin) established by the Government 
resolution N 452;  
 
August 2001 -  Approval by the President of the Concept of Reform of the Russian 
Civil Service (Decree N 1496);                                                                                                            
 
August 2001 - Creation by Presidential Resolution N 436 of the Commission on 
Civil Service Reform headed by the Prime Minister;  
 
October 2001 - Establishment of Inter agency working group on elaboration of the 
Programme of civil service reform and respective legislation (Resolution of the 
Presidential Administration N 1331);  
 
August 2002 - Approval of the Code of Ethics of civil servants by the Presidential 
decree N 855 “On General Principles of Professional Conduct of Civil Servants”;  
 
November 2002 - Federal Programme “Reform of the Civil Service of the Russian 
Federation (for the period 2003-2005)” approved by the Presidential Decree N 1336;   
 
May 2003 - Federal Law (N 58) “On the Civil Service System of the Russian 
Federation” adopted by the State Duma;  
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July 2003 - The President signed a Decree N 824 “On Measures to Implement 
Administrative Reform During the Period 2003 – 2004”;  
 
November 2003 - Anti-Corruption Council under the President of the Russian 
Federation set up by the Presidential Decree N 1384;   
 
February 2004 - The Department of Federal Civil Service was established in the 
Presidential Administration by the Presidential Decree N 298;  
 
March 2004 - Large scale reorganization of the Russian Government enacted by the 
Presidential Decree N 314;  
 
July 2004 - The Presidential Decree N 910 “On Measures to Improve State 
Governance” established a Commission under the RF President for Improvement of 
State Governance headed by the Head of the Presidential Administration. The 
Commission comprised three Working Groups: (i) Interagency Working Group on 
Implementation of Civil Service Reform Measures; (ii) Interagency Working Group 
on Federative Relations and Local Self-Governance; and (iii) Interagency Working 
Group on the System and Structure of Federal Bodies of Executive Power; 
 
July 2004 - Federal Law (N 79) “On the State Civil Service of the Russian 
Federation” approved by the Duma;  
 
October 2005 - Adoption of the Concept of administrative reform and Action Plan 
for the period 2003 – 2004;  
 
December 2005 - Extension by the Presidential Decree N 1437 of the Federal 
Programme “Reform of the Civil Service of the Russian Federation” till 2008; 
 
December 2005 - Decree N 1574 “On Register of the RF State Civil Service 
Positions” signed by the RF President;   
 
July 2006  -  Decree N 763 “On Monetary Compensation for Federal Civil Servants" 
signed by the RF President;  
 
December 2006 - Decree N 1474 “On Post Entry Training of the Russian Civil 
Servants” signed by the RF President;   
 
December 2006 - Decree N 1490 “On Increasing Monthly Salaries of Federal Civil 
Servants” signed by the RF President;  
 
March 2007 - Federal Law N 25 “On the Municipal Service of the Russian 
Federation” signed by the RF President;  
 
March 2007 - Decree N 269 “On the Establishment of the Commissions on the 
Observation of the Requirements for the Professional Conduct of State Civil 
Servants” signed by the RF President; 
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June 2007 - Decree N 722 “On Conducting Experiments within the Frameworks of 
the Reform of the Russian Civil Service” signed by the RF President;  
 
December 2007 - Draft Federal Programme “Reform and Development of the 
Russian Civil Service (2008-2013)” elaborated by the Presidential Administration.  
 
 
4.10   Reform Implementation and Management  
Since the start of the reform implementation in early 2003 the 
Administration of the President of the Russian Federation has performed the function 
of coordinator of the reform activities. It was also assigned the task of monitoring 
and controlling reform implementation. “The Program Coordinator shall be 
responsible for organizing the Program implementation and monitoring progress in 
carrying out the measures envisaged therein” (Federal Programme “Reform of the 
Russian Civil Service”, 2002). The structural unit in the Presidential Administration 
in charge of reform coordination and monitoring has been the Directorate on Civil 
Service Issues.  
The principal authority to drive civil service reform at the nationwide level 
first rested with the Commission on Civil Service Reform headed by the Prime 
Minister (established in August 2001) and later transferred to the Commission for 
Improvement of State Governance (established in July 2004) headed by the Head of 
the Presidential Administration. The Commission had the status of a consultative 
body to the President of the Russian Federation and was supposed to have three 
inter-agency groups: a) On Civil Service Reform; b) On Federal Relations; and c) On 
the Issues of the System and Structure of Federal Executive Agencies.  
The Inter-Agency Group on civil service reform was in charge of 
developing conceptual approaches and adopting key decisions on this issue. It 
consisted of officials representing all branches of power and comprised an affiliated 
permanent team of approximately 200 experts. The Inter-Agency Group was led by 
Chief Presidential Advisor (Savchenko, 2006: 18). 
Meetings of the above commissions were held quarterly on average. In 
essence the commissions constituted ad-hoc consultative/coordinating structures with 
restricted mandate (especially after July 2004) to manage reform and make important 
decisions obligating all stakeholders. In reality a special body directly responsible for 
managing and effectively exercising reform has not been established. There has been 
weak coordination with other reforms, above all with administrative reform.  
Reform management was particularly weak at the operational level. 
Insufficient attention was paid to monitoring and assessment of progress as well as 
timely resolution of the emerging problems and correction of the reform tactics and 
approaches. This prevented reform managers to address operational issues in an 
effective manner.   
The reform management was further compounded by rivalry between 
various groups of bureaucrats for power and authority within the state administration 
itself and definite shortage of relevant technical expertise. Deficiencies were evident 
in particular of experts with practical experience in modern human resource 
management, result oriented budgeting and prevention of conflict-of-interest 
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situations. Capacity of various regions to absorb and implement reform measures 
was uneven (Otechestvennyie Zapiski, 2004:109). 
The reform programme referred to the following methods and means of 
achieving reform objectives: 
a) selection and formation of groups of experts and specialists;   
b) development and approval of methodologies, selection of pilot regions and 
ministries; 
c) implementation of pilots and experiments in the selected regions and 
government agencies;  
d) enhancing training, retraining, and professional development of federal 
public servants;      
e) improving the legislative and regulatory framework for civil service; 
f) enforcing the provisions of the regulatory and legal framework in practice.  
 
Section 5 of the Programme stipulated that: “The Program shall be 
implemented using federal budget funds on the basis of state contracts (agreements) 
concluded according to the established procedure by state customers with 
implementers of the measures envisaged by the Programme and on the basis of 
agreements concluded with relevant constituent entities of the Russian Federation or 
municipalities”. 
The state contracts were grouped according to the reform tasks. The basic 
idea was that successful implementation of the contracts should facilitate fulfilment 
of the programme tasks and create favourable ground for the achievement of its 
results at least those timed for short term perspective. Therefore particular 
consideration was given to linking contractual activities as much as possible to the 
planned results. This approach makes up an important element of the federal targeted 
programme (FTP - referred above) or sometimes called target oriented method of 
implementing reform (Savchenko, 2006:14). 
Out of 539 million roubles allocated from the Federal budget for reform 
purposes 296 million roubles have been geared to research and development work. 
The remaining 243 million roubles were used to implement pilot experiments and 
other activities.  
Analysis of available information on reform progress and opinions of the 
experts and civil servants involved in reform implementation indicates that most 
reform activities during the first three year period (2003 – 2005) were concentrated 
on: a) elaboration of civil service legislation and normative framework; and b) 
preparation and implementation of pilots in selected ministries and regions.   
During the period from 2000 to mid 2004 overall 117 laws and decrees of 
the President and Government resolutions were adopted on various issues of the civil 
service and its reform (Otechestvennyie Zapiski, 2004:112). During two years that 
followed adoption of the Law ‘On State Civil Service of the Russian Federation’ in 
2004 more than 20 Presidential decrees were issued on various aspects of civil 
service regulation.  
Considerable funds have been allocated and overall consistent efforts have 
been made so far to implement various pilot projects and experiments (both at the 
federal and regional levels) aimed at raising the efficiency and transparency of civil 
servants’ activities. Some of the pilots were carried out within the frameworks of the 
on-going administrative reform and projects funded from external sources (mainly 
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the European Commission, DFID, and the World Bank). As a rule, the launch of 
pilot projects was preceded by the elaboration of appropriate methodology for their 
implementation. Active implementation of pilot experiments was concentrated 
mainly in five-six Subjects of the Federation (regions). 
Pilots and experiments covered a wide range of issues including in 
particular – development and application of performance indicators for individual 
civil servants; elaboration and application of standard employment contracts; 
elaboration and application of job descriptions for various categories of civil 
servants; elaboration of normative acts to provide for establishment of regional civil 
service management structures; and improving the effectiveness of the use of reserve 
cadre.   
In January 2005 President Putin signed a decree extending for two years 
(until 2008) the programme of civil service reform. The decree provided for 
continuous flow of funding for the programme implementation whereas its goals and 
tasks remained in principle unchanged.   
 
   
4.11  New Civil Service Legislation   
The civil service reform programme (2003-2005) put high emphasis on the 
development of modern legislation and regulatory framework for the Russian civil 
service. In this respect particular importance was attached to the adoption of two 
federal laws: the Federal Law N55 of 27.05.2003 “On State Service System of the 
Russian Federation” and the Federal Law N79 of 27 July 2004 “On the State Civil 
Service of the Russian Federation”.  
The first Law “On State Service System of the Russian Federation” 
stipulated that there should exist three types of state service in Russia: the civil 
service, the law enforcement service and the military service. The civil service 
consists of two levels: the federal civil service and the civil service of Subjects of the 
Russian Federation. Status compatibility across the three types of state service was 
established. Thus every civil service position corresponds to a certain position in the 
law enforcement service and similarly within the military service. The law also 
envisaged establishment of the body in charge of management of the service at 
federal and regional levels.  
The second Law “On the State Civil Service of the Russian Federation” was 
originally developed to replace the civil service law adopted in 1995. Therefore, this 
legal document set out basic legal, organisational and economic principles of the 
Russian civil service. It also defined the rights and duties of civil servants, 
determined conditions and terms of service and career advance and fixed appropriate 
requirements and restrictions.  
Principal innovations and changes contained in the new laws as compared 
to the law from 1995 were as follows:  
- four new categories of civil servant positions were introduced; 
- qualification classes were replaced with civil service ranks;  
- reference to Labour Code as governing legislation for civil servants was 
entirely dropped;   
- fixed term contracts with a wider range of compensation linked to 
performance in distinction to the standard rules of compensation became 
possible; 
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- conflict of interest regulation was introduced;. 
- frequency of compulsory re-training of civil servants was increased from 
every five years in the previous law to every three years;  
- establishment of a single management body for the federal civil service and 
similar bodies in each Subject of the Federation (region) was envisaged; 
- up to 25% of the members of the competition commissions were to be 
independent experts.  
The above mentioned innovations were overall positively assessed by the 
majority of experts and observers. However, the new legislation also included 
clauses and provisions that raised controversy and evoked criticism. In particular, it 
was alleged that the legislation lacked certain principles and requirements that were 
expected to be part of the new normative environment.     
These include failure of the new legislation to introduce essentially new 
reward mechanism. The latter remains largely based on the principle of seniority and 
length of service. Performance based pay is limited almost exclusively to fixed term 
positions in the civil service which make up a tiny portion of the overall number of 
contracts.   
This means that career advance of a civil servant will continue to depend 
predominantly on the individual’s relations with the relevant chief and less on 
professionalism, competency, skills and efficiency of work.   
The laws did not provide for the creation of effective mechanism opening 
civil service to public oversight and scrutiny.  
Although the Law of 2004 stipulates that recruitment and promotion should 
be competition based (Ch. 4, art. 22) there are numerous exceptions to this rule. For 
example, exempt from this requirement are civil servants with fixed term contract, 
those with access to classified information, those appointed by the President etc. 
Competition is also not mandatory in cases when position can be filled by persons 
from the so called cadre reserve (Ch 4, art 22). Taking into account that such 
candidates are available in the majority of promotion cases, this clause considerably 
undermines the practical value of the principle of competition. According to the Law 
a list of cadre reserve nominees also should be compiled on a competitive basis. 
However, in practice this rule is seldom observed and many experts express doubt as 
to the objectivity of competition in such cases.   
It is noteworthy that the number of clauses in the new law granting 
exceptions from the requirement to hold mandatory competition as far as enrolment 
and promotion are concerned has actually increased compared to the law from 1995.  
The new laws extended the age limit for holding civil service post to 65 
years whereas before the ceiling was fixed at 60 years of age.   
It appears that the requirement of non-partisanship of civil servants and 
separation of religious communities from the state organs (Article 5 point 11 in the 
Law of 1995) was dropped in the new legislation. No mechanism to effectively 
prevent excessive politicisation of the civil service has been foreseen.  
The new laws failed to create a uniform and integrated civil service. 
Regional authorities retained considerable independence in determining the specific 
organisation of the regional civil service.  
In general the new laws appear to have largely preserved the existing 
situation rather than responded to a new one. It is noteworthy that both laws on civil 
service “were prepared in total secrecy without involvement of public organizations 
and citizens” (Yuzhakov, 2005). An interesting definition was given to the new laws 
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on civil service (adopted respectively in 2003 and 2004) by State Duma Deputy 
V.Yuzhakov – “both laws are laws about bureaucrats, drafted by bureaucrats and in 
the interests of bureaucrats” (ibid).   
 
 
4.12  Administrative Reform  
It is widely acknowledged that civil services can function properly only 
within the framework of well designed administrative structures and processes with 
clearly defined roles of executive units, adequate horizontal and vertical coordination 
systems, clear lines of accountability and transparent policy making mechanisms.  
  Therefore, civil service reforms are often made part of wider administrative 
reforms or are accompanied by comprehensive reform measures in the administrative 
environment.   
 As we have indicated at the beginning of this chapter the first concepts of 
administrative reform were developed in the Russian Federation as early as 1997-
1998.  Administrative reform was officially launched in July 2003 by the Presidential 
Decree N 824 “On Measures to Implement the Administrative Reform in 2003-
2004”. In the same month the Government set up the Commission on Implementing 
Administrative Reform headed by the Deputy Prime Minister.  
The decree of the President 824/2003 formulated the main objective of the 
administrative reform – “to raise effectiveness of the public administration in 
particular in providing services for citizens, enhancing the rule of law, removing 
administrative barriers in dealing with the business sector”.   
The same decree defined the following measures aimed at improving 
efficiency of the activities of the government and creating a more favourable climate 
for business:  
- reduction of government intervention into activities of businesses, including 
abolition of  excessive government regulation;  
- elimination of duplication of the functions and powers of the government 
agencies;  
- creation of a new structure of government with clearly separated functions 
of policy making, regulation, supervision and control; of managing 
government property; and of providing government services to citizens and 
legal entities;  
- delineation of powers and authority between federal and regional levels of 
government.  
In the years 2003-2005 funding of administrative reform from the federal 
budget amounted to USD 7 million each year (Otechestvennyie Zapiski, 2004:179).  
In spring 2004 within the framework of the administrative reform a 
comprehensive restructuring and reorganisation of the Federal Government was 
launched which turned out to be much more radical than most observers predicted. In 
fact this was the largest reorganization of the Russian government over the last 40 
years.   
A three category system of federal executive bodies has been introduced 
comprising ministries (“setting the rules”), services (“enforcing the rules”) and 
agencies (“implementing the rules”).  
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 Ministries were made responsible for the delivery of Government Program 
objectives within their area of competence. The main preoccupation of 
Ministries is to “set the rules”, undertaking policy analysis and drafting 
legislation;  
 Services were entrusted with “enforcing the rules” through supervision and 
regulatory activities;  
 Agencies were assigned the task of “implementing the rules” through 
service delivery and management of state property.  
The number of ministries has been reduced from 24 to 15. The number of 
Deputy Prime Ministers was cut from six to one. By the Prime Minister’s decision 
146 government commissions, advisory committees and groups have been dissolved. 
Regular weekly meetings of the Cabinet were opened to the press during fixed 
periods of time. However, the total number of executive bodies at the federal level 
has increased from 53 to 72.   
Apart from a number of key regulatory bodies, such as the Federal Financial 
Markets Supervision Service and the Federal Anti-monopoly Service which report to 
the Prime Minister, all Services and Agencies were subordinated to a specific 
Ministry. Simultaneously staff reductions were announced at the level of ministries. 
For example, within the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade the number 
of departments has been cut from 58 to 16, the number of Deputy Ministers from 17 
to 2 and total staff by 300.  
Such a radical restructuring process could not fail to increase uncertainty 
and insecurity among the majority of civil servants and in most cases led to a 
significant reduction in their performance.   
In accordance with the introduction of the three categories system of 
executive organs a review of the functions of federal government bodies (functional 
reviews) was conducted in 2003-2004. The Government Commission headed by 
Deputy Prime Minister screened over 5600 functions. Out of this number 800 were 
found excessive, 350 duplicating and 500 requiring reduction of the scope of 
application (World Bank, 2005:110). 
Implementation of administrative reform in the regions proceeded at a 
slower rate with only 21 Subjects of the Federation (regions) adopting a programme 
of administrative reform by 2005.     
One of the peculiarities of the administrative reform in Russia was that it 
was launched prior to the elaboration of the reform’s concept. A Presidential advisor 
admitted at that time that there did not exist a document where the goals, tasks and 
mechanism of administrative reform were outlined (Otechestvennyie Zapiski, 
2004:86). 
The concept of administrative reform and action plan for the years 2006-
2008 were developed and approved later by the Government Resolution N 1789 of 
25 October 2005. These documents defined the following priority directions of 
reform activities:  
- development and introduction of service standards; 
- changeover from funding of government agencies based on their budget 
estimates to allocation of funds for specific programmes to be implemented; 
- enhancement of senior executives’ rights to redistribute funds between 
budget items and to use the payroll at their discretion; 
- wider usage of information technologies; 
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- increasing transparency and accountability of government structures.  
The reform implementation mechanism was modified to allow for a more 
decentralized approach where each ministry or Subject of Federation developed their 
own programme based on methodological support provided centrally. Also a 
competition based principle of funding reform implementation from the state budget 
was introduced. The 2006 state budget allocated an equivalent of approximately 18 
million USD for this purpose.  
 
 
4.13  Impact of External Diffusion and Assistance   
As we have stressed above the objectives, directions and methods of the 
reform of the Russian civil service were largely in line with modern trends in 
designing and implementing administrative reforms practiced world wide.  
There are no firm grounds to assert that any specific foreign concept of civil 
service reform was borrowed as a model for replication in Russia. It is known that in 
1997-1998 the Russian experts drew upon the experience of the United States 
(‘National Performance Review’), France (civil service legislation) and Germany 
(post-war administrative transformation) in elaborating the concept of administrative 
reform.  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s the scale of international cooperation and 
donor assistance in the area of public administration expanded and became further 
diversified.   
However, we should be aware that by the mid 1990s Russia has largely 
adopted a career based model of civil service, many elements of which were 
borrowed from the French civil service system. As we pointed out earlier this can be 
explained by similarity of the Russian and French Constitutional orders with a strong 
Presidency being one of their distinguished features. There was also close 
collaboration of the Russian and French officials and experts on public 
administration in the development of civil service legislation and reform’s 
conceptual documents throughout the 1990s (Zaitseva, 2003:69).  
Contrary to the situation in the Czech Republic where the declared process 
of accession to EU entailed a considerable pressure from Brussels on the Czech 
authorities to implement genuine civil service reform, there was no such outside 
pressure experienced by the Russian authorities. The reference to the necessity of 
public administration reform in World Bank and IMF key documents relating to 
Russia started to be clearly articulated only in the years 1999 – 2000 but were not 
really binding for the Russian leadership.  
Various international organizations and separate countries have been 
delivering technical and other assistance to Russia in support of the development of 
its public administration and civil service reform. The European Commission has 
been the largest player in the field earmarking around 323 mln euros over the period 
1991 - 2003 in support of institutional, legal and administrative reform in Russia 
(Tacis Action programme, 2004:130).    
The experience of Russia shows that international assistance to public 
sector management and civil service reform has been so far focused mainly on 
achieving short-term results without considering longer term consequences. External 
assistance could have been more systematic and better coordinated. In connection 
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with this one observer made the following comment: “The international intervention 
programmes in Russian civil service reform have accordingly tended to be either 
piecemeal, or ‘pilot’ in nature, and therefore uncoordinated, and hard to ‘scale up’, 
thus generating what is in effect a self-fulfilling prophecy about the country’s 
‘openness to reform’. Some external interventions have by contrast been excessively 
‘foundational’, assuming that development must start from a long way ‘back up the 
modernity ladder’, and thus perversely have the effect of reinforcing Russian 
‘backwardness’ with legislative measures which have little chance of being 
implemented or are at such a high level of generality that they fail to address the 
pressing operational difficulties faced by Russian government day to day”. (Gray, 
2005:14). 
Establishment in January 2004 in Moscow of the Donor Secretariat funded 
by DFID (UK) to coordinate assistance to public administration reform offered by 
external donors appears to have contributed to increasing efficacy of the foreign 
intervention and ensuring its integrity with the Russian Government priorities.  
 
 
4.14  Assessment of Civil Service Reform Progress and Mid-term 
Results  
 As we noted above assessment of the progress of civil service reform in 
Russia is rather difficult because of absence of clearly defined outputs and specific 
deadlines in the reform programme as well as frequent shortage of data about the 
extent of advance of reform.     
Judging by the available information, interviews with participants and rare 
statements made by those who were directly involved in coordinating and managing 
reform activities we may state that notable advance of civil service reform has been 
registered mainly in the following areas:  
a) adoption of legislation and other normative acts (laws, decrees, 
enactments); 
b) considerable increase in monetary compensation of civil servants;  
c) implementation of pilots and experiments in selected ministries and regions.   
 Apart from the two laws “On the State Service System of the Russian 
Federation” and “On the State Civil Service of the Russian Federation” adopted in 
May 2003 and July 2004 respectively over 30 legal and regulatory acts were signed 
by the President and the Head of Government by mid 2006 as part of the secondary 
legislation specifying and complementing the provisions of these laws. These acts 
dealt with such issues as arrangements for resolving conflict of interest, organising 
competitive recruitment, awarding class ranks, carrying out appraisal of civil 
servants, conducting qualification examination, approval of the roster of civil service 
positions and others.  
In connection with this a World Bank report noted “For the past two and a 
half years significant progress has been achieved in developing legal and 
methodological framework for the reform implementation” (World Bank, 2006).   
Implementation of the reform Programme together with creation of material 
and technical base for efficient functioning of the civil service has brought about 
some quite tangible results. It is estimated that during the period 2004–2007 the 
monetary compensation of Russian federal civil servants increased on average 100-
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150% for mid level positions and 300-500% for top level positions. The Federal 
State Statistics Service (Rosstat) data published in March 2007 revealed that in 2006 
average remuneration of federal civil service employees increased by 24% and 
amounted to 13,425 roubles which was higher than general Russia average of 10,728 
roubles. In some Russian regions civil servants appear to be in a particularly 
privileged position in this respect. The same Rosstat data demonstrated that in 2006 
the average salary of a civil servant in St. Petersburg was 30,990 roubles (approx. 
USD 1200) which was twice higher than the average salary in the city and higher 
than average civil servant’s salary in Moscow ("Kommersant Daily", 27 March 
2007). 
The advance in implementing pilots and experiments, though not even, was 
overall successful as it laid down the ground for practical enforcement of the 
innovative approaches contained in the reform Programme and legislation, provided 
there was sufficient will for these changes.   
Some of the experiments appear to be truly innovative in the Russian 
context. For instance, in line with the Presidential Decree signed late 2006, selected 
federal ministries and agencies were allowed to retain the pay bill of those staff 
members, who have left (for whatever reason) public office or were dismissed, and 
to use the savings made to increase the salaries of the best performing civil servants 
(Sharov, 2007). 
In another case experimental introduction of performance related pay took 
place in 2006 in 20 government agencies and offices rendering services to citizens 
and businesses. The experiment envisaged considerable bonuses to the staff on top of 
their standard remuneration schemes in cases where the customers were satisfied 
with the quality of rendered services (Sharov, 2007). 
Activities were carried out along other directions of reform as they were 
mapped out in the Programme but with limited scope and overall less convincing 
results. Starting from 2005 considerably more state budget funds were directed at 
training civil servants. This allowed to increase the number of staff trained and to 
diversify the forms of training, e. g. to use more long term and distance learning 
courses, to send more civil servants for training abroad. However, the shortcomings 
of the existing system of training - very formal competition among training 
institutions (often organised only for subsequent reporting); low fees for the teaching 
staff; and in most cases weak relevance of training programmes to the real practical 
needs of civil servants - basically remained.   
Similarly, introduction of modern job descriptions in the majority of cases 
turned out to be formal. The Presidential Decree N 159/2005 “On the Official 
Contract of Employment by the Civil Service and Appointment to Civil Service 
Positions” set three months period for the development of job regulations by all 
federal government institutions in line with new requirements. However since no 
methodological guidelines had been developed to help ministries in drafting new job 
regulations the latter transformed the existing job instructions into job regulations 
without any substantive changes (World Bank, 2006:25).  
In spite of much rhetoric a number of key issues in the reform programme, 
in particular, excessive politicisation of the civil service and fight against corruption 
have been left unattended in terms of achievement of any practical results.    
The task of further democratization of civil service implying introduction of 
mechanisms for increased accountability to democratically elected institutions and 
civil society, transparency and openness, client orientation and responsiveness, 
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have been left unattended in terms of achievement of any practical results.    
The task of further democratization of civil service implying introduction of 
mechanisms for increased accountability to democratically elected institutions and 
civil society, transparency and openness, client orientation and responsiveness, 
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consultation with citizens appears to have been so far of “second priority”. For 
example, in his annual address to the Federal Assembly in 2003 the President 
stressed the necessity of developing effective mechanism for resolution of disputes 
between a citizen and state through improving administrative and judicial 
procedures. However, a year after this statement very little if anything had been done 
in this respect. (Otechestvennyie Zapiski, 2004:114).   
The managers of the reform programme appear to have defined 
development of civil service legislation as the principal reform implementation tool. 
This decision does not seem to be fully justified for a number of reasons. First, 
because of weak law enforcement in Russia in general and of civil service related 
legislation in particular. Secondly, because there has been definite shortage of 
qualified and skilful experts in Russia capable of drafting legislation and other 
normative documents on civil service issues. Thirdly, because this priority 
overshadowed other important implementation tools such as networking, coalition 
building and fiscal incentive instruments which turned out to be partially or entirely 
“forgotten”. 
The Law “On Procurement of Services and Goods for the State Needs” 
provides good illustration of weak law enforcement. The Law envisaged that almost 
all purchases should be tender/competition based whereas in reality nine out of ten 
procurement procedures were exempt from competition (Dmitriev, 2005:42). 
Another example is linked to the Law “On the State Civil Service of the Russian 
Federation” which envisaged measures to regulate conflict of interest situations. As a 
result, commissions on conflict of interest were set up in the majority of ministries 
and other state institutions. However, in course of the two years following adoption 
of the law in 2004 no single case of such a conflict was reviewed (ibid).  
One of the weaknesses of reform implementation was evident shortage of 
committed reform stakeholders. Mobilisation of internal and external support for 
reform has been largely disregarded. As a result only 11% of interviewed civil 
servants were ready to fully support the reform, 79% were ready to do it only 
partially, and 8.5% were not supportive of reform at all (RACS, 2004:17). 
Reform implementation has been accompanied by a number of unforeseen 
side effects. It turns out that while Russia’s population has decreased steadily in 
recent years, the number of civil servants has increased at an inversely proportionate 
rate. 
According to the data of the Federal State Statistics Service only in 2005 the 
number of state administration employees at the federal level increased by 10.9%. A 
report by the consulting company Troyka Dialogue indicates that in the course of 
three years (2004-2006) the number of civil servants had grown by approximately 
17%, whereas labour productivity in the public sector had dropped 7% for the same 
period.   
Even more interesting is that funding of public administration from the state 
budget for the period 2000–2006 increased 11 times in nominal prices whereas, for 
instance, expenditures on social protection grew 3 fold only. (Business Week, 
Russia, 28 August 2006). The same period saw expansion of privileges for top level 
civil servants. For example, since 2005 officials from the level of Deputy Head of 
Department upwards gained the right for business class travel by air and 1 class 
travel by train.   
 Summing up we may conclude that the civil service reform has failed so far 
to make considerable advance in most of priority directions as mapped out in its 
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programme. That means that the announced transfer to an effective, merit based and 
accountable civil service is still pending. One of the top managers of civil service 
reform, Head of the Commission on Improvement of State Governance, D.Medvedev 
remarked that “the reform got stuck in bureaucratic problems, in inability to organize 
work and activities in an appropriate manner” (Izvestia, 27 December 2005). Similar 
opinion was expressed by the World Bank report, which noted that civil service 
reform “has so far not moved significantly, overall from the status quo” (World 
Bank, 2006:7). 
 
 
4.15  Assessment of Administrative Reform Progress   
Implementation of the administrative reform in Russia was taking place in 
parallel to civil service reform. Many observers expressed the view that the issues of 
integrating approaches to both reforms and of coordinating their advance do not 
appear to have been properly taken care of.   
Most radical in recent Russian history, the restructuring of the Russian 
Government that took place in spring 2004 was a widely acknowledged current 
result of the administrative reform. However, the assessment of this restructuring has 
not been straightforward. Having liquidated 24 ministries, committees and agencies 
the Government created 42 new state institutions where most of the dismissed 
officials found new employment. Since that time the number of officials has been 
constantly growing (Izvestia, 11 November 2006). The reform reduced the number 
of Deputies to Prime Minister from 6 to 1, and Deputies of Ministers from between 6 
and 15 (depending on the ministry) to only 2 in each ministry.  But by 2007 the 
Prime Minister had again 4 Deputies, and Federal Ministers raised the number of 
their Deputies to 4-5 on average.  
Restructuring led to the reduction of the staff of the Office of the 
Government  by 17 % (2,100 persons) and territorial branches of the Government 
agencies cut a further 42,000 persons (Izvestia, 20 April 2005). However, as we have 
shown above, in less than a year the overall number of civil servants actually 
increased as compared to the pre-reform period.   
In the end government restructuring turned out to be limited to rather 
mechanical mergers of government institutions without thorough consideration of the 
level of preparedness of these structures for the reform. In one of the interviews 
given late 2004 First Deputy Minister of Economic Development M. Dmitriev gave 
the following assessment of the measures undertaken within the scope of 
administrative reform;  “The crisis of executive branch manageability is obvious. It 
is a typical transitional crisis, where reforms are incomplete and inconsistent. The 
functions of executive branch bodies have been inventoried, the government 
structure revised, and a three level administration system including services and 
agencies introduced. This kind of structure has a number of advantages as it helps to 
quickly take decisions and makes the administrative system more transparent. On 
one condition, however, namely if the structure changes are supplemented with new 
administrative methods such as changes in the principles and standards of civil 
servant’s work, the introduction of a new result driven remuneration system, and 
fight against corruption. Too little, if at all, has been done in this regard” (Dmitriev, 
2004). 
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   Certain tangible results were achieved in removing administrative 
barriers. In particular, entrepreneurs were granted the right to open business in five 
days subsequent to submission of a prescribed number of legal documents for 
registration. The number of control and check up procedures to which businesses had 
been previously subject was considerably reduced by introducing fixed frequency 
and advance planning. The overall number of business activities that needed to be 
licensed was reduced from 214 to 120 (Otechestvennyie Zapiski, 2004:107). 
Also tested under the administrative reform were new approaches and 
mechanisms for planning, budgeting, usage of resources, motivation and 
performance assessment. The reform programme envisaged that the regional 
authorities would adopt similar reform programmes funded both from the federal and 
local budgets. By early 2006 such programmes had been approved in less than half 
of the Russian regions.   
To conclude, in spite of certain setbacks in reform implementation, civil 
service and administrative reforms seem to remain important issues in the 
government agenda in Russia. Extension by the President of the Programme of civil 
service reform to 2008 and approval in October 2005 of the Concept and Action plan 
of the administrative reform for the period 2006–2008, as well as submission by the 
Presidential Administration in late 2007 of the draft Programme “Reform and 
Development of the Russian Civil Service” for the period 2008-2013 provide 
additional evidence for that statement.   
 
 
4.16  Conclusions 
In 2002 Russia committed itself to radical changes in its system of state 
administration by approving a programme of reform of the Russian civil service. The 
task of transforming the administrative apparatus which the Russian Federation 
inherited from the old Soviet system into an efficient, merit based, impartial, 
responsive, corruption immune and accountable state administration turned out to be 
clearly an immense one.  
Although many progressively thinking politicians and top ranking civil 
servants realized already in the early 1990s that the growing problems faced by the 
nation could not be successfully solved with unreformed state administration, for 
many years this apprehension was not turned into practical action. Throughout the 
whole 90s political will to launch reform of the Russian civil service was absent. 
Like many other major reforms in the history of Russia the impetus to the reform of 
the civil service came from the top. The reform was initiated by newly elected 
President V. Putin who has been its principal driving force.  
From the very beginning civil service reform had been conceived as part of 
a wider agenda, above all part of the reform of system of governance. However, in 
reality the extent of integration with other reforms like administrative reform, reform 
of judiciary and budgetary reform was in many cases superficial.  
Raising efficiency of civil servants’ activities was declared the priority 
objective of civil service reform. To achieve this purpose the Programme envisaged 
such measures as introduction of performance based pay, improvement of post entry 
training, development of modern job descriptions, setting up a system of civil service 
management, regulation of situations of conflict of interest and others. Development 
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and introduction of new regulatory framework transpired to be the principal tool of 
reform implementation.    
The major goals of the administrative reform (apart from the reorganisation 
of the government) which was launched almost simultaneously with civil service 
reform consisted in the removal of administrative barriers in dealing with the 
business sector, improving standards of services provided to citizens and 
introduction of performance related budgeting.   
Compared to the period of stagnation of the Russian civil service 
throughout most of the 1990s recent changes induced by the reform constitute a 
significant shift for the better. In terms of meeting the declared objectives of the civil 
service and administrative reforms the achieved results appear so far rather modest. 
They are confined mainly to the adoption of civil service related legal and normative 
framework, implementation of pilots and experiments in different regions of Russia, 
increase in civil servants’ pay, wider scale of training (civil service reform), 
restructuring of the government and removal of some administrative barriers in 
dealing with businesses (administrative reform).    
The authors of principal conceptual reform documents drew widely upon 
the experience of other countries in designing and implementing civil service reform. 
It would be wrong to assert that any specific foreign concept of civil service reform 
was borrowed as a model for replication in Russia. Even so, for a number of reasons 
the influence of representatives of the French civil service has been significant 
especially during the 1990s.   
Implementation of civil service reform revealed certain drawbacks and 
weaknesses that constrained considerably its advance and achievement of key 
results. 
The process of reform preparation and to a certain extent implementation 
has been largely non-transparent. Potential stakeholders (e.g. civil society, business 
community) were not invited to take part in designing conceptual documents and 
monitoring reform progress. Mobilisation of internal and external support for reform 
was largely disregarded.        
There turned out to be no real ownership of reform. The majority of civil 
servants were either indifferent to reform at best or remained in silent opposition at 
worst.  
Some issues important for the development of the Russian civil service, 
such as excessive politicization and embedded corruption, have not been properly 
addressed yet.   
High priority given to legislation as the main implementation tool turned 
out to be detrimental to wide application of other tools and instruments. As a result 
such tools as best practice diffusion and training were used rather inconsistently. 
Networking and fiscal incentive instruments were largely ignored.   
Advance of reform was further affected by insufficient operational 
management, weak law enforcement and proven ability of the bureaucracy to distort 
or sidetrack many of the innovative approaches contained in the reform programme.  
Finally, the analysis of the reform revealed certain unforeseen side effects. 
These include considerable increase in budget spending on state administration and 
notable growth of the number of civil servants at both federal and regional levels in 
recent years.  
One of the principal conclusions that can be drawn after several years since 
the start of reform is that it has failed so far to change the internal incentive 
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mechanism within the civil service and introduce effective systems of external 
accountability. Career advance of Russian civil servants continues to depend more 
on their relationship with the respective higher level management and much less on 
their performance.     
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CHAPTER V  
THE  CZECH  CIVIL  SERVICE:  HISTORICAL LEGACY, 
CURRENT SITUATION AND CAPACITY FOR REFORM   
 
 
 
5.1  Introduction  
The objective of this chapter is to explore reform capacity of the Czech 
civil service. To achieve this objective and in line with our methodological approach 
the chapter starts with review of the historical development of the Czech nationhood 
and evolution of the state administrative apparatus on the territory of the present day 
Czech Republic. Particular focus is made on the prevailing traditions and 
stereotypes of behavior of state administrators. Further, we examine the overall 
institutional framework of the Czech civil service and in particular, peculiarities of 
the Czech constitutional order and political system, and economic development of 
the country since the early 1990s including the process of privatization. Our 
attention is also focused on the civil service’s legal status, political-administrative 
relations, issues of bureaucratic accountability and ethical standards. 
 Subsequently societal and administrative traditions, values and culture as 
well as relations civil service–civil society are analyzed. This analysis is 
complemented by the study of the selected features of the Czech civil service 
system: overall structure and human resources management, civil servants’ incentive 
mechanism and training, professionalism of cadres and available financial resources, 
and problems in contemporary development of the service. 
It is important to bear in mind that from a formal point of view the Czech 
civil service had not existed until 2002 as there was no respective law or other legal 
act providing for its legal recognition. However, state administration in the Czech 
Republic has been functioning in a normal mode and possessed many features 
common to those inherent to bureaucracies in most industrial countries. Hence, in 
spite of temporary absence “de-jure” of the subject of research, it has existed “de-
facto” and therefore could be respectively analyzed and compared.   
 Most information in this chapter relates to the processes taking place in the 
Czech public administration and its environment throughout the 1990s prior to the 
adoption of civil service law. Overview of recent developments will be given in the 
next chapter.   
 
 
5.2  The Czech State and Its Administration -  Historical Overview  
 An independent Czechoslovak state was established only in 1918 but its 
roots go back many centuries. The history of the Czech nation is predominantly a 
history of co-existence and struggle with powerful neighbors.1  
                                                 
1
 Source: http://www.geocities.com/TheTropics/Resort/3353/history/index.html 
http://www.czech.cz/en/czech-republic/history/all-about-czech-history/ 
http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/czech-republic/history.html 
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The Moravian Empire 
 Around the 4th century B.C. the present-day Czech Republic was populated 
by Celts. They were the first ethnic group to arrive in the area, according to 
available historical evidence. The Celtic Boii tribe gave the country its Latin name - 
Boiohaemum (Bohemia). They were overrun by the German tribes before the 
beginning of our era.  
 Between the 5th and the 6th centuries, during the period known as the 
Migration of Peoples, the tribes of Slavs moved to the territory of Bohemia and 
Moravia and settled there. The first half of the 7th century marks the first successful 
attempt to unite Slavonic tribes. The so-called "Samo's kingdom" resisted the 
pressure of the powerful Avar empire centered in the Hungarian lowlands and 
defended its territory against various attackers from the west.  
 In the 9th century A.D., the ancestors of the Czechs were united in the 
Great Moravian Empire. This was the first sovereign state structure on the territory 
of the modern Czech Republic. The territory of the Empire included today's 
Bohemia, Slovakia, southern Poland and western Hungary. The affairs of the state 
were managed at that time by ruling princes (Mojmir, Rostislav), selected 
representatives of the nobility and appointed servants. Influence of the church 
representatives in running the princedom was also considerable.   
 The culture of the Great Moravian Empire exerted a notable impact on the 
development of culture and religion among the Eastern and Southern Slavs in the 
Middle Ages. In 863, the Byzantine Christian missionaries Constantin and 
Methodius came to Moravia to introduce Slavic liturgy and Cyrillic alphabet. Later, 
however, the influence of the Roman Catholic Church gradually expanded and 
became dominant. The Great Moravian Empire collapsed following invasions of the 
Magyars in the years 903-907. It is noteworthy that a significant part of the local 
aristocracy remained more or less undisturbed by the fall of Great Moravia and their 
descendants became nobles in the newly formed Kingdom of Hungary.  
 
The Premyslid and Luxembourg Dynasties   
  During the reign of the Premyslid dynasty (10th–13th centuries), Bohemia 
became the center of an independent state-building process, gradually grew in 
strength and succeeded in preserving its actual sovereignty despite formal vassal ties 
to the Holy Roman Empire. As a result of the strife for independence the 
foundations of local self-government were also laid down during this period. 
 In 1212, Prince Otakar I received The Golden Bull of Sicily, a decree 
proclaiming Bohemia a kingdom and Bohemian princes hereditary kings. Bohemia 
then became one of the most important states within the Holy Roman Empire. The 
reign of the Luxembourg dynasty began when John of Luxembourg (1310-1346) 
was elected King of Bohemia in 1310. The Luxembourg kings added new regions to 
their kingdom which received the name the Crownlands of Bohemia.   
 The kingdom of Bohemia reached its height of power and prestige during 
the reign of Charles IV (1346-1378), the second Luxembourg on the throne of 
Bohemia. In 1348 he established Charles University - it was the first university 
founded north of the Alps.   
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 The late 14th and early 15th centuries were marked by the economic and 
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Charles IV. This period also witnessed an influential Church-reform movement, the 
Hussite Revolution, led by a Czech Jan Zizka. The latter was inspired by the 
teachings of Jan Hus, a preacher who was burnt at the stake in 1415 at Constance. 
 Heir to the crown of Bohemia, the Roman Emperor Sigismund, tried to 
crush the growing revolution by force but the Hussites defeated his five consecutive 
crusades in the years 1420-1431. Only the victory of the Emperor’s troops in 1434 
opened the way for a temporary agreement between Hussite Bohemia and Catholic 
Europe. The Hussite movement contributed to the changes in the structure of society 
and establishment of religious dualism for the first time in Christian Europe. The 
power and prosperity of the Church declined. The Czech nobility, towns and culture 
benefited from these developments.  
 
The Habsburg Dynasty   
In 1526 the Habsburgs of Austria succeeded to the throne of Bohemia. 
During his reign Rudolf II (1576-1611) left Vienna for Prague and the Bohemian 
capital grew into an important center of European culture. The Czech Estates forced 
Rudolf II to issue a decree proclaiming freedom of religious confession. The 
Emperors Matthias and Ferdinand tried to limit this freedom and their efforts 
sparked a civil war between the Estates and the Catholic Emperor. The Estates were 
defeated in 1620 at the Battle of the White Mountain. The following period of the 
Thirty Years' War brought political disorder and economic devastation to Bohemia 
with far-reaching implications for the future development of the country.  
Bohemia lost its independence and became part of Austria and later of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire for the subsequent 300 years. The people of Bohemia 
were forced to accept the Catholic faith or to emigrate. The throne of Bohemia was 
made hereditary in the Habsburg dynasty and the most important offices were 
transferred permanently to Vienna.  
This period gave rise to alienation and resentment of citizens towards state 
officials who represented foreign power, spoke foreign language and acted often in 
an authoritative and arrogant manner.  
A crisis of feudalism and the fiscal interests of the state led to the 
Enlightenment reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II in the second half of the 18th 
century. The reforms brought more autonomy to Bohemia and Moravia. At the same 
time the reforms contributed to the centralization of power and to the process of 
Germanization which proved to be a serious threat to the identity of the Slavic 
nationalities of the empire.  
Bureaucracy played a key role in public life of the Habsburg Monarchy and 
especially in resolving various problems caused by multinational structure of the 
Empire. “Bureaucracy dominated the government under the Hubsburg Monarchy”  
(Liegle and Muller, 1999). Development of self-governed society was not 
encouraged since local self-government bodies were largely based on national 
affiliation and the central state suspected them of disloyalty. The whole system of 
education was oriented towards teaching students to be loyal citizens.  
 
Formation of the Modern Czech Nation  
Although the Czech national revival movement aspired at first only to a 
revival of the Czech language and culture, it soon began to strive for political self-
determination. In the revolutionary year 1848, Czech politicians made the first 
coherent political proclamations aimed at transforming the empire into a federalist 
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state. Plans for national revival were supported by quick industrialization of 
Bohemia which made the country the most developed monarchy in the second half 
of the 19th century.  
The roots of many current administrative traditions, attitudes and 
behavioral patterns prevailing in the Czech society go back to the period when 
Bohemia was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As one of the observers 
remarked “If Czechs have a penchant for bureaucracy (and by God, they do), then it 
is perhaps above all, a legacy of the remarkable social and economic modernization 
of Czech lands in the late 19th century”. During this period “…they also developed 
a rich administrative vocabulary (most of it calqued from the German of their 
Austrian Hapsburg rulers) and a magnificent culture of bureaucracy and 
administration” (Hanley, 1999).   
 
Independent State (from 1918)  
In the years during World War I Czech politics took a turn towards 
radicalism largely as a result of the activities abroad of the future presidents T. 
Masaryk and E. Benes. The defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Empire cleared the way 
for the formation of an independent state of the Czechs and Slovaks (October 1918). 
The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic defined the new state as a 
parliamentary republic. In many ways it provided for a dominant position of the 
parliament over the Head of state and the Government. This was a reaction to the 
previous experience of authoritative regime. The political parties represented in the 
Parliament had excessive powers over the executive and to a considerable extent 
were determining the personnel policies of the state administration.   
During the period between World Wars I and II Czechoslovakia had a 
developed parliamentary democracy. The state administration embraced almost 
unchanged the civil service system of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The latter was 
structured largely in accordance with Weberian principles of developed bureaucracy 
and respective legal norms (Civil Service Rules of 1914 – Act N 15 of the Imperial 
Code of 25 November 1914). The state administrative structure comprised two 
institutional levels: 1) the organs of the state i.e. central government and other state 
authorities including those at the regional level; and 2) the organs of territorial self-
government at the level of the lands, districts and localities.   
During the inter-war period the country became one of the ten most 
developed countries of the world. This period of twenty years of democracy and 
prosperity was ended by the aggression of Hitler's Germany. The conference in 
Munich and the following German occupation in March 1939 brought an end to the 
independent Czech state.  
 
The Period of Communist Rule  
After World War II, the restored republic became part of the Soviet sphere 
of influence. A period of "limited" democracy was ended by a communist takeover 
in February 1948. Much private property was expropriated and political and human 
rights were suppressed. The civil service was formally abolished by the Labour Act 
of 1950 which did away with the distinction between public and private 
employment.  
The communist regime subjected state administration to strict ideological 
control and subordinated it to the monopoly power of the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia. State administrative structures served as one of the main 
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instruments for implementing political and economic decisions of the ruling party as 
well as interference in all fields of life both social and individual. Employment to 
any more or less significant post in state administration required demonstration of 
evidence of political loyalty, acceptance of the principles of "democratic centralism" 
and authorization of the respective communist party organ. 
In practice, the so called principles of "democratic centralism" defined the 
mechanism of internal organization and management within state administration. In 
accordance with these principles democracy functioned within narrowly 
circumscribed limits set by party leaders. When the party elite made decisions, the 
rank and file members were obliged to endorse and strictly follow these decisions.  
 The communist regime downgraded the position of administrative staff. It 
abolished the legal status of civil servants which was effectively replaced by 
regulations of the Labour Code.  The formal distinctions between an employee in a 
public sector (factory worker, teacher, doctor etc) and a civil servant ceased to exist. 
Administrative management was exercised by a system of the party nomenklatura 
whose representatives occupied positions at all levels of administration.  
In 1968 the “Prague Spring” marked an attempt to “humanize” the 
country’s political system, its state apparatus and above all its relations with 
citizens. In April 1968 Action Programme of the Communist Party declared 
“democratization” of the political and economic system as its main objective. The 
reform programme called for abolition of censorship, free travel abroad and also for 
replacement of incompetent officials and closer involvement of the public in 
decision-making process. The “Prague Spring” was suppressed by Warsaw Pact 
troops in August 1968.  
Although plans to reform the political and economic system of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 failed, many ideas and slogans popular at that time were 
reactivated after the victory of the “velvet revolution”.   
 
“Velvet Revolution” 
The gradual decay of the Communist rule and the Soviet influence 
culminated in the overthrow of the Communist regime in November 1989. 
Following the “velvet revolution” the first free elections were held in 1990. Vaclav 
Havel was elected President of the Republic.  
On 1 January 1993 the Czechoslovak state was peacefully divided and the 
independent Czech and Slovak Republics were founded. The Czechs initiated the 
process of the transformation of the formerly centralized state system into a 
parliamentary democracy and market economy. On 1 May 2004 the Czech Republic 
became a member of the European Union. 
Summing up, we may say that the modern history of the Czech Republic 
has been a history of predominantly non-democratic political regimes with only one 
short exception – the period between the two world wars. The roots of the Czech 
state administrative system arise from the traditions of the Austro-Hungarian 
bureaucracy and principles of state management as practiced by the ruling 
communist party. It is interesting that, over the centuries, the prevailing in Czech 
lands bureaucratic attitudes and patterns of behavior became the source of great 
literature such as Franz Kafka’s ‘The Castle’ and Jaroslav Hasek’s ‘Good Soldier 
Sveik’.    
Most typical features of the previous administrative systems were wide 
spread patron-client relations and high extent of politicization of the state 
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administration. It is noteworthy that even during the period of the Czech 
independent state between the two world wars “the political affiliation of an 
applicant for a civil service post played an important role in recruitment decisions” 
(Vidlakova, 2000:8).    
 
 
5.3  Constitutional Framework  
The Czech Republic is a parliamentary republic. It is defined by the 
constitution as a sovereign, unitary and democratic state governed by the rule of law 
based on respect for human rights and freedoms. The constitution states that the 
people are the source of all power in the state. They exercise it through respective 
bodies of legislative, executive and judicial branches of power. 
The new Constitution of the Czech Republic (Constitutional Act of the 
Czech National Council No. 1/1993 of 16 December 1992) came into force on 
1 January 1993. In accordance with another Constitutional Act of the Czech 
National Council No. 4/1993  of 15 December 1992 all laws and other legal 
regulations of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic that were in effect on the day 
of the dissolution continued to be binding unless they were cancelled. The Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms is an integral part of the Czech constitutional 
order. 
The Constitution of the Czech Republic defines general authority of state 
administrative bodies and serves as the main legal basis for its activities. The extent 
of state executive power is defined explicitly in Article 2: “State power shall serve 
all citizens and may be applied only within the limits and in the manner provided for 
by law.” 
The legislative power belongs to the Parliament which consists of two 
chambers: the Chamber of Deputies with 400 deputies elected for four years period 
and the Senate with 81 senators elected for a term of six years. One third of the 
senators are replaced every two years. The Constitution established a Constitutional 
Court consisting of 15 judges who are appointed by the President of the Republic 
and approved by the Senate (Articles 83-93). Judges serve ten-year terms. The 
constitutional court also rules on the abolition of laws or their individual provisions 
that are in violation of a Constitutional Act or a ratified international treaty on 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
The Czech President is formally elected by the Chamber of Deputies and 
the Senate for a maximum of two five-year terms. He is the Head of State but his 
role is largely ceremonial and his real powers are rather limited. He heads the armed 
forces, nominates the Prime Minister and in special cases can dissolve the lower 
house of the Parliament. He approves laws and has a power of veto though this can 
be overridden by a simple majority of deputies. The President cannot announce 
referenda or rule by decree. Because of the personality of V. Havel, the President in 
the Czech Republic has been widely perceived as a moral guardian of the nation.  
 In practice the balance of power between the President, Government and 
Parliament is gravitating towards the Government which defines the main directions 
of the country’s internal and external policy. A survey conducted by Johansen 
among the Czech officials and experts revealed that in the Czech Republic the 
Government is considered to be the most important forum for decision making 
(Johansen, 2004:2).   
 
 108
administration. It is noteworthy that even during the period of the Czech 
independent state between the two world wars “the political affiliation of an 
applicant for a civil service post played an important role in recruitment decisions” 
(Vidlakova, 2000:8).    
 
 
5.3  Constitutional Framework  
The Czech Republic is a parliamentary republic. It is defined by the 
constitution as a sovereign, unitary and democratic state governed by the rule of law 
based on respect for human rights and freedoms. The constitution states that the 
people are the source of all power in the state. They exercise it through respective 
bodies of legislative, executive and judicial branches of power. 
The new Constitution of the Czech Republic (Constitutional Act of the 
Czech National Council No. 1/1993 of 16 December 1992) came into force on 
1 January 1993. In accordance with another Constitutional Act of the Czech 
National Council No. 4/1993  of 15 December 1992 all laws and other legal 
regulations of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic that were in effect on the day 
of the dissolution continued to be binding unless they were cancelled. The Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms is an integral part of the Czech constitutional 
order. 
The Constitution of the Czech Republic defines general authority of state 
administrative bodies and serves as the main legal basis for its activities. The extent 
of state executive power is defined explicitly in Article 2: “State power shall serve 
all citizens and may be applied only within the limits and in the manner provided for 
by law.” 
The legislative power belongs to the Parliament which consists of two 
chambers: the Chamber of Deputies with 400 deputies elected for four years period 
and the Senate with 81 senators elected for a term of six years. One third of the 
senators are replaced every two years. The Constitution established a Constitutional 
Court consisting of 15 judges who are appointed by the President of the Republic 
and approved by the Senate (Articles 83-93). Judges serve ten-year terms. The 
constitutional court also rules on the abolition of laws or their individual provisions 
that are in violation of a Constitutional Act or a ratified international treaty on 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
The Czech President is formally elected by the Chamber of Deputies and 
the Senate for a maximum of two five-year terms. He is the Head of State but his 
role is largely ceremonial and his real powers are rather limited. He heads the armed 
forces, nominates the Prime Minister and in special cases can dissolve the lower 
house of the Parliament. He approves laws and has a power of veto though this can 
be overridden by a simple majority of deputies. The President cannot announce 
referenda or rule by decree. Because of the personality of V. Havel, the President in 
the Czech Republic has been widely perceived as a moral guardian of the nation.  
 In practice the balance of power between the President, Government and 
Parliament is gravitating towards the Government which defines the main directions 
of the country’s internal and external policy. A survey conducted by Johansen 
among the Czech officials and experts revealed that in the Czech Republic the 
Government is considered to be the most important forum for decision making 
(Johansen, 2004:2).   
  109
The first constitutional change after the demise of the communist regime 
was made by the Constitutional Act of 3 December 1997, "On the Establishment of 
Higher Territorial Self-governing Units and on the Change of the Constitutional Act 
No.1/1993 - the Constitution of the Czech Republic". This legal act provides for the 
division of the Czech Republic’s territory into communities which are the basic 
territorial self-governing units, and regions which are the higher territorial self-
governing units. As a result 14 regional governments were established.  
 
 
5.4  Political System   
As we noted above effective political power in the Czech Republic is 
concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet who defines the 
main directions of governmental activities and priorities of drafted and reviewed 
legislation. As a collegiate body the government is responsible to the Parliament 
(Chamber of Deputies). In particular, it is accountable to the Chamber for the 
implementation of the state budget.  
Elections to Parliament are held through a proportional representation 
system based upon party affiliation. The minimum level of popular support required 
to qualify for representation in Parliament is 5% of the local vote. The largest four 
political parties are Civil Democratic Party (ODS), Czech Social Democratic Party 
(ČSSD), Christian Democratic Union – Czech Folk Party (KDU-ČSL) and the 
Communist Party of the Czech and the Moravia (KSČM). 
The development of state administration in any country is influenced by 
various factors – political, economic, historical, cultural etc. Three political factors 
deserve in our view special attention since they have had a considerable impact on 
the development of the Czech state administration throughout the 1990s:  
o the process of formation of a democratic society and market oriented 
economy (started in 1989); 
o the break-up of the former Czechoslovakia into two independent states 
(1 January 1993); 
o the preparation of the country for accession to the European 
Community (since 1995).  
In the opinion of some observers the Czech political system has been 
crippled (at least in the 1990s) by two essential drawbacks. Firstly, the major 
political parties have not enforced minimum accountability and quality by serving as 
watchdogs of each other’s conduct and activities. Secondly, too often the system 
displayed a high level of tolerance towards politicians who failed to govern 
competently and honestly.  
In his speech to both houses of parliament in December 1997 President 
Vaclav Havel emphasized: ”The prevailing opinion is that it pays off in this country 
to lie and to steal; that many politicians and civil servants are corrupt; that political 
parties – though they all declare honest intentions in lofty words – are covertly 
manipulated by suspicious financial groupings” (CTK, 9 December 1997). In 
particular he pointed to lawlessness, corruption and utter neglect of any moral 
principles that accompanied mass scale privatization in the country. In his words the 
situation in the Czech Republic was such that to respect the law meant to put oneself 
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at a disadvantage to the privileged whose wealth has been so often built on violation 
of laws and ethical principles (ibid).   
 
 
5.5  Economic Situation 
The economic development of the country in the 1990s is often divided into 
two phases. The first phase is confined to the period 1990-1996 during which the 
Czech Republic was regarded as a success story in the region with the lowest rates 
of inflation (9.1%) and unemployment (2.9% of the labour force). The high GDP 
growth rate was accompanied by a relatively low budget deficit.  The priorities of 
the economic policy at that time included: 
- price and trade liberalization; 
- reduction of subsidies to enterprises; 
- transfer to full currency convertibility; 
- rapid privatization programme; 
- restrictive monetary and fiscal policy. 
During this period elementary institutional foundations of the market 
economy in areas such as property rights, the financial sector, corporate governance 
and bankruptcy were laid down. 
The second phase 1997-2001 was characterized by decline in investment, 
real GDP growth at 0.3% and depreciation of the Czech Crown by 20% against 
USD. By the end of the decade the Czech economy was in deep recession. 
Unemployment doubled reaching 8.7% at the end of 1999, major banks tottered on 
the brink of collapse and industrial production was plummeting. 
The major reasons for this unsatisfactory performance were slow pace of 
enterprise restructuring, growth of real wages above productivity, unconvincing 
results of voucher privatization, inadequate enforcement of legal norms and, in 
particular, protection of shareholders’ rights. 
Opinion polls provided further evidence of an “unhealthy” state of affairs – 
from 31 per cent among the Czechs in 1995 who thought the reform process had 
gone well the number of positively minded respondents had fallen to a mere 5% by 
1998 (Shepherd, 2000:76).  
An appropriate illustration of the situation was provided by one of the 
observers:  “The culmination of all of these problems within the Czech economy 
created an atmosphere of failure in the government. In 1997, as the reform process 
appeared to be coming to a close, several drastic measures were introduced to keep 
the economy and the nation’s infrastructure from falling well below its forecasts. 
Despite the efforts made by the government and private firms, the Czech economy 
still faltered heavily and to a great extent many of the causes of the financial crisis 
could have been prevented in the early phase of transformation. Vaclav Klaus’ 
declaration that the transformation process in the Czech Republic had been 
completed was premature by any measure.” (Kampars, 2004:41). 
Radical reform measures taken by the Czechoslovak government in the 
initial years of transformation came at a very high social cost. According to official 
government statistics, in the first three years of transformation (1991-1993) the GDP 
in the Czech Republic declined by 21.8 percent; industrial output dropped even 
more by 34.8 percent. (Adam, 1999: 4). 
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 Statistics published by the Czech Statistics Office in 2000 indicated that the 
Czech economy started to gradually emerge from its three-year recession. In this 
connection an OECD report argued that the Czech case shows a lesson “about 
sequencing of reform and the importance of establishing a sound regulatory and 
institutional framework to allow the market to operate”. (OECD, 2001:160).   
 
 
5.6  Privatization and its Implications 
In the early 1990s the economic aspects of reform were considered by the 
Czech politicians to be of highest priority while the importance of introducing 
regulatory mechanisms was largely ignored. Development of institutional and 
regulatory framework was lagging far behind the process of privatization. 
Numerous sources indicate that absence of a sound legal framework 
allowed the dishonest to misappropriate huge assets from the state. Weak control 
and easy access to huge financial resources contributed to wide proliferation of 
corruption and economic crime.   
Selling off of formerly state-owned companies (coupon privatization) was 
launched shortly after “velvet revolution”. Many state monopolies like those in the 
telecommunications, automobile and tobacco industries were privatized. This was 
not the case with regard to the majority of state banks. A debt structure retained by 
the formerly state companies from communist times led to the emergence of a 
complicated system of mutual insolvency. The state-run banks were unwilling to 
foreclose on virtually bankrupt companies fearing an increase in unemployment. At 
the same time banks tended to offer limited loans at very high interest rates. When 
mismanagement and embezzlement caused a number of leading Czech banks to fall 
in the mid 1990s, the government bailed them out instead of allowing them to go 
bankrupt. Later the government repeated the mistake by not letting any large 
enterprises to fail on account of their unmanageable debts.  
The government support to medium and small businesses was not 
convincing though the development of the private sector needed effective assistance 
after 40 years of communist rule. Taxes for both individuals and business were 
rather high. In 1996, restrictions on trading of the Czech crown were lifted, making 
it the first convertible currency in the former Soviet Bloc.  
In mid 1997 negative trends in economic development and foreign market 
speculation with the newly convertible Czech currency brought about a monetary 
crisis. All the deficiencies in the Czech privatization process and economic 
transformation were glaringly disclosed.  
 As one observer noted: “Economic privatization was expected to carry 
considerable costs, but dispersed equally across the population. Instead, not only are 
these costs perceived to be unequally distributed, but they are also considerably 
higher than first expected” (Hallstrom, 2005).  
An opinion poll conducted in early 1998 revealed that over 50% of the 
Czech population felt they had been deceived by coupon privatization while more 
than two-thirds thought it had benefited only the government and the dishonest 
(Shepherd, 2000:104).   
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5.7  Legal Framework  
The Constitution of the Czech Republic stipulates (Art.79) that “The legal 
relations of state employees in the ministries and other administrative offices shall 
be regulated by an Act of Parliament”. This is the only provision of the Constitution 
directly concerning personnel employed by the Government and other state 
institutions. The Constitution also states that ministries and other administrative 
structures may be established and their competences defined exclusively by an Act 
of Parliament (ibid).  
According to the Czech legislation a state institution has to be established 
by a legal act. The Law on Competences (No. 2/1969) comprises a list of ministries 
and determines their functions and authority. This law defines the overall division of 
tasks within the central administration and its basic organisation. Administrative 
procedures are governed by the Law on Administrative Procedure (No. 71/1967) and 
some other laws.  
In the Czech Republic neither the Constitution nor the Law on 
Competencies established clear division of authority between ministries and other 
governmental institutions. There has been a shortage of conceptual and legal 
definitions of organisational entities such as Ministries, Committees, Agencies, 
Inspections, etc. This vacuum resulted in  sometimes confused perceptions of what 
should be part of the political mandate of a Minister and what should not. 
(Fernandez, 2001). 
             Until 2002 the civil service in the Czech Republic did not exist from the 
legal point of view since state administration employees (as one whole) were not 
covered by special regulations. Unified standard criteria for civil servants selection, 
recruitment, promotion and management were missing. As a rule each government 
agency defined its own policy in this respect. A special law on civil servants was 
drafted by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and submitted to the 
government in September 2000. It was approved by the Czech Parliament in April 
2002 (Civil service Act No. 218/2002). 
Approval by the Parliament on 21 March 2000 of the Act 150/2000 on 
Judicial Administrative Proceedings (enforced from 1 January 2002) created a 
system of administrative justice in the Czech Republic. There are two areas of 
jurisdiction of the Administrative court: appeal to specialized chambers in regional 
courts and cassation before the Supreme Administrative Court (set up in Brno in 
2003). The courts have the right to replace or annul administrative decisions. 
However, due to limited experience it is too early to speak about their effectiveness.   
  
 
5.8  Central Government   
The Government is the central policy-making and executive body. It 
consists of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers. The number 
of Deputy Prime Ministers is not determined by law. In 2006 the government 
consisted of 18 members, including the Prime Minister, two Vice Prime Ministers 
(one of whom also acts as Minister of Labour and Social Affairs), 14 ministers in 
charge of separate ministries, and a minister without portfolio. The ministers are 
appointed and dismissed by the President on the proposal of the Prime Minister. The 
majority of ministries have regional offices.  
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The Prime Minister chairs Government meetings which are held on a 
weekly basis. Decisions may be passed by a majority of members present. The 
Government issues decrees within the scope of existing law. Decrees must be signed 
by the Prime Minister and the government member concerned. Ministries, other 
administrative agencies and territorial self-government bodies may issue legal 
regulations on the basis of existing legislation and within the area of their authority.   
The Office of the Government is an advisory and administrative support 
structure providing information, technical and organizational assistance for the 
activities of the government. It is a central institution which does not fulfill 
ministerial functions. 
The line ministries are responsible for designing and implementing 
government policy in a specific area.  Their internal organisation is decided by each 
minister. Formal guidelines and mechanisms for policy coordination among 
ministries are generally in place and are administered by a special department in the 
Cabinet. Policy coordination is usually achieved through government advisory 
structures created by a decision of the Government and by ad hoc commissions 
formed by separate ministries.  
One of the examples of the latter was the Inter-ministerial Commission on 
Public Administration Reform established by the Ministry of Interior. The 
Commission consisted of Deputy Ministers of all ministries and Heads of selected 
central administration bodies. It was headed by the Deputy Minister of Interior in 
charge of public administration reform. 
Various reports show that although mechanisms for inter-ministerial co-
ordination are in place they are generally weak and the procedures are slow. 
Negotiations on draft laws, on policy-proposals and on budget lines take a long time 
and are not settled at appropriate levels. Also ministries, departments and sub-
departments often have over-lapping functions and communication and management 
structures are blurred. Effective elaboration and coordination of policy at the central 
level is complicated by the tendency of line ministries to focus on narrow sectored 
interests at the expense of broader cross-sector priorities. As one expert stated “Each 
ministry is an isolated fiefdom working independently with little cooperation or 
sharing of information” (Chandran. 2000:10).    
 
 
5.9  Civil Service: Status, Efficiency and Institutional Setting   
In the 1990s the Czech Republic has undertaken certain reforms aimed at 
developing institutional environment to support competitive markets and democratic 
values. Progress has been made in devolving powers to local and new regional 
governments, introduction of certain regulatory mechanisms, and harmonization of 
Czech laws with EU legislation.  
Little attention however was paid to the modernization of the state 
administration. The need for reform of public administration was regularly 
pronounced. However, the reform 1) was conceived almost exclusively as reform of 
regional and local government; 2) its implementation was permanently delayed; and 
3) even when modernization of central state administration was considered, it was 
perceived mainly as adoption of respective legislation. “The public administration 
reform has been understood in the Czech Republic in a very narrow way as the 
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setting-up of regional authorities and the adoption of the Civil service Act” (NTF, 
1998: 7-1-7). 
A particular feature which distinguished the Czech Republic from many of 
its CEE neighbours was absence until 2002 of legislation providing for the existence 
of a civil service and respectively lack of formal status of a “civil servant” as such. 
Each employee had a contractual relationship with a specific institution (ministry, 
agency etc) but not with the state as a whole. The Labour Code served as the basis 
for this relationship.  
The problem remained, however, that whereas by the early 2000s the 
number of civil servants had increased, the quality of civil service had fallen. 
Speaking to the deputies of the Parliament, the Czech Deputy Prime Minister 
remarked “The level of civil service in the Czech Republic since 1989 has dropped 
considerably” (Spidla, 2001). 
The functions of central government bodies were not sufficiently clarified 
within the general system of public administration. The role of civil servants in the 
policy process was not clearly defined either. The internal regulations of ministries 
governing their structure and responsibilities of their units differed considerably in 
their content and extent. Typical of the Czech institutional setting has been weak law 
enforcement. “As with all laws in the Czech Republic, enforcement is a concern” 
(Chandran, 2000:11).  
Promotion and appointment based exclusively on merit were rather an 
exception than a rule. Unethical and corrupt behaviour of civil servants continued to 
arouse serious concern. “The administration is still politicized and lacks sufficiently 
qualified staff to serve as reform agents” (SIGMA, 2003).   
In spite of these negative trends the Czech Government “did not initiate any 
in-depth analysis of this state of affairs and did not deal systematically and 
conceptually with the problems of civil service in general or the personnel policy of 
state administration in particular” (Vidlakova, 2000:8). 
An OECD report described the situation in the following way “Today many 
of the highest priority challenges facing the Czech Republic lie in improving the 
capacities of the public administration – its skills, its structures, its accountability for 
performance, its relation with and understanding of markets and consumer interests, 
its culture and its style of operation” (OECD,  2001:136).  
 The period of the 1990s revealed also that in the Czech Republic there was 
no influential political party or social group, which not only displayed interest in 
civil service reform but was committed and motivated to push for its 
implementation. 
 
  
5.10  Civil Service Management  
Since the institution of civil service was established in the Czech Republic 
only recently and the basic law which determines largely its activities has not been 
fully enforced yet, it is possible to speak here only about the way state 
administration was managed before and the way it should be managed according to 
the new legislation.  
As we pointed out already, prior to 2002 management of the Czech state 
administration was largely compartmentalized and exercised mainly by the 
leadership of each ministry or agency. Universal standards of the organisation, 
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recruitment, assessment, motivation of civil servants were lacking. There existed 
general provisions in the Constitution that overall management of the central 
administration is exercised by the government of the day. The terms of service were 
regulated mainly by the Labour Code.   
Management of state administration was characterized by insufficient 
coordination, orientation on process rather than results, disregard of the importance 
of proper training and considerable neglect of citizens as ultimate clients.    
The level of decision-making was excessively “top heavy” with 90% of the 
decision-making powers concentrated on average in around 6% of employees of the 
state institution (NTF, 1998: 3-1). 
The new law adopted in 2002 envisaged that civil service management 
would be exercised by the General Directorate for Civil Service which was 
established in June 2002 as a separate unit in the Office of the Government 
(SIGMA, 2003). The law also provided for the introduction of a new post in each 
ministry and agency - Director of Personnel who is reporting directly to the General 
Directorate for Civil Service.  
However, full enforcement of the Civil service Act has been regularly 
postponed. Four years after the adoption of the Law the post of the Head of the 
General Directorate for Civil Service was still vacant and the Directorate’s staff was 
cut by 60% (Landova, 2006:60).  
 
 
5.11   Relations Politicians - Civil Servants  
Until the adoption of the Civil Service Act a clearly defined distinction 
between political appointees and tenure government officials was absent in the 
Czech Republic. The legal framework guiding relations between politicians and civil 
servants has been fragmentary. Some elements of this framework were incorporated 
in the Conflict of Interest Act (No. 238/1992) and partly in the amended Labour 
Code (No. 65/1965). 
 After the fall of communism in 1989 politicization of the state 
administration in the Czech Republic continued to be a problem. An analysis 
prepared by the National Training Foundation stated “We have also failed to get rid 
of the politicization of administrative staff…. Some officials believe that the most 
important thing is to be loyal to a certain political party, which can bring more profit 
than perfect performance of the service. Czech politicians have not grasped yet how 
such an approach can damage public administration and, consequently, also 
themselves through undue influence upon state officials”. (NTF, 1998: 6-2).  
 One of the objectives of the Civil service Act adopted in 2002 consisted in 
reducing politicization of the civil service personnel. However, since the full 
enforcement of the Act is still pending, the relationship between politicians and civil 
servants in the Czech Republic continues to be based on many stereotypes of 
administrative culture and conduct formed during the communist and pre-
communist past.   
 The negative impact of excessive politicization of the administrative 
apparatus was noted by many observers. “The first weakness in the Czech 
bureaucratic structure is that there is no clear separation between civil service and 
politics. Civil servants come and go with changing governments. Thus, the main 
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agenda of the civil service is to serve the ruling party rather than the people” 
(Chandran, 2000:10).    
 “While personnel changes within ministries due to changes in the cabinet 
could hardly be said to represent anything unique in the world, it needs to be 
emphasized that in the Czech Republic these changes often affected even the lowest 
management levels within the institution; something that would be impossible in 
many democratic countries due to the safeguards provided by civil service laws” 
(Landová, 2006:15).  
 Deputy Prime Minister Spidla introducing a draft Civil service Act to the 
Czech Parliament referred to “unhealthy politicization of the civil service”. “It is 
becoming a rule that every change of government or a minister is accompanied by 
replacement of key staff (a sort of personnel earthquake) which has a very negative 
impact on the quality and effectiveness of work.” (Spidla, 2002).  
One can find even more critical generalizations “Current unsatisfactory 
status of the Czech state administration serves evidence of the negative effects of the 
long term political interference in the management of public administration” 
(Onisko, 2000:36). 
 
 
5.12  Human Resources Management  
 The main feature of personnel management in the Czech state 
administration has been its decentralization. Data on the number of employees in the 
Czech public administration coming from various sources is incomplete and 
conflicting. Since the formation of the Czech Republic in 1993 the number of state 
administration employees has been growing. In 1998 there were 13,000 civil 
servants in the central state administration. In 2001 the number has reached almost 
17,000. Overall number of state administration employees in 1998 amounted to 
154,000 (World Bank, 2000:122).  
 According to Williams the Czech bureaucracy doubled in size under the 
“pseudo-Thatcherite” government of Vaclav Klaus (Williams, 1999). 
 Prior to 2002, there was neither a centralized human resources management 
system dealing with employees in the state administration, nor standard criteria for 
civil servants’ selection, recruitment, promotion and management. The 
establishment of such a system was envisaged in the Civil service Act full 
enforcement of which has been pending for years.   
 In fact, in matters of employment and personnel management, every 
institution has acted as an independent  legal  entity  and  not  on  behalf  of  the  
State or on the basis of State authorization. Even more important, strict observance 
of merit based principles in appointments, promotion and compensation was rather 
an exception than a rule. “Practices in recruitment and promotion are not based on 
open, merit based competition, with the result that they encourage political 
allegiance and patronage and put the professionalism and impartiality of the civil 
service at risk” (SIGMA, 2003:15)  
 The workload of individual civil servants has been generally unbalanced. 
Those who are capable are overburdened and the administration finds it difficult to 
dispose of those who are incompetent and inefficient under the existing conditions 
(NTF, 1998: 6-2).  
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 Insufficient prestige of civil service and relatively low levels of 
remuneration weaken the ability of the administration to retain employees. As a 
result, staff turnover has been high, particularly of young specialists who have been 
employed by the government only for a year or so. Due to the same reason existing 
training facilities have been overburdened.  
 There has been no effective policy of making public sector career attractive 
for qualified and experienced entrants. Public and professional recognition of 
service to the government and attractive career prospects are largely absent.  “Civil 
servants in the Czech Republic have neither job security nor a clearly defined career 
path which discourages young people from entering the civil service” (Chandran, 
2000:10). 
  Mobility between ministries or from outside the public service has been 
limited which reduced exchange of experience and new ideas. “There is a shortage 
of professionals with general orientation, modern education for management 
positions and strategic decision-making as well as of members of a number of 
professions and specializations, trained for performing analytical, information, 
legislative etc. functions in public administration.” (NTF, 1998: 6-2). 
  
 
5.13  Pay and Incentive Mechanisms  
 Until the adoption of the Civil service Act civil servants’ remuneration 
system was based on the Act on salaries and remuneration in budgetary 
organizations (No. 143/1992) from the year 1992. This act defined salary scales, 
terms for granting bonuses and extra pay and determined procedures for 
management of payroll.  
 Principal elements of this system (NTF, 1998: 5-5) comprised:   
-  the core of the salary model is formed by the base pay (tariff);  
- salaries are based on salary classes and grades according to the number of years in 
service;  
- there are personal evaluation bonuses which should reflect the performance and 
achieved results over a longer period of time;  
- additional allowances;  
- extra pay reflecting specific conditions for the performance of work and the nature 
of work activities.  
 The bonuses for the grades 9 to 12 and 1 to 8 could amount up to 100 and 
40 per cent of the base salary respectively (SIGMA, 2002:7). 
 Modern staff appraisal and evaluation systems, proper job descriptions and 
clear rules for career advancement have been largely absent thus allowing strong 
discretionary powers of superiors. The mechanism of supplementary pay (bonuses 
and other discretionary allowances) lacked clarity and transparency and resulted in 
significant differences in take-home pay between officials of state institutions. Such 
practices created a demotivating environment restricting efficiency, quality and 
initiative of rank and file civil servants. (NTF, 1998: 5-5) 
 In the late 1990s the Czech Ministry of Finance introduced a policy of 
providing an overall wage budget to line ministries while allowing substantial 
discretion in its use, subject to compliance with existing regulations regarding 
remuneration (World Bank, 1999:4). Such practice was aimed at ensuring effective 
management of human resources at the same time preserving overall fiscal 
 
 117
 Insufficient prestige of civil service and relatively low levels of 
remuneration weaken the ability of the administration to retain employees. As a 
result, staff turnover has been high, particularly of young specialists who have been 
employed by the government only for a year or so. Due to the same reason existing 
training facilities have been overburdened.  
 There has been no effective policy of making public sector career attractive 
for qualified and experienced entrants. Public and professional recognition of 
service to the government and attractive career prospects are largely absent.  “Civil 
servants in the Czech Republic have neither job security nor a clearly defined career 
path which discourages young people from entering the civil service” (Chandran, 
2000:10). 
  Mobility between ministries or from outside the public service has been 
limited which reduced exchange of experience and new ideas. “There is a shortage 
of professionals with general orientation, modern education for management 
positions and strategic decision-making as well as of members of a number of 
professions and specializations, trained for performing analytical, information, 
legislative etc. functions in public administration.” (NTF, 1998: 6-2). 
  
 
5.13  Pay and Incentive Mechanisms  
 Until the adoption of the Civil service Act civil servants’ remuneration 
system was based on the Act on salaries and remuneration in budgetary 
organizations (No. 143/1992) from the year 1992. This act defined salary scales, 
terms for granting bonuses and extra pay and determined procedures for 
management of payroll.  
 Principal elements of this system (NTF, 1998: 5-5) comprised:   
-  the core of the salary model is formed by the base pay (tariff);  
- salaries are based on salary classes and grades according to the number of years in 
service;  
- there are personal evaluation bonuses which should reflect the performance and 
achieved results over a longer period of time;  
- additional allowances;  
- extra pay reflecting specific conditions for the performance of work and the nature 
of work activities.  
 The bonuses for the grades 9 to 12 and 1 to 8 could amount up to 100 and 
40 per cent of the base salary respectively (SIGMA, 2002:7). 
 Modern staff appraisal and evaluation systems, proper job descriptions and 
clear rules for career advancement have been largely absent thus allowing strong 
discretionary powers of superiors. The mechanism of supplementary pay (bonuses 
and other discretionary allowances) lacked clarity and transparency and resulted in 
significant differences in take-home pay between officials of state institutions. Such 
practices created a demotivating environment restricting efficiency, quality and 
initiative of rank and file civil servants. (NTF, 1998: 5-5) 
 In the late 1990s the Czech Ministry of Finance introduced a policy of 
providing an overall wage budget to line ministries while allowing substantial 
discretion in its use, subject to compliance with existing regulations regarding 
remuneration (World Bank, 1999:4). Such practice was aimed at ensuring effective 
management of human resources at the same time preserving overall fiscal 
  118
discipline. However, absence of effective mechanisms for holding budgetary units 
accountable for how effectively the line ministries attain policy and plan objectives 
undermined motivation to effectively exercise this autonomy.    
 The comparison of salaries in comparable jobs between state administration 
and private sector shows that the average income in state administration for mid 
level staff is lower by 30% or more (NTF, 1998: 5-5). Until late 1996, the earnings 
in the public sector, in particular of employees performing more highly qualified, 
complex and responsible work, were generally on the rise. However, in 1997 the 
government austerity measures resulted in the drop of remuneration in the state 
administration in contrast with the business sector. These developments led to high 
turnover of personnel, a tendency to seek higher income elsewhere and proliferation 
of corruption. 
 The Civil service Act (if fully enforced) should provide for an overall 
higher level of remuneration of civil servants and closer dependence of take home 
pay on the results of performance appraisal. Still, OECD experts assessed the 
proposed new salary and supplementary pay system as “rather complex and 
fragmented, which may give rise to some interpretational and operational 
difficulties”. They also did not exclude difficulties in budgetary funding of this 
expenditure (SIGMA, 2002).  
 
 
5.14  Education and Training 
 Throughout the 1990s neither specialized university level education nor 
systematic in-service training of central state administration officials existed in the 
Czech Republic (Vidlakova, 1999:11, Potucek, 2004:97). Upgrading qualifications 
and re-training of civil servants had been managed ad hoc by many central and 
regional public administration institutions without any coordination. The role of 
training in the resolution of urgent problems of public administration development 
was reduced to mostly random sending of individuals to training courses (including 
courses and study abroad). No central authority for coordination of the training of 
public administration employees existed at that time. 
 A central higher education institution specializing in a targeted preparation 
of civil servants and their training did not exist either. Motivation for training and 
self-training has been overall weak. The level of education of 17% of civil servants 
in central state administration did not correspond to the qualification requirements of 
the post they occupied (Concept of Training, 1999). It can be generally stated that an 
opportunity to extensively utilize training as one of the basic tools of the reform and 
modernization of the Czech public administration has been missed. (NTF, 1998)  
 In 1996 the opinion of all ministries was requested regarding the necessity 
of establishing a Public Administration School of university level. The surprising 
result was that the majority of ministries was satisfied with the existing situation and 
did not consider the establishment of such a school a priority.  
 In June 1999 the Czech Government approved a policy for training civil 
servants. The main objective of this document was to establish life-long training in 
an open system providing qualified preparation of civil servants to standards 
appropriate to EU accession. The system would be provided by state and private 
sector middle-level and higher schools and universities. The document highlighted 
 
 118
discipline. However, absence of effective mechanisms for holding budgetary units 
accountable for how effectively the line ministries attain policy and plan objectives 
undermined motivation to effectively exercise this autonomy.    
 The comparison of salaries in comparable jobs between state administration 
and private sector shows that the average income in state administration for mid 
level staff is lower by 30% or more (NTF, 1998: 5-5). Until late 1996, the earnings 
in the public sector, in particular of employees performing more highly qualified, 
complex and responsible work, were generally on the rise. However, in 1997 the 
government austerity measures resulted in the drop of remuneration in the state 
administration in contrast with the business sector. These developments led to high 
turnover of personnel, a tendency to seek higher income elsewhere and proliferation 
of corruption. 
 The Civil service Act (if fully enforced) should provide for an overall 
higher level of remuneration of civil servants and closer dependence of take home 
pay on the results of performance appraisal. Still, OECD experts assessed the 
proposed new salary and supplementary pay system as “rather complex and 
fragmented, which may give rise to some interpretational and operational 
difficulties”. They also did not exclude difficulties in budgetary funding of this 
expenditure (SIGMA, 2002).  
 
 
5.14  Education and Training 
 Throughout the 1990s neither specialized university level education nor 
systematic in-service training of central state administration officials existed in the 
Czech Republic (Vidlakova, 1999:11, Potucek, 2004:97). Upgrading qualifications 
and re-training of civil servants had been managed ad hoc by many central and 
regional public administration institutions without any coordination. The role of 
training in the resolution of urgent problems of public administration development 
was reduced to mostly random sending of individuals to training courses (including 
courses and study abroad). No central authority for coordination of the training of 
public administration employees existed at that time. 
 A central higher education institution specializing in a targeted preparation 
of civil servants and their training did not exist either. Motivation for training and 
self-training has been overall weak. The level of education of 17% of civil servants 
in central state administration did not correspond to the qualification requirements of 
the post they occupied (Concept of Training, 1999). It can be generally stated that an 
opportunity to extensively utilize training as one of the basic tools of the reform and 
modernization of the Czech public administration has been missed. (NTF, 1998)  
 In 1996 the opinion of all ministries was requested regarding the necessity 
of establishing a Public Administration School of university level. The surprising 
result was that the majority of ministries was satisfied with the existing situation and 
did not consider the establishment of such a school a priority.  
 In June 1999 the Czech Government approved a policy for training civil 
servants. The main objective of this document was to establish life-long training in 
an open system providing qualified preparation of civil servants to standards 
appropriate to EU accession. The system would be provided by state and private 
sector middle-level and higher schools and universities. The document highlighted 
  119
the necessity of establishing a central authority for personnel management to co-
ordinate registration and professional education of state administration employees. 
 The Institute of Public Administration was finally established in June 2001 
as a structure affiliated to the Office of the Government. Its current main functions 
are the provision of in-service training and coordinating training activities for the 
central government agencies. 
 
 
5.15  Accountability and Responsibility 
 During communist rule for understandable reasons the notion of 
accountability or responsibility of state administration employees was regarded 
almost exclusively as accountability/responsibility to the ruling party or, in other 
words, to the leadership of the ruling party.  
 After the “velvet revolution” the Czech political leaders enjoyed legitimacy 
and support of the population. They prioritized purely political and economic 
aspects of the reform. The development of comprehensive regulatory frameworks 
and mechanisms of oversight and accountability was delayed. 
 It should be noted that there does not exist direct and precise translation of 
the concept ‘accountability’ into the Czech language (Konopasek, 2002:1). 
"Accountability" is usually translated as "odpovednost", but this word can be best 
equated to the English term "responsibility". A group of Czech experts who studied 
this issue proposed another expression "verejna vykazatelnost" which is in their 
view equivalent and more precise (ibid). 
 Difficulties with translation and historical heritage did not facilitate 
development of the appropriate environment and introduction of effective 
mechanisms of ensuring politicians’ and civil servants’ accountability above all to 
citizens and civil society. The situation was further compounded by overall 
immaturity of the Czech civil society and the prevailing conviction among state 
administrators that citizens exist for them, not the other way round. As a result 
“there has been insufficient public and civil control over the performance of public 
administration” (Marek, 1999), “the main accountability mechanism continues to be 
hierarchical subordination” (SIGMA, 2003).  
 In summary, we refer to the statement of one of the Czech experts in the 
field who asserted that the process of introducing real accountability in the Czech 
public administration “will be most difficult and most protracted” (Vidlakova, 
2000:21). 
 
  
5.16  Ethical Standards and Corruption 
 The Labour Code which was approved long before the “velvet revolution” 
but remained binding on state administration employees for more than decade after, 
contained certain restrictions concerning ethical norms and potential “conflict of 
interest” situations. These comprised requirements amongst others to ensure 
confidentiality of information obtained on the job, to maintain political neutrality, to 
refuse accepting gifts or favours in connection with one’s post, to ask for permission 
in order to engage in private business activities (World Bank, 1999:8). Even so, 
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these quite appropriate measures were not supported by sufficient institutional 
arrangements to ensure compliance.  
 In general, issues of ethics received relatively little attention in the Czech 
public administration (NTF, 1998 p.6-4). There was no separate code of conduct for 
civil servants in the Czech Republic until 2001. Code of Ethics came into effect in 
2001 but “it is vague and largely repeats provisions already stated elsewhere” (Open 
Society Institute, 2002).  
 The Conflict of Interest Act (N 238/1992) was adopted in 1992 but its 
applicability was confined only to the ministers and heads of other central state 
administration institutions. The Act in particular required that these top level 
officials should regularly submit reports on their (and their spouses) personal 
income, real property and other assets (Vidlakova, 1999:6).  
 As we have underlined above proliferation of unethical behavior and fraud 
was facilitated by the relatively low level of remuneration of Czech civil servants, 
absence of a sound regulatory framework and wide opportunities for graft and 
embezzlement that opened up in the course of privatization.   
 Attempts to reduce red tape and corruption have often failed because of 
inconsistent political backing and resistance of bureaucracy. For example, the Prime 
Minister’s Office advisory body on removing bureaucratic burdens was dissolved in 
summer 1998 after only one year of operation (World Bank, 1999:98).  
 The considerable degree of corruption in the Czech state administration is 
acknowledged by many observers. A report of the Czech Ministry of Interior on 
corruption submitted to the Government in 2001 stated that the number of bribes 
was not decreasing and not only civil servants but even representatives of political 
parties were engaged in corruption ("Mlada Fronta Dnes", 2001). Another report 
noted “the areas that appear to be seriously affected by corruption are the state 
administration, the legislative process, judicial system and public procurement. 
Political party finance appears to have receded as a corruption hot spot since the 
scandals of the late 1990’s. Although the Czech Republic is not ranked as a country 
seriously affected by “State capture,” corruption of the legislative process appears to 
be an increasingly serious problem, encouraged by uncontrolled lobbying, MPs’ 
immunity and inadequate conflict of interest regulations. The dynamics of 
corruption have been shaped in very important ways by the nature of Czech 
privatization and its consequences” (Open Society Institute, 2002).  
 The CERGE-EI think tank identifies two dominant levels of corruption in 
the Czech Republic: a) high level corruption involving elected and senior public 
officials; and b) low level corruption involving mid and low level bureaucrats (Lizal 
and Kocenda, 2003). 
 Corrupt behavior has taken various forms. “Corruption is believed to be 
prevalent within the Czech civil service. Bribes are expected everywhere where 
some material benefit ensues, for example, in government procurement. 
Businessmen claim that no government contract is rewarded without a bribe of 
around 10 percent of the value of the contract. Bribes are also reported in 
applications for bank loans, registering transfers of property, receiving inheritance, 
restitution, privatization, registration of a business with a court, and university 
admission” (Open Society Institute, 2002). 
 The issue of anti-corruption strategy has attained particular significance 
after the government was forced to resign following allegations of the corruption in 
the V.Klaus' party - ODS. Czech citizens seemed to be frustrated by the fact that 
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privatization and its consequences” (Open Society Institute, 2002).  
 The CERGE-EI think tank identifies two dominant levels of corruption in 
the Czech Republic: a) high level corruption involving elected and senior public 
officials; and b) low level corruption involving mid and low level bureaucrats (Lizal 
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Businessmen claim that no government contract is rewarded without a bribe of 
around 10 percent of the value of the contract. Bribes are also reported in 
applications for bank loans, registering transfers of property, receiving inheritance, 
restitution, privatization, registration of a business with a court, and university 
admission” (Open Society Institute, 2002). 
 The issue of anti-corruption strategy has attained particular significance 
after the government was forced to resign following allegations of the corruption in 
the V.Klaus' party - ODS. Czech citizens seemed to be frustrated by the fact that 
  121
many scandals involving state and government officials had been so far seldom 
properly investigated and few officials had ever been punished.  
 In February 1999 the Ministry of Interior submitted an anti-corruption 
strategy under the title "The Government Programme of Fight against Corruption" 
which was approved the same year by the Government’s resolution No.125. In spite 
of these efforts the results of the fight against fraud and corruption have been 
modest so far. In April 2002 the Czech Government approved its own report on 
corruption which confirmed that the situation was not improving. Overall, 
implementation of anti-corruption strategy remained a declared priority of 
subsequent reforms of the Czech state administration.   
 
 
5.17  Societal and Administrative Traditions and Values  
 With regard to societal traditions and norms prevailing in Czech state 
administration one should bear in mind that in 1620 the Czech state lost its 
independence for over 300 years. Since that time the perception of state bureaucrats 
was very much associated with foreign officials and their local assistants appointed 
to run administrative matters. Generally this perception did not include local self-
government which was considered by many Czechs as more loyal to citizens than 
central state administration.   
 Overall the Czech society is distinguished by the prevalence of egalitarian 
tendencies, weak religious feelings and general indifference to ultra-nationalism 
(Jalovecka, 2004:4). Ordinary Czechs have been often associated with such well 
known character as Hasek’s Good Soldier Sveik and his high degree of conformism. 
Still widespread among citizens is the belief that government and administration 
should solve all problems including loss of jobs and closure of businesses. 
 Besides, contemporary Czech society is to a very large extent clientelistic 
and corporate. Groups of friends, acquaintances and relatives dominate most of the 
public sector (Tychtl, 1999:11). As a rule such an environment is favorable for 
preservation of patronage networks which are wide spread within the Czech political 
elite and civil service.  
 As we already know many traditions and behavioral patterns of the Czech 
bureaucracy developed under strong influence of the formal and informal norms and 
rules that prevailed in the state administration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and 
later of the communist regime. Therefore these traditions are, on the one side, 
predominantly state centered and vested interests oriented, and on the other side - 
citizen unfriendly. Due to this historical legacy one often comes across the deeply 
entrenched custom of maintaining governmental and administrative secrecy in the 
Czech Republic, wide-spread cases of red tape, top heavy executive control and 
supervision and treatment of citizens as subordinates rather than clients.  
  Preparation for accession to EU and actual membership since 2004 have 
provided the Czechs with a lot of opportunities to become acquainted with best 
administrative practice in EU member countries and, what is more important, to 
improve compliance with EU average standards in this field. As a result for example 
cases of greater transparency and client friendly attitude have become relatively 
more common.      
 
 
 
 121
many scandals involving state and government officials had been so far seldom 
properly investigated and few officials had ever been punished.  
 In February 1999 the Ministry of Interior submitted an anti-corruption 
strategy under the title "The Government Programme of Fight against Corruption" 
which was approved the same year by the Government’s resolution No.125. In spite 
of these efforts the results of the fight against fraud and corruption have been 
modest so far. In April 2002 the Czech Government approved its own report on 
corruption which confirmed that the situation was not improving. Overall, 
implementation of anti-corruption strategy remained a declared priority of 
subsequent reforms of the Czech state administration.   
 
 
5.17  Societal and Administrative Traditions and Values  
 With regard to societal traditions and norms prevailing in Czech state 
administration one should bear in mind that in 1620 the Czech state lost its 
independence for over 300 years. Since that time the perception of state bureaucrats 
was very much associated with foreign officials and their local assistants appointed 
to run administrative matters. Generally this perception did not include local self-
government which was considered by many Czechs as more loyal to citizens than 
central state administration.   
 Overall the Czech society is distinguished by the prevalence of egalitarian 
tendencies, weak religious feelings and general indifference to ultra-nationalism 
(Jalovecka, 2004:4). Ordinary Czechs have been often associated with such well 
known character as Hasek’s Good Soldier Sveik and his high degree of conformism. 
Still widespread among citizens is the belief that government and administration 
should solve all problems including loss of jobs and closure of businesses. 
 Besides, contemporary Czech society is to a very large extent clientelistic 
and corporate. Groups of friends, acquaintances and relatives dominate most of the 
public sector (Tychtl, 1999:11). As a rule such an environment is favorable for 
preservation of patronage networks which are wide spread within the Czech political 
elite and civil service.  
 As we already know many traditions and behavioral patterns of the Czech 
bureaucracy developed under strong influence of the formal and informal norms and 
rules that prevailed in the state administration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and 
later of the communist regime. Therefore these traditions are, on the one side, 
predominantly state centered and vested interests oriented, and on the other side - 
citizen unfriendly. Due to this historical legacy one often comes across the deeply 
entrenched custom of maintaining governmental and administrative secrecy in the 
Czech Republic, wide-spread cases of red tape, top heavy executive control and 
supervision and treatment of citizens as subordinates rather than clients.  
  Preparation for accession to EU and actual membership since 2004 have 
provided the Czechs with a lot of opportunities to become acquainted with best 
administrative practice in EU member countries and, what is more important, to 
improve compliance with EU average standards in this field. As a result for example 
cases of greater transparency and client friendly attitude have become relatively 
more common.      
 
 
  122
5.18  Civil Service and Civil Society 
 The relation of the Czech citizens to state institutions is characterized by a 
certain crisis of trust. The social distance between citizens and the state 
administration is still considerable and in some cases even critical.  
 There exist a number of factors that have led to such a state of affairs. On 
the one hand, the bureaucracy has largely discredited itself by numerous cases of 
corruption, frequent neglect of citizens’ interests and overall attitude towards 
citizens as “inferiors”.   On the other hand, the Czech civil society is not strong 
enough yet to effectively defend its interests and there still persists widespread 
among the population paternalistic conviction that the state should resolve almost all 
the problems of ordinary citizens. The whole situation was compounded by obvious 
difficulties in the country’s economic and social development, particularly in the 
second half of the 90s, which indirectly testified to the “efficiency” of the state 
administration.  
 The second part of the decade (after 1996) witnessed a sense of deep 
disappointment in society. Economic recession in 1997 complemented by corruption 
and political opportunism appears to have undermined the ideals of the “velvet 
revolution”. “Klaus economic miracle had been exposed as a sham” (Shepherd, 
2000:6). 
 When it turned out that Klaus's reforms were in many respects a failure, 
there was a radical change in people's attitudes: until mid-1996, more than 40 per 
cent of Czech voters were "very satisfied" with political and economic 
developments in the Czech Republic, and more than 30 per cent were "satisfied". In 
July 1997 it was only 12 and 8 per cent respectively. (Čulík, 2000).  
 Czech civil servants have often failed to establish good contacts with 
citizens, either due to a low degree of its professionalism and motivation or to their 
attitude towards citizens. In a survey conducted by the IVVM (research institute in 
Prague) in March 1998, 48% of interviewees stated that they had met with an unjust 
decision of the authorities. Negative experience was expressed primarily by people 
of productive age, with higher education, and by entrepreneurs. The majority did not 
have much hope in success in dealing with the authorities and enforcing their 
justified demands and rights. According to the survey, there often prevails a mistrust 
of citizens towards the government and ministries, and in some cases its extent is 
enormous. (NTF 1998: 4).  
 The lack of trust towards the administration is also caused by inconsistent 
prosecution of public offences, especially cases where high ranking officials are 
involved, and by the still rather ineffective mechanism of defending citizen’s rights 
in case some damage has been inflicted by the authorities.  
 The early 2000s have seen some improvements in government policies 
towards the citizens. The Act on Free Access to Information was approved by the 
Czech Parliament and entered into force on 1 January 2000. The same year the 
Institution of Ombudsman was created in the Czech Republic. During the period 
2000–2004 the Ombudsman dealt with over 14,000 complaints from the public and 
helped to resolve over 7,000 cases, providing legal advice to the remaining 7,000. 
Opinion polls conducted in 2004 showed that the Czech Ombudsman Motejl was the 
second most trusted public figure in the country. With a 53% approval rating he was 
second only to the President and considered more trustworthy than any cabinet 
minister including the Prime Minister (Radio Prague, 14 October 2004).  Also recent 
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years have seen much wider practice of placing information about the ministries’ 
activities on their web pages. 
 
 
5.19 Capacity and Resources 
  The need for institutionalization of the civil service and its modernization 
was acknowledged by all post-communist Czech governments. However, these 
declarations were not followed by consistent practical measures. There was obvious 
shortage of political will to adopt respective legislation and launch civil service 
reform. A document produced by experts working for a Phare project in the Czech 
Republic contained the following comment: “Reform of the public administration 
was accentuated in all the government’s statements but has not been implemented so 
far.”  
Even when the start of public administration reform was actually 
announced it turned out that it had been substituted by the reform of the territorial 
government. “In the Czech Republic the professionalisation of the civil service and 
the construction of significant local autonomy have been self-consciously tied 
together across the party spectrum as issues of efficiency reform. However after ten 
years, this near cross-party insistence on connecting these two issues, combined with 
the persistent unwillingness to enact either, has looked more like a strategy for 
postponing losses of central party political autonomy than a coherent framework for 
developing efficiency” (Innes, 2002:32). 
The post-communist period was also characterized by certain deficit of 
financial and human resources to prepare and implement reform of the state 
administration. The draft Civil Service Act is said to have been prepared by two part 
time experts who were occasionally assisted by the officials of the Czech Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs. The growing state budget deficit in course of recent 
years did not facilitate preparation and initiation of reform either.  
One of the main factors that appear to have affected effective functioning 
of the Czech state administration has been inconsistent application of the 
meritocratic principles in human resource management. Performance based criteria 
have been either absent or had little value in the work of various administrative 
structures because of excessive politicization and prevalence of patronage networks. 
Even greater damage to the capacity and prestige of the administration seems to 
have been inflicted by the far from isolated cases of graft and embezzlement.   
 A condensed description of the capacity of the Czech state administration 
for reform and the conditions for its implementation was given by one Czech expert: 
“Public administration reform is prepared in the environment which is far from 
being favourable. Public opinion, politicians and, on the other side, public finances 
are not supportive of realization of the new law” (Onisko, 2000:5). 
 
 
5.20   Conclusions  
 The development of the Czech state administration in the 20th and the 
beginning of the 21st centuries has been seriously influenced by the bureaucratic 
traditions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and principles of administrative control 
and management as practiced more recently by the ruling communist party. It is 
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precisely in this historical legacy that we can find the roots of such widespread 
phenomena as patronage and clientelistic networks, excessive politicization and 
secrecy, treatment of citizens as subordinates and frequent disregard of the interests 
of common people.    
 It is worth remembering that “The Communist regime in Czechoslovakia 
was amongst the most strict and conservative, particularly since it suppressed the 
“68 liberalization movement” (Toonen 1993: 159). In that sense the regime was very 
similar to its Soviet counterpart.  
By the mid 1990s there had formed in the Czech Republic a model of 
central state administration with strong elements of a career civil service comprising 
lifelong employment, guaranteed promotion plan, complicated procedure of 
dismissal from the job, etc. However, this was a “specific” model since the status of 
state administration officials wasn’t different from that of other public sector 
employees and the terms of service were governed by the Labour Code. There was 
no civil service related legislation and attempts to develop and adopt Civil service 
Act as well as to launch reform of the Czech civil service lacked sufficient political 
backing. “…little political priority was given to administrative reform” (World 
Bank, 1999:5)  
 Overall the post-communist period in the Czech Republic was marked by 
the absence of influential political party or social groupings that could effectively 
push for the start of civil service reform. Constraints in the development of a 
modern, efficient and accountable civil service were unfortunate as “the failure to 
recognize early the role of a reliable administration as an important element of an 
enabling framework of economic and political/social development continues to 
resound in the complex problems now facing the Czech Republic” (World Bank, 
1999:5)     
 The main problems and deficiencies accumulated by the early 2000s in the 
Czech state administration were:   
- persistent absence of civil service related legislation and hence absence 
of a legally binding status of a civil servant; 
- excessive politicization of the state administration; 
- domination of patronage networks; 
- relatively high level of corruption; 
- budgetary constrains in funding state administration;  
- shortage of expertise in modern HR management;    
- replacement of meritocratic principles by personal or party loyalty; 
- lack of political will to “legalize” and reform civil service; 
- underdeveloped performance based outlook and accountability to 
various stakeholder groups.  
 These “bottlenecks“ of the Czech state administration were seriously 
weakening its capacity for effective functioning and reform. By the late 1990s it also 
became clear that the Czech state administration was substantially failing to meet the 
requirements imposed by the European Commission on the candidates for accession 
to the European Union. This was, in particular, reflected in regular evaluations by 
the European Commission on the progress made by the Czech Republic in the 
preparation for accession.   
 To conclude, it should be stated that throughout the 1990s the reform 
capacity of the Czech civil service was low across its all major parameters: 
institutional framework (absence of civil service de-jure, prevalence of outdated 
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formal and informal norms and rules, preservation of many behavioral patterns, 
attitudes and traditions rooted in the communist and pre-communist past); collective 
or individual human factor (lack of political will of the country’s leadership to 
launch reform, absence of influential stakeholders which could push for the 
“revival” of the Czech civil service); available resources (severe budget constrains 
and shortage of specialists in modern civil service management and reform).       
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CHAPTER VI 
REFORM OF THE CZECH CIVIL SERVICE: INTERNAL 
IMPERATIVE OR EXTERNAL PRESSURE?  
 
 
 
6.1   Introduction 
In line with overall methodological approach we intend in this chapter to 
study various aspects and stages of the preparation and implementation of civil 
service reform in the Czech Republic.  
For that we will need to trace the development of the Czech state 
administration after the “velvet revolution” (1989) and formation of independent 
Czech Republic (1993). We will analyze the history of attempts to launch reform of 
public administration and central state administration; identify reform dimensions, its 
dynamics and driving forces; examine its objectives as well as the process of reform 
implementation and management; and assess the preliminary results of reform if any. 
Particular attention will be paid to a set of issues relevant to civil service reform as 
defined in the Protocol for comparative studies of national civil service systems 
namely:  
- who or what initiates reform and why? 
- what are the contents of reform and up to date results? 
- what is the extent of external influence? 
Any researcher who undertakes to study recent evolution and changes in the 
Czech state administration should distinguish between public administration (or 
administrative) reform and civil service reform (called reform of central state 
administration in Prague). The meanings of these terms have never been formally 
specified in such a way as to ensure unified acceptance and identical understanding 
by the majority of experts, scholars and civil servants. It should be noted that 
throughout the 1990s public administration reform was regarded by the majority of 
Czech government officials and experts entirely as reform of territorial self 
government and regional administration. “During the 1990s the public administration 
reform both in its conceptual and actual form concerned solely territorial self-
government and territorial state administration” (Vidlakova, 2006:2). 
Therefore, it is possible to speak about implementation of civil service 
reform in the Czech Republic in a more commonly perceived meaning only 
subsequent to 2004 when the Czech government approved basic documents 
concerning reform of the central state administration.    
 
6.2  Preparation of Civil Service Reform  
In spite of numerous declarations the reform of state central administration 
and central government remained outside the priorities of Czech politicians and 
legislators for many years after “velvet revolution” (Vidlakova 1999, Onisko 2000, 
Potucek 2001). It is true that the structure of the Czech government and central state 
administration was modified several times during this period (Vidlakova, 2006:2) but 
these alterations did not constitute part of a comprehensive reform measures. 
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Throughout the 1990s limited and sporadic changes that were taking place in the 
Czech state administration followed neither a properly developed strategy of civil 
service reform, nor were effectively managed by a specially designated management 
team or unit. An introductory note to the Czech government policy document in 
2004 underlined that the Czech central state administration “has not been subject to 
any significant change since 1993” (Further advance, 2004:1). 
Furthermore, throughout the 1990s the perception of civil service reform 
itself in the Czech Republic was confined almost exclusively to the preparation and 
adoption of the Civil service Act. Several attempts to draft a Civil service Act and 
get it approved were made over the period 1993-1996.  
The first coalition government in the Czech Republic was formed in 1992. 
The coalition was led by Civil Democratic Party (ODS) and its leader V.Klaus. In its 
programme declaration the government defined the objective of eliminating old 
methods and rules in administrative practice and enhancing the professionalism of 
civil servants as well as efficiency and prestige of their work. Promise was made to 
prepare expeditiously a draft act on the legal status of state administration employees 
(civil servants) “defining the requirements imposed on these employees and their 
duties as well as certain compensating measures assuring stability and independence 
of their status” (Vonkova, 1996:120).  
An important event took place in October 1992 when the Office for 
Legislation and Public Administration of the Czech Republic (OLPA) was 
established under the chairmanship of the Vice Prime Minister. From the very 
beginning this institution was assigned a significant role in drafting civil service 
related legislation and developing a conceptual vision of the future civil service. 
Regretfully, this office was disbanded in 1996.   
In June 1993 the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs presented to the 
Government a draft document outlining the principles of Civil service Act which the 
Government approved in August 1993. The principles were based on the assumption 
that a career (tenure) civil service would be established in the Czech Republic. 
Principal drafting responsibility at that time rested with a small team in the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs and the Office for Legislation and Public 
Administration (OLPA). Later this document was positively appraised by the 
respective Committees of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament. On the basis of 
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regional tier of government. In view of the short period of its existence this 
government failed to get its plans materialized.  
In August 1998 the new coalition government headed by the Social 
Democratic Party (CSSD) declared that reform of the state administration would be 
one of its five key priorities. In its policy statement the Government set the year 
2000 as the deadline for the approval of the Civil service Act. In March 1999 the 
government approved by its Resolution N 228/1999 the Concept of Public 
Administration Reform dealing almost entirely with territorial government reform.   
In particular the new government announced its intention to: 
- submit a number of new bills for implementation of the Constitutional Act 
on the establishment of a regional tier of government; 
- adopt a Civil Service Act in order to depoliticise state administration, 
enhance its effectiveness and reduce its dependence on short-term political 
pressures; 
- create a system of training of government employees; 
- expand citizen’s participation in governance; 
- reinforce the economic powers of local and regional government. 
In parallel, certain technological modernisation of the Czech state 
administration has been going on since mid 1990s. Government employees were 
provided with computers and respective training. Computer networks and on-line 
systems have been developed. In 1996 the Office for the State Information System 
was established.  
However, it appears that various initiatives to “institutionalize” the Czech 
civil service at that time were effectively put on hold on their way to final approval 
by the Parliament and Government. For quite a long time the Czech Republic was 
ranked by the European Commission as an outsider among the Central and Eastern 
European countries (which made up the first group of those joining European Union) 
as far as administrative capacity of the state was concerned.  
A Czech expert on public administration wrote in 1999: “When the former 
administrative regions were abolished, no effective structure to replace them was 
offered. As a result self-government got frozen at the village level. No civil service 
law was adopted. The state administration was largely politicized. Perhaps 
paradoxically some parts of government moved to even greater centralization. 
Procedures became less flexible and at the central level degenerated into mechanical 
job descriptions. Inefficient deconcentration of the ministries resulted in even more 
inflated regional bureaucracy so that in spite of Klaus’s market rhetoric, at the end of 
his five-year term, the number of administrators at top levels had multiplied almost 
twofold from less than 100,000 to 170,000 (Potucek, 1999:1). 
The post-communist transformation in the Czech Republic witnessed 
periods when “there was no body authorized by the government with overall 
responsibility for improving, modernizing and reforming public administration” 
(NTF 1998, Foreword:1).  
 
 
6.3  NTF Report  
A rare attempt to carry out a comprehensive analysis and assessment of the 
Czech state administration and thus to draw attention to its unsatisfactory status was 
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undertaken by the National Training Foundation (Czech non-government non profit 
organisation) in 1998. The initiative was backed by international donor-
organisations. Regretfully, the recommendations of the report, finalized in 
September 1998, remained largely unclaimed.  
One of the report’s strongest points was that it provided a substantial 
overview of constraints and problems facing Czech public administration. One can 
find in the report a remarkable statement “what is at issue in the Czech Republic, like 
in other European post-communist countries, are not partial reforms of territorial or 
functional administration, not a simple process of its gradual modernization through 
partial and minor changes but a complete and principal qualitative transformation of 
public administration” (NTF, 1998: 1-3-2). 
The report continued by stating that “the public administration reform has 
been understood in the Czech Republic in a very narrow way as the setting-up of 
regional authorities and the adoption of the Civil service Act. The aims of the 
reform, which would secure the compatibility of our public administration with the 
Western level are much wider and deeper, they concern the very substance of public 
administration, its role, functions and means. Therefore, it will be vital to follow the 
vision of the desirable future development of the Czech society, economy and state. 
The decisive question is: what kind of state do we want and what role should this 
state play in the future development of our society and country?” (NTF, 1998:7-1-7).  
In comparison to most other post-communist countries where fundamental 
reforms of civil services had been long part of the practical agenda “the Czech 
Republic was lagging obviously behind most of those countries… as they have 
already created the foundations of the legal regulation of civil service and modern 
personnel management, established or modernized training institutions for civil 
service and have bodies responsible for this area” (NTF, 1998: 6-1). Assessing 
previous attempts to develop and adopt reform programmes and civil service 
legislation in the Czech Republic the authors of the report pointed to the principal 
drawback – that promised and planned measures and actions remained only on paper.  
The report also comprised well balanced recommendations concerning 
possible strategy of reform of the Czech state administration. It is regrettable that the 
NTF report was unknown even to some specialists of public administration in the 
Czech Republic.   
 
 
6.4  Civil Service Reform Preparation and Implementation Stages  
The analysis of the reform conceptual documents and statements made by the reform 
managers allows single out the following stages of the preparation and 
implementation of the Czech civil service reform.    
 
I.   REFORM PREPARATION   1992 – 2004  
a) 1992 – 1997 this period was characterised by some rather fragmented actions 
resulting in particular in several drafts of civil service law being developed, 
submitted to government and parliament but each time rejected, also a number of 
normative acts dealing with various aspects of activities and position of government 
employees were adopted;  
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b) 1998 – 2000 the period is known for overall greater attention to the issue of public 
administration and civil service reforms, mainly as a result of growing EC pressure; 
c) 2001 – 2003 during this period the Concept of Modernization of Central State 
Administration (Resolution 619 of 20th June 2001 of the Czech Government) was 
approved and Civil service Act adopted in April 2002;   
 
II.  REFORM IMPLEMENTATION  2004 – 2010  
a) 2004 - 2007 Government Resolution N 237 of 17 March 2004 approved “Concept 
and main directions of reform and modernization of central state administration”, 
implementation of the reform started the same year;    
b) 2008 – 2010 the reform conceptual documents envisaged transfer from reform to 
modernization of the Czech civil service (2006-2007 finalization of functional 
review/audit; 2008 – 2010 implementation of the review conclusions).  
 
 
6.5  Political Leadership and Reform 
Throughout most of the 1990s the Czech political leadership was giving 
priority to large scale privatisation and maximum reduction of the role of the state in 
the economic and public spheres. In spite of much rhetoric interest of the ruling 
parties, their leadership in an in-depth transformation of the Czech state apparatus 
was rather superficial.  
The views of V. Klaus, leader of the Civic Democrats and the Czech Prime 
Minister in 1993-1996, on this issue are of special interest as his party was in power 
for over six years after the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. At that time V. Klaus 
was supporting the idea that the forces of an unrestrained market would solve all the 
problems of the country’s development including those of state bureaucracy.  
It is noteworthy that on the eve of 2002 parliamentary elections V. Klaus 
promised that if his party wins it would negotiate "equal partnership" for Czechs in 
the EU. He was particularly critical of the European Commission's demand that the 
Czechs should introduce a law on the civil service without delay in order to pave the 
ground for a well functioning administrative system: "Individual states have varying 
civil service rules and regulations and the question whether or not we have a civil 
service law is entirely inconsequential with respect to our progress and preparedness 
to join the EU. The insistence of the European Union on this law shows a complete 
lack of comprehension with regard to the workings of this country” (Radio Prague, 
12 May 2002).  
The President of the Czech Republic V. Havel appears to be one of the few 
Czech politicians who was fully aware of the need for changes in the state 
administration. On numerous occasions he emphasized the significance of a stable, 
efficient and modern civil service and an appropriate legal and normative 
environment for its proper functioning.  
Concerning issues of public administration in his country he stressed that: 
“The nervous system of the state is constituted by a network of self-government and 
state administration authorities. I consider it a crucial task for the coming period to 
undertake a reform of this system. This reform has been put off for several years and 
the delay has done this country a great deal of damage. It is only in recent days that 
you adopted the first piece of legislation that paves the way to it -- the constitutional 
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act on regions. It will have to be followed by a series of other laws to develop the 
concept, as well as by a civil service act whose absence is beginning to pose 
tremendous difficulties…” 
V. Havel continued: “I find it absurd that while we are building a market 
economy, many of us do not object to the fact that whole spheres of our public life -- 
state administration is one of them -- still bear the marks of the communist pattern of 
rule over the people, including a high degree of politicization. It is not true that 
reform of public administration will produce more bureaucracy and more 
bureaucrats. Unless it is disastrously mismanaged, it should achieve the very 
opposite” (Havel, 1997). 
On another occasion V. Havel stated: "It is vital that Parliament approves a 
civil service law without delay in order to strengthen our administrative sector so that 
newly approved laws can be implemented in practice as soon as possible. It is 
likewise important to work on improving the "political culture" in this country, 
especially in view of the need to fight corruption and various irregularities such as 
the very high number of government contracts granted without tenders"(Radio 
Prague, 22 February 2000). 
 
 
6.6  Civil Service Act  
All the governments in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic that have 
existed since the year 1991 referred to the necessity of adopting a law on civil 
service in their programme declarations (Spidla, 2001). The Civil service Act was 
finally approved by the Parliament in April 2002 and this was actually the fourth 
attempt to elaborate the law and get it accepted by the legislators. The very first draft 
was submitted already in 1991 during the times of the Czechoslovak Federal 
Republic (Streckova, 1997).  
Among prior attempts to draft the Act, most successful is considered to be 
that of 1993 (Draft Act N579). This draft was approved and supported by all 
Parliament committees but later “got lost somewhere in the government”. In the 
opinion of some experts the weak points of this draft consisted in a lack of incentives 
for an improved performance of civil servants and higher costs of the proposed 
pension and salary schemes which were neither estimated nor funded. The Act was 
introducing “employment for life” civil service and did not envisage a transitional 
period. Enforcement of this draft would have meant that incumbents of positions 
would have become civil servants with absolute tenure over-night without any proper 
evaluation or any requirements of training and passing examinations. The main 
intention of the 1993 draft law seemed to be to reward those that had been employed 
in the administration for a long time, not to build a system for the future (Vonkova, 
1996:120).  
During the rule of the second coalition government (1996-1997) the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs set up a working group which reassessed the 
previous draft and largely abandoned the principles of “employment for life” civil 
service. However, the government did not have time to review the prepared 
document as it resigned in November 1997.   
The work over elaboration of the draft law was further pursued by the 
successive governments but neither civil servants nor citizens have been invited to be 
involved (Onisko, 2000:69). Similarly, assistance coming from international 
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organisations was not always effectively used. For example, in 1995 SIGMA (OECD 
structural unit) provided a detailed commentary to the draft Civil service Act. But its 
conclusions were largely neglected (World Bank, 1999:7). 
When the long-awaited, much-discussed and very controversial draft law 
was submitted by the governing Social Democrats to the Parliament for final reading 
and approval in April 2002 it was pushed through the lower House by just one vote! 
The opposition Civic Democrats were against it saying they saw no reason for civil 
servants to be elevated to what they called "special status". Besides in their view 
implementation of the law would require huge funding from the state budget. The 
Communists disagreed with the law’s retention of the screening process aimed at 
preventing former high-ranking Communists and secret police collaborators from 
holding public office.  
Generally, the process of civil service law preparation was characterised by 
an atmosphere of strict confidentiality, insufficient attention to prior resolution of 
conceptual issues and, at times, lack of “corporate memory” in the development of 
various proposals. According to Onisko “no alternative models of civil service 
systems had been considered before adopting the model which forms the basis of the 
Law” (Onisko, 2000:65). 
The Act has 254 articles and three annexes. But only 15 articles and one 
annex were enforced upon promulgation (Vidlakova, 2006:2). By comparison the 
draft law from 1993 contained almost 400 pages (275 articles) plus attachments 
(Cebisova, 1996:136). By the year 2006 i.e. even before full enforcement of the Law 
it had been amended seven times! (Vidlakova, 2006:2). The Act was supposed to 
enter into force in 2004 and its full implementation was originally planned to occur 
by the end of 2006. However, full enforcement of the law was several times 
postponed with the latest deadline fixed for the year 2009.   
In the opinion of OECD experts the text of the law had numerous 
inconsistencies, confused wording and structure. It was too large for such a legal act 
and overburdened with excessive details. This may lead to complications in 
interpretation and implementation problems.  
            The “EC Regular Report 2002 on Czech Republic’s progress towards 
Accession” referred to the following major objectives of the Civil service Act:   
- depoliticisation of personnel policy by the creation of a General Directorate 
for the Civil Service which will be responsible for the application of unified 
human resources management throughout the administration; 
- rationalization of the number of civil servants posts and the funds 
earmarked for salaries in state administration; 
- introduction of uniform professional standards through increased use of 
competitive exams for filling in vacancies and more transparent criteria for 
promotion; 
- establishment of the Institute of Public Administration which will contribute 
to the creation of a comprehensive and upgraded system of civil servants’ 
training; 
- streamlining and standardizing the system of remuneration;  
 The law intended to limit political influence. A clear border-line between 
functions and positions staffed by political appointees and those occupied by career 
civil servants was to be established.  The Act also envisaged higher pay and 
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inconsistencies, confused wording and structure. It was too large for such a legal act 
and overburdened with excessive details. This may lead to complications in 
interpretation and implementation problems.  
            The “EC Regular Report 2002 on Czech Republic’s progress towards 
Accession” referred to the following major objectives of the Civil service Act:   
- depoliticisation of personnel policy by the creation of a General Directorate 
for the Civil Service which will be responsible for the application of unified 
human resources management throughout the administration; 
- rationalization of the number of civil servants posts and the funds 
earmarked for salaries in state administration; 
- introduction of uniform professional standards through increased use of 
competitive exams for filling in vacancies and more transparent criteria for 
promotion; 
- establishment of the Institute of Public Administration which will contribute 
to the creation of a comprehensive and upgraded system of civil servants’ 
training; 
- streamlining and standardizing the system of remuneration;  
 The law intended to limit political influence. A clear border-line between 
functions and positions staffed by political appointees and those occupied by career 
civil servants was to be established.  The Act also envisaged higher pay and 
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improved work conditions for civil servants in return for better skills, improved 
performance and greater independence from political influence 
The law provided for the establishment of a HRM (Human Resources 
Management) Department in each ministry headed by a Personnel Director, who 
would be appointed by, and reporting to, the General Director for the Civil Service. 
The Personnel Director, responsible for selection and appraisal of all civil servants in 
a ministry would not be subordinated to the Minister or to anyone else in the 
ministry.  
Provisions of the law envisaged precise definition of the authority of 
ministries, agencies and departments, as well as of individual civil servant’s posts 
and required greater transparency from state administrative organs. Regular 
upgrading of qualifications and re-training was to become a civil servant’s duty. The 
law envisaged that over the period 2004–2007 current personnel would apply for 
admission to a civil service “preparatory” stage and pass respective service 
examination in order to retain their posts.  
The drafters of the civil service law seem to have been concentrating largely 
on employment conditions of civil servants. The law provided for considerable 
increase in remuneration of civil servants. The annual increase of the remuneration 
budget was calculated to be between 5.7 and 7.1 billion crowns (Debates in the 
Czech Parliament, 12 April 2002).  
Overall the Civil service Act was a considerable step forward as it laid 
down legal foundation for the existence of a civil service in the Czech Republic. The 
new law also provided for introduction of better control over overall staff number 
and costs of the civil service. For that it envisaged preparation of annual personnel 
plans outlining the required number of staff, grades and salaries allocated to 
positions which should be managed from a central information database (SIGMA, 
2003:22).  
The authors of the law claimed that it was aiming at creating “an open 
system of civil service” with “no guarantee of life long employment” (Debates in the 
Czech Parliament, 12 April 2002). However, many experts expressed view that the 
proposed model comprises some obvious elements of the tenure system and therefore 
it can be classified minimum as mixed (SIGMA, 2003).   
 Analysis of the Act leads to the conclusion that it does not envisage an 
effective mechanism for ensuring improved management and performance. The law 
does not explicitly define such important issues as role and mission of civil service, 
civil servants’ mobility and motivation, delegation of responsibility, and 
prerequisites for elimination of corruption. Measures to improve the quality of civil 
service personnel are generally limited. The duties of state administration and civil 
service in relation to citizens and other institutions are not well explained. The issue 
of accountability of civil servants remains largely unconsidered.  
It appears that the increased expenditure caused by the law will mainly be 
used for rewarding officials retiring during the coming years and less for attracting 
adequately educated new candidates. Assessment carried out by OECD experts 
pointed out that the law granted “excessive benefits and privileges” to civil servants 
(SIGMA, 2003:4). Similar opinion was expressed during Parliamentary hearings that 
“the draft Law is not so much about duties but more about benefits” (Debates in the 
Czech Parliament, 12 April 2002). 
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The most feasible up-to-date implications of the Civil service Act is that by 
late 2007, i.e. 5 years after adoption of the law, most of its provisions had not been 
enforced yet.   
 
 
6.7  Accession to EU and its Impact  
As outlined above, in spite of numerous official declarations the Czech 
post-communist political leadership did not consider reform of the Czech state 
administration as its real priority for quite a long time. It is true that various plans 
and strategies of reform were developed both by government agencies and 
independent organisations. However intentions proclaimed in these documents 
remained mostly on paper. The only areas where essential changes (though not 
always for the better) did take place before 2000 were regional and territorial 
government.  
By announcing its intention to join the European Union the Czech Republic 
undertook a commitment to improve among other things its state administrative 
structures and raise the efficiency of its civil service. Many observers expressed the 
view that it is only after criticism contained in particular in the EU annual reports on 
the status of preparation of the Czech Republic for accession that the Czech 
Government took practical steps to adopt a Civil service Act and launch civil service 
reform.    
In fact accession of the Czech Republic to the EU offered in many aspects a 
unique chance of getting away with undesirable features of the “old” bureaucracy. 
New opportunities for creating a modern civil service in the Czech Republic had 
opened up.  The question one may ask is whether the Czech Government used these 
opportunities.  
It is interesting that one of the experts in the field used the expression 
“battering ram” to describe the extent of pressure from Brussels on the Czech 
authorities at that time. “Without the EU pressure, it is unclear whether any relevant 
reform would be passed in either two countries (Czech Republic and Slovak 
Republic - AK). The ‘battering ram’ function allowed to create credible exogenous 
pressure on individual politicians, political parties, government employees and 
stakeholders and break through a very complex web of interests, which would 
otherwise almost certainly veto the change” (Behlavy, 2002:  64).   
Concern of the European Commission with the level and quality of public 
administration in accession countries was first made known publicly in Madrid in 
1995 when the European Union outlined “adjustment of administrative structures” as 
a condition for accession. Some authors argue that only by 1997 the EU had 
developed a relatively clear picture of state administrations it wants its future 
member states to embrace (Scherpereel, 2002:2). 
As far as the Czech Republic is concerned the European Commission was 
fairly consistent in emphasizing that the existence of efficient, accountable and 
legally protected civil service was one of the important prerequisites for accession. In 
its regular reports the EC stated that in the Czech Republic civil servants lacked the 
necessary security, were defenceless against politically motivated decisions and their 
income was considerably lower in comparison to those in the private sector. This 
resulted in low interest of the young generation in positions in government agencies, 
 
 134
The most feasible up-to-date implications of the Civil service Act is that by 
late 2007, i.e. 5 years after adoption of the law, most of its provisions had not been 
enforced yet.   
 
 
6.7  Accession to EU and its Impact  
As outlined above, in spite of numerous official declarations the Czech 
post-communist political leadership did not consider reform of the Czech state 
administration as its real priority for quite a long time. It is true that various plans 
and strategies of reform were developed both by government agencies and 
independent organisations. However intentions proclaimed in these documents 
remained mostly on paper. The only areas where essential changes (though not 
always for the better) did take place before 2000 were regional and territorial 
government.  
By announcing its intention to join the European Union the Czech Republic 
undertook a commitment to improve among other things its state administrative 
structures and raise the efficiency of its civil service. Many observers expressed the 
view that it is only after criticism contained in particular in the EU annual reports on 
the status of preparation of the Czech Republic for accession that the Czech 
Government took practical steps to adopt a Civil service Act and launch civil service 
reform.    
In fact accession of the Czech Republic to the EU offered in many aspects a 
unique chance of getting away with undesirable features of the “old” bureaucracy. 
New opportunities for creating a modern civil service in the Czech Republic had 
opened up.  The question one may ask is whether the Czech Government used these 
opportunities.  
It is interesting that one of the experts in the field used the expression 
“battering ram” to describe the extent of pressure from Brussels on the Czech 
authorities at that time. “Without the EU pressure, it is unclear whether any relevant 
reform would be passed in either two countries (Czech Republic and Slovak 
Republic - AK). The ‘battering ram’ function allowed to create credible exogenous 
pressure on individual politicians, political parties, government employees and 
stakeholders and break through a very complex web of interests, which would 
otherwise almost certainly veto the change” (Behlavy, 2002:  64).   
Concern of the European Commission with the level and quality of public 
administration in accession countries was first made known publicly in Madrid in 
1995 when the European Union outlined “adjustment of administrative structures” as 
a condition for accession. Some authors argue that only by 1997 the EU had 
developed a relatively clear picture of state administrations it wants its future 
member states to embrace (Scherpereel, 2002:2). 
As far as the Czech Republic is concerned the European Commission was 
fairly consistent in emphasizing that the existence of efficient, accountable and 
legally protected civil service was one of the important prerequisites for accession. In 
its regular reports the EC stated that in the Czech Republic civil servants lacked the 
necessary security, were defenceless against politically motivated decisions and their 
income was considerably lower in comparison to those in the private sector. This 
resulted in low interest of the young generation in positions in government agencies, 
  135
low motivation of civil servants, high turnover of personnel, tendency to seek higher 
income elsewhere, and relatively high level of corruption.  
The experience of a number of CEE countries in the area of the 
improvement of public administration was discussed in May 1997 in Rotterdam at a 
session of the SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in 
Central and Eastern European Countries) programme funded jointly by OECD and 
EU. The document adopted in Rotterdam outlined some prerequisites for the success 
of the ongoing reform process. They comprised in particular: 
- Political will and support: the most advantageous solution is that the authority 
responsible for the planning and overall implementation and coordination of the 
reform is as close to the Prime Minister and the Government as possible; 
- Strategic approach: the reform must be broadly based and it must have an 
overall strategy; no matter how good the intentions may be, partial reforms without 
an overall strategy and without complying with joint principles and coordination 
cannot substitute the general reform;  
- Well-considered progress: it is necessary to proceed in a well-considered, 
deliberate way.  
The European Commission found it unfortunate that the Czech Republic did 
not have at that time a body responsible for designing and monitoring the 
implementation of administrative reform. It made a note that there was no civil 
service act in the country. It also observed that there was relatively widespread 
shortage of staff, especially of skilled staff in certain departments that are essential 
for applying the Community acquis.  
There was a distinct difference in understanding the contents of the reform 
between the EU and Czech authorities. While Brussels was talking mainly about the 
reform of central level administration, Prague regarded the reform as being mostly 
about organisation of territorial government.  
 
 
6.8  Assessment Made by the European Commission and OECD  
Until the final decision on the membership of the Czech Republic in the 
European Union was taken the quality and status of its state administration had often 
been criticized by the European Commission.  
A study ordered by the European Commission and published by EIPA 
(European Institute of Public Administration) in August 1997 evaluated the Czech 
Republic as follows: "Public administration reform in the Czech Republic is 
seriously lagging behind the approaches pursued in most of the neighbouring 
countries. There is a significant shortage of qualified personnel, institutional stability 
and procedural capacities. The emphasis on developing a pre-accession strategy 
should be used to engage in a serious attempt at reform. That ought to include not 
only further attempts at training (currently under way via the National Training 
Foundation), but also policies to functionally link legal approximation, 
administrative reform and EU integration. It might furthermore make sense to help in 
establishing a "focal point" for administrative reform to allow for better information 
and transparency concerning the various reform attempts. This way the very thin 
layer of qualified and knowledgeable personnel and the few programmes serving as 
"islands" within a still anti-administrative and anti-public environment ought to be 
broadened" (NTF 1998: 1-3-3). 
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In another European Commission’s document "Agenda 2000" commenting 
on the request of the Czech Republic for accession to the European Union the 
following assessment of the administrative capacity of the Czech Republic was 
made: "Since 1990, the governments of Czechoslovakia and later of the Czech 
Republic have given low priority to the necessary reforms and modernization of 
public administration. There are no signs of any changes in this attitude. The non-
existence of a more significant or deliberate plan for the modernization of public 
administration represents the only serious reason for uneasiness in this area. 
Measures adopted are completely insufficient with respect to the significance of 
problems that necessitate a solution ... it will be necessary to start and keep in 
operation an extensive reform process if the Czech Republic is to introduce public 
administration of such general quality, level of knowledge, motivation and flexibility 
which will be necessary for the path of the country towards further economic and 
social development and its membership in the European Union." 
Starting from July 1997 the European Commission opinions on the state of 
readiness of the candidate countries for EU membership used administrative capacity 
as a separate criterion (Verheijen, 2000:16). Since 1999 the evaluation of the 
administrative capacity was based on the regular SIGMA (OECD public 
management programme) baseline assessments, which focused on six core areas 
(ibid): 
- Legal status of civil servants; 
- Legality, responsibility and accountability of civil servants;  
- Impartiality and integrity of civil servants;  
- Efficiency in management of civil servants and in control of staffing;  
- Professionalism and stability of civil servants;        
- Development of civil service capacities in the area of European Integration.     
It should be noted that the level of criticism by the European Commission and 
OECD of the Czech Republic’s advance in the modernisation of its state 
administration did not ease at least until the year 2004. “With regard to civil service 
reform, the Czech Republic shows a disappointing track record as politicians, with 
some outstanding exceptions, have considered civil service reform unnecessary…. 
Given this state of affairs, it can be concluded that the Czech Republic has passed a 
law on civil service only to comply with the formal requirements posed by the 
European Commission’s Regular Reports since 1998 and not because there is a 
genuine political commitment to make the civil service more professional and less 
dependent on political patronage” (SIGMA, 2003:1). 
 
 
6.9   Civil Service Reform Preparation and Implementation Milestones  
June  1992  - the Law ‘On Conflict of Interest’ (Act 238/1992) adopted, applies only 
to high level “public functionaries”, ministers and heads of agencies;  
 
October 1992 - the Office for Legislation and Public Administration of the Czech 
Republic (OLPA) established;  
 
August 1993 - the Government approved basic principles of the Civil service Act;  
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November 1996 - the Government abolished the OLPA;  
 
December 1997 - the Czech Parliament adopted a Constitutional Act on the 
Establishment of Higher Territorial Self-Governing Units in the regions (regarded at 
that time as major trend of public administration reform);  
 
March 1998 - the Government assigned the role of central authority for public 
administration reform (including coordination of activities of other government and 
state bodies) to the Ministry of Interior.   
 
August 1998 - the Government issued a Policy Statement which comprised 
commitments in the area of public administration reform (in particular referring to 
the necessity of adopting a civil service law) following EC Opinion 1997 on the 
status of preparation of the Czech Republic for accession;   
 
May 1999 - the Law ‘On Free Access to Information’ (Act 106/1999) was enacted 
by the Parliament of the Czech Republic and entered into force on 1 January 2000; 
 
May 1999 -  the Government adopted Resolution (No. 511) on the Strategy of Public 
Administration Reform; 
 
June 1999 - the Government adopted Resolution (No. 601) approving the Concept of 
Training of Civil Servants;  
 
July 1999 - principles of public administration reform approved by the Resolution of 
the Government (No. 716); 
 
December 1999 - establishment of the Institution of Ombudsman (Act 349/1999);   
 
December 2000 - draft Civil service Act submitted to the Czech Parliament;  
 
March 2001 - Code of Ethics of state administration employees approved by the 
Government; 
 
July 2001 - establishment of the Institute of Public Administration; 
 
July 2001 - Government Resolution (No.619) approved the Concept of 
Modernization of Central State Administration Considering the Status of Civil 
Servants and Structure of Administration Authorities;  
 
April 2002 - the Parliament adopted a Civil service Act (No. 218/2002) on 26 April 
2002;  
 
June 2002 - The General Directorate of Civil Service created within the Office of 
the Government on 15 June 2002;  
 
August 2002  -  Programme declaration of the Government formally announced the 
reform of central state administration as one of its priorities;  
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January 2003 - Supreme Administrative Court established; 
 
March 2004 - Government Resolution (No. 237) of 17 March 2004 approved 
“Concept and main directions of reform and modernization of central state 
administration”. The resolution launched implementation of the reform of central 
state administration in the Czech Republic.  
 
July 2005 - the document “Further Advance of Improvement of Central State 
Administration in the Years 2005–2006” which specified the main directions of the 
reform of central state administration was submitted for consideration of the 
Government; 
 
November 2006 - the Government adopted a Resolution (No.1232) to transfer 
management of civil service reform back to the Ministry of Interior;  
 
August 2007 – the Czech Government decided at its meeting on 13 August to 
abolish the Civil service Act. 
 
 
6.10  Concept of Public Administration Reform  
In course of developing various concepts of administrative and civil service 
reform the objectives, tasks and contents of the reform underwent certain and 
sometimes considerable evolution and change. As one may presuppose there existed 
and still persist in the Czech Republic differing, in some cases polar, views and 
opinions as to the overall strategy, directions and specific contents of the reform. 
Nonetheless, implementation of civil service reform (reform of central state 
administration) launched in 2004 was largely based on the provisions and guidelines 
contained in the document “Concept and main directions of reform and 
modernization of central state administration” approved by the Government 
Resolution No. 237 of 17 March 2004. This document deserves special attention and 
will be reviewed below.  
Broader view on the essence and scope of public administration reform 
which goes far beyond just reform of regional and territorial government started to 
acquire prominence in the Czech Republic in the late 1990s. Several documents on 
the strategy of public administration reform were drafted at that time. The Ministry 
of Interior used them for elaborating a new conceptual approach for public 
administration reform. A working group composed of respective Deputy Ministers 
and heads of some central state agencies was created in September 1998, headed by 
the Deputy Minister of Interior who was in charge of public administration reform. 
This group performed the function of a co-ordinating and advisory body. A special 
official was appointed in each ministry as a reform coordinator. Every three months 
the group prepared a quarterly report which was signed by the Minister of Interior 
and then submitted to the government.  As a result of the activities of this group and 
of a section in the Ministry of Interior a draft Concept of Public Administration 
Reform in the Czech Republic was elaborated. 
The Concept of Public Administration Reform and the Concept of Training 
of Public Administration officials were approved by the Czech Government in 1999 
 
 138
 
January 2003 - Supreme Administrative Court established; 
 
March 2004 - Government Resolution (No. 237) of 17 March 2004 approved 
“Concept and main directions of reform and modernization of central state 
administration”. The resolution launched implementation of the reform of central 
state administration in the Czech Republic.  
 
July 2005 - the document “Further Advance of Improvement of Central State 
Administration in the Years 2005–2006” which specified the main directions of the 
reform of central state administration was submitted for consideration of the 
Government; 
 
November 2006 - the Government adopted a Resolution (No.1232) to transfer 
management of civil service reform back to the Ministry of Interior;  
 
August 2007 – the Czech Government decided at its meeting on 13 August to 
abolish the Civil service Act. 
 
 
6.10  Concept of Public Administration Reform  
In course of developing various concepts of administrative and civil service 
reform the objectives, tasks and contents of the reform underwent certain and 
sometimes considerable evolution and change. As one may presuppose there existed 
and still persist in the Czech Republic differing, in some cases polar, views and 
opinions as to the overall strategy, directions and specific contents of the reform. 
Nonetheless, implementation of civil service reform (reform of central state 
administration) launched in 2004 was largely based on the provisions and guidelines 
contained in the document “Concept and main directions of reform and 
modernization of central state administration” approved by the Government 
Resolution No. 237 of 17 March 2004. This document deserves special attention and 
will be reviewed below.  
Broader view on the essence and scope of public administration reform 
which goes far beyond just reform of regional and territorial government started to 
acquire prominence in the Czech Republic in the late 1990s. Several documents on 
the strategy of public administration reform were drafted at that time. The Ministry 
of Interior used them for elaborating a new conceptual approach for public 
administration reform. A working group composed of respective Deputy Ministers 
and heads of some central state agencies was created in September 1998, headed by 
the Deputy Minister of Interior who was in charge of public administration reform. 
This group performed the function of a co-ordinating and advisory body. A special 
official was appointed in each ministry as a reform coordinator. Every three months 
the group prepared a quarterly report which was signed by the Minister of Interior 
and then submitted to the government.  As a result of the activities of this group and 
of a section in the Ministry of Interior a draft Concept of Public Administration 
Reform in the Czech Republic was elaborated. 
The Concept of Public Administration Reform and the Concept of Training 
of Public Administration officials were approved by the Czech Government in 1999 
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- Resolution No. 228 of 30 March 1999 and Resolution No. 601 of 16 June 1999 
respectively (see National programme for preparation of the Czech Republic for EU 
membership, June 2001 point 1.1.1). The first document stated that public 
administration reform in the Czech Republic “consists of three fields: 1.Territorial 
structure reform of public administration; 2. Reform of public administration at the 
central level; 3. Reform of the functioning of public administration.” Such 
differentiation seems largely illogical since the two fields are determined on the basis 
of their place in the overall structure of governance (central and territorial levels) and 
the third field on the basis of subject matter (activities).    
 The Government decided about further progress of the reform at its session 
on 26 May 1999 by adopting Resolution No. 511 on the Strategy of Public 
Administration Reform. The resolution envisaged that for public administration 
reform a whole package of conceptual documents should be drafted. The list of 
concepts comprised those on:  
a) preparation and training of officials in public administration; 
b) informatics in public administration; 
c) improving the efficiency of public services; 
d) improving quality management in public administration; 
e) improving the effectiveness of public control.  
Subsequent positive developments in this area included: approval of the 
principles of civil service reform by the Government Resolution No. 716 of 14 July 
1999; creation of a governmental board to deal with administrative reform issues 
composed of six ministers presided by the Prime Minister and of a working 
committee in which deputy ministers of all interested ministries took part (Onisko, 
2000:5).  
As we can see the list of conceptual documents approved by the Czech 
Government and devoted to public administration reform is large (we have 
mentioned not all of them by far) and rather confusing. We should bear in mind that 
apart from the Civil service Act (adopted in April 2002) there exist two principal 
documents, approved by the Czech Government, which largely determined the 
dimensions, contents and general time frame of civil service reform:  
1)   Concept of Modernization of Central State Administration Considering 
the Status of Civil Servants and Structure of Administration Authorities - 
(Government Resolution No. 619 of 20 June 2001); 
2)  “Concept and Main Directions of Reform and Modernization of Central 
State Administration”   (Government Resolution No. 237 of 17 March 2004).  
The first concept dealt with several issues including territorial reform, 
reform of central administration and overall reform of governance in the Czech 
Republic. The second concept was devoted entirely to the reform of central state 
administration. In defining specific ways and instruments to implement reform the 
first concept referred to the experience of the European Union member states in 
reforming their administrative systems over the past several decades “The targets of 
the modernisation of the central state administration in the Czech Republic are 
similar to those for which also other advanced countries are striving approximately 
during the last twenty years, in particular the member countries of the European 
Union and, in the bigger picture, also the member countries of Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)” (Concept, 2001). 
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The same concept singled out the following main lessons that could be 
drawn from foreign and Czech experience: 
 
- public administration reform must become a government priority long-term 
in character; the reform should be headed by the Prime Minister;  
-  public administration reform must become a public matter; it must acquire 
public support both on the level of citizens and on that of public 
administration officials and staff;  
-  the concept of pubic administration and the methods of its implementation 
must be based on political consensus between the government and the 
opposition which is possible only if the institutional structure, processes and 
technology of public administration are considered above party level; 
- public administration reform must absorb the preparation for the entry to the 
European Union in its very concept, i.e. in its institutional structure, 
processes and technology, the concept of European public administration 
in the European administrative space.   
              The Programme declaration of the Government from 20 August 2002 
defined the objective of the reform of central administration in the following manner: 
“Greater efficiency, rationalization and horizontal coordination of state 
administration activities by means of wider application of modern management and 
IT technologies with the aim of raising overall quality of administrative performance 
for the benefit of citizens” (Radio Prague, 21 August 2002).  
 
 
6.11  Reform Programme.  
The objectives and tasks of civil service reform as well as programme of its 
implementation were outlined in the above referred document “Concept and Main 
Directions of Reform and Modernization of Central State Administration” 
(Government Resolution No. 237 of 17 March 2004). Various aspects of reform 
implementation were specified further in the document “Further Advance of 
Improvement of Central State Administration in the years 2005–2006” submitted to 
the Government for its consideration in July 2005. 
The main reform goal is defined as “To ensure that state administration 
bodies implement better the provisions of the law and serve government and citizens 
more effectively. Civil service should be more oriented towards quality of services 
and results”.  
Vision of the reform constituted “Flexible and well functioning central state 
administration responding better to global challenges and cross cutting issues”. The 
overall approach to the reform was: “to ensure transfer from offer driven to demand 
driven model of central state administration” (Concept, 2004). 
The Concept singled out five principal directions of reform: 
A. rationalization of processes in central state administration;   
B. improvement of management in central government;  
C. raising quality in central government;  
D. improving civil service in central government;  
E. rationalization of public administration financing. 
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Implementation of the civil service reform was stated to be based on project 
management principles. In other words, the reform programme would be executed in 
the form of projects, each targeting a specific reform objective. A summary of the 
contents of the reform directions/projects is given below, whereas more detailed 
description of the projects and the status of their implementation by mid 2006 are 
provided in Annex 2 to this study:  
 
A. Rationalization of processes in central state administration   
- to define mission statements of central government agencies and institutions 
and determine their mid term priorities;  
- to implement audit of  processes in central government agencies;  
- to define standard rules with reference to support and operational services 
that should be provided to central government authority; 
-  to define the rules for the “new” central administration (including the old 
ones which proved to be effective); 
 
B. Improvement of management in central government  
- to define the rules of effective coordination among central state 
administration agencies and bodies;   
- to develop a training system that will ensure application by top 
management of modern managerial techniques; 
- to develop an effective mechanism of coordination between central state 
administration and territorial public administration; 
- to develop a system of information sharing among central state 
administration as well as that of keeping “institution memory”;  
 
C. Raising quality in central government  
- to train management of central state administration in quality management 
issues; 
- to implement Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) in the legislation 
process;  
- to promote e-government tools and practices; 
 
D. Improving civil service in central government  
- to implement provisions of the Civil service Act; 
(namely, creating personnel departments in each government  ministry and 
agency; transforming the Institute of Public Administration into a state 
contributory organization; preparing  organizational structure of 
administrative authorities for the year 2005; issuing service regulation by 
the Director General of Civil Service; developing guidelines for training 
civil servants; drafting plan for supervisory activities of the Directorate 
General of the Civil Service for the year 2005; elaborating principles for 
appraisal of civil servants; 
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E. Rationalization of public administration financing  
- to prepare top management in central administration for wide economic 
reforms; 
- to define the rules for the use of public and private resources in public 
investments; 
- to enhance systematic control and strengthen its relation to higher 
performance. 
 
 
6.12 Management of Preparation and Implementation of Civil Service 
Reform 
At different stages of preparation and implementation of public 
administration and civil service reform in the Czech Republic overall responsibility 
rested with various organizations. Often this responsibility was fragmented, 
overlapping or was entirely lacking.  
A special body responsible primarily for the modernisation of Czech state 
administration was established in the Czech Republic in October 1992 and existed 
until November 1996. The body was called the Office for Legislation and Public 
Administration (OLPA). It reported to a Deputy Prime Minister. The Office 
comprised a special public administration division which served mainly as an 
advisory body and a point for elaboration of reform proposals. OLPA took an active 
part in the development of conceptual approaches to public administration and civil 
service reforms though few of them were resurrected for practical work later. The 
Office was dissolved in 1996 under pretext of the necessity to decentralise 
responsibility for reform to each individual agency.  
Following dissolution of OLPA part of responsibility for preparing public 
administration and civil service reforms was divided between the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs (MLSA) and the Ministry of Interior. In practice MLSA was 
dealing mainly with developing relevant legislation including draft civil service law. 
The Ministry of Interior was responsible more for overall coordination and 
elaboration of the reform conceptual documents. In 1998 the Czech Government 
formally entrusted the Ministry of Interior with drafting of the concept of public 
administration reform and co-ordination of its implementation.  
Starting from 2002 reform management was transferred to the Office of the 
Government - in particular to the Department of the Regulatory Reform and Central 
State Administration Reform. The General Directorate of Civil Service (set up in 
2002) was also involved in the management of reform activities. Operational 
management appears to have been ensured by the Reform Steering Committee 
composed of Deputy Ministers and Heads of large structural units of respective 
ministries. Overall supervision was exercised by the Prime Minister.  
Implementation of civil service reform (reform of central state 
administration) was formally launched in March 2004 when the Czech Government 
approved the document “Concept and Main Directions of Reform and Modernization 
of Central Public Administration”. This document mapped out the main directions of 
civil service reform executed in the form of projects (see above). It defined the 
project outputs, deadlines for presenting results and those organizations and persons 
responsible for their implementation.  
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By adopting this document the Czech Government ended the reform 
preparation phase and launched the implementation phase. Application of project 
management principles in reform implementation meant that major components of 
the reform had been partitioned into separate projects each targeting a specific 
reform objective. Each project was implemented by a separate project team headed 
by a project manager. Each ministry and other executive agencies appointed so 
called “managers of public administration reform” in all large structural units to 
ensure greater coordination of reform activities.  
In terms of reform implementation tools the Czech authorities gave 
exclusive preference to the development and adoption of legislation. Other tools such 
as training and best practice diffusion were applied occasionally. The importance of 
fiscal incentive instruments, networking and rotation was largely disregarded.  
Another quite essential dimension of the good quality reform management 
was notably absent. Full enforcement of the law which provided the legal ground for 
all the changes and innovations in the Czech state administration, has been 
postponed four times. The latest deadline was fixed for the beginning of 2009.    
 
 
6.13  Reform Diffusion and External Assistance  
In designing a strategy of civil service and public administration reforms the 
Czech Government and its experts were resorting to external assistance coming 
within the framework of bilateral agreements with predominantly EU member 
countries and contributions made by international organisations, mainly the 
European Union and OECD.  
For instance, the years 2002–2003 saw realisation of the twinning project 
Modernisation of the Central state administration in the Czech Republic financed by 
the EU PHARE programme. The general aim of the project, led by Finish and 
French experts, was to provide recommendations on raising efficiency and 
performance of the Czech state administration through application of performance 
management and performance budgeting, total quality management, wide application 
of IT technologies and other tools and methods. During project implementation 
working groups on the modernization of central state administration were created in 
most ministries and agencies. This was considered necessary to insure proper 
coordination and interface between various government institutions in the process of 
reform.   
The recommendations made by the project team, in particular concerning 
various aspects of establishment of the General Directorate of Civil Service, were 
reflected in the Government’s “Concept and Main Directions of Reform and 
Modernization of Central State Administration” (Government Resolution No. 237 of 
17 March 2004) (Jalovecka, 2004:8). 
Another example refers to an evaluation of regulatory mechanisms and 
framework in the Czech Republic carried out by the OECD experts in June 2001. 
This work was assessed by the Czech Government as a fundamental contribution to 
the public administration reform in the country.  
Co-ordination of external assistance funded by PHARE programme was 
carried out by the Foreign Assistance Centre in the Czech Ministry of Finance but, in 
view of some experts, was not always appropriate. “The use of external assistance 
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for public service development has been scattered over individual ministries and 
other administration authorities without any co-ordination” (Vidlakova, 1999 point  
8-10). 
There appear to be no grounds for asserting that a single civil service model 
of a particular country or group of countries was used by the Czech authorities in 
shaping their perceptions as to what kind of civil service should exist in the Czech 
Republic.   
Various views have been expressed concerning the absorption capacity of 
the recipient side and the value of rendered assistance. Although the overall positive 
effect of the external assistance can be hardly denied there was criticism as well. 
“Western specialists did not really understand the organization of Central and 
Eastern European societies…. It is rather surprising, for instance, that these Western 
specialists did not realize from the beginning that what these societies primarily need 
is an efficient and impartial civil service on the one hand, and the rule of law, on the 
other.” (Culik, 1999).  
The NTF report made the following remark. “A number of studies have 
been made for the support of the reform in Central and East European countries and 
numerous exchanges of experience have taken place. So far the utilization of these 
opportunities has been weak as foreign contacts have been limited to a very narrow 
group of specialists with the necessary knowledge of languages, there is no national 
base for the study and research of public administration and for the analysis of 
policies and strategic studies in this area (whether at government or university level). 
As a consequence, significant documents and studies such as OECD 
recommendations for deregulation, the Rotterdam document of the SIGMA 
programme, the EIPA study (Maastricht 1997) and many others are not only 
unfamiliar to our authorities (not even mentioning the public), but they are not 
available within one place and, moreover, even the authors of various reform 
proposals often do not know them either”. (NTF, 1998: 7-1-13). 
 
 
6.14  Assessment of Reform Implementation and Current Results   
            Assessment of the Czech civil service reform, its programme and extent of up 
to date implementation has been carried out against the declared outputs, 
deliverables and time frame (contained in the concept of reform adopted in March 
2004), against provisions of the Civil service Act (2002), as well as against the 
recommendations and criteria developed by the National Training Foundation 
(Report 1998) and the OECD/European Commission (SIGMA, 2003).   
            On the evidently positive side it should be acknowledged that the Czech 
Republic has finally “acquired” its civil service as the Civil service Act has formally 
“legalized” this institution in the Czech Republic and determined the general status 
of civil servants.  
            The law introduced a number of far reaching (at least in the Czech context) 
innovations e.g. mandatory competition for vacancies and promotion, formal 
differentiation of political and career appointments, formation of a single HR 
management center for the entire service, cancellation (at least formal) of guaranteed 
life long service, to name just a few. However since most of the law articles “wait” 
to be enforced it is difficult to say how they would be implemented in practice.  
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 Among other positive developments one should mention creation of a sound 
reform strategy and programme based on project management principles. The Civil 
service Act (to a lesser degree) and the reform programme (to a greater degree) are 
congruous with modern trends in public management development and civil service 
reforms and result from the respective experience of other countries, above all EU 
member states. Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration in July 2001 
was also an obvious step forward.  
There has been much wider involvement of civil servants in various forms 
of re-training and up-grading of qualifications. Appropriate training courses focused 
particularly on the application of the Common Assessment Framework (CAF), which 
is  considered to be an effective tool in implementing changes in the management of 
state administration (Vidlakova 2006:4). 
 Regretfully, the drafters of the civil service law seem to have been 
concentrating largely on improving employment conditions of civil servants. This is 
in contrast to recommendations developed by the NTF and OECD/EC which insisted 
on a comprehensive approach proceeding above all from the conceptual 
understanding of the role and mission of civil service in the society. 
Furthermore, permanent postponement of the full enforcement of the Civil 
service Act (the latest in order Government decision 531/2006 of 7 December 2006 
moved the deadline to 1 January 2009) made this legal document quite unique in 
terms of the time frame of its validation – almost seven years (2002 to 2008)! - and 
raised serious doubts whether it would be ever implemented. 
 Quite disappointing remains the fact that by mid 2007 (5 years after 
adoption of the law!) the Head of the General Directorate of Civil Service had not 
been appointed yet. “The fate of the General Directorate, which was established in 
conjunction with the Act, does not seem to portend a positive future for the regime 
foreseen by the law; established in 2002 with 65 employees, later budgetary cuts 
targeted at human resources caused the Directorate to shrink to only 22 employees 
by spring 2005” (Landová, 2006:60). 
Comparison of the recommendations contained in the SIGMA report (2003) 
with the contents of the reform programme and extent of its implementation reveals 
that so far only few recommendations have been taken account of. These include for 
example the need to place reform implementation issues under highest possible 
authority, expanding a range of training programmes for central government 
officials, and compulsory competition in appointments and promotion. On the other 
hand, at best insufficient attention has been paid to the development of accountability 
and anti-corruption mechanisms, improving transparency, speeding up enforcement 
of the new law, reducing managerial discretion in determining individual salaries, 
etc. Many of these issues remain unattended as most provisions of the new law have 
not been enforced yet.   
With regard to implementation of the reform programme adopted in 2004 
(Concept and Main Directions of Reform…) the majority of projects were launched 
to schedule and three sub-projects were terminated by mid 2006 (e.g. projects A1 
Identification of missions and functions of government agencies). However it is not 
always easy to evaluate extent of success of these projects since in many cases the 
expected results (outputs) had not been sufficiently detailed and proper evaluation or 
feedback was in most cases absent.  
The government has issued resolutions approving a number of documents 
prepared by the project teams: No. 420/2005 ‘On introducing methods of regulatory 
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impact assessment (RIA) in relation with businesses’; No. 421/2005 ‘On reducing 
administrative burden on entrepreneurs’; No. 430/2005 ‘Analysis of coordination 
mechanisms between central and territorial authorities’; and No. 738/2005 ‘Analysis 
of the system of control in central government’. At the same time there were serious 
setbacks where certain projects have not been launched at all. For example, project 
A4 (Reorganization of central government), appears to have been cancelled all 
together. The explanation given  -  the failure of the project A2 (Description and 
analysis of processes) the results of which should have been used in the project A4. 
(Further Advance…, 2005: 4). 
Project A2 has largely failed “as process of audit was carried out only in the 
Ministry of Finance” (ibid). No reason was given (at least in the report on progress) 
why only one ministry was subjected to this audit procedure. Later it was reported 
that in spring 2005 the Government declared process audits no longer compulsory 
and that they could be exercised only on request of a particular ministry or agency. 
Again one may ponder the causes of such a decision. In our view such a selective 
approach marks a retreat from general principles of reform implementation.   
Similar and a somewhat mysterious saga befell another quite important 
project D1 (Implementation of civil service law). Since late 2005 reference to this 
project dropped from reports on reform implementation. Several months later one of 
the documents prepared for the Government (attachment 1 to ‘Further advance…’) 
referred to a proposal to change the title of this project to Raising quality of HR 
management system (including proposals to modernize Civil service Act). To what 
extent the original objectives and tasks of this project have been retained remains 
unclear.   
Some projects were cancelled on request of separate ministries e.g. project 
E2 on request of the Ministry of Finance. In a number of cases the time frame of the 
projects’ implementation was extended. Justification of such measures was not 
always convincing. Overall these examples provide evidence of at times serious 
difficulties experienced by the project teams and of covert constraints and obstacles 
they encountered in advancing reform implementation.   
Noteworthy information about the internal mechanism of reform 
implementation and encountered problems could be drawn from the document 
entitled “Further Advance of Improvement of Central State Administration in the 
years 2005–2006” submitted to the Government for its consideration in July 2005. 
            In particular, this document pointed out that reform implementation revealed 
serious drawbacks in distribution of information about reform. “There still exists 
overall very low knowledge about the start of reform implementation and its goals. 
Not only wider public but also many civil servants and the highest management of 
the central government institutions are unaware of the reform objectives and its main 
directions” (Further advance…, 2005:6).  
Another concern expressed in the document referred to frequent changes of 
the government as a source of great difficulties and complications in project 
implementation (Further advance…, 2005:6). For example resignation of the Cabinet 
in summer 2004 and subsequent negotiations on the creation of the coalition 
Government resulted in replacement of the top management of many central 
government agencies. This quite negatively affected the work of reform projects 
teams.  
Also reference was made to insufficient fulfilment of government 
resolutions. For instance, the Cabinet’s requirement to all central government 
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institutions to submit (by 30 June 2004) an analysis of all the implemented and 
planned projects in the area of application of ICT in their public relations activities 
was either completely ignored (e.g. Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Environment, 
Ministry of Defence, Central Statistical Office) or was implemented very 
superficially (Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Interior) 
(Further Advance… 2005:6).  
Besides, the reform has been often perceived as pure reorganisation, or as 
one time process, which can be resolved by a single political decision or legislative 
act. It also appears that issues of transparency, accountability, public consultations 
have been so far generally disregarded by the reform managers.  
 A distinct problem emerged regarding insufficient coordination of the 
project activities and often low respect for the agreements concerning overall 
management of the reform. In practice the Reform Steering Committee has not 
always been informed (as it should be) about the measures and activities undertaken 
by various ministries and agencies in the areas of project teams’ intervention. This 
led to duplication of efforts and wastage of resources (ibid). 
The document referred to numerous cases of “passive resistance” on the 
part of civil servants. This could be explained by “general shortage of information 
about reform and absence of a clear cut signal from either political leadership or top 
management in central government that implementation of civil service reform is an 
obvious priority of the Government” (Further advance…, 2005:7).  
However most significant developments in terms of reform advance and 
results took place in late 2006. By approving Resolution No. 1232 of 25 October 
2006 the Government decided to transfer coordination of the civil service reform 
from the Office of the Government back to the Ministry of Interior. The contents of 
the reform were seriously scaled down with only three projects out of the original list 
of seventeen remaining for further implementation. Simultaneously, the Institute of 
Public Administration, which was part of the structure of the Office of the 
Government, was also handed over to the Ministry of Interior. By early 2007 
information about advance of implementation of civil service reform disappeared 
from the web site of the Czech Government.  
This decision of the Czech Government looked particularly odd since 
before the reform was launched in 2004 its preparation had been managed by the 
Ministry of Interior and continuation of this practice was declared by the Czech 
authorities to be unacceptable. It was alleged that any single ministry was not in an 
appropriate position to lead reform efforts targeted at the entire government 
structure.    
The culminating point of the long term “saga” of civil service reform 
preparation and implementation in the Czech Republic (though expected by “shrewd 
and experienced” observers) happened on the 13 August 2007. On that day the 
Czech Government adopted a resolution cancelling the Civil service Act and 
announcing that a new law on civil service would be drafted. Explanation given was 
neither amplified nor convincing – “the Act granted too many privileges to civil 
servants and did not sufficiently motivate good performance”. It remained unclear, 
however, why over the five years (a quite sufficient time period) that elapsed since 
adoption of the Act there had not been improvement of this legal document.   
Persistent unwillingness of the Czech authorities to enforce the Civil service 
Act, complemented by drastic reduction of the number and scope of reform projects 
and by the transfer of the reform management back to the Ministry of Interior leave 
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us only one option i.e. to conclude that by late 2006 implementation of civil service 
reform in the Czech Republic had been put on hold. In this connection is a rather 
remarkable comment made by a Czech expert in the field: “While we cannot 
discount the burden of the negative connotations of civil servants in the past, it must 
be said that the improvements – not only in the image but also in the actual state of 
affairs – were hindered by a constant lack of true advocates for the civil service 
within the Czech political elite.” (Landova, 2004:57).  
 
6.15  Conclusions  
Throughout most of the post-communist period reform of the state 
administration in the Czech Republic was largely seen as a task of “reducing” the 
state or leaving it “undisturbed” rather than “rebuilding” the state. In spite of at times 
lavish rhetoric the Czech post-communist political leadership did not consider 
reform of the Czech civil service as their real priority throughout most of the 1990s.  
During the 1990s the internal factors pushing for civil service reform were 
weak and sporadic. They were mainly represented, on the one side by opposition 
parties and groupings which used the issue of corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy to 
blame their political opponents, and on the other side by non-governmental and civil 
society organisations concerned with the issues of adequate development of 
democratic institutions in the country. The latter have not been strong enough to 
make the government sustain its commitment to the civil service reform at that time.   
During the 1990s public administration reform in the Czech Republic was 
viewed almost exclusively as reform of the regional and local government whereas 
civil service reform proper was largely confined to the adoption of civil service law. 
Although various drafts of civil service law and strategies of civil service reform 
were developed (as shown above) by government agencies and independent 
organisations, intentions proclaimed in these documents remained mostly on paper. 
The only areas where essential changes did take place before 2000 were the 
organisation of territorial government. 
Insufficient quality of the Czech civil service has been a permanent cause of 
criticism by the European Commission. The process of accession of the Czech 
Republic to the EU offered in many aspects a unique opportunity for cardinal 
improvement of its state administration. Under strong pressure applied by the 
European Commission in the late 1990s the Czech Government finally undertook 
practical measures aimed at developing the necessary legal framework and launching 
civil service reform.  
Following approval of the strategy of reform of central state administration 
in June 2001 and adoption by the Czech Parliament of the Civil service Act in April  
2002 the Czech Government approved in March 2004 a programme of civil service 
reform which was effectively launched the same year.  
Raising efficiency of the civil service activities was declared the principal 
reform objective. The authors of the civil service law and reform conceptual 
documents declared that they intend to build up an “open” position based civil 
service system. The reform programme comprised the following major tasks :   
a) carrying out functional analysis; b) reorganising the Government; c) 
improving coordination and communication; d) defining standards and regulations; 
e) introducing modern management technologies; f) enforcing civil service law; g) 
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promoting e-government practices; k) improving monitoring and control; l) 
enhancing training of civil servants; m) developing quality management; and n) 
improving financial management.   
Implementation of the reform programme was based on the application of 
project management principles whereas adoption and enforcement of the respective 
legislation turned out to be the main reform implementation tool. In designing reform 
conceptual documents the Czech experts drew largely from international experience, 
above all that from EU member countries. There seem to be no grounds to assert that 
any single civil service model was borrowed for replication under Czech conditions.    
Available information allows conclusion that opposition to civil service 
reform in the Czech Republic is considerable and has taken different forms. The 
current results of the reform implementation are rather modest and, as recent 
developments show, are in a way disappointing.  The Civil service Act was adopted 
by the Parliament in April 2002 but its full enforcement has been regularly 
postponed since then. The outcomes of the reform implementation have been 
confined so far mainly to the development of methodological instructions and 
manuals on how to introduce innovations and improvements, establishment of the 
Institute of Public Administration, wider scale of civil servant re-training and 
application of information technologies.   
By early 2007 the Czech Government had not yet appointed the Head of the 
General Directorate of Civil Service (envisaged by the law), considerably reduced 
and modified the scope of reform activities, transferred the function of reform 
management back to the Ministry of Interior, and eventually abolished the Civil 
service Act in August 2007.   
The only conclusion that can be drawn from these developments is that the 
advance of civil reform in the Czech Republic by that time (2007) had been halted. It 
also means that the adoption of civil service law and the start of civil service reform 
in the Czech Republic were realized mainly for the sake of meeting external 
requirements rather than due to internal conviction or imperative.   
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CHAPTER VII  
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS IN THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC: IS THERE 
MORE DIFFERENCES OR SIMILARITIES?  
 
 
7.1    Introduction   
This chapter introduces the reader to the results of a comparison of prime 
features of the Russian and Czech civil service systems carried out in line with the 
Protocol (guidelines) for comparative studies of national civil service systems 
developed by experts from Leiden and Indiana Universities specifically for 
comparative research of administrative systems. 
In accordance with this methodological framework the principal 
characteristics of the two civil service systems are grouped into clusters – historical 
development, internal labour market, representativeness, politicization, public 
opinion, and reform and diffusion. Within every cluster we examine its key elements, 
presented in most cases under respective sub-titles.  
The cluster ‘historical development of the nation and civil service’ was 
reviewed at the beginning of each country specific chapters (Chapters III and V) and 
therefore is not present in this chapter.    
In view of its direct relevance to the objective of our research the cluster 
‘reform and diffusion’ will be considered in the next chapter devoted to comparison 
of civil service reforms proper.  
The analysis and comparison of certain characteristics of the civil service 
systems in the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic gives us an opportunity to 
see a  comprehensive picture of the problems experienced by each system, its status 
and reform capacity and, no less important, to single out similarities and differences 
in the two systems.  
 
 
7.2   Czech and Russian Civil Services: Selected Features According 
to the Protocol for Comparative Studies.  
In the analysis pertaining to each of the major topics (as defined in the 
Protocol) we make a distinction between the situation in the Czech civil service 
before and after the adoption of the Civil service Act (2002). Accordingly, similar 
distinction was made between the situation in the Russian civil service before and 
after the start of civil service reform in 2003.   
Once again it should be emphasized that there exist definite shortage or 
actual absence of reliable statistical data and information on various aspects of 
activities of the Czech civil service. This was in particular emphasized in the report 
prepared by the National Training Foundation which pointed to a lack of plausible 
and usable statistical data, relevant databases, publicly accessible inspection reports 
etc., on the status of the Czech public administration (NTF, 1998, foreword). A 
similar statement was made also in the World Bank report (World Bank, 1999:3).  
The situation with regard to statistics concerning the Russian civil service is 
overall better though considerable “black holes” or “omissions” in availability of 
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information exist here as well. Therefore, wherever appropriate, absence of 
respective data was substituted by expert opinions and assessments.  
For the purpose of objective comparison we tried to use, wherever possible, 
information and data from the years 1998-2002 (a decade after the start of political 
and economic transformation) and 2003-2005 (the start of civil service reforms).  
 
 
7.3    Internal Labour Market  
The Internal Labour Market is defined as the “rules pertaining to job 
definition or classification, deployment, job security and membership, and reward 
structures” (Wise, 1996). One of our objectives consists of tracing variations and 
similarities between the two civil service systems in the way human resources are 
used and rewarded. The importance of studying the rules governing entry to civil 
service and various aspects of human resource management can be hardly 
overestimated as it allows us to identify and determine the extent of democratization 
and social equity of a civil service as well as the factors influencing its efficiency. By 
“rules” we mean not only formal but also informal rules. Informal rules may be quite 
important in understanding key elements of the organisational culture and 
bureaucratic tradition and may provide explanation of the direction and speed of 
reform implementation.  
In exploring various aspects of internal labour market we have paid priority 
attention to: 
a) job definition and classification system; 
b) deployment rules;   
c) job security and membership rules; 
e) reward mechanisms and practices. 
 
7.3.1   Job Definition and Classification System - the Czech Republic 
According to World Bank estimates the number of officials in the Czech 
state administration at central and regional levels amounted to approximately 
154,000 in 1998 (Nunberg, 2000:122). The respective figure for the year 2004 was 
186,000 (Debates in the Czech Parliament, 12 April 2002). According to Zuzana 
Rusňáková from the Office of the Czech Government there were about 108,000 
officials working for the central government in Prague and in the regions in 2004 
(Rusňáková, 2004).  
Taking into account total employment in central budgetary and subsidized 
organizations this number reaches around 508,000 employees and constitutes 7.2% 
of the population (World Bank, 1999:122). The increase in the number of public 
administration officials is estimated to be over 1.8 times for the period 1992–2002 
(World Bank, 2006:122). 
In terms of job classification we should note that until 2002 there has been 
no civil service legislation, no distinct group of employees called “civil servants” and 
no civil service de jure in the Czech Republic. Respectively the scope and the nature 
of civil service were not formally defined. 
Still, de facto there existed a category of state administration officials, 
although their status and conditions of employment were regulated largely by the 
Labour Code. Article 73 of the Labour Code refers to a group of government 
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employees who may be considered, de facto, civil service staff. As we can see the 
status of these employees was not different from the status of other employees in the 
public sector. Until recently civil servants were employed by individual ministries 
and there did not exist a strategy of personnel deployment across the whole state 
administration.    
 
Table 7.1.  Public Sector Employment in Percent of Overall Population 
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Table 7.1 shows that the Czech Republic and Russia stand out from other 
compared countries in two respects: a) the Czech central state administration appears 
to be relatively largest in size in terms of percent of population; and b) in proportion 
to overall number of citizens the Russian public sector employees in health and 
education appear to outnumber those in other countries.     
The extent to which responsibility for job classification is centrally held or 
decentralized to agency level allows categorizing civil service systems into rigid 
position (centralized) and flexible position (decentralized). The Czech civil service 
can be classified as flexible position (decentralized) since until recently job 
categories in the Czech civil service had not been sharing common attributes and 
ranking factors.  
It appears that the Civil service Act adopted in 2002, if consistently 
implemented, might widen perspectives for career development of various categories 
of civil servants.  The elements of centralisation have been gradually reinforced since 
2001 when the General Directorate of Civil Service within the Office of the 
Government was established. It has been assigned the task since January 2002 of 
coordinating human resources management across central state administration 
(SIGMA, 2003:20). The Government decree No.469//2002 of 5 August 2002 
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(SIGMA, 2003:12) introduced a Catalogue of Job Positions and Qualification 
requirements. The decree was enforced starting from 1 January 2004.   
Administrative systems can be further distinguished by the extent to which 
jobs are broadly or narrowly defined and the extent of predominance of generalist or 
specialist jobs. As demonstrated earlier in this study, until recently civil servants’ 
jobs in the Czech Republic have been classified into 12 grades as stipulated by the 
Labour Code. Each grade was divided into 12 steps (classes) according to the length 
of service. So looking at the situation from this point of view we come to the 
conclusion that jobs in the Czech civil service are narrowly defined.  
The new civil service law (2002) seems to consolidate this trend as it 
provides for the existence of 12 grades for civil servants and 16 grades for public 
employees. The law also distinguishes two large categories of civil servants – 
principals and subordinates. The group of principals comprises basically positions 
of state secretaries and their deputies; heads and deputy heads of departments; 
directors and deputy directors of divisions and sections. Positions of subordinates are 
divided into two groups: those civil servants who have high education and those with 
vocational or secondary education (SIGMA, 2003:12).  
With regard to prevalence of generalist or specialist jobs there is a definite 
shortage of generalists in the Czech public administration (NTF, 1998 point 9-4). 
The Concept of training of Czech civil servants points to a quite insufficient number 
of professional managers in the Czech public administration who are generalists, i.e. 
educated and trained in analytical, information, personnel management and similar 
functions (Concept of Training, 1999, point 4.1). 
There are different opinions as to whether the Czech administrative system 
constitutes a position based (fixed term) or career (tenure) employment system. 
According to Vidlakova the existing employment system is position based rather 
than career based (Vidlakova, 1999 point 3-1). But she admits that state employees 
have the right to be promoted according to the length of service in a particular grade 
and that promotion is automatic according to seniority in a particular grade (ibid, 
point 3-5).  Furthermore, normal employment relationships for the majority of state 
administration employees were established for an unlimited period of time. 
Therefore it appears that strong elements of a tenure system have been and still are 
present in the Czech administrative system: “Tenure is guaranteed to some extent” 
(SIGMA, 2003:11). Although the new law (2002) does not provide for permanent 
tenure, the basic type of service contract will be of unlimited duration. According to 
Onisko the Czech state administration is a “position based system” with elements of 
career system (Onisko, 2000:7). He argues that advance is guaranteed within each 
grade (12 steps according to seniority) whereas transfer to another grade can be 
authorized by the decision of the head of the agency concerned (Onisko, 2000:7).   
Therefore, there are good grounds to argue that the Czech civil service 
system is a mixed one, combining elements of position and career based systems. 
The Civil service Act (2002) appears to strengthen the mixed nature of the existing 
system although only full enforcement of the law will show how the system 
functions in practice.    
Until recently in the Czech Republic there has been no obligation for state 
administration agencies and institutions to have comprehensive job descriptions for 
their staff. Only the main activity determining the grade needed to be specified 
(SIGMA, 2003:11). Therefore proper modern job description was a rarity and 
employees often did not know well the tasks and requirements formally assigned to 
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them (NTF, 1998: 6-2). Following full entry into force of the Civil service Act all 
recruitment issues, job descriptions and overall classification shall be responsibility 
of the Director General of the Civil Service.  
 
7.3.2   Job Definition and Classification System  -  Russian Federation 
 The total number of civil servants of federal state bodies, state bodies of the 
constituent entities of the Russian Federation, and other state bodies established 
under the Constitution of the Russian Federation, (hereinafter collectively referred to 
as the state bodies), together with municipal servants of local self-government bodies 
amounted to 1,053,100 at the beginning of 2002. This total includes a verified 
315,100 civil servants and other employees of federal executive bodies. For the 
period of 1992-2002, the number of civil servants and other employees of these 
bodies grew by a factor of 1.8, primarily at the regional level (Federal Programme  
‘Reform of the Russian Civil Service’, 2002). It is almost identical growth to that in 
the Czech Republic for the same period. 
The data provided by the Federal State Statistics Service is somewhat 
different. In 2002 overall employment by Russian federal and regional government 
amounted to 1,252,300 persons; in 2004 the figure was 1,318,600 (Federal State 
Statistics Service, 2005:8). One of the possible reasons for discrepancy in the data is 
that Federal State Statistics Service counts also technical, support and security staff 
on payroll of the respective state organs.  The years 2005-2006 have seen further 
increase in the number of state officials up to the level of 1.623 million (Federal 
State Statistics Service, 2008:4).   
      The verified number of federal civil servants in central administrations of 
federal executive bodies amounted to 24,900 and in their territorial bodies to 290,200 
(ibid). 
The system of civil service personnel management is decentralised and 
continues to be largely based on the rules set up under the Soviet system with a 
number of new regulations formally introduced but often disregarded. Growing 
autonomy of regions in the 1990s contributed to weakening of centre-periphery 
relationships within the civil service. Following adoption in 2006 of the Roster of 
federal civil service positions, responsibility for job classification at the federal level 
is now centrally held. Therefore in this respect the system tends to be predominantly 
of a rigid nature.  
The new law ‘On the State Service System of the Russian Federation’ 
(2003) provides for the establishment of a central organ that should manage the civil 
service. However, five years after the law was enforced establishment of such a 
central body was still pending.  
The law ‘On State Civil Service of the Russian Federation’ (2004) stipulates 
that there should be four categories of civil servants (article 9), five groups of civil 
service positions, and five civil servants’ ranks (article 11) which in their turn are 
divided into three classes. From this point of view the new law does not differ much 
from the previous one since only the number and titles of civil servants’ categories 
have been changed. Therefore, we may conclude that jobs in the Russian civil 
service are rather narrowly defined.  
The balance between specialist and generalist positions in the Russian civil 
service is shifted towards prevalence of the former. However, deficit of professionals 
in certain areas e.g. analysts, personnel managers is considerable. The proportion of 
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civil servants at the federal and regional levels with basic education in technical, 
agricultural or natural sciences (that is generally irrelevant to the job needs) was 
around 30% in 2004 compared to 56% in 1995 (Federal State Statistics Service, 
2005:24).  
The Law ‘On the Basic Principles of the Russian Civil Service’ adopted in 
1995 specifies that “an individual can join the civil service on the basis of a labour 
contract to be concluded for an indefinite term or for a term of not more than five 
years” (Article 21, point 6). Although the authors of the new law (2004) advocated 
wider use of fixed term contracts neither the text of the law (Article 25) nor 
subsequent normative acts provide an effective mechanism for practical 
implementation of this provision. In practice the absolute majority of contracts with 
‘existing’ staff and new entrants to the civil service are of an indefinite length. 
Advance to the next grade and rank is not directly linked to performance and 
depends almost entirely on the length of service. Therefore the Russian civil service 
system belongs to a category of career (tenure) systems.   
Until recently job descriptions in the Russian civil service were drafted very 
formally. Preparation of modern job descriptions was declared one of the civil 
service reform priorities. Available information indicates that the overall situation 
with job descriptions is beginning to change in the positive direction.   
   
7.3.3   Deployment Rules - Czech Republic 
In the absence of a specific civil service related legal framework for Czech 
government employees, human resource management remained the domain of 
individual ministries (World Bank, 1999:5). Hence there exists significant variability 
in personnel management practices. Personnel management was understood and 
implemented in practice primarily as personnel record keeping and administration 
(NTF, 1998: 6-2). Many HR managers saw their role in personnel management only 
as determining the salaries and bonuses and the approval of reorganization and 
related transfer of people. 
Each ministry and agency performed the role of an employer in relation to 
its staff members (Onisko, 2000:8). Contracts (either for indefinite term or fixed 
term) were signed between an individual and the respective agency (Onisko, 2000:7). 
Thus, civil servants mobility was seriously constrained. Further, according to the 
Labour Code provisions mobility was possible only with the consent of the person 
concerned (Vidlakova, 1999, point 2-8). Although the new law makes reference to a 
general principle which implies that civil servants have legal relationship with the 
state, it also introduces the notion of “sphere of service” for an individual civil 
servant thus complicating horizontal mobility. Therefore horizontal mobility as a 
means of professional development and sharing of cross sectoral expertise may be 
difficult. “Mobility between ministries or from outside the public service is rare and 
this reduces cross fertilization of ideas and cooperation between ministries and 
agencies” (SIGMA, 2003:138).  
According to Vidlakova “persons with experience gained outside the public 
service have broad possibilities of entry to public service” (Vidlakova 1999, point 2-
3). However, there is no reliable information as to the extent such opportunities have 
been used in practice. According to article 39 of the Civil service Act (2002) 
transfers are compulsory but for not more than 6 months.  
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Until recently, general principles of recruitment and promotion of civil 
servants were regulated by the Labour Code (1965). There was no differentiation in 
this respect  between civil servants and other employees. Explicit rules for promotion 
did not exist allowing a considerable degree of discretion by managers (SIGMA, 
2003:10). NTF report points to “generally disorganized conditions in civil service 
which do not guarantee professional growth of the employees, career promotion 
based on defined rules and clear career prospects” (NTF, 1998: 6-2). 
The right to promotion has been based mainly on the length of service in the 
grade (Vidlakova 1999, point 3-1). The promotion practices allowed for a 
considerable degree of arbitrariness and patronage (SIGMA, 2003:10). Furthermore, 
considerable discretion in recruitment and promotion, in addition to absence of 
restrictions to involvement in party politics, undermined principles of impartiality 
and professional independence.  
In the absence of such rules civil servants in their turn were not sufficiently 
motivated to achieve performance objectives. The new law (2002) envisages that 
recruitment issues will fall under the prerogative of the Director General of the Civil 
Service. However, there are no indications that decisions on recruitment and 
appointment can be subjected to judicial review which is regarded by some experts 
as an obvious shortcoming of the new law. 
Numerous evidence suggests also that promotion into higher grades is often 
used to counterbalance overall low remuneration granted to civil servants (SIGMA, 
2003:11).  
Staff turnover in the Czech civil service in 1997 (see table 7.2) varied 
between 4.75% in the Ministry of Agriculture to 14.7 % in the Ministry of 
Education, Youth and Sport. (Vidlakova, 1999) but according to other sources this 
number was larger – from 25 to 30% in 1996 (Onisko, 2000:20). 
 
Table 7.2   Estimated Staff Turnover in Central and Regional Government 
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According to the World Bank data average turnover below Director Level 
appears not to be very high (World Bank, 1999:9). In this connection many observers 
point to informal rules which discourage dismissal except for cases of clear 
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According to the World Bank data average turnover below Director Level 
appears not to be very high (World Bank, 1999:9). In this connection many observers 
point to informal rules which discourage dismissal except for cases of clear 
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misconduct. Ratio of number of staff subordinate to managers averages 5 for central 
agencies and appears to be rather low (World Bank, 1999:90).  
In the Czech Republic funds for civil servants’ training are not allocated 
centrally. Each ministry and agency determined how much to spend on training its 
officials within established limits (Vidlakova, 1999: point 3-7). As a rule fees for 
training are covered from a special fund for social needs amounting to 2-3% of the 
total payroll of a particular ministry or agency. However, allocations from this fund 
may be directed also to purposes other than training. Therefore the real percentage of 
the total payroll spent on training is considered to be around 1% on average. In 
general, training was not obligatory for career development (Vidlakova 1999, point 
3-9). It is known that the Ministry of Finance spent on average 2% of its wage bill on 
training (World Bank, 1999:140).   
“There is no comprehensive training system that would guarantee a targeted 
preparation and recruitment of graduates for the civil service” (NTF, 1998: 6-2). A 
comprehensive system of in-service training of central government officials is also 
missing (ibid). Responsibility for training of existing staff resides with individual 
ministries and agencies. “Training of civil servants is not centrally coordinated, it is 
organized on a case by case basis, responsibility for its effectiveness is not 
determined” (NTF, 1998: 2-2). Motivation for training at manager level is weak. The 
number of civil servants who did not meet the educational requirements of their posts 
in 1999 was around 15% of the total civil service membership (Concept of Training , 
1999). 
Until recently there has been no central educational institution for training 
and up-grading qualifications of Czech civil servants working in central government. 
Generally there appears to be a shortage of highly qualified specialists, trainers and 
lecturers on various aspects of modern public management. Donor and bilateral 
programmes do not seem to be able to meet in full the demand in this area.          
In October 2001 the Government adopted a resolution approving a Strategy 
of systematic training of civil servants. In September 2001 the Section on Personnel 
Management and Training was set up in the Office of the Government. An Institute 
of Public Administration in charge of developing strategies and coordination of 
training of civil servants was also created in 2002 and organizationally became part 
of this Section. The establishment of the Institute of Public Administration 
constitutes a significant milestone in the development of training strategy and 
practice for the Czech civil servants. 
 
7.3.4   Deployment Rules - Russian Federation 
  Human resource management in the Russian civil service is largely 
decentralised. Each ministry or government agency continues to be responsible for 
hiring and managing its staff. The establishment of a central management organ for 
the entire civil service, as stipulated in the Law ‘On the State Service System of the 
RF’ (adopted in 2003), is still pending. Nonetheless some elements of centralised HR 
management can be found; for example, in the areas of civil servants training or 
management of top level positions in the Government and Presidential 
Administration.     
The mechanism of appointment to the upper rungs of career ladders is still 
predominantly very informal. One of its most important elements is the ability of a 
candidate to establish good personal contacts and to prove one’s loyalty to superior 
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management. The general tendency is that the higher the position to be filled is, the 
less emphasis is placed on the professional qualities of a candidate and his education 
and the more decisive is the factor of his personal loyalty to the superior. This is 
particularly true for civil service positions starting from the level of Deputy Head of 
Department and upwards.   
Appointment based on transparent and open competition is still rare. The 
new legislation (2004) introduced in fact more opportunities for bypassing the 
requirement for competition as compared to the law from 1995. Although the reform 
set the objective of competitive based recruitment and promotion, the mechanism for 
ensuring compliance with these principles is generally weak.  
The new law (2004) provides for a possibility of side entry to the civil 
service on the basis of competition. However the procedures and mechanism to 
ensure implementation of this provision are to be determined by secondary 
normative acts.    
Opportunities for inter-departmental (lateral) mobility are generally limited 
and such cases are rare. Existing practice of deployment of personnel provides for 
opportunities for movement but mainly within one organisation. The system of 
rotation of civil servants among federal ministries and between them and other state 
organs is only now being developed. The practice of temporary assignment of middle 
and high level officials to regional executive or judicial bodies of power, common in 
Soviet times, is no longer used.   
High turnover of cadres has been one of the serious problems faced by the 
Russian civil service in the 1990s. Civil service pay at that time was unacceptably 
low and the prestige of work in the service was falling. During the period 1992-1995 
the turnover of employees involved two third of the total staff of executive power 
agencies at federal level and one third of those at regional level (Ovsyanko, 
1996:71). In the period 1991–1994 the staff of the executive branch of federal and 
regional government in Russia turned over by 58%! (Grishkovets, 2002:53). As a 
rule it was the best employees who left to the private sector. In 1995, on average 
14% of positions were vacant in federal ministries and agencies with vacancies in 
some of the ministries reaching 40% (Ovsyanko,1996:73).  
In the late 1990s the rates of turnover in the Russian civil service slowed 
down. The problem remained largely at low level positions since advance to senior 
positions for young personnel was virtually blocked because of utter shortage of 
vacancies. As a result young people had no stimuli to enter or stay long in the civil 
service (Gimpelson & Magun, 2004:7). Following the considerable increase in civil 
servants’ pay in recent years turnover of cadres appears to have slowed down even 
further and remains now at generally acceptable levels. 
Attracting new entrants with appropriate skills and values is also improving 
because of retreat of the older generation.  
“Soviet type” traditions are particularly strong in what concerns delegation 
of authority and rights to lower echelons of civil service. Decision making tends to 
be concentrated in the higher echelons. In the mid 1990s in many ministries the ratio 
chief - subordinate was approaching 1:1 (Otechestvennyie Zapiski, 2004 :128).  
There is no centralised bank of data on the types of skills needed across all 
levels of government. However, attempts to create such a data bank are inhand.  
Retraining and professional development of federal civil servants is 
currently being funded from the federal budget. Under the Federal Law ‘On the 
Federal Budget of the RF for 2002’, 417.5 million roubles was appropriated for this 
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purpose. The sum included 68.5 million roubles allocated for the so called state order 
that serves as a basis for retraining and professional development of federal civil 
servants (Federal Programme ‘Reform of the Russian Civil Service’, 2002:6). 
The central educational institution for training civil servants is the Russian 
Academy of Civil Service (RACS) which has a large number of regional branches.  
In 2004, 15,7% of the total number of civil servants underwent different types of 
training, of which over 60% were trained by RACS and its centres. Less than 10% of 
the trainees attended training and upgrading courses which lasted more than one 
month (Kotchegura, 2006:281).  
Standard criteria of eligibility for training as well as links between 
professional up-grading and career prospects generally do not exist. The level of co-
ordination of educational institutions’ training programmes with personnel 
departments of federal and regional agencies is generally low. Training of civil 
servants lacks coherent strategy and until recently has been seriously under-financed 
in particular at the regional level.  The number of civil servants whose professional 
education does not match the qualification requirements of their positions tends to 
grow (Federal Programme ‘Reform of the Russian Civil Service’, 2002:6). 
 
7.3.5 Job Security and Membership Rules - Czech Republic 
Pending full enforcement of the Civil service Act, the existing rules and 
practices do not comprise strict requirements for recruitment on the grounds of open 
competition (SIGMA, 2003:10). Also there was no regulation which required public 
advertisement of vacancies. Open competition was not obligatory and therefore was 
regularly used only for separate categories of civil servants or in separate 
government agencies (SIGMA, 2003:9). For example, the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs has practiced publication of vacancy announcements in the mass 
media. Candidates were shortlisted and then interviewed by the commission 
consisting of 3 to 5 staff members. Recommendations of the commission had to be 
approved later by the Minister.   
According to Onisko, recruitment in most cases lacked previously agreed 
and approved standard formal procedures (Onisko, 2000:31). The head of a structural 
unit had total discretion in selecting his subordinates. Probation period was up to 
three months (Onisko, 2000:6). 
There was no possibility for appeal against recruitment and appointment 
decision except in clear discrimination cases where violation of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms was presumed (SIGMA, 2003:10). 
In general until recently, recruitment into civil service was characterized by 
low attractiveness to potential candidates and low transparency of the process.  
According to the new Civil service Act (No. 218, 2002) the process of 
recruitment will incorporate the so called preparation for civil service phase. 
Selection of candidates for this phase (it lasts 12 months) should be made through 
public competition. A selection committee is composed of three civil servants and no 
outside observers are invited. Selection is accomplished mainly by means of an 
interview.  
The probation period ends by oral and written examination conducted by an 
examination committee consisting of three civil servants and two external experts. 
The procedure is followed by an appraisal done by the supervisor. As a result of this 
procedure a candidate is either approved for service or his candidature is rejected. 
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However, “new recruitment processes are unlikely to be put in place during the 
transition period, which has now been extended until 31 December 2007” (SIGMA, 
2003:5).   
The Civil service Act stipulates that vacancies across virtually all levels of 
civil service should be advertised and filled in by means of open competition. This 
should also contribute to establishment of merit based promotion system. The first 
round of competition will involve only those who are already employed in the 
organization offering the vacancy. The second round is held when the first does not 
identify suitable candidates. It involves both acting civil servants in other 
organizations in the same sphere of service as well as those persons who have 
completed the preparation phase for service. Finally, the third round targets civil 
servants in other organizations beyond the sphere of service concerned. During the 
transitional period (until full enforcement of the law) current civil servants are 
supposed to apply for admission to the preparatory civil service in order to be able to 
keep their positions. The preparation in this case means retraining and passing a 
service examination.  
The SIGMA report 2003 points to a number of flaws in the new law which 
may in practice undermine principles of promoting professionalism, de-politicisation 
and reduction of cases of conflict of interest (SIGMA, 2003:15). For instance, the 
law regulates that a candidate for a civil service position can be rejected if a 
recruiting manager considers that the individual does not respect democratic 
principles of the Czech Constitution. In view of many experts this clause may lead to 
cases of arbitrary and biased decisions (SIGMA, 2003:11). 
No restrictions concerning trade union activities and the right to strike have 
existed in the Czech Republic (Vidlakova, 1999, point 3.10). The new Law retains 
the right of trade union membership and the right to organize strikes with one 
limitation: civil servants occupying position of Principals. 
“All employees appear to work under a cloud of uncertainty regarding the 
security of their posts, which seems to increase after major political changes and to 
be greater the higher one’s position” (World Bank, 1999:81).  This is particularly 
true with regard to top level officials who are often replaced following elections 
(Onisko, 2000:21).    
In general administration has the right to dismiss an employee in case of 
physical incapability, professional incompetence or grave/regular misconduct. 
Dismissal is also possible following reorganization or abolition of the post. In 
principle, decisions on dismissal can be appealed in a civil court.  
The pension system provided to the Czech civil servants does not look 
sufficiently developed and attractive. It is based on the principle “pay as you go”.  
 
7.3.6    Job Security and Membership Rules - Russian Federation 
The Russian Constitution (Article 32, point 4) stipulates that “citizens of the 
Russian Federation have equal access to civil service employment”. Apart from 
general restrictions like Russian citizenship, respective age, good health, and 
knowledge of the state language any citizen has the right to apply for a civil servant 
position.  
Issues of recruitment to civil service are also regulated by the Law ‘On 
State Civil Service of the RF’ approved on 27 July 2004 and Presidential Decree 
No.112 dated 1 February 2005 ‘On Competitive Recruitment to State Civil Service 
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of the Russian Federation’. Article 21 of the Law specifies that “Citizens of the 
Russian Federation who have reached the age of 18 years, are fluent in the official 
language of the Russian Federation and meet the relevant qualification requirements 
established by this Federal Law, shall be entitled to enroll for civil service”. 
Article 22 of the Law sets the requirement of mandatory competition in 
cases of recruitment and promotion to civil service positions whilst stating also a 
number of exceptions to the rule. Competition may not be held when it concerns:  
- appointment to civil service positions with a fixed term in office in the 
categories "executives" (political appointees) and "counselors (their 
assistants)"; 
- appointment to civil service positions in the category "executives" where 
appointments and dismissals are effected by the President of the Russian 
Federation or the Government of the Russian Federation; 
- conclusion of a fixed-term service contract; 
- appointment of a civil servant to another civil service position in the 
instances envisaged by clause 2 of Article 28 and clauses 1, 2 and 3 of 
Article 31 hereof; 
- appointment to a civil service position of a civil servant (citizen) is included 
in the personnel reserve formed on a competition basis. 
Point 3 of the same article says also that “Competition may be foregone in 
the case of appointment to certain civil service positions where the performance of 
job responsibilities involves the use of information that constitutes state secret….”. 
Regretfully these exceptions to a considerable extent undermine practical 
application of the principle of competition in the Russian civil service since they 
allow its bypass all too easily. Particular reference can be made to the clauses dealing 
with “personnel reserve membership” and “access to state secrets”. The point is, that 
in spite of the law’s provisions, personnel reserve (a list of civil servants 
recommended for promotion to high ranking posts) has been so far seldom formed 
on a competitive basis. 
It should be noted that strict requirement to hold a competition for filling a 
vacant civil service post was also contained in the previous law adopted in 1995 
(Article 21) but was rarely observed in practice. Furthermore, if comparison is made 
between both laws (from 2004 and 1995) the number of exceptions in the new law 
concerning mandatory competition in cases of recruitment and promotion has 
actually grown.  
The above mentioned Presidential Decree No.112 stipulates that 
competition for filling a vacant civil service position should be preceded by 
publication of announcement of the vacancy in no less than one periodically printed 
publication as well as on the web-site of the government structure in question. 
Whilst the new Law provides for broader opportunities of side entry to civil 
service and wider application of fixed term contracts, the mechanism for the 
practical application has not been developed yet.   
Although the situation with regard to application of competition procedures 
in the Russian civil service is gradually improving, until recently enrolment and 
promotion to a higher position in the majority of cases was taking place without 
competition. According to a representative poll carried out by Gimpelson & Magun 
in 2002, only 4% of the interviewed civil servants (age up to 35) both at the federal 
and regional level had progressed through competition or special tests at the time of 
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between both laws (from 2004 and 1995) the number of exceptions in the new law 
concerning mandatory competition in cases of recruitment and promotion has 
actually grown.  
The above mentioned Presidential Decree No.112 stipulates that 
competition for filling a vacant civil service position should be preceded by 
publication of announcement of the vacancy in no less than one periodically printed 
publication as well as on the web-site of the government structure in question. 
Whilst the new Law provides for broader opportunities of side entry to civil 
service and wider application of fixed term contracts, the mechanism for the 
practical application has not been developed yet.   
Although the situation with regard to application of competition procedures 
in the Russian civil service is gradually improving, until recently enrolment and 
promotion to a higher position in the majority of cases was taking place without 
competition. According to a representative poll carried out by Gimpelson & Magun 
in 2002, only 4% of the interviewed civil servants (age up to 35) both at the federal 
and regional level had progressed through competition or special tests at the time of 
  162
enrollment (Gimpelson & Magun, 2004:11). The poll confirmed that one of the main 
criteria for recruitment continued to be personal relationship and loyalty to the 
management. The poll results show that professional qualities and belonging to a 
patronage sealed network of like minded officials have approximately the same 
impact on the prospects of career advance (Gimpelson & Magun, 2004:21).  
Contrary to the Czech legislation the Russian Law does not grant civil 
servants the right for strike.  
Significant politicisation of the Russian civil service complemented by 
frequent reorganisations of government institutions place stability and security of 
staff into dependence on political decisions. This is especially true for the civil 
service staff at the regional level. During the period 1991–2000 the structure of the 
federal government in Russia had been significantly changed nine times. Under such 
conditions it is difficult to speak about any stability (Grishkovets, 2002:73).  
Any state institution can effectively dismiss a civil servant in line with 
numerous provisions contained in the law. Regretfully dismissals are not done 
always in strict conformity with the law especially during large scale reorganisations 
and even more so during reshuffles of political leadership.  
However a civil servant has the right to appeal to a court against such 
decision if he/she is convinced that there is unfair treatment. In practice cases when 
the court rules in favour of a dismissed civil servant are far from being exceptions.  
The existing pension system for Russian civil servants possesses certain 
comparative advantages to the schemes of most other large social groups.  
The absolute majority of contracts with ‘existing’ staff and new entrants to 
the civil service are of a non-specified duration. Therefore the Russian civil service 
system can be classified as that of a career (tenured) system.   
 
7.3.7  Reward Mechanism - Czech Republic 
Until recently, the remuneration system for Czech civil servants (Law 
143/1992) comprised a considerable element of bonuses, premiums and extra 
payments additional to basic salary. The premium can amount up to 100% of take 
home pay for grades 9-12, and up to 40% for grades 1-8 (SIGMA, 2003:15). In 
practice, on average 70% of civil servants’ remuneration is salary and 30% is 
additions and premium (Onisko, 2000:8).  
The average gross monthly earning in the state administration was 11,788 
crowns in 1999 equivalent to approximately 370 USD (World Bank, 1999:88). In 
2001–2002 the average salary in state administration amounted to 17,000–18,000 
CZK (approx. 550 euros). The lowest and the highest salaries were in the range of 
9,000 CZK and 37,000 CZK respectively (SIGMA, 2003:16). 
Salary and most additions are permanent depending on the position, length 
of service etc. Various supplements (premium) are granted on the basis of 
discretional assessment done usually by the Head of unit (service, agency). The 
criteria which are used to define the size of premium are neither sufficiently 
specified nor are open for external scrutiny, nor are unified across various 
government institutions.  
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Until recently jobs were remunerated differently in the various state 
institutions. This may change if a Civil service Act is fully enforced. In accordance 
with Government order 48/1995 the opportunities to use savings from unfilled 
vacancies as monetary incentive for existing staff were restricted. However, in 1997 
these limitations were removed and the savings are more frequently used for general 
salary increases.        
In 1997 budget expenditure to cover wages of employed in the budgetary 
organizations amounted to roughly 100 billion CZK including allocations to funds 
for social and cultural needs (NTF, 1998, 5-3). 
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Source: An International Statistical Survey of Government Employment and Wages, World 
Bank, 1997. IMF (Czech Republic), World Bank (Estonia), World Bank (Russia).  
 
There is no general regulation prescribing performance appraisal and its 
manner (Vidlakova 1999, point 3-6). In general, standard and transparent criteria for 
performance based remuneration are lacking.   
In comparison with similar jobs in the private sector, monthly salaries in the 
Czech civil service are from 25 to 30 % for director level positions but increase up to 
60-80 % for lower skilled positions (World Bank, 1999:71).  
Salary differential (compression) within the system of 12 grades ranges 
from one to five (SIGMA, 2003:16). Similarly a World Bank report shows that 
compression ratio of highest to lowest salaries in the Czech state administration is 
between 4.4 and 5.1 (World Bank, 1999:71). However, taking into account highly 
discretionary allowances and supplements reaching up to 100% for the Czech top 
level servants, this ratio may reach 7-8.  (World Bank, 1999:71). In comparison the 
average compression range in EU member states is from 6 to 10. 
 
 
Table 7.5.    Compression Ratios (basic civil servants’ wages). 
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The new Law introduces a unified salary system and a unified classification 
of civil servants (National Catalogue of Job Positions) which however will be fully 
applied only after the transition period is over. The new system envisages that 
remuneration of a civil servant will be based on tariff classes (linked to pay grades 
and pay classes) and regular performance appraisal. It is expected that its 
introduction will result in overall 40% increase in salary levels across the service. 
Some experts reckon that the Law grants to Czech civil servants “disproportionate 
privileges in the form of generous fringe benefits and perquisites” (SIGMA, 2003:5). 
The salary will consist of two basic components: entitlements and 
discretionary allowances. Apart from basic salary the first component comprises 
 
 164
Source: An International Statistical Survey of Government Employment and Wages, World 
Bank, 1997. IMF (Czech Republic), World Bank (Estonia), World Bank (Russia).  
 
There is no general regulation prescribing performance appraisal and its 
manner (Vidlakova 1999, point 3-6). In general, standard and transparent criteria for 
performance based remuneration are lacking.   
In comparison with similar jobs in the private sector, monthly salaries in the 
Czech civil service are from 25 to 30 % for director level positions but increase up to 
60-80 % for lower skilled positions (World Bank, 1999:71).  
Salary differential (compression) within the system of 12 grades ranges 
from one to five (SIGMA, 2003:16). Similarly a World Bank report shows that 
compression ratio of highest to lowest salaries in the Czech state administration is 
between 4.4 and 5.1 (World Bank, 1999:71). However, taking into account highly 
discretionary allowances and supplements reaching up to 100% for the Czech top 
level servants, this ratio may reach 7-8.  (World Bank, 1999:71). In comparison the 
average compression range in EU member states is from 6 to 10. 
 
 
Table 7.5.    Compression Ratios (basic civil servants’ wages). 
 
4,4
1,6
3,6 3,7
0
1
2
3
4
5
Czech
Republic
Estonia Hungary Russia
 
Source: Official government wage scales, calculations of World Bank staff (Moscow); 
Administrative reform in Russia, 2004.  
 
The new Law introduces a unified salary system and a unified classification 
of civil servants (National Catalogue of Job Positions) which however will be fully 
applied only after the transition period is over. The new system envisages that 
remuneration of a civil servant will be based on tariff classes (linked to pay grades 
and pay classes) and regular performance appraisal. It is expected that its 
introduction will result in overall 40% increase in salary levels across the service. 
Some experts reckon that the Law grants to Czech civil servants “disproportionate 
privileges in the form of generous fringe benefits and perquisites” (SIGMA, 2003:5). 
The salary will consist of two basic components: entitlements and 
discretionary allowances. Apart from basic salary the first component comprises 
  165
wherever appropriate extra pay for service, management duties, overtime, work in 
difficult conditions and some other criteria. The second component is composed of 
two allowances – personal extra pay and reward for extraordinary performance. The 
first allowance can amount to 20% of basic salary and the second allowance up to 
100% of basic salary. The future system incorporates an extensive list of 
supplements and allowances which, in the absence of clearly defined rules for their 
application, may strengthen discretionary powers of top managers. This increases the 
risk of arbitrary decisions and politicization (SIGMA, 2003:18).  
In general the new wage system is aimed at widening salary differentials 
among jobs in Czech state administration and better rewarding selected highly 
qualified specialists (Dvorakova,  2005:3).    
 
7.3.8  Reward Mechanism - Russian Federation 
In the 1990s the compensation system of civil servants in Russia was based 
on the provisions of the Federal Law No. 119 of 31 July, 1995 “On the Basic 
Principles of the Russian Civil Service”. Article 17 of this Law stipulated that civil 
servants’ pay shall comprise a base salary and increments in accordance with the 
assigned civil service class rank, special conditions of civil service, length of civil 
service and also bonuses based on job performance. In practice this system of civil 
servants’ remuneration gave definite priority to the principles of seniority and length 
of service.  
Prior to the default in 1998 the average civil servant’s monthly salary in 
Russia was about $450 but the default reduced it by over 300 per cent. In the year 
2001 a civil servant’s average monthly salary in Russia amounted to 4,800 roubles 
(approx. $180) (Federal programme “Reform of the Civil Service of the Russian 
Federation”, 2002). Various types of bonuses and allowances constituted from 35% 
of the total amount of compensation for mid and low level civil servants and up to 
200% for high level officials.   
One of the declared priorities of the programme of reform of the Russian 
civil service (adopted in 2002) was introduction of a performance based pay. By 
2007 these plans had resulted in a number of experiments in selected ministries and 
regions. As in the past, the level of compensation of the majority of civil servants 
does not depend directly on the results achieved. There exists substantial 
differentiation in the level of civil servants’ compensation across the various regions 
of Russia.  
In the years 2004–2006 the average pay (remuneration) of civil servants in 
the federal government structures has grown over 100%. In 2006 average monthly 
remuneration of federal civil service employees was estimated to be 13,425 roubles 
(approx. USD 500). This is higher than general Russia monthly average of 10,728 
roubles ("Kommersant Daily", 27 March 2007). Average monthly pay of a Moscow 
based federal civil servant was 24,124 roubles (approx. 800 USD) in 2006 (ibid). 
The pay of top level civil servants (heads and deputy heads of departments, 
deputy ministers) has been raised from 300% to 500% for the same period. It is 
noteworthy that the base-salary, transparent to society and the tax service, was not 
increased significantly in comparison with various types of bonuses (Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, 6 February 2006).   
Federal Law No. 79 “On the State Civil Service in the Russian Federation” 
adopted in the year 2004 and in force as of 1 February 2005 stipulates that “The pay 
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of a civil servant shall include the monthly civil servant's salary in accordance with 
the occupied civil service position and the monthly civil servant's allowance in 
accordance with the assigned civil service class ranking, which shall jointly make up 
the monthly pay of a civil servant, and monthly or other additional payments” 
(Article 50 of the Law). 
The same article refers to six types of additional payments covering: length 
of service (monthly increment to base salary up to 30%); special work conditions 
(monthly increment to base salary  up to 200%); working with state secret data (as 
established by the legislation of the RF); bonuses for completing especially 
important and difficult tasks (no maximum limit shall apply); monthly bonuses; 
lump-sum payment upon granting of annual paid vacation; and financial assistance 
paid from the civil servants payroll fund. 
The Law also sets out some novelties. In particular the law rules that for 
specific civil service positions, special compensation terms may be established, with 
such compensation paid depending on professional service performance and 
efficiency indicators specified in the fixed-term service contract.  
Compression ratio in the Russian civil service is estimated by various 
sources to have been around 1/3-1/4.  
The new Law has left discretionary allowances virtually undisturbed and 
they keep on occupying a significant part of a civil servant’s take home pay. This 
undermines considerably the spirit of reform and will continue to feed up patronage 
and politicisation of the Russian civil service.  
 According to the official statistics state administration related expenses 
amounted to 2.8% of the overall expenditure part of the federal budget in 2004 
(Federal State Statistics Service, 2005).    
 
 
7.4    Representativeness 
Representativeness appears to be a term which is associated with a wide 
range of ideas, views and policies. To a considerable extent this may be explained by 
marked differences in political, societal and administrative values typical of various 
country specific settings (Meer & Roborgh, 1996:119). These values have a 
profound impact on the development and function of civil service systems in 
respective societies.  
The study of representativeness in a particular environment helps to 
understand some important elements of the system of governance and specifically 
relationships between “the rulers and the ruled”. “Representativeness must be viewed 
against the background of basic concepts of the raison d’etre of the state and more 
specifically the changing relationship between the population and the state” (Meer & 
Roborgh, 1996:121).   
Proceeding from the above reflections we will consider the status of 
representativeness in the Czech Republic and the Russian Federation above all from 
the point of view of : 
a) demographic (gender, religion, language, ethnicity, educational 
background) composition;  
b) equal opportunity (the degree the recruitment process to the civil service is 
impartial and based upon functional and standard criteria);  
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c) interest representation (extent to which particular groups of civil servants 
act as sponsors of interest groups);  
d) responsiveness and accountability to external actors as important elements 
of representativeness. 
 
The analysis of these elements and characteristics of representativeness 
provides insight into the extent of legitimacy of civil service and control of civil 
servants by society. The idea is that acceptance and control of administrative 
activities will increase when the composition of civil service more or less 
corresponds to that of society in terms of its demographic composition, opinions and 
interests (Meer & Roborgh, 1996:123). In essence representativeness may serve as a 
factor containing possible abuse of power by civil servants.  
Extent of responsiveness and accountability are crucial for grasping the 
relationship between citizens and civil service. It is also essential to find out to whom 
accountability and responsiveness are exercised: to society, to a particular societal 
group, to a party, to government or to president.  
 
7.4.1  Demographic Representation - Czech Republic 
Available and scarce data lead to the conclusion that there is no large 
discrepancy between the demographic composition of the Czech civil service and the 
rest of the society as far as nationality, religious affiliation and language are 
concerned. For obvious reasons the civil service personnel is more educated than 
many other social groups in the society. Expert opinions indicate also that 
representation of the younger generation in the Czech civil service is lower than its 
part in the composition of the Czech entire population. Problems in recruiting young 
staff stem generally from the rather low prestige of the civil service and numerous 
opportunities appearing in the more lucrative private sector.  
The ages pyramid in the Czech civil service shows a deficit of the officials 
aged 30-45 years (SIGMA, 2003:8). This means that that the Czech civil service will 
face a serious problem of finding a skilled replacement for a considerable amount of 
experienced cadres who will retire in the coming 5-10 years.   
In the Czech public administration women considerably outnumber men: 
300,000 against 73,000 persons respectively (Czech Statistical Office, 2005).  
However, at the top level positions women are seriously underrepresented. Average 
age of women occupying positions of managers in the public and defence sector is 
42.6 years whilst the age of men in comparable positions is 46.3 years (Krause, 
2005:30).  
 
7.4.2   Demographic Representation - Russian Federation 
In 2002 the average age of civil servants in the Russian civil service was 40 
years (Federal programme “Reform of the Civil Service of the Russian Federation”, 
2002:5). The existing gender and age structure of civil service personnel has a 
number of peculiarities which distinguish it from the gender and age structure of 
Russia’s employed population. 
In the same year 2002 women accounted for over 70 percent of all civil 
servants including 71.8 percent in executive bodies, 67.6 percent in administrations 
of judicial bodies and prosecutors’ offices, 55.8 percent in administrations of 
legislative bodies, and 55.4 percent in administrations of other state bodies. The high 
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proportion of women in the civil service is explained by their prevalence in low and 
mid level positions in state administration (Federal programme “Reform of the Civil 
Service of the Russian Federation, 2002:5). Women are however seriously 
underrepresented at higher levels of civil service.  
Throughout the 1990s there was substantial deficit of young specialists in 
the civil service which persists at present though to a lesser degree. In 2002 more 
than 65% cadres in the federal civil service were over 40 years of age. It is estimated 
that within the next 10 years over half of civil servants employed in key positions 
will retire and it will be hardly possible to fill these positions with specialists 
possessing the necessary experience and professional skills (Otechestvennyie 
Zapiski, 2004 :153).   
 
7.4.3  Equal Opportunity - Czech Republic 
The Civil service Act (No. 218, 2002) includes provisions that ensure equal 
treatment of civil servants and candidates for civil service positions. In particular, it 
stipulates that: 
(1) A service authority shall be obliged to ensure equal treatment of all 
public servants as regards the conditions of their performance of service, 
remuneration and other monetary fulfilment, education and opportunities to achieve 
promotion in service, unless laid down otherwise by the law (Part 6, Chapter 1, 
article 80). 
(2) “Any discrimination of public servants whatsoever in service relations 
pursuant to this Act for the reason of race, colour of skin, sex, sexual orientation, 
language, belief and religion, political or other opinion, membership or activities in 
political parties or political movements, trade unions and other associations, 
nationality, ethnical or social origin, property, family, state of health, age, family 
status or obligations towards the family shall be prohibited. Conduct that is of a 
discriminatory nature, although not directly, but rather in its consequences, shall also 
be prohibited” (ibid). 
There is no information available as to possible serious violations of equal 
opportunity rights in the Czech Republic with regard to civil service employment 
except concern voiced by a number of non-government organisations about highly 
politicized decisions on appointment to mid and top level civil service positions.  
 
7.4.4  Equal Opportunity - Russian Federation  
The Federal Law “On the Basic Principles of the Russian Civil Service” 
adopted on 5 July 1995 provided for equal treatment of candidates for civil service 
positions. Article 21, point 2 of the law stipulated that “It is not allowed to establish 
any direct or indirect limitations or privileges for those entering the civil service 
depending on the sex, race, nationality, language, origin, property and official status, 
place of residence, lack of availability of citizenship of the subjects of the Russian 
Federation, religious affiliation, convictions, membership in public associations…..”   
Similarly the new law “On the State Civil Service of the Russian 
Federation” adopted on 27 July 2004 states in Article 4 point 21 that “Citizens of the 
Russian Federation who have reached the age of 18 years, are fluent in the official 
language of the Russian Federation and meet the relevant qualification requirements 
established by this Federal Law, shall be entitled to enroll for civil service”. 
 
 168
proportion of women in the civil service is explained by their prevalence in low and 
mid level positions in state administration (Federal programme “Reform of the Civil 
Service of the Russian Federation, 2002:5). Women are however seriously 
underrepresented at higher levels of civil service.  
Throughout the 1990s there was substantial deficit of young specialists in 
the civil service which persists at present though to a lesser degree. In 2002 more 
than 65% cadres in the federal civil service were over 40 years of age. It is estimated 
that within the next 10 years over half of civil servants employed in key positions 
will retire and it will be hardly possible to fill these positions with specialists 
possessing the necessary experience and professional skills (Otechestvennyie 
Zapiski, 2004 :153).   
 
7.4.3  Equal Opportunity - Czech Republic 
The Civil service Act (No. 218, 2002) includes provisions that ensure equal 
treatment of civil servants and candidates for civil service positions. In particular, it 
stipulates that: 
(1) A service authority shall be obliged to ensure equal treatment of all 
public servants as regards the conditions of their performance of service, 
remuneration and other monetary fulfilment, education and opportunities to achieve 
promotion in service, unless laid down otherwise by the law (Part 6, Chapter 1, 
article 80). 
(2) “Any discrimination of public servants whatsoever in service relations 
pursuant to this Act for the reason of race, colour of skin, sex, sexual orientation, 
language, belief and religion, political or other opinion, membership or activities in 
political parties or political movements, trade unions and other associations, 
nationality, ethnical or social origin, property, family, state of health, age, family 
status or obligations towards the family shall be prohibited. Conduct that is of a 
discriminatory nature, although not directly, but rather in its consequences, shall also 
be prohibited” (ibid). 
There is no information available as to possible serious violations of equal 
opportunity rights in the Czech Republic with regard to civil service employment 
except concern voiced by a number of non-government organisations about highly 
politicized decisions on appointment to mid and top level civil service positions.  
 
7.4.4  Equal Opportunity - Russian Federation  
The Federal Law “On the Basic Principles of the Russian Civil Service” 
adopted on 5 July 1995 provided for equal treatment of candidates for civil service 
positions. Article 21, point 2 of the law stipulated that “It is not allowed to establish 
any direct or indirect limitations or privileges for those entering the civil service 
depending on the sex, race, nationality, language, origin, property and official status, 
place of residence, lack of availability of citizenship of the subjects of the Russian 
Federation, religious affiliation, convictions, membership in public associations…..”   
Similarly the new law “On the State Civil Service of the Russian 
Federation” adopted on 27 July 2004 states in Article 4 point 21 that “Citizens of the 
Russian Federation who have reached the age of 18 years, are fluent in the official 
language of the Russian Federation and meet the relevant qualification requirements 
established by this Federal Law, shall be entitled to enroll for civil service”. 
  169
In practice there are known cases of violation of the existing legislation 
where regional authorities have introduced additional criteria for those seeking jobs 
in the civil service. For example, candidates for civil service positions in the 
Republic of Tatarstan are required to demonstrate knowledge of the Tatar language.   
 
7.4.5  Interest Representation - Czech Republic 
Analysis of opinions and information from various sources provides 
sufficient ground for claims that many Czech government officials still think that 
citizens exist for them, not the other way round (NTF, 1998: 6-2). The image of civil 
servants in the Czech Republic is generally not favourable. According to the survey 
conducted in 2007 by an independent research agency most frequent association 
evoked by an average Czech state official among its compatriots is that of “an 
unpleasant arrogant person” (Westminster, 2007).  
In the absence of clearly articulated policy objectives, mission statements 
and sound legal framework Czech civil servants have been often either unaware of 
the possible “conflict of interest” or under no bounding pressure to observe its 
principles. “The policy missions of the public administration have not been clearly 
defined to incorporate citizens’ needs and rights, and competition and market 
openness principles” (OECD, 2001 : 136). 
There is enough evidence to conclude that “defence of corporate and vested 
interests” is by no means an exceptional and rare phenomena particularly among 
Czech high ranking civil servants. “It is quite usual that people leave positions in 
high politics or state administration directly to top level positions in big companies 
or consultancy firms – often those that belonged to the field of their competence” 
(Konopasek, 2002:21). 
Even so, examples of institutions which are regarded as exemplary in 
defending citizens’ rights and interests do exist in the Czech Republic. According to 
official statistics during the period 2000–2004 the institution of Ombudsman has 
dealt with over 14,000 citizens’ complaints. Of these there was resolution in half the 
cases and the remaining 7000 were provided with legal advice. Opinion polls 
conducted in 2004 showed that Mr. Motejl, the Czech Ombudsman, was the second 
most trusted public figure in the country. With a 53% approval rating he was second 
only to the President and considered more trustworthy than any cabinet minister 
including the Prime minister (Radio Prague 14 October 2004). 
 
7.4.6  Interest Representation - Russian Federation 
Since the times of the tsars and emperors the Russian bureaucracy has been 
known for its readiness to serve the powerful and disregard the needs and interests of 
ordinary citizens. These traditions have largely survived till present in spite of 
fundamental changes in the political and economic system of the country.  
Successful career advance of a Russian civil servant often depends on the 
external support provided by a “sponsor” - usually a commercial entity or a “patron” 
which could be an influential politician or high ranking official (Afanasyev, 1998). 
Whose interests are promoted and defended by these civil servants is clear enough.   
The whole post-communist experience of Russia shows that it is quite 
difficult to move away from the Soviet concept of the person serving the state (in 
essence serving the political elite) to the democratic principle of the state serving the 
person.  
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In addition, civil service practices in recent years have provided numerous 
examples when the corporate interest of the bureaucracy prevailed over the interests 
of the state and society.  
Finally, in the atmosphere of endemic corruption many civil servants have 
actually “commercialized” their civil service posts. The phenomenon of extracting 
the so called “status rent’ by state officials out of their ‘special’ relations with 
businesses is widely spread and has been criticized by President Putin on numerous 
occasions. In goes without saying that in such a situation the principal objective and 
interest of a civil servant remains the size of the “profit” he/she can acquire.   
Within the framework of current civil service reform, measures to 
strengthen impartial execution of the policy by civil servants and eliminate 
possibilities for arbitrary use of public authority have been neither consistent nor 
effective.  
 
7.4.7  Accountability - Czech Republic 
As we have already pointed out in Chapter V there does not exist a precise 
term for the word ‘accountability’ in the Czech language.  “Public accountability 
does not have a simple and well-established equivalent in the Czech language” 
(Konopasek,  2002:7). 
The findings of one of the projects financed by the European Commission in 
the Czech Republic acknowledge that “Responsibility (accountability) of state 
officials exists vertically, but not horizontally. From the point of view of citizens it 
does not exist at all” (Phare, 2000:7). Similarly, a World Bank publication states that 
“institutional arrangements to hold public servants and government agencies 
accountable are weak in the Czech Republic” (World Bank 1999:71).  
According to a report on public accountability in the Czech Republic at the 
beginning of the post-communist transformation “political leaders enjoyed 
unquestioned legitimacy and emphasized economic aspects of the reform. The 
reforms of regulatory frameworks and of control mechanisms were delayed. The 
delay, together with a lack of competence and easy access to huge financial 
resources, led to proliferation of corruption, economic crime and loss of trust of the 
public as well as of foreign entrepreneurs. Despite current effort, results of the fight 
against frauds and corruption have not been convincing” (Konopasek, 2002:3). The 
same author argues that weak accountability of Czech politicians and public 
authorities resulted in such phenomena as uncontrolled links between politics and 
business, power monopoly of the two most influential political parties based on so 
called Opposition Treaty, the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993, non-transparent 
privatization, lagging and protracted reform of civil service, corruption in public 
administration, and inefficient law enforcement.  
The Administrative Procedure Act (1967) protects to a certain extent 
citizens’ rights of appeal and specifies duties to citizens of public administration 
representatives in such cases. However the Act does not apply to all administrative 
decisions which have impact on individuals. The accountability mechanisms of the 
bureaucracy envisaged by the Act are weak and appeals procedures are costly 
(OECD, 2001:52).   
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7.4.8  Accountability - Russian Federation 
In spite of profound changes in the country’s political system since the late 
1980s effective control over state administration by the society is largely absent. To 
a considerable extent the bureaucracy does not bear external responsibility for its 
actions or lack of actions and hence is under no real pressure to improve 
performance and responsibility. In the opinion of M. Dmitriev, Russia's former first 
deputy minister for economic development, "the administration was never 
accountable to the general public" ("International Herald Tribune", 19 July 2006). In 
the post-communist Russia the state administration was freed from the former strict 
control by the party and in the absence of effective accountability distanced itself 
further from society (Obolonsky, 1999:308). 
As before, “decisions in the executive branch in essence are taken 
collectively, nobody carries personal responsibility” (Otechestvenyie Zapiski, 
2004:86). Systematic arrangements to hold public servants accountable for their 
performance are largely absent (World Bank, 2002:16).  
Furthermore, in the atmosphere of entrenched patronage, responsibility and 
accountability of civil servants to society and citizens has been replaced by 
accountability to those who granted them their civil service posts. Only 15 percent of 
the Russian civil servants consider control by civil society as effective means of 
improving civil service activities (RACS, 2003:16).  
Introduction of citizens’ right to a pre-judicial appeal against an 
administrative ruling has been one of the administrative reform objectives. However, 
the process of elaboration and approval of respective legislation has been very slow. 
There are concerns that this legislation may repeat the fate of the draft law “On 
Access to Information about Government Activities” which was prepared in 2002 
and has been circulating since then along the corridors of power without notable 
advance to the final approval (Dmitriev, 2004).   
 
 
7.5    Politicization  
This section deals with the extent of demarcation, interdependence and 
influence between politics and administration. The processes of politicization of 
bureaucracy and bureaucratization of politics are known for having exerted a notable 
influence on the development and functioning of civil services in various countries. 
“Politics shapes administration and administration shapes politics” (Toonen, 
2001:183).  
Politicization usually refers to levels and types of political activity 
undertaken by civil servants and attempts by others to politically influence the 
behavior of civil servants (Aberbach and Rockman, 1987). It is generally 
acknowledged that the impact of politicization of the civil services has been 
particularly strong in the post-communist countries. Below we will consider the 
situation in this respect in the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic.      
 
7.5.1   Politicization - Czech Republic 
In the Czech Republic legally defined distinction between political 
appointments and career civil servants has been absent for quite a long time. “This 
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absence (of legal distinction between political appointments and civil servants – 
A.K.) undermines professionalism of the staff and encourages civil servants to be 
politically focused and discourages them from being responsive to cross-cutting and 
medium term objectives” (Jalovecká, 2005:9). 
The Czech post-communist experience shows that political parties that won 
elections offered public service positions to their supporters and provided benefits to 
these collaborators in the form of access to various government posts and services. 
More importantly, often the new governments acted as clients of the patrons who 
helped the governing parties win elections.     
High level of politicization of the Czech civil service to a considerable 
extent determines actual conduct, attitudes and values of many civil servants who 
“toss about in conflict between their careers and their pretended loyalty to political 
parties in hope of getting lifelong privileges for their merits” (Potucek, 2002:48). 
A SIGMA/OECD report on the Czech Republic emphasizes “the system 
allows politicians to create political clienteles within the administration in an 
unrestricted way, as there are no legally established limits for political involvement 
of civil servants” (SIGMA, 2003:10). 
In the opinion of Danish experts L Moller and O Norgaard, who studied 
reform capacity of the Czech and Hungarian telecom administrations, many 
problems in the development of the Czech telecom industry could be explained by 
the fact that, contrary to Hungary, most important positions in the management of the 
Czech telecom industry were filled in by politically appointed officials (Moller and 
Norgaard, 2002:17).  
Overall “the unsatisfactory status of the Czech state administration reflects 
negative implications of long-term political interference in its affairs” (Onisko, 
2000:36).   
 
7.5.2    Politicisation - Russian Federation 
The values, norms and traditions of governance and public administration 
existing in Russia favour the creation of a civil service which remains an obedient 
tool in the hands of the political elite. Total subordination of the state administration 
to the political authority is deeply rooted in Russia and dates back to the period of 
the establishment of unified Russian state. A former high ranking Russian official 
observed "Since the formation of a centralized state about 800 years ago, bureaucrats 
have mainly served the country's leaders, not its people. And they have been 
anything but civil." ("International Herald Tribune" 19 July 2006).  
Differentiation into political and career tenure posts in the Russian civil 
service has not been always clear-cut. As a rule, top level civil servants find 
themselves very close to the policy making process and establish partisan links with 
the ruling political elite. Almost common practice is involvement of civil servants in 
the elections campaigns of governors, mayors, heads of administration, and deputies 
to the Parliament. For instance, a number of federal agencies were providing active 
indirect support to the pro-government party "Our Home Russia" during 1995 
Parliamentary election campaign. Moreover, the principle of “non-partisanship” was 
dropped in the new Law “On the State Civil Service of the Russian Federation” 
adopted in 2004. 
Changes of political leaders, government, party or coalition in power as a 
rule have a direct impact on the civil service cadre. “The political nature of 
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administration and dependency on individual directors make the position of civil 
servants unstable. The weakness of a merit-based system and staff instability 
partially explain the unprofessional features in administrative operations and 
unpredictability of the results. These features particularly derive from the fact that 
career officials are also often replaced on political grounds.” (Larjavaara, 2001:16). 
On the other hand the bureaucracy in Russia retains a considerable policy 
making capacity and continues to be a major player in selecting and supporting 
candidates for key political posts. In Russia the strength and influence of a politician 
are determined to a considerable extent by the number of high-ranking supporters 
he/she has in key administrative positions.  
 
 
7.6   Public Opinion  
This section comprises an overview of the dominant perception of the 
Russian and Czech civil services and civil servants prevailing among the public and 
citizens. Accent has been made on the general (based on the prevailing society 
opinions and stereotypes) and individual (based on personal encounters) perceptions 
of civil servants.   
 
7.6.1   Public Opinion - Czech Republic 
At present the attitude of Czech citizens to state and government institutions 
can be characterized as a certain crisis of trust. The social distance between citizens 
and the state administration appears to have grown in recent years and in some cases 
has become critical.  
Throughout the 1990s the prestige of the Czech civil service in the Czech 
society was rather low. The dominant public opinion was that the number of civil 
servants was excessive, they were ineffective and too many of them took bribes. An 
opinion poll carried out in 2000 in the Czech Republic by Transparency 
International, an organisation dealing with corruption, showed that one third of those 
polled thought that without bribes the Czech state administration would cease to 
function. Twenty four percent of respondents admitted that in the past three years 
they had been in a situation where a bribe was expected. (Radio Prague, 14 February 
2001).  
There does not exist big difference in perception of civil servants at general 
and individual levels. In a survey conducted by the IVVM (non government research 
institute) in March 1998, 48% of interviewees stated that they had met with an unjust 
decision of the authorities. Negative experience was expressed primarily by people 
of productive age, with higher education and by entrepreneurs (Public Management 
Forum, 1999). 
 
7.6.2    Public Opinion - Russian Federation 
In Russia the image of civil servants has been shaped for years by such wide 
spread phenomena as corruption and their arbitrariness towards citizens. In the 1990s 
the distance between civil society and the state administration is reported to have 
grown further. In mass consciousness civil servant continues to be associated with 
“the powers that be” and is counter-opposed to common people (RACS, 2005:36).  
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7.6.1   Public Opinion - Czech Republic 
At present the attitude of Czech citizens to state and government institutions 
can be characterized as a certain crisis of trust. The social distance between citizens 
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7.6.2    Public Opinion - Russian Federation 
In Russia the image of civil servants has been shaped for years by such wide 
spread phenomena as corruption and their arbitrariness towards citizens. In the 1990s 
the distance between civil society and the state administration is reported to have 
grown further. In mass consciousness civil servant continues to be associated with 
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The survey conducted in 2004 by the Foundation “Public Opinion” among 
citizens of various regions in Russia revealed that 71% of respondents assessed civil 
servants’ activities highly negatively (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 June 2006). Only 
15% of the interviewed held the view that civil servants now work better than 15-20 
years ago and almost 50% thought that they worked definitely worse. However, 70% 
agreed that to be a civil servant was prestigious (a stark change compared to the 
situation 8-10 years ago).  
Results of the poll conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian 
Academy of Science in 2005 show that half of the population (49,9%) share opinion 
that corruption among the national economic and political elite constitutes the main 
obstacle to rapid economic advance of the country (Russian Academy of Sciences, 
2005:8).  
 Findings of another poll revealed that only 18% of respondents 
(representing various groups of the population) could explain what civil service 
reform was about, 40% had heard something and 39% learnt about it for the first 
time (RACS, 2005:37).  
 
 
7.7 Conclusions  
The findings of our analysis conducted in line with the selected 
methodology for comparative studies (Protocol for comparative studies of national 
civil service systems) enable making some significant conclusions concerning the 
studied aspects of the civil service systems in the Russian Federation and the Czech 
Republic. They also allow identify commonalities and distinctions in the key 
characteristics of the two civil service systems. 
The two civil service systems have certain common features which 
distinguish them from modern administrative systems in the majority of EC member 
states. In comparison to many states with developed institutional systems we have 
established that the Russian and Czech civil service systems possess the following 
peculiarities in common:  
- modern principles of performance based remuneration of civil servants are 
largely absent;   
- the part of civil servants’ earnings comprising allowances and supplements 
compared to basic salary is considerably higher than respective ratio in civil 
services of most industrially developed countries;  
- the heads of units have large discretionary power in determining take home 
pay of their subordinates; 
- appointment to civil service positions on a competitive basis has been an 
exception rather than a rule (often competition is formal with the decision 
already known before it starts);   
- modern and detailed job descriptions have been almost entirely absent until 
recent reform efforts;  
- the level of corruption is much higher in comparison with both EC and CEE 
average;   
- civil servants salaries have been absolutely not competitive with salaries of 
respective positions in the private sector;  
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- the start of most institutional reforms in Russia and the Czech Republic has 
been delayed as compared to the majority of  advanced CEE countries;  
- training of civil servants has been underfinanced and exposure to best 
practice has been limited; 
- promotion and recruitment to high level posts in the Czech and Russian 
civil services are highly politicized; there are practically no restrictions to 
penetration of party politics into the activities of civil service; this 
undermines principles of impartiality and professional independence of civil 
servants;  
- there is crisis of trust of citizens in relation to central state administration 
and government; 
- there has been a remarkable similarity in the growth of overall number of  
public administration employees in both Russia and the Czech Republic in 
the 1990s - roughly 1.8 times over a decade (1993 – 2003);   
- the quality and level of professionalism of civil service in both Russia and 
the Czech Republic have dropped considerably since the late 1980s; 
- performance orientation and accountability to the society and various 
stakeholder groups are underdeveloped in both civil services; 
- enforcement of civil service legislation is generally weak and ineffective;  
- there has not existed sufficient integrity and uniformity of both civil service 
systems ( e.g. until recently no single employer countrywide).   
 
We have identified also definite variations between the two civil service systems:    
 
- from the legal point of view there was no civil service in the Czech 
Republic until 2002 whereas in Russia it exists since 1993; 
- there was no central training institution for civil servants in the Czech 
Republic (except for municipal servants) until 2002 whereas the Russian 
Academy of Civil Service was established in 1995; 
- although far from exemplary the effectiveness of the Czech government’s 
activities has been overall higher than that of the Russian government;   
- the Czech civil service system has started moving towards a mixed model 
with elements of both position based and tenure system (Civil service Act 
2002), whereas the Russian system is much more oriented towards 
incorporating strong elements of career (tenure) system, though some 
innovations, like introduction of short term contracts, are envisaged by the 
new Law (2004);  
- re-training of civil servants has been generally more regular and better 
organized  in Russia compared to the Czech Republic; 
- although in terms of overall number of the public sector and civil service 
employees the Czech Republic and Russia do not stand out much from 
other industrialized nations they are to a considerable extent different in two 
respects: a) the Czech central state administration appears to be relatively 
(per cent to the population) largest in size; and b) Russian public sector 
employees in health and education sectors appear to outnumber respective 
employees in other countries as per cent to the population;     
- corruption in the Russian state administration appears to have adopted a 
greater scale than in the Czech state administration, though it continues to 
be a serious problem in the latter.     
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These are major observations concerning key features typical of the Russian 
and the Czech civil service systems. Overall there appears to be more similarities 
than differences in the Russian and Czech civil service systems as far as their basic 
characteristics are concerned. Neither Russian nor Czech civil service fits well either 
of the two types of civil service systems – classical Weberian or modern professional 
and responsible civil service.  
Our research has identified clear deficit of meritocratic principles in the 
organization and functioning of the two civil service systems. Lack of proper 
attention to the enforcement of these principles encourages political allegiance and 
patronage and at the same time undermines professionalism, impartiality and 
external accountability of the Russian and the Czech civil services. 
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CHAPTER VIII  
COMPARISON OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS IN RUSSIA AND 
THE CZECH REPUBLIC: DYNAMICS, DIMENSIONS AND 
EXPLANATORY FACTORS   
 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
Our methodological approach presupposes that the process of institutional 
change is subject to the influence of numerous endogenous and exogenous factors. 
In line with this approach we intend in this chapter to highlight those factors which 
have had a distinct, often decisive, impact on the initiation and implementation of 
civil service reforms in each of the selected countries. 
The study of civil service systems and reforms in the Russian Federation 
and the Czech Republic carried out in the previous chapters allows define factors 
which have performed as either intervening or determining variables. The 
identification and analysis of these factors is important for understanding the 
dynamics of the reform, the encountered difficulties and results achieved so far. It is 
also crucial for the appropriate comparison of the two reforms and exploration of the 
causes of possible commonalities and differences in reform implementation between 
the two countries. 
The above mentioned factors have been divided into two large groups - 
intra bureaucracy and extra bureaucracy factors. This division is entirely 
conventional and serves mainly the purpose of logical presentation of the research 
inferences.  
First, we look at the factors “arising from within the system” or “linked to 
the logic of reform preparation and development”. These include clientelistic and 
patronage networks, corruption, bureaucratic resistance, administrative traditions 
and culture, mislaid reform priorities and inadequate preparation of reform. 
Secondly, we examine a range of “external influences” such as constitutional and 
political framework, economic environment, historical legacy, politicization of civil 
service, budgetary constraints, political leadership and civil society, and impact of 
“imported” ideas and concepts.  
The second part of the chapter deals with the comparison of civil service 
reforms in Russia and the Czech Republic. Particular emphasis is made on matching 
capacities for reform, reforms’ dimensions and dynamics, driving forces, 
implementation constraints and results achieved so far. Similarities and distinctions 
across the range of raised issues are separated out and preliminary findings as to the 
impact of selected variables on the processes of reform preparation and 
implementation are developed and summarized.  
 
 
8.2 Intra Bureaucracy Factors 
8.2.1   Resistance of the Bureaucracy  
Taking into account some principal features of the bureaucracy in general 
and of state bureaucracies in Russia and the Czech Republic in particular (as 
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described in the previous chapters), it is unlikely that most civil servants in these 
countries will support reforms meant to expose them to public scrutiny, enhance 
accountability, reduce discretionary power and rent seeking opportunities.  
It is not easy to substantiate any judgment about the extent of bureaucratic 
resistance by empirical data since such resistance is always either hidden or masked. 
Therefore, conclusions are usually based on close observation of behavior, indirect 
evidence, questioning of experts and thoroughly prepared interviews of civil 
servants.  
One of the useful instruments in this respect is the measure the civil service 
reform is accepted or approved by civil servants and this can be identified through 
various surveys.    
Such a survey was conducted in November 2003 by the Russian Academy 
of Civil Service (RACS). It shows that only 11% of interviewed civil servants were 
ready to fully support administrative and civil service reforms, 79% were ready to 
do it only partially and 8.5% were not supportive of the reform. (RACS, 2003:17).  
Another indicator is the reluctance of state administrators to accept 
improvements and measures outlined in the proposed reform concept and 
programme. Quite demonstrative is the extent some radical innovations contained in 
the draft Russian law ‘On State Civil Service of the RF’ (the law was finally adopted 
in July 2004) have been cancelled, distorted or ignored at different stages of the 
approval and implementation of this legal act. For example, the mandatory 
requirement to hold competition, when a civil servant vacancy needs to be filled in, 
contained in the first draft of the Law, was complemented by numerous exceptions 
in the final document. Another well known case concerns a draft law “On Access to 
Information about Government Activities” prepared in 2002 and since then 
circulating along the corridors of power without any tangible advance to final 
approval (Dmitriev, 2004).  
It is noteworthy that the Russian Federation’s economic and social 
development strategy for the period of 2000-2010 elaborated in the late 1990s by the 
Gref’s Center of Strategic Studies included also a section on the strategy of reform 
of state governance. However, this section was the only (!) part of this 
comprehensive document, which was not made public (Zaitseva, ed. 2003:58).  
The World Bank’s report stresses “All earlier reform efforts (over the last 
12 years) have been comprehensively blocked by the bureaucracy they were meant 
to reform” (World Bank, 2004:24). Perhaps most convincing evidence comes from 
the highest authority – the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin, who 
acknowledged in his Presidential address to the Federal Assembly in 2002 that the 
country’s huge potential was blocked by the cumbersome, inert and inefficient 
government bureaucracy and that officialdom resisted reforms (Otechestvennyie 
Zapiski, 2004:111).  
In many ways a similar situation, as far as “rejection” of reform is 
concerned, though with its own peculiarities, has existed in the Czech Republic.  
This can be well illustrated by both delays in implementing the civil service reform 
programme and by surveys of Czech civil servants and Czech citizens. 
Postponement of the full enforcement of the Civil service Act (adopted in 2002) till 
2005, then to 2007 and then to 2009 can serve as a clear signal of non-acceptance of 
the reform by both politicians and top bureaucrats. One of the reform documents 
described it in the following way: “Current attitude of the state officials is rather 
illustrative of the method of “passive resistance” towards reform efforts in central 
 
 178
described in the previous chapters), it is unlikely that most civil servants in these 
countries will support reforms meant to expose them to public scrutiny, enhance 
accountability, reduce discretionary power and rent seeking opportunities.  
It is not easy to substantiate any judgment about the extent of bureaucratic 
resistance by empirical data since such resistance is always either hidden or masked. 
Therefore, conclusions are usually based on close observation of behavior, indirect 
evidence, questioning of experts and thoroughly prepared interviews of civil 
servants.  
One of the useful instruments in this respect is the measure the civil service 
reform is accepted or approved by civil servants and this can be identified through 
various surveys.    
Such a survey was conducted in November 2003 by the Russian Academy 
of Civil Service (RACS). It shows that only 11% of interviewed civil servants were 
ready to fully support administrative and civil service reforms, 79% were ready to 
do it only partially and 8.5% were not supportive of the reform. (RACS, 2003:17).  
Another indicator is the reluctance of state administrators to accept 
improvements and measures outlined in the proposed reform concept and 
programme. Quite demonstrative is the extent some radical innovations contained in 
the draft Russian law ‘On State Civil Service of the RF’ (the law was finally adopted 
in July 2004) have been cancelled, distorted or ignored at different stages of the 
approval and implementation of this legal act. For example, the mandatory 
requirement to hold competition, when a civil servant vacancy needs to be filled in, 
contained in the first draft of the Law, was complemented by numerous exceptions 
in the final document. Another well known case concerns a draft law “On Access to 
Information about Government Activities” prepared in 2002 and since then 
circulating along the corridors of power without any tangible advance to final 
approval (Dmitriev, 2004).  
It is noteworthy that the Russian Federation’s economic and social 
development strategy for the period of 2000-2010 elaborated in the late 1990s by the 
Gref’s Center of Strategic Studies included also a section on the strategy of reform 
of state governance. However, this section was the only (!) part of this 
comprehensive document, which was not made public (Zaitseva, ed. 2003:58).  
The World Bank’s report stresses “All earlier reform efforts (over the last 
12 years) have been comprehensively blocked by the bureaucracy they were meant 
to reform” (World Bank, 2004:24). Perhaps most convincing evidence comes from 
the highest authority – the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin, who 
acknowledged in his Presidential address to the Federal Assembly in 2002 that the 
country’s huge potential was blocked by the cumbersome, inert and inefficient 
government bureaucracy and that officialdom resisted reforms (Otechestvennyie 
Zapiski, 2004:111).  
In many ways a similar situation, as far as “rejection” of reform is 
concerned, though with its own peculiarities, has existed in the Czech Republic.  
This can be well illustrated by both delays in implementing the civil service reform 
programme and by surveys of Czech civil servants and Czech citizens. 
Postponement of the full enforcement of the Civil service Act (adopted in 2002) till 
2005, then to 2007 and then to 2009 can serve as a clear signal of non-acceptance of 
the reform by both politicians and top bureaucrats. One of the reform documents 
described it in the following way: “Current attitude of the state officials is rather 
illustrative of the method of “passive resistance” towards reform efforts in central 
  179
state administration. This attitude can in a way be understood since neither political 
leadership nor top management has given any clear signal that realisation of reform 
measures constitutes a definitive priority of the government” (Further Advance…, 
2005 point 2.3.2).            
It is noteworthy that the officials in the Czech Ministry of Interior used 
deliberately the term “modernization”, not “reform”, when they developed in 1999 a 
concept of reform at the level of central administration. According to Pavlik, the 
experts of the Ministry of Interior advocated the view that the process in question 
could be better defined using the term ‘modernisation’ especially because that 
process is step-by-step, long-term and of evolutionary character. Unlike reform, 
modernisation does not affect the substance of the system as such, but it rather 
modifies the way that it works (Pavlik, 2000:21). This idea of modernisation was in 
stark contrast with recommendations made earlier by the Czech non-government 
National Training Foundation in a comprehensive analysis of the Czech public 
administration. These recommendations called for “a complete and principal 
qualitative transformation of the public administration” (NTF, 1998: 1-3-2). Some 
authors assert that in the Czech Republic one can witness “an active fight against 
reform proposed by EU” (Scherpereel, 2002:6). 
Opposition has taken different forms. For example, reluctance of various 
governmental institutions and agencies to submit to the Czech Ministry of Interior 
proposals for devolved competencies (the former were obliged to do this within the 
frames of civil service reform – A.K.). In this connection Coombes remarked that 
transitions in Central and Eastern Europe seem “to confirm generally the 
extraordinary capacity of bureaucracy to withstand political turbulence” (Coombes, 
2002:7).  
Celebrating his first anniversary of election to the office President Putin 
told a group of journalists that the main lesson he had learnt was “the extreme 
difficulty of fighting bureaucracy” (The Observer, 8 June 2003). 
 
 
8.2.2  Problems of Reform Management   
As we have shown in the preceding chapters a civil service system is a 
complex organization made up of various elements connected by multilateral links 
and relations. Therefore, management of this organization and coordination between 
its elements is essential for effective functioning of the whole system and even more 
so for its reform.  
Inadequate or weak management appears to be one of the reasons that 
delayed or misdirected advance of civil service reform in both countries. As a rule 
weak quality management is characterized by a badly prepared start, incorrect 
diagnosis, imitation instead of innovation, hidden agendas, inconsistent approach, 
poor coordination, inability to obtain and command resources and win internal and 
external support, and absence of regular monitoring and assessment.  
Civil service reform in Russia appears to have lacked a proper mechanism 
for reform management in particular at the operational level. The Commission for 
Improvement of State Governance turned out to be an ad hoc structure having 
irregular meetings. The Civil Service Directorate in the Presidential Administration 
was assigned mainly coordinating and information gathering function and did not 
have full authority to manage the reform process. In practice the reform has been 
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implemented by single ministries and regional authorities often duplicating each 
other and experiencing lack of uniform approach to reform. The weakest points of 
reform management were poorly defined responsibility, shortage of clearly 
formulated specific targets and deadlines, sporadic monitoring of implementation 
process and actual absence of evaluation of the reform progress and achievements. 
Relevant work done in this respect by international donors could not substitute for 
comprehensive and regular assessment that should have been done by official 
authority.  
The overall approach to management of civil service reform in the Czech 
Republic evolved as more comprehensive and well thought over. The reform 
implementation mechanism was based on project management principles with 
structures and responsible persons in place and with assigned specific authority and 
responsibility: e.g. project teams and project managers, team leaders, reform 
managers in each large ministry or institution, reform steering committee and, the 
Office of the Government acting as the central management and supervision body.  
The biggest problem for reform management in the Czech Republic 
appeared to be lack of sufficient support for its mission from the political authority. 
In practice this meant that although formally the reform was led by the Head of the 
Government Office, that person often could not or did not want to resolve various 
problems and difficulties of reform implementation, in particular issues and disputes 
arising between ministries and agencies.  
Weak quality management can be explained also by scarcity of technical 
expertise in key reform areas both in Russia and the Czech Republic. There was and 
largely still is a severe shortage of experts with hands-on practical experience in 
reform design and implementation. For example, the draft Civil service Act was 
produced by two part-time experts who occasionally could get support from 
assigned functionaries representing a number of Czech ministries (Onisko, 2000:71). 
The situation was further aggravated by insufficient public relations 
activities and other measures to promote and spread information about the reform. 
The weak communications resulted in a lack or poor understanding of reform 
objectives, principles and contents even by civil servants. Findings of a survey 
conducted in 2003 by the Russian Academy of Civil Service revealed in particular, 
that less than 40% of civil servants fully understood the objectives and essence of 
civil service reform (RACS, 2004: 92). Paradoxically, there were cases in the Czech 
Republic when some of its parliamentarians made public statements about the 
necessity to launch civil service reform when it was already in a full swing.   
Interesting commonalities between the two countries can be found in the 
management of the process of reform preparation. It appears that civil service reform 
preparation and coordination centers in Russia and the Czech Republic were created 
and dissolved in a surprisingly similar manner. The Czech “Office for Legislation 
and Public Administration” (OLPA) established in 1992 soon after the formation of 
the Czech Republic was dissolved in 1996. In the Russian Federation a similar unit 
called Roskadry was created in 1991 (after the adoption of the first Constitution of 
the Russian Federation) and it was also disbanded in 1994. No sound reasoning was 
provided in either case explaining the cause of the closure. After liquidation the 
centers’ competences and functions in their entirety were handed to no other 
organisation. Therefore, for some time civil service reform preparation in both 
countries lacked a central agency with the authority and political backing to exercise 
overall leadership.  
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Reform management was also affected by general weaknesses of the 
existing systems of public administration both in the Czech Republic and Russia, 
e.g. weak level of inter-ministerial coordination (Onisko 2000, Kotchegura, 2002) 
and shortage of qualified and well trained staff (Kotchegura 2006, SIGMA 2003). 
The following example provides illustration to the overall extent of 
management and implementation constraints in particular in the Czech Republic. 
Johannsen and  Nørgaard carried out a survey of former and acting ministers and 
central government officials in 15 post-communist countries investigating the 
number of policy implementation problems they experienced. In their survey they 
confronted 888 interviewees with 8 implementation problems and later processed 
the responses to find out average frequency these problems emerged in the work of 
officials in respective countries. The returns showed in particular that only 0.7 
percent of the interviewees did not recognize any of the problems. The returns also 
demonstrated that the number of reported implementation problems varied from 
country to country. The survey results provided evidence that the state 
administration in the Czech Republic was in severe distress reporting an average of 
4.8 problems, considerably exceeding the cross-country average. For example, the 
average level of problems for Armenia was 1.6 (Johannsen and Nørgaard, 2004). 
The survey did not cover the Russian Federation but there are firm grounds to assert 
that the extent of policy implementation problems in Russia were of the same order 
as in the Czech Republic or even greater.  
Assessing the intermediary results of civil service reform the Head of the 
Inter-Agency Commission D.Medvedev admitted in an interview that “the reform 
got stuck in bureaucratic problems, in inability to organize work and activities in an 
appropriate manner” (Izvestia, 27 December 2005). Similarly, according to the Head 
of the Office of the Russian Government S. Naryshkin up to 40% of the Russian 
President’s orders and instructions are either not fulfilled by the indicated deadline, 
or are not fulfilled at all (Izvestia, 25 September 2006).  
 
 
8.2.3  Goal Displacement and Mislaid Priorities.   
Goal displacement is a frequent phenomenon in the various types of 
reforms. The public administration reform in the Czech Republic provides a good 
example as throughout the 1990s it was regarded entirely as the process of 
decentralisation and reform of the territorial government. “The issue of regional 
reform (in the Czech Republic – AK) has become almost synonymous with 
administrative reform” (World Bank, 1999:5). The reform of the Czech civil service 
“is marginal to the reform of public administration, whereas it should be its core” 
(Onisko, 2000:65). “Throughout the years the administrative reform was reduced to 
one single aspect: decentralization, manifested by the creation of regions” (Onisko, 
2000:70).  
Rather common for the two countries has also been the view that civil 
service reform is a purely legal and organizational/technical matter aimed at 
enhancing efficiency of civil servants’ activities. In line with such an approach: a) 
the reforms were reduced largely to adoption of relevant legislation; b) developing a 
proper mechanism of enforcement of the adopted legislation was considered of low 
priority; and c) the issues of civil service’s mission, its place within the existing 
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institutional setting, accountability to citizens and civil society, openness and 
transparency have became either irrelevant or marginal in practical terms.   
The NTF report states that “the public administration reform has been 
understood in the Czech Republic in a very narrow way as the setting-up of regional 
authorities and the adoption of the Civil service Act. The aims of reform, which 
would secure the compatibility of our public administration with the Western level 
are much wider and deeper, they concern the very substance of public 
administration, its role, functions and means. Therefore, it will be imperative to 
follow the vision of the desirable future development of the Czech society, economy 
and state. The decisive question is: “what kind of state do we want and what role 
should this state play in the future development of our society and country?” (NTF, 
1998 point 7-1-7).  
In Russia the civil service reform concept and programme left the issues of 
consistent and targeted fight against corruption virtually unaddressed. It is true that 
the new Law ‘On State Civil Service of the Russian Federation” introduced a 
concept of conflict of interest. Moreover, even commissions on the regulation of 
conflict of interest were set up in the majority of ministries. However, in the course 
of at least two years since the adoption of the law in 2004 not a single case has been 
reviewed by these commissions. All this was happening against the background of 
numerous reports on rocketing corruption in the state bureaucracy.   
Another example of wrongly selected priorities is manifested in the clear 
underestimation of the significance of democratization of the state administrative 
apparatus, above all in terms of making it more transparent and accountable 
externally. In fact, if we examine recently adopted Czech and Russian legislation on 
civil service we may conclude that one can find there very little concerning 
accountability of the civil service to citizens and society. Rather, there are non-
specific references to the need for ensuring transparency of the service’s activities.  
 
 
8.2.4  Inadequate Preparation of Reform  
Were the reform proposals firmly based on prior studies of the problems 
facing state administrations in Russia and the Czech Republic? If consider the period 
until the late 1990s the answer is rather negative.  
The report prepared by the Czech National Training Foundation stated “No 
real analysis and evaluation of the development of the state administration from the 
first republic up to the present has been made yet” (NTF, 1998:12). Another Czech 
source explained “One might think that elaboration of such an important law 
defining status of civil servants would have been preceded by sound quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of the state administrative personnel and comparative study of 
different analogous systems abroad, as well as by the development of various 
alternative models. In reality, this has not been done” (Onisko, 2000: 65).  
In essence preparation of civil service reform in the Czech Republic was 
carried out in a confidential manner. It was marginalized within the framework of 
public administration reform whereas it should have been its “heart”. The reform 
lacked strategy and the authors of the law progressed in “complete darkness” 
(Onisko, 2000:65).  
A similar situation in this respect existed in the Russian Federation at least 
throughout the 1990s. The preparation of the Law ‘On the Basic Principles of Civil 
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Service of the Russian Federation’ (adopted in 1995) was not preceded by a 
comprehensive study of the Russian state administration. Although the law was in 
many respects a positive step forward, it did not tackle in a consistent and robust 
manner some important issues of the development of the Russian state 
administration. Elaboration of civil service reform concept and programme was also 
done “behind closed doors”.  
Good quality assessment and analysis regarding status and problems of the 
Czech and Russian civil services finally appeared in the late 1990s. Conceptual 
documents prepared in Russia by President Yeltsin’s advisors in 1998 and in the 
Czech Republic by the National Training Foundation in the same year serve as good 
examples. However, these reports were not used at that time and were largely 
disregarded in the course of later preparation of reform programmes and legislation. 
 The same can be often said about recommendations given by donor 
agencies. For example, in 1995 SIGMA provided a detailed commentary to the draft 
Czech Civil service Act. But its conclusions were largely neglected (World Bank, 
1999:7). 
Typical of reform implementation in both countries was underestimation of 
the need for public support of reform which is one of the key factors of its success.  
In Russia the text of the concept of civil service reform was not made 
available in full to the public until almost a year after its approval by the President. 
Similarly in the Czech Republic neither citizens and NGOs, nor rank and file civil 
servants were invited to any significant degree to take part in discussing draft 
concept and other important documents of the forthcoming civil service reform. One 
of the documents prepared by a Phare project team put it this way: “Public servants 
view the reform as a purely internal matter, whereas the public (society) either does 
not understand or does not know of the benefits which the reform may bring” 
(Phare, 2000). 
    Generally preparation and execution of reform were not always well 
thought through. It is widely acknowledged that profound restructuring of the 
Russian Government in 2004 was carried out in line with international practice. But 
as a World Bank report notes it was “a very radical and risky reform, which will be 
extremely difficult to operate, particularly since it was launched with no advance 
consultation or communication. Even inside the system, most participants do not 
fully understand how it is all supposed to work in the future. Shifting boxes in 
structure charts – no matter how radically – does not by itself change the behaviour 
of individual civil servants and institutions. There have to be new incentive and 
accountability systems, and procedures for translating government restructuring into 
real administrative reform in order to achieve real improvement in performance of 
the civil service.” (World Bank, 2004:17). 
 
 
8.2.5  Corruption  
Corruption (no matter which form it takes) undermines the goals of civil 
service reforms and the mechanism of their implementation. The reform which does 
not address the issues of eradicating conditions for corruption, embezzlement and 
fraud runs high risk of failure. Raising the effectiveness and efficiency of activities 
of corrupt civil servants very often contributes to widening opportunities for their 
personal enrichment.  
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Corruption is acknowledged to be a very serious problem in Russia.  It is 
estimated that annual corruption in the state administration amounts up to USD 33 
billion (INDEM, 2002). So far, adopted anti-corruption measures have been 
ineffective. The Anti-corruption council set up by President Putin in 2003 has not 
yet shown any activity. Existing anti-corruption legislation is often ignored in 
practice. For instance, despite the mandatory requirement of holding open tenders in 
public procurement, only 51% of the state budget funds allocated for that purpose in 
2001 were distributed as a result of open tenders. (Nikolaev, 2006 :136). 
As compared to Russia the scale of corruption in the Czech Republic does 
not seem to be so extensive but according to a SIGMA report “corruption still 
remains a significant problem, having penetrated the majority of public 
administration structures at both central and regional levels” (SIGMA, 2003:13). 
The European Commission stated in one of its reports that “surveys of public 
opinion (in the Czech Republic – A.K.) show a consistent increase in the perception 
of corruption and economic crime. Concern is greatest as regards the state 
administration, the police and intelligence services, healthcare, banking and the 
political sphere” (Regular report…, 2001: 20). 
According to the results of a public opinion poll conducted in May 2001 by 
Gfk Institute (Prague), half of the population of the Czech Republic agree with the 
opinion “we live in a corrupt state” (GfK, 2001).  
A fairly remarkable illustration and an interesting similarity between Russia 
and the Czech Republic is provided by the World Bank study of the influence of 
corruption in state administration on businesses in CEE and CIS countries. It shows 
that the share of firms’ annual revenues spent on bribing officials in Russia and the 
Czech Republic is almost equal at about on average 4.5% of the companies’ annual 
income.  
The Czech Republic and Russia saw repeated scandals over party and 
election financing. In 1996 prior to the Presidential elections, the security of the 
White House (the building housing the Russian Government) intercepted five 
hundred thousand US dollars in cash brought by a representative of one of the 
Russian banks to the managers of President Yeltsin’s election campaign. As it 
turned out later the representative received a transaction of this amount in the 
Russian Ministry of Finance. 
In the Czech Republic the ruling party, the ODS, could not explain: why a 
dead Hungarian and a resident of Mauritius were its main donors during 1995-1996; 
why it concealed over 170 million Czech crowns in Switzerland; or why it received 
7.5 million crowns from Moravia Steel Plant after the company was allowed to 
lower its bid for Trinecke Zelezarne Metal Works by 300 million Czech crowns 
(Grzymala-Busse, 2001: 46).  
In the opinion of a prominent academic expert, today in Russia one can see 
a poorly controlled conglomerate of government agencies which has merged with 
big business clans in order to develop their joint financial/bureaucratic interests. As 
President Putin said once sarcastically, “the depths of the government are as deep as 
the oil and gas reserves of the Russian Federation and it is certainly true that things 
sometimes vanish there.” (Arbatov,  2007).   
Overall it can be stated that corruption considerably undermined public 
confidence in civil service reform processes in both Russia and the Czech Republic.  
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8.2.6  Clientelism and Patronage  
Clientelism denotes such social relations where personal loyalty to the 
patron prevails over democratic decision-making, professional duties and ethical 
behaviour. Our analysis has shown that clientelistic networks (widespread in the 
former socialist countries) survived political upheavals and remain the base of 
relations across state administrative institutions in many post-communist societies. 
“In Eastern Europe, clientelism - in interaction with various forms and levels of 
corruption – is becoming a stable form of social organization” (Sajo, 1998).  
Within such a framework qualifications, skills and competence have less 
significance than personal loyalty to the boss when it comes to considering 
promotion or increased remuneration. Furthermore, particularly in Russia but also in 
the Czech Republic, most top level civil servants are members of informal “teams“ 
based on political, personal, place of origin, joint studies, family and other 
affiliations (Afanasyev, 2004). The teams safeguard the individual interests of the 
team “leaders” and those loyal to them within administration. If an individual wishes 
to gain promotion and be successful in the system he should become attached to 
someone in a higher position: join the team and serve the group’s interests. 
Such a system is maintained also by existing practices and regulations. For 
example, various bonuses constitute a considerable part of pay arrangements in both 
Russian and Czech civil services and are almost entirely at the discretion of 
managers.  
Widespread clientelism creates a situation when officials have little or no 
incentives to safeguard interests of the state and citizens or promote competition in 
various spheres including career appointments. Instead, they establish personal 
relationships that are beneficial for individuals and separate companies but 
detrimental to society at large (Linkola and Luhtala, 2001:5). Such informal 
networks and practices are very often linked to vested interests, especially of those 
who profited from illegal privatization. In turn, these networks create fertile ground 
for politicization of civil services.  
According to Afanasyev, clientelistic networks have penetrated all layers of 
the Russian bureaucratic officialdom and determine to a large extent its principal 
characteristics (Afanasyev, 2004:16). Similarly in the Czech Republic “despite the 
liberal rhetoric of the past decade current Czech society is to a very large extent a 
clientelistic and corporate one. Groups of friends, acquaintances and relatives 
dominate most of the public sector, including the administration, media as well as 
public schools and academia” (Tychtl, 1999).  
This assertion is confirmed by Nunberg who wrote “In the main, 
administrative practice from the communist era has survived remarkably 
undisturbed, though, by and large, in a de-ideologized form” (Nunberg, 2000:254). 
A number of prominent experts and scholars hold the view that in the 
Russian Federation and the Czech Republic the political elite possesses some 
principal features of the “nomenclature” (a communist type bureaucracy) – above 
all, a high degree of disregard for the society. Many of them speak about 
“clientelism and pressure groups usurping the right to adjust the interpretation and 
implementation of laws, especially subordinate norms, to serve their own benefit”. 
(Potucek, 2003:48). Some experts conclude that political and administrative elites in 
Russia and the Czech Republic have merged into “le nouveau nomenclature”. A 
prominent Czech philosopher Vaclav Belohradsky points to “an arrogant new 
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political and economic nomenklatura” that was formed in the Czech Republic in the 
nineties (Central Europe Review, No.20, 2000). 
 
 
8.2.7  Mentality and Administrative Culture  
The importance of studying national mentality and administrative traditions 
can hardly be overestimated. “Behavioral traits, more than structural elements, are 
what distinguish one bureaucracy from another.” (Heady, 2001). 
Dominant mentality and administrative culture (attitude towards authority 
and citizens, prevailing qualities, values) in Russia and Czechia seem to have much 
in common since their roots stem from the heritage of a pre-communist monarchist 
past (Russian and Austrian-Hungarian Empires) and subsequent communist regimes. 
It is true that Czechoslovakia went through a period of democracy in pre-second 
world war years but the period seems to have been rather too short to have a long-
term impact.   
Among frequently mentioned typical national features are a high decree of 
conformism of the Czechs (reflected in such well-known character as Hasek’s Good 
Soldier Sveik) paralleled by generally low public demands and high degree of 
patience of the Russians.  
There still remains a basic principle of social culture and mentality 
widespread in the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic which is based on the 
view that survival is possible only by offering mutual favours. Such attitude feeds 
patronage and clientelism, the roots of which can be traced back to the times of the 
19th century monarchies ruling over the territory of both countries.   
Mass consciousness in the Czech Republic and Russia suffered a sort of 
psychological crisis in the 1990s. This was connected with feelings of lost identity 
(dissolution of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia) and realization that previously 
the most developed country in Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia) and a world 
superpower (Soviet Union, later Russia) could no longer claim their former statuses.   
Indeed, Czechoslovakia was a leading industrial state both during pre-war 
period and after the war with a relatively high standard of living as compared to 
other communist states. At present the Czech Republic is only one of several Central 
European nations often lagging behind others in some key areas of social, economic 
and political development, affected by serious economic decline in the second half 
of the 1990s and until recently (before accession) criticized frequently by EU 
officials.  
Such a situation is even more typical of Russia since the comparison of 
economic, scientific, human resources, military and other potential of the Soviet 
Union and that of present day Russian Federation reveals distortions comparable 
only to the harmful consequences of devastating wars.    
There are of course peculiarities inherent to national mentality in each of 
the countries in question. For instance, the Russian Orthodox church occupies an 
influential position in society with millions of followers. At variance to many other 
post-communist countries, Czech mentality is distinguished by weak religious 
feelings and relative immunity to ultra-nationalism.  
At present there does not seem to be a nationwide or other idea (clerical, 
nationalistic, charismatic, cultural etc.) that unites either Russian or Czech societies.   
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The typical features of the prevailing bureaucratic culture in Russia are 
demonstrated in the results of the sociological interview of Russian civil servants 
conducted in 2003. When asked what type of negative qualities are most typical of 
Russian civil servants today, the following answers were received (ranked according 
to their extent):  a) red tape; b) use of official position for personal gains; and c) 
imitation of activities (RACS, 2004 : 48). 
Commenting on the Czech state administration, Sean Hanley describes it 
(perhaps too emotionally) as the combination of Austro-Hungarian and Soviet type 
of bureaucracy “melted in one pot”, which produced a strange cocktail. “In fact, a 
more bureaucratic, bureaucratically minded nation can scarcely be imagined….the 
plain truth is that bureaucracy is as Czech as beer, Milan Kundera and Good Soldier 
Sveik” (Hanley,  1999). 
It is interesting that a survey by the Czech Academy of Sciences conducted 
in 2004 and based on interviews with civil servants from the Czech Republic and 
other EU member countries’ revealed that whereas the West European civil servants 
try to work efficiently and confront problems as they arise, “many Czech officials 
try to avoid a problem-solution approach. What they prefer to do is impute guilt on a 
third party” (Radio Prague, 31 March 2004).  
Similarly in Russia “many civil servants’ actions are directed not to achieve 
a result, but to coordinate and agree the form and contents of the document or 
decision with other bureaucrats” (Otechestvennyie Zapiski, 2004:86). Furthermore, 
recent years have provided enough evidence for the claim that there exist large 
groups of civil servants in Russia who regard their service and duties entirely from 
the point of view of rent seeking opportunities.   
Overall it may be stated that the existing administrative culture in Russia 
and the Czech Republic regards secrecy and personal loyalty as a virtue. 
Responsiveness, transparency, responsibility and dialogue with citizens are viewed 
as a rule as matters of secondary importance.  
 
 
8.3 Extra Bureaucracy Factors 
 
8.3.1 Politicization of Civil Service  
Proper development of the institution of civil service in Central and Eastern 
Europe faces a serious challenge of overcoming the custom of treating state 
administration as the instrument of personal or narrow group power. The habit of 
placing „their own people” in the strategic administrative positions and to exercise 
meticulous control over high ranking civil servants has been a long tradition in the 
administrative cultures of Central and Eastern European ruling elites and has largely 
survived until today.    
Indeed, recent experience shows that in many post-communist countries the 
political parties that won elections offer public service positions to their supporters 
and provide benefits to their collaborators in the form of access to various 
government posts and services. Far from exceptional are situations when the new 
governments act as clients of the patrons who helped the governing parties win 
elections.     
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The relationship and interplay between new political elites and the 
predominantly unchanged bureaucratic establishment exert serious influence on the 
process and results of civil service reform. Observation that “bureaucracy plays a 
distinctly political role during regime transitions” (Church, 1981) made with regard 
to developing countries, in our view, is highly relevant to the situation in Central and 
Eastern Europe and CIS countries.  
As a rule, change in the relationship between top civil servants on the one 
hand and politicians on the other, is most difficult because “numerous 
interconnected features of most bureaucracies require not piecemeal change but a 
revolutionary restructuring of the whole system to make major differences, and, 
because of vested interest, major restructuring will be resisted and piecemeal change 
will often be neutralized to continue to protect the interest of the bureaucrats” 
(Chandler, 2000: 258).  
The high level of politicization of state administration, absence in practice 
of standard criteria for promotion and benefits and dependency on individual 
personal ties contribute to maintaining instability within the service and shape the 
conduct, attitudes, values and objectives of politicians and civil servants in both 
countries.  
In the Czech Republic legally defined distinction between political 
appointments and career civil servants has been absent for a long time. “There is no 
clear distinction between political appointments and career positions. In case of 
political changes all the top administrative cadre is under threat of losing their 
posts.” (Onisko, 2000:21). Although in Russia such a distinction was formally 
introduced in 1995 by the Law ‘On the Basic Principles of Civil Service of the 
Russian Federation’, in practice this distinction was not always clear. Civil servants’ 
careers have been particularly vulnerable at the regional level where changes of the 
political leadership were more frequent and the scale of replacement of the civil 
service staff considerably greater. Instances of full scale reshuffle of the top and mid 
level civil servants upon arrival of a new Governor or Minister are so frequent that 
its absence may be considered exceptional. 
 “The system (in the Czech Republic - AK) allows politicians to create 
political clienteles within the administration in an unrestricted way, as there are no 
legally established limits for political involvement of civil servants” (SIGMA, 
2003:10). “All employees (in the Czech state administration –AK) appear to work 
under a cloud of uncertainty regarding the security of their posts, which seems to 
increase after major political changes and to be greater the higher one’s position” 
(World Bank, 1999:81).  This is particularly true with regard to top level officials, 
who are often replaced after each elections (Onisko, 2000:21).    
The situation in Russia in this respect is no better as compared to the Czech 
Republic. For example, there have been numerous cases of using the so called 
“administrative resource” by the leading political parties during the elections 
campaigns both at the federal and regional levels. Illustrative in this sense is the new 
law ‘On the State Civil Service of the Russian Federation’ adopted in 2004. 
Contrary to the provisions of the previous law (adopted in 1995) the text of the new 
law does not contain the requirement of de-partisanship of the civil service.  
In connection with this quite interesting are the results of a survey of the 
Czech and Russian civil servants conducted in the Czech Republic and Russia. The 
survey was carried out in the Czech Republic by R. King (King, 2001) and in the 
Russian Federation by the author of this study using the same questionnaire (in 
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reduced form in Russia – A.K.). Nineteen Russian and nineteen Czech civil servants 
were interviewed representing various government ministries and agencies at central 
and regional level. Around 85 percent of interviewees had more than five years of 
service record. The findings of the survey reveal high level of politicization of both 
Russian and Czech civil services – over 90% of the responses point clearly to high 
politicization of both civil services.  
The following tables provide data on the responses to a number of key 
questions of the survey:  
 
In your country civil service 
and politics are kept separate?   
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Yes  2 - 
No  17 19 
   
 
 
In your country change in 
Government entails 
replacement of some career 
civil servants? 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Yes  17 19 
No  2 - 
 
 
Protection of civil  service from 
direct political interference is   
 Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Not important - - 
Important 11 - 
Very important 8 19 
 
It should be noted that whereas in the Czech Republic interviews were held 
exclusively with civil servants with over 5 years record of service, in Russia around 
10 % of interviewees possessed less than 3 years of work experience. This can be 
one of the reasons for slight deviation in responses of the Russian civil servants as 
compared to their Czech colleagues.  
 
 
8.3.2 Lack of Political Will  
It is widely acknowledged that the Russian and Czech political leadership 
demonstrated lack of political will to reform their civil services throughout most of 
the 1990s. Various reasons can be offered to explain this fact: for example, 
adherence of Prime Minister V.Klaus and some leading Russian liberal economists 
to the theory of reducing the state to minimum “since market will put everything in 
order”; or prevailing mentality and soviet-style conception that the state is for their 
ownership. These reasons can be generally accepted but only as partial explanation.  
As we have shown in previous chapters one of the principal causes of this 
unwillingness derives from the top politicians’ fear of losing control over the 
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bureaucratic establishment and undermining their client type relationship with the 
state administration’s elite. In many ways a remarkable statement was made on this 
issue by a Czech senator Edvard Outrata. Speaking in the Czech Senate on the 
question of enforcement of the new Civil service Act he said “The civil service is the 
part of our transformation process that has not yet been completed, and I see a kind 
of conspiracy running from one end of the political spectrum to the other not to 
finish it. Do you politicians really believe that you’re better off if you can 
manipulate the personnel in your offices? I tell you that you’re far worse off, 
because you won’t get expert help where you need it; you’ll get help from your 
buddies who’ve already long ago told you everything they have to say…We are 
returning to the level we thought we’d escaped in 1989. Do we really intend to 
remain stuck there?” (Wilson, 2005). 
In the case of the Czech Republic it appears that the political will has been 
absent throughout all the country’s post-communist period. The decision to launch 
civil service reform and adopt a Civil service Act was taken under consistent and 
heavy pressure from the European Commission. One of the public administration 
reform experts used the expression “battering ram” to describe the pressure from EU 
on the Czech Republic on the issue of civil service reform (Behlavy. 2002:64). It is 
interesting that after the Czech Republic joined the European Union the Czech 
authorities seem to have lost all interest in successful implementation of the civil 
service reform programme. 
Similarly in Russia, “patron-client” relations penetrating bureaucratic 
officialdom constituted a de-motivating factor for any action aimed at modernisation 
of the state administration (Afanasyev, 1998). 
The political will to launch civil service reform has emerged only following 
the election of the new President, who committed himself to transform an inefficient 
and unaccountable state administration into a modern civil service. President Putin 
did not seem to be “fascinated” by the existing patronage networks. Many of them 
were cementing the “family” of the “old guard” as was made clear from the 
opposition to his new course. Speaking about reasons that made civil service reform 
possible in Russia Gray noted that “the election of Putin…provided a window of 
opportunity for change which appeared to have been taken in the early part of 2002” 
(Gray, 2004:14). 
 
 
8.3.3 Budgetary Constrains and New Opportunities  
As we have already pointed out in Chapter II, contrary to the experience of 
many industrialized countries where civil service reforms were driven among other 
things by economic considerations, namely, intentions to reduce the cost of 
maintaining huge state bureaucracy, budgetary constraints in the post-communist 
countries appear to have impeded rather than encouraged reform initiation and 
implementation. Civil service reform overall is a quite expensive undertaking, and is 
particularly so for countries involved in large scale transformation and experiencing 
severe budget deficit. It is necessary also to bear in mind that administrative reforms 
in CEE countries are aimed at reconstructing the existing administrative system, not 
simply modernizing it. “So, the question was not only, or even primarily, one of 
downsizing, but rather one of building, instead of reforming, a functioning PA 
system, which is invariably costly” (Verheijen, 2000:41). 
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severe budget deficit. It is necessary also to bear in mind that administrative reforms 
in CEE countries are aimed at reconstructing the existing administrative system, not 
simply modernizing it. “So, the question was not only, or even primarily, one of 
downsizing, but rather one of building, instead of reforming, a functioning PA 
system, which is invariably costly” (Verheijen, 2000:41). 
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Therefore, fiscal constrains could be an important factor that reduces 
capacity for civil service reform in the post-communist countries. This factor played 
a definite role in the case of Russian and Czech reforms.   
It is noteworthy that the first draft Civil Service Law submitted to the 
Czech Government in 1993 and revised many times in 1994 granted civil servants 
considerable privileges and was strongly criticized by the Czech Ministry of 
Finance. This draft was finally abandoned in 1995 with explanations of budgetary 
restrictions (Onisko 2000:12). In explaining the decision to postpone full 
enforcement of the Civil service Act (adopted in 2002) in the Czech Republic, 
reference was also made to the shortage of funds.  
Insufficient funding of state administration resulted in situations when, for 
example, vacancies for some key positions in the Czech Institute of Public 
Administration (created in 2000) have been left open for several years. Lack of 
interest from potential candidates was caused mainly by the low compensation 
package offered.  
Throughout the 1990s the situation in Russia in this respect was even more 
deplorable. The state budget deficit and low priority attached to the conditions of 
employment of civil servants resulted in a situation when wages of Russian civil 
servants were unacceptably low especially as compared to the wages in the 
commercial sector. Low level of funding hindered hire of qualified and experienced 
local and foreign experts to assist reform preparation and implementation.     
Although fiscal constraints can not be regarded as the main factor 
explaining delays and difficulties in launching and implementing civil service 
reform (there are examples of other reforms implemented at that time in spite of 
severe budget deficit) they constituted one of the obstacles on the way of reform 
preparation and advance.   
It should be noted that the far from exemplary overall economic situation in 
both countries in particular in the second half of the 1990s has cardinally changed in 
the early 2000s in Russia. The main reason – steep increase in the price of oil on the 
world markets. Russia has benefited from this trend and improved considerably its 
financial position. For Russia this period was marked by high rate of economic 
growth and larger revenues of the state budget.  
With its budget benefit in the years 2000–2005 running at the average rate 
of about 4-5% Russia differed considerably from the Czech Republic where the 
deficit of the state budget has become permanent. However, low effectiveness of the 
budget allocations and high level of corruption have prevented Russia from using 
most efficiently this “advantage” (compared to the Czech Republic) at least in terms 
of advance of civil service reform. Furthermore, the growing flow of petro-dollars 
seems to have caused a number of unanticipated side effects. The most striking are 
the steep increase in the expenditures on the Russian state administration and growth 
of the number of civil and municipal servants.  
Experts of Troyka Dialogue consulting company have calculated that 
during the period 2002–2006 labour productivity in almost all sectors of the Russian 
economy was rising (e.g. growth in agriculture and construction up to 10-15 %); 
only in the energy and financial sectors it remained static. But labour productivity in 
the Russian state administration has fallen 7 % during the same period (Business 
Week Russia, 28 August 2006). 
From the year 2000 till 2006 overall expenditure on the Russian state 
administration has increased 11 times in nominal prices. For the same period growth 
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of allocations to the social sphere in nominal prices was only three fold. Draft state 
budget for the year 2007 envisaged further 50% (!) increase of budget spending on 
the Russian state bureaucracy (Business Week Russia, 28 August 2006). 
 The Russian Minister of Finance A.Kudrin provided the following data – 
in 2000 an increase in one dollar of the oil price on the world market led to 0.2% 
growth of Russia’s GDP, but in 2005 the same increase resulted in only 0.006% 
GDP growth. During the same period the number of civil and municipal servants in 
Russia had gone up 1.3 times and budget expenditure to support their existence had 
grown from 0.3% GDP to 1.1% GDP (ibid).   
  These data cannot fail to illustrate an interesting tendency typical at least of 
the early 2000s - the higher world oil prices and hence revenues of the state budget 
were, the more Russian state bureaucracy would expand and consume resources. We 
may also conclude here that the civil service reform in Russia has failed so far to 
reverse this trend.     
 
 
8.3.4  Constrained Political Competition  
It is commonly recognized that one of the effective instruments for 
reducing politicization and enhancing accountability of state administration is 
critical opposition:  strong opposition parties that continually threaten to 
democratically replace the government in power. Furthermore, critical opposition 
tries to force the ruling party/coalition to be consistent in implementing its 
commitments and pledges, and to effectively and timely respond to new challenges. 
Experience shows that those political leaders who lack political will to implement 
required policies often change their mind under pressure from critical opposition 
which is using various instruments (parliament, mass media, non-governmental 
organizations) to encourage appropriate decision-making. More importantly the 
existence of strong opposition reminds politicians of the inevitable accountability for 
the policies they pursue.    
“When no critical opposition monitors the government, and forces the 
creation of formal oversight and power-sharing institutions, governing parties can 
freely dispense state funds, jobs, contracts, and other resources for their own private 
benefit” (Grzymala-Busse, 2003).  
Such a situation (no critical opposition) developed gradually in the Russian 
Federation and the Czech Republic in the early 1990s. In Russia the turning point to 
elimination of effective opposition took place in 1993 when President Yeltsin 
ordered armed assault of the building of the Russian Parliament. Following this 
violent suppression of the opposition, its role since then has been limited and 
depends largely on the balance of political forces in the country and political 
preferences of the President in office.   
The situation in Russia is notably different also because the results of 
parliamentary elections have no direct impact on the formation of the government. 
The Prime-Minister is appointed by the President (later to be approved by the Duma) 
who is not strictly obliged to take into account the outcome of the elections in 
selecting candidates for this post. The same rule applies to future ministers who may 
not be chosen only from the list of representatives of the winning party/coalition. 
Besides, the system of political parties in Russia continues to remain largely in 
embryonic state.  
 
 192
of allocations to the social sphere in nominal prices was only three fold. Draft state 
budget for the year 2007 envisaged further 50% (!) increase of budget spending on 
the Russian state bureaucracy (Business Week Russia, 28 August 2006). 
 The Russian Minister of Finance A.Kudrin provided the following data – 
in 2000 an increase in one dollar of the oil price on the world market led to 0.2% 
growth of Russia’s GDP, but in 2005 the same increase resulted in only 0.006% 
GDP growth. During the same period the number of civil and municipal servants in 
Russia had gone up 1.3 times and budget expenditure to support their existence had 
grown from 0.3% GDP to 1.1% GDP (ibid).   
  These data cannot fail to illustrate an interesting tendency typical at least of 
the early 2000s - the higher world oil prices and hence revenues of the state budget 
were, the more Russian state bureaucracy would expand and consume resources. We 
may also conclude here that the civil service reform in Russia has failed so far to 
reverse this trend.     
 
 
8.3.4  Constrained Political Competition  
It is commonly recognized that one of the effective instruments for 
reducing politicization and enhancing accountability of state administration is 
critical opposition:  strong opposition parties that continually threaten to 
democratically replace the government in power. Furthermore, critical opposition 
tries to force the ruling party/coalition to be consistent in implementing its 
commitments and pledges, and to effectively and timely respond to new challenges. 
Experience shows that those political leaders who lack political will to implement 
required policies often change their mind under pressure from critical opposition 
which is using various instruments (parliament, mass media, non-governmental 
organizations) to encourage appropriate decision-making. More importantly the 
existence of strong opposition reminds politicians of the inevitable accountability for 
the policies they pursue.    
“When no critical opposition monitors the government, and forces the 
creation of formal oversight and power-sharing institutions, governing parties can 
freely dispense state funds, jobs, contracts, and other resources for their own private 
benefit” (Grzymala-Busse, 2003).  
Such a situation (no critical opposition) developed gradually in the Russian 
Federation and the Czech Republic in the early 1990s. In Russia the turning point to 
elimination of effective opposition took place in 1993 when President Yeltsin 
ordered armed assault of the building of the Russian Parliament. Following this 
violent suppression of the opposition, its role since then has been limited and 
depends largely on the balance of political forces in the country and political 
preferences of the President in office.   
The situation in Russia is notably different also because the results of 
parliamentary elections have no direct impact on the formation of the government. 
The Prime-Minister is appointed by the President (later to be approved by the Duma) 
who is not strictly obliged to take into account the outcome of the elections in 
selecting candidates for this post. The same rule applies to future ministers who may 
not be chosen only from the list of representatives of the winning party/coalition. 
Besides, the system of political parties in Russia continues to remain largely in 
embryonic state.  
  193
Opportunities for fare political competition were reduced further when in 
the early 2000s the Duma adopted a number of laws which established much stricter 
criteria for the parties wishing to be registered for elections. This move made it 
practically impossible for small and mid-size political parties to take part in 
parliamentary elections.   
In the Czech Republic the almost uncontested hegemony of the Civic 
Democratic Party – ODS (1993-1996) made it difficult to foster a genuine pluralist 
competition with clear governmental alternatives. The Social Democratic party, as 
ODS successors were hardly different in this respect The Czech political party 
system in consequence resembled an incomplete and somewhat “defective” 
pluralism (Akmiska, 2000).  
The period starting from 1997 was marked by a formal deal between two 
major parties. The so called “opposition” agreement reached between the Social 
Democrats and ODS (headed by Klaus) in 1997 stipulated that whichever of the two 
parties had won an election, the other would not support a vote of non-confidence in 
parliament. This agreement between the biggest right and left wing parties was also 
aimed at squeezing out the smaller parties from competition.  
As we can see the intentions to ensure a sort of “monopoly” position during 
the elections was typical of both Russian and Czech largest political parties.  
In essence the Czech Prime Minister V. Klaus and the Russian President B. 
Yeltsin (who both, as we indicated above, were reluctant to start genuine reform of 
state administration) were under no serious pressure (that should usually come from 
the political opposition and parliament) to modernize and reform the existing 
administrative system and bureaucratic apparatus. ”Political culture of the country 
has suffered in the last four years because the ruling coalition governed virtually 
unopposed. The ODS leaders and Klaus in particular, have tended to disregard or 
show disrespect for not only the opposition and the media but frequently to their 
coalition allies as well” (Pehe,1996 : 28). 
We may conclude that seriously weakened competition between major 
political parties and forces representing various political spectra in the Czech 
Republic and Russia was a significant factor that allowed delays in launching civil 
service reform in these countries happen.   
 
 
8.3.5 Alienation of Citizens and Weak Civil Society  
High level of alienation of citizens from the state administration and 
political leaders is one of the factors that feeds growing indifference and lack of 
motivation of citizens to engage in constructive criticism and participatory action.  
The Czech President V. Gavel speaking at the joint session of the 
Chambers of the Czech Parliament in December 1997 stressed that “growing 
number of citizens feel disgust towards politics and politicians, whom they rightly 
blame for recent failures” (Shepherd, 2000:47). In Russia the state administration, 
freed from former control by the communist party, in fact distanced itself further 
from society (Obolonsky, 1999:308). 
A paradoxical situation has arisen where new political elites have not 
developed respect for their own society. This lack of respect was occasionally 
manifested in concrete actions and contributed to mutual mistrust and the difficulty 
of the entire reform project. As an example one can refer to the separation of the 
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Soviet Union and division of Czechoslovakia which appear to have been 
accomplished against the will of the majority of citizens. According to sociological 
polls in March 1992 only 17% of the Czechs and 11% of the Slovaks supported the 
idea of division of the country into two separate states. The new Czech and Slovak 
elites “decided not to submit the deal (separation) to a popular referendum fearing 
possible rejection” (Shepherd, 2000:138).   
Similarly the leaders of three largest Soviet republics (Yeltsin, Kravchuk, 
Shushkevitch) adopted hastily a decision on dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
December 1991. They had rejected the idea of holding a referendum and ignored the 
results of referendum of March 1991 which clearly demonstrated that absolute 
majority of the population was against break up of the Soviet Union. 
The study providing results of the polls conducted by the Centre for Public 
Opinion Research at the Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences 
shows that the national elites in the Czech Republic are evaluated very critically by 
the public and this critical appraisal has only intensified in recent years.  
“Over the course of the 1990s there occurred a decline in the amount of 
confidence people have in both political parties and top politicians, and in how 
politics functions on the whole in addressing society-wide problems and asserting 
the valid interests and needs of ordinary people. The majority of the public evaluates 
the political culture and morality of the highest political representation, including its 
motivations, in very critical terms. This negative evaluation of politics in general 
and politicians in particular manifests itself in the decline in interest in public affairs 
and undoubtedly also in the falling participation in elections” (Mišovič and Tuček, 
2003:11). 
In general one of the peculiarities of the Russian and Czech transition was 
the absence of a long term and permanent interaction between the “new” political 
elite and the society at large.   
The factor of generally weak civil society in both Russia and the Czech 
Republic was clearly hindering the progress of civil service reforms. “The best 
guarantee for an improved public service is not internal administrative reforms but a 
stronger and more vibrant civil society that can hold public officials accountable” 
(Pierre 2001:181). The role of civil society was underestimated by Prime Minister 
Klaus and almost completely disregarded by President Yeltsin and the Russian 
political elite as a whole.  
Among key factors that contributed to distancing civil society from the 
state were corruptive behavior and the arbitrariness of government officials. In 
Russia the distance between civil society and the state administration is reported to 
have been steadily growing throughout the 1990s and later (Nozdrachev 1999, 
Obolonsky 1999, Larjavaara,  2001, Kotchegura 2004).  
Some experts reckon, in our view justifiably, that civil societies in Russia 
and the Czech Republic are still in a way “infantile”, meaning they are not ready to 
face responsibility. Instead they tend to look up to “charismatic” leaders from whom 
they derive self-confidence and certainty, the way children derive their self-
confidence and certainty from their parents.  
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8.3.6 Historical Legacy 
Commonalities in history between Russia and Czechia go back to the very 
early days of statehood in both countries, which geographically were parts of a 
transitional zone between the East and the West. Both nations were under foreign 
domination for several centuries. However, Russia achieved independence in the 
16th century whereas there had not been an independent Czechoslovakian state until 
the end of World War I. In Russia the state considerably pre-dates democracy. In 
Czechoslovakia democracy and national state emerged almost simultaneously.  
There are well known natural, geographical, demographical and other 
differences between the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic. One can simply 
compare, for example, the huge largely unpopulated territory inhabited by 
multinational multi-religion ethnos (Russia) and a relatively small single nation 
country (Czech Republic). On the other hand, the Russians (who make the majority 
of the population in the Russian Federation) and the Czechs belong to the same 
ethnical group – the Slavs.  
Both countries have a set of similarities explained by their recent 
communist past. A Soviet model of governance with slight variations was dominant 
in all former socialist countries. Its characteristics were the leading role adopted by 
the communist party, a socialist form of property ownership, merger of the top party 
and state officials into one ruling elite (nomenklatura), and democratic centralism as 
the key principle of public management.  
The spirit of Prague Spring with its aspirations for democratic and human 
values is still fresh in the memory of many Czechs and that makes a distinctive 
difference from the situation in Russia. Before the start of Gorbachev’s perestroika, 
Russia knew only a very limited period of democratic development which lasted six 
months after the bourgeois revolution in February 1918 to the Bolsheviks’ takeover 
in October the same year.  
But one should also remember that after suppression of the Prague Spring 
in 1968 the regime in Czechoslovakia became one of the most rigid and orthodox in 
the communist block and there were no widespread opposition movements in the 
country similar to Solidarity in Poland. The same can be said about Russia where the 
dissident movement was represented by a small group of citizens.   
By late 1991, both in Russia and in the Czech Republic, the supremacy of 
the communist party was abolished, competitive elections were fairly organized and 
held, and a form of political pluralism started to take root.     
 
 
8.3.7  Constitutional Setting  
The extent and balance of powers belonging to the President, Parliament 
and Government in the two countries proceed from the peculiarities of the form of 
state organization, political traditions and historical development. The Russian 
Federation is a parliamentary federal republic with a strong presidency and the 
Czech Republic is a unitary parliamentary republic but with rather limited powers of 
the president.  
It is noteworthy that there is certain dualism of the executive power in the 
Russian Federation since in practice it is exercised by both the President and the 
Government. The government in the Czech Republic is formed by the party or 
coalition that has won the elections whereas in the Russian Federation the results of 
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the elections to the Duma and formation of the government do not necessarily co-
relate. “The major drawback of the Russian government is that it is purely 
bureaucratic i.e. it is not formed by the winning party or coalition” (Delyagin, 2005). 
Table 8.1 demonstrates to whom belongs the authority for taking important political 
decisions in the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic.  
 
 
Table 8.1  Authority for Taking Important Political Decisions in Russia and the 
Czech Republic    
 
Political decisions and 
powers  
Russian Federation 
(reference to the text of the 
Constitution) 
 
Czech Republic 
(reference to the text of the 
Constitution) 
Dismissal of the 
Government  
By the Presidential decree or 
by the Duma through vote of 
non-confidence (Art. 117) 
Only by resolution of the 
Parliament (Art. 72, 73)  
Dissolution of the 
Parliament 
By decision of the President 
as the Head of State (Art. 
109) 
By decision of the President 
as the Head of State (Art. 35)  
Possibility of combining 
posts of a minister and a 
deputy in a parliament  
Not possible (Art. 97)   Possible (Art. 32) with some 
restrictions re. membership 
in the Parliamentary 
committees 
Rule of countersignature  No such rule. Some of the Presidential 
decrees must be signed by 
the Chairman of the 
Government or designated  
Minister 
Relations of President with 
Government  
President is empowered to 
chair meetings of the 
Government, to request 
information.(Art. 83)  
President is empowered to 
take part in meetings of the 
Government, to request 
information.(Art. 64) 
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the elections to the Duma and formation of the government do not necessarily co-
relate. “The major drawback of the Russian government is that it is purely 
bureaucratic i.e. it is not formed by the winning party or coalition” (Delyagin, 2005). 
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The above table shows that the Czech parliament generally has more 
powers than the Russian Duma. The Russian President has more authority than his 
Czech counterpart. In the Czech Republic almost all organizational and many other 
issues regarding state administration must be decided by a formal parliamentary act 
whereas in the Russian Federation this can be often resolved by the Presidential 
decree. From this point of view policy decision making in the Czech Republic as a 
rule is more protracted.   
The executive branch in both Russia and the Czech Republic appear to be 
quite influential. “We found an overall dominance of the executive as decision 
centers and that the parliaments played only a limited role – in particular in 
presidential systems” (Johansen, 2004 : 9).   
The Czech Republic differs from Russia also as far as the status and rights 
of ministers are concerned. In Prague they have had the right to be simultaneously 
deputies of the Parliament. “It is quite usual that ministers are simultaneously 
deputies in the parliament – this gives them immunity, which protects them forever” 
(Konopasek, 2002:22). 
A noteworthy distinction is that the government in the Czech Republic is 
responsible mainly to the Parliament whereas in the Russian Federation the 
government in essence is more accountable to the President. In view of the general 
weakness of political parties and domination of pro-presidential lobby in the Russian 
parliament, the nature of government in Russia tends to be more majoritarian. In the 
Czech Republic one may speak about the executive being more consensual.   
The Constitutions in the Russian Federation (1991) and the Czech Republic 
(1992) resulted from negotiations between various political forces and groupings. 
However, the current Constitution (1993) in Russia was adopted as a result of 
violent ejection by the then President of one of the groups from the political arena.  
It is interesting that two major political parties in the Czech Republic, the 
ODS and CSSD, attempted in 2001 to change the Czech Constitution and the 
electoral law to secure the two parties’ advantage in the next elections by “squeezing 
out” from the election process smaller parties, but so far have failed to do so (the 
Senate rejected the bill). A similar attempt was more successful in Russia in 2000 
when the Duma introduced much stricter criteria for parties wishing to take part in 
the elections.  
 
 
8.3.8 Political Framework  
 The political and administrative systems in the former communist countries 
provided an example of the development of uncontrolled and unaccountable party 
and state bureaucracy. The political regime in Czechoslovakia before the “velvet 
revolution” was one of the most conservative and ideologically rigid in Eastern 
Europe. In this respect it was very similar to the political regime in the Soviet 
Union. In our view this similarity is one of the key factors that explain many 
common traits of civil service development and reform in both countries.   
Following break down of the communist regimes and subsequent 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia the new political elite in these 
countries faced the task of creating new political systems with new institutions and 
functions. A list of immediate priorities included among other things: appropriate 
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distribution of state power; constructing relationships between legislative, executive 
and judicial branches; establishment of proper representation of social and regional 
interests; ensuring political stability and interface between the political elite and the 
society at large; and last but not least – creation of a new system of governance and 
formation of a new state administration.  
The reality showed that, as Coombes observed, “In most instances 
politicians and administrators in the countries concerned (Central and Eastern 
Europe – A.K.) have stubbornly refused to understand public administration in the 
more realistic but nevertheless rarely articulated western sense, as involving the 
making of decisions both politically determined and politically consequential 
(Coombes, 2004). 
Boone and Horder described the prevailing in CEE countries tendencies in 
the following way:”In the vacuum that followed political breakdown, the old elites 
and rent seekers captured the political initiative in these countries. To sustain their 
powers and sequester incomes, they issued credits and maintained distorting policies 
and, as a result, acquired enormous assets” (Boone and Horder, 1998).   
  The persistence of administrative and bureaucratic practices typical of the 
previous regimes has been complemented by preservation of generally high level of 
politicization of the state administration in these countries. The situation was further 
complicated by unstable political alliances that formed the basis of ruling coalitions 
and hence overall turbulent and unstable political environment in the majority of the 
countries in the region. The generally unstable situation was also typical of Russia in 
the 1990s but was caused mainly by the policy of President Yeltsin who often 
encouraged conflicts and competition among political competitors and his 
subordinates in order to remove potential rivals and act as an arbitrator.    
 Distinctions between the two countries in the constitutional setting and 
peculiarities of their political regimes appear to have exerted a definite influence on 
the emergence by 2007 of the differing status of civil service reform implementation 
in Russia and the Czech Republic. The situation concerning continuation of the 
reform seems to have been more favourable in Russia where the President has been 
the major driving force of the reform and has relatively more powers in enforcing 
his policies (compared to the Czech executive authorities). In addition the Russian 
political parties as a rule play only symbolic role in the formation of the government 
and hence their interest in the right to “spoils” is limited.  
 The ruling coalitions in the post-communist Czech Republic used to be torn 
by internal contradictions and conflicts and on many occasions have demonstrated 
their clear interest in preserving the right to “spoils”. Besides, administrative policy 
making in the Czech Republic is relatively more protracted (many decisions of a 
purely technical or organisational nature need to be pushed through the Parliament). 
Finally, after the Czech Republic joined the European Union in 2004, the major 
driving force of civil service reform – the European Commission - virtually ceased 
its pressure on the Czech authorities. All these factors considerably weakened the 
capacity of the Czech Republic to continue and sustain reform.  
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8.3.9  Economic Environment  
In the early 1990s new political leadership in the majority of CEE and CIS 
countries adopted a strategy which focused above all on macroeconomic 
stabilization and microeconomic restructuring.  
Development of a proper institutional and legal framework, in particular in 
the areas of public management, lagged behind considerably. The principle that 
“…the market economy is only ‘free’ within a public and legal set of enforceable 
rights and constraints” (Toonen, 1993:157) appears to have been largely disregarded. 
In fact neglect of this principle was one of the causes of serious recession in the 
Czech Republic in 1997-98 and financial default in Russia in 1998. 
The implementation of economic reform strategies varied across countries 
in terms of speed and depth. The merits of fast reform versus gradual reform are still 
debated but as it turned out, almost all the governments in the region rushed ahead in 
rapid "big bang" style. The Russian Federation and the Czech Republic were no 
exception. Various studies indicate that there are certain and often striking 
similarities in the way privatisation was conducted in both Russia and the Czech 
Republic in terms of neglect of citizens’ and public interests, disregard of the law 
and extent of favouritism. In the absence of proper legislation or its adequate 
enforcement bureaucrats often used their positions in ministries and other state 
bodies to advance their economic interests by establishing businesses in the very 
areas they were to regulate.  
The World Bank data on transitional economies illustrate the trend in real 
gross domestic product (GDP) during transition. All transitional countries in CEE 
and CIS experienced output decline in the early 1990s: the extent of fall in GDP as 
well as the rate of recovery was for obvious reasons different in each country. It is 
noteworthy that the number of consecutive years of output decline between 1990 
and 2000 for the Czech Republic and Russia were respectively 3 and 7. Cumulative 
output decline amounted to 12 for the Czech Republic and 40 for the Russian 
Federation.  
Real GDP in 2000 was 99% of that in 1990 in the Czech Republic: 
correspondingly it was 64% in the Russian Federation. As one can see the slump 
(recession) in Russia was considerably greater in depth and duration (World Bank, 
2002:5).  
On the other hand, from 2001 till 2005 Russia has been demonstrating 
economic growth in the order of 5 - 6% per annum. This exceeds the respective 
figure of around 3% for the same period in the Czech Republic (World Bank, 2006).  
It is interesting that comparison of government consumption as percentage 
of GDP in 1997 and 2004 shows approximately equal numbers 20.2% for the Czech 
Republic and 20.8% for the Russian Federation (ibid).  
Summing up, throughout the 1990s the economic and budgetary situation in 
the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic did not differ substantially. The 
situation has notably changed in the early 2000s when the state budget of the 
Russian Federation started to receive extra revenues because of high rocketing oil 
prices on the world markets. This period practically coincided with the start of 
reform implementation in both countries.   
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8.3.10  Impact of Diffusion  
Civil service reform agendas in both countries were largely formulated on 
the basis of information derived from the study of other countries’ administrative 
experiences. Naturally modern trends in public management were taken into account 
as well.  
Available information does not lead to a conclusion that a specific foreign 
model was used for preparation of the reform programme and strategy either in the 
Czech Republic or in Russia. Even so, it will be appropriate to consider the main 
sources of inspiration and experience that were used in designing civil service 
reform in each of the two countries.  
Traditionally both Russia and the Czech Republic were following a 
continental European model of civil service. The only differences were that within 
the framework of this model Russia gave relatively more preferences to French 
experience, whereas the German system of public administration appears to be of 
relatively greater influence in the Czech Republic.  
It should be noted (and we have shown this in the previous chapters) that 
elements of the so called New Public Management can be found in civil service 
reform programmes and in respective legislation in both countries.  
In terms of specific impact on legislation, the first drafts of the Czech Civil 
service Act proceeded from the ideas of the Law on civil servants that existed in the 
Czech Republic during inter-war period. The latter was largely based on the 
Statutory rules adopted in the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1914. In the opinion of 
Onisko the Czech territorial system of state administration was to a considerable 
extent copied from the Germanic states - Germany and Austria (Onisko, 2000 : 53). 
It is known that in 1993 French experts assisted elaboration of the draft law 
on the Russian civil service (adopted in 1995). Later contributions to civil service 
reform came from various technical assistance and donor-aid projects and 
programmes. Starting from 2003 in Russia coordination of foreign assistance in the 
civil service reform area has been exercised by the Donor Secretariat on Civil 
Service Reform funded by DFID (UK).    
Technical assistance from the EU to the administrative reforms in the 
Czech Republic came largely as part of PHARE programme. PHARE started 
operating in 1990 but initially only limited resources were devoted to public 
administration development. Similarly assistance from EU to Russia came within 
TACIS Programme which was launched in 1991. Until the early 2000s contribution 
to public administration development was relatively modest in terms of funding. 
Support was focused mainly on policy advice and civil servants’ training. In recent 
years priority has been given to larger projects which are better coordinated, 
progressive from previous programmes and more adjusted to the specific needs of 
administrative and civil service reforms.  
At the same time it should be emphasized that opportunities to benefit from 
foreign experience have not been always efficiently used. For instance, in the Czech 
Republic foreign contacts have been often limited to a very narrow group of 
specialists with the knowledge of respective languages. There was no national center 
for the study and research of public administration or for the analysis of policies and 
strategic studies in this area whether at government or university level. As a 
consequence, significant documents and studies, such as the Rotterdam document of 
the SIGMA programme, the EIPA study (Maastricht, 1997), World Bank country 
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related research papers and many others were unfamiliar to the Czech authorities. 
Even the authors of various reform proposals often did not know them either (NTF 
1998: 7-1-13). 
Appropriateness of foreign experience for the Russian and Czech 
conditions has not been always properly assessed prior to its use. As a result some 
borrowed solutions did not work and often were even counterproductive just because 
they were designed for different environment. An example is decision of the Russian 
reformers to outsource some services rendered by state administration to non-
governmental organisations or commercial entities. Under conditions of endemic 
corruption and absence of thorough preparation this move only facilitated abuse of 
authority and extended its scale.   
Donor aid and technical assistance in the sphere of administrative and civil 
service reform was on average insufficiently coordinated and did not always take 
into account specific conditions of the recipient country. However it would be wrong 
to underestimate the impact of external assistance and diffusion. For example, 
support from international organisations allowed hundreds of civil servants from 
Russia and the Czech Republic to visit EU member countries and become 
acquainted with modern experience in the organisation and functioning of civil 
services and implementation of administrative reform.   
Summing up the above we may conclude that:  
a) attempts to reform the Russian and Czech civil services were based not so much 
on the appropriate and thorough analysis of the existing problems and shortcomings, 
but rather proceeded from the intention to conform to modern international trends in 
reforming public administrations;  
b) there was no single source of inspiration for defining the reform dimensions and 
hence a rather broad direction approach was applied in both countries; 
b) a certain measure of eclecticism and compromise in civil service reform proposals 
and the legal framework (both in the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic) 
can be explained in particular by weak coordination of reform efforts, impact of 
corporate and vested interests and general shortage of home based expertise.  
 
 
8.4  Matching Civil Service Reforms  
8.4.1  Reform Capacity  
The analysis demonstrates that preparation of civil service reform in both 
countries took an extensive period – over a decade after collapse of the communist 
regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and the formation of the Czech Republic and 
the Russian Federation as sovereign states. This observation distinguishes Russia 
and the Czech Republic from the absolute majority of other CEE countries where 
civil service reform was launched much earlier.  
We have established that the capacity for reform was overall low in both 
states. There are many indications of this low capacity and we considered them in 
detail in the respective chapters. The low reform capacity manifested itself above all 
in the following principal characteristics:  
- absence of legal status of civil servants (until 2002 in the Czech Republic) 
or/and weak enforcement of the civil service related legislation and 
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states. There are many indications of this low capacity and we considered them in 
detail in the respective chapters. The low reform capacity manifested itself above all 
in the following principal characteristics:  
- absence of legal status of civil servants (until 2002 in the Czech Republic) 
or/and weak enforcement of the civil service related legislation and 
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normative acts (in Russia since 1993 and Czech Republic since 2002 until 
present);   
- strong elements of patrimonial bureaucracy prevailing in the Russian and 
Czech state administrations to the detriment of wide application of 
meritocratic principles in building up and managing modern civil services;    
- domination of outdated informal rules, norms and traditions, in particular,   
widespread clientelism and patronage;    
- excessive politicization of the two civil services;   
- embedded corruption  in Russia and the Czech Republic (more widespread 
in the former);  
- absence of political will to launch civil service reform (was lacking 
throughout the 1990s in both countries);  
- shortage of qualified expertise and sufficient funding (the latter valid for 
Russia till the early 2000); 
- absence of committed reform stakeholders (e.g. mature civil society, 
influential business sector, strong political opposition, external pressure) 
that could force political leadership to adopt a pro-active stand towards 
civil service reform (in case of the Czech Republic no external pressure till 
the late 1990s); 
- considerably weakened competition (often making it senseless) between 
major political parties and coalitions in the two countries;   
The reform capacity was also influenced by unpredictability and uncertainty of 
the political and economic situation in both Russia and the Czech Republic (e.g. 
frequent change of governments, political and economic crisis, fragmented and 
conflicting legislation, etc).   
On the positive side it should be emphasized that in both Russia and the Czech 
Republic there were small groups of experts who during the 1990s managed to 
prepare quality analysis of the status of the public administration of their countries 
and developed recommendations on how to improve the overall situation. 
Regretfully these analyses (Report of the National Training Foundation, Prague, 
1998 and Concept of Administrative Reform, Moscow, 1998) were not properly 
reclaimed in the course of preparation of the civil service reforms.   
During the late 1990s a number of attempts, though unsuccessful, were made in 
both countries by reform minded politicians and experts to convince their political 
leadership to launch civil service reform.    
One of the substantial differences in terms of existing institutional environment 
and reform capacity between Russia and the Czech Republic was absence of a civil 
service in the Czech Republic from the legal point of view throughout all the 1990s. 
Other important differences include: a) in the Czech Republic the emergence in the 
late 1990s of the significant external factor of strong pressure from the European 
Commission to introduce civil service legislation and launch civil service reform 
resulting from the commitment of the Czech Republic to comply with strict 
requirements of EU membership; b) in the Russian Federation, significant changes 
in terms of existence of political will to launch civil service reform after V. Putin 
was elected President of the Russian Federation and committed himself to 
modernize Russian state administration; and c) also in the Russian Federation 
essential changes in some aspects of its economic situation in the early 2000s 
manifested in the high rate of economic growth and soaring state budget revenues 
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mainly as a result of considerable increase of oil prices on the world markets. This 
development lessened budgetary constraints on the reform implementation.    
             Having compared the two cases we may conclude that the capacity for 
reform has been initially relatively higher in Russia than in the Czech Republic for a 
number of reasons: 
a) contrary to the situation in the Czech Republic, where reform was driven 
mainly by external pressure from the European Commission, in Russia the 
reform’s driving force was the President elected in 2000; 
b) from the legal point of view the Russian civil service was established in 
1993, much earlier than in 2002 in the Czech Republic;   
c) starting from the early 2000s Russia was no longer experiencing tight 
budget constraints and could allocate considerably more funds for civil 
service development and reform.  
In terms of the major cause (in broad sense) of initiation of civil service reforms 
in these two countries the answer is unambiguous. Profound transformation of their 
political and economic systems at the beginning of the 1990s made existing 
administrative structures obsolete and incapable of facing and countering new 
challenges and opened way for reform initiatives.    
 
 
8.4.2 Reform Implementation  
As far as implementation of reform is concerned the two states have 
demonstrated a top down approach to initiation and carrying out of civil service 
reform. In view of the atmosphere of confidentiality surrounding reform preparation 
and evident shortage of information and PR strategy to raise public awareness about 
the reform, not only citizens, but also the majority of civil servants were largely 
unaware of reform objectives, agenda, time table, benefits, progress etc.   
Civil service reform agendas in the two countries were formulated mainly 
on the basis of information derived from the study of modern trends in 
administrative reforms and other countries’ experiences in this field. Therefore it 
comes as no surprise that the contents of reform programmes in many ways were 
similar. They comprised measures directed mainly at raising the efficiency of state 
administration and creating in the civil service a culture, focused on performance 
and outcomes and on service to citizens;   
More specifically the programmes of civil service reform in Russia and the 
Czech Republic (complemented by elements of administrative reform where 
necessary) comprised the following major tasks to be achieved:  a) carrying out 
functional analysis; b) re-organizing the Government; c) improving coordination and 
communication; d) defining standards and regulations; e) introducing modern 
management technologies, above all performance management; f) designing and 
enforcing civil service law; g) promoting e-government practices; k) enhancing 
training of civil servants; l) developing quality management; m) improving financial 
management; and n) developing anti-corruption mechanisms.     
In both countries civil service reform was regarded as complementing or 
being part of a wider administrative reform. The specificity of the Czech case was 
that for quite a long time public administration and civil service reforms were 
strongly associated with the reform of the territorial and regional government.  
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The approach to reform implementation in the Czech Republic was based 
on the application of principles of project based management. In the Russian 
Federation implementation was driven through the so called federal targeted 
programmes. The difference between these approaches is not essential. Both 
instruments are known for strong result orientation if properly and consistently 
applied. Federal targeted programmes appear to be more centralized, whereas 
project based management allows for greater de-centralization.  
However, practical implementation of these instruments both in Russia and 
the Czech Republic turned out to be problematic. Cases of better performance and 
achievement of expected results appear to be rather exceptional so far and confined 
to individual organizational units but very rarely to larger institutions (e.g. 
ministries) not speaking about entire civil services.    
A major paradox of civil service reforms in Russia and the Czech Republic 
is that, although practical introduction and application of performance and results 
oriented management were declared the principal objectives of administrative 
transformation, in managing the reforms themselves these objectives were de facto 
largely ignored.   
Implementation of civil service reform took place mainly in central 
administration in the Czech Republic and in both federal and regional government in 
the Russian Federation. With regard to reform implementation tools, exclusive 
preference in both countries was given to legislation. Other tools such as training 
and best practice diffusion were also applied though not always on a wider scale. To 
a considerably less extent were used fiscal incentive instruments, networking and 
coalition building. Limitations in the use of implementation tools reduced the 
potential of reformers in both countries to reach reform objectives.  
In Russia and the Czech Republic the reform strategy implied launching a 
series of pilot projects before full-scale implementation was attempted.  
In differentiating the civil service reforms according to dominant tradition – 
governance or management (Ingraham) - we need to take into account not only the 
contents of the reform programmes but also distinguish declared objectives and real 
achievements in practice. Since the development of state administrations in both 
Russia and the Czech Republic was rooted in the continental European tradition of 
state bureaucracy one would expect that for the reformers in both countries the 
governance tradition will be the main source of inspiration.   
This tradition in fact was paid tribute to in the reform programme 
declarations. But overall the reform agenda appears to be mixed containing priorities 
adhering to both governance (civil service is primarily a mechanism for effective 
governability and political legitimacy) and management (attention above all to 
efficiency and economic rationality) traditions. Furthermore, in practical 
implementation of reform in both countries distinct priorities were given to the 
measures directed at strengthening aspects of efficiency of civil services. Issues of 
legitimacy, accountability and transparency in their practical enforcement turned out 
to be quite “unpopular” among bureaucratic officialdom in both Russia and the 
Czech Republic.  
In connection with this, classification of the models of civil service system 
that are being reinforced within the framework of reform implementation in Russia 
and the Czech Republic encounters certain difficulties. Within the models 
framework advocated by Pollitt and Bouckaert this “mixed” combination of reform 
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initiatives typical of both reviewed cases tends to place them half way between New 
Public Management (NPM) and Neo Weberian State (NWS) concepts.   
Categorization of civil service reforms in line with the criteria defined in 
the Protocol for comparative studies of national civil service systems leads to the 
conclusion that they were partly structural and partly procedural/technical.  
The extent of intensity of reform measures and pace of reform progress 
appear to have varied. The restructuring of the Russian Government (as part of 
administrative reform) was quick and most radical at least for the last 40-50 years of 
the Russian history. Implementation of reform of the Czech civil service was 
advancing much slower. Quite demonstrative in this respect was the decision of the 
Czech authorities to suspend several times full enforcement of the Civil service Act. 
The time lag between the adoption of the Act in 2002 and numerous postponements 
of its full enforcement with the latest one extending the law’s “invalidity” till 2009 
is seven years which appears unprecedented by any standards. After an initial stage 
of quick advance the pace of the reform in Russia has also slowed down.      
Management of civil service reforms necessitated appointment of the 
highest authority and establishment of special structures responsible for it. In the 
Czech Republic this was the Prime Minister and Office of the Government 
strengthened at the operational level by the Civil Service Directorate and Steering 
Committee to oversee and supervise reform projects. In the Russian Federation this 
was an ad hoc Commission on Reform of Governance headed first by the Prime 
Minister and then by the Head of the Presidential Administration. The Commission 
was working in close interface with the Presidential Administration and several 
expert groups. Reform implementation in the two countries lacked sound 
management mechanisms at the operational level, as well as proper and timely 
monitoring and progress assessment procedures, though the latter was overall better 
in the Czech case. Bureaucratic resistance to change (although generally anticipated) 
was not properly taken into account, even less so was effectively dealt with in both 
countries.   
The Russian authorities were quick in adopting legislation but many of the 
innovative provisions have remained so far on paper because of weak law 
enforcement. Reform results in the Czech Republic appear to have been confined so 
far mainly to pilot experiments.  
A peculiarity of the Czech case is that the reform strategy and programme 
were developed and approved long after the Civil service Act was adopted. In other 
words co-relation and congruence between the legislation and practical 
implementation work were difficult to achieve. The situation was further 
compounded by numerous postponements of the full enforcement of the Civil 
service Act.  
 
 
8.4.3 Reform Outputs  
Further comparison of the two reforms leads us to the following reflections 
and inferences. Throughout the entire analysis we have made regularly the point that 
the task faced by the reformers in Russia and the Czech Republic was not in 
improving, reorganizing or modernizing their civil service, but in essence in its re-
founding. One of the conclusions reached in this research is that this need has not 
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been fully acknowledged by the reform managers in Russia and the Czech Republic 
and even less so taken into account in practical activities.       
Preparation of the Czech Republic for EU membership provided its 
representatives with many opportunities for intensive dialogue and cooperation with 
the European Commission and its officials and experts. Commitments taken by the 
Czech authorities to meet criteria of EU membership also in the sphere of 
administrative capacity and quality of civil service were demanding and stimulated 
modernisation of the Czech state administration in a number of fields. Russia could 
not benefit equally from these opportunities but was open to various programmes 
and projects of international assistance.       
Since in neither of the countries civil service reforms were officially 
announced to be finished nor the time table of reform implementation expired by the 
time of finalizing this research, we can only speak about preliminary results of 
reform implementation. Overall these appear to be modest.  
Obviously the fact that civil service reforms were eventually launched in 
Russia and the Czech Republic can be viewed as an achievement in itself. 
Undoubtedly it raised awareness of the expert community and civil servants in each 
country of the existing problems and ways of resolving them.  
Overall, introduction of the principles of meritocratic, performance 
oriented, uniform, integrated, accountable and corruption immune civil service so far 
has not been sufficiently consistent and result oriented in either country. Therefore 
many expected outcomes turned to be less tangible or intangible or failed to 
materialize at all.  
Among tangible reform results in Russia so far are – adoption of new 
legislation on civil service and related normative acts (e.g. Code of Ethics), increase 
in civil servants remuneration package (but with rather weak link to performance), 
large scale restructuring of the government (as part of administrative reform), wider 
scale of training of civil servants, and greater transparency achieved through the 
web-sites created by virtually all federal ministries and agencies. A number of 
processes were initiated – review and development of qualitatively new job 
descriptions, functional analysis of the ministries and structural units, development 
and approval of standards of services rendered to citizens and legal entities, 
introduction of the principles of performance based budgeting, etc. However, it is 
too early to speak about the success of these initiatives.  
One of the peculiarities of the civil service reform in Russia is that 
implementation of civil service related laws requires preparation and adoption of the 
so called secondary legislation – Presidential decrees, Government enactments, 
Federal Ministries’ orders - which specifies the mechanism of enforcement of the 
provisions contained in the Laws. So far this process has been developing at a much 
slower than expected rate.     
Simultaneously a number of experimental pilot activities were carried out 
on the development and introduction of performance related pay, performance 
budgeting and performance management. In 2006 a Presidential decree allowed 
several government agencies and ministries (as an experiment) to retain the overall 
pay bill of those employees who have left public office and to use the savings for 
motivating quality work of the remaining personnel. There has been also increase in 
state budget funds allocated for civil servants training. In coordination with 
administrative reform certain practical measures were taken to reduce administrative 
barriers for businesses. This include: reduction of the powers of licensing and 
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controlling organs by introducing, for example, the right to open business in five 
days period following submission of a fixed number of legal documents; 
considerable reduction of control and inspection exercises by introducing fixed 
frequency and scheduling; reducing the list of business areas that need to be licensed 
from 214 to 120; and some others (Otechestvennyie zapiski 2004:107). 
Some important measures envisaged in the new legislation and the entire 
reform programme have not found their way to practical implementation yet. For 
example, commissions on conflict of interest were created but no single case has 
been reviewed in course of at least two years of their existence. Fixed term contracts 
with higher remuneration closely linked to performance as envisaged by the Law, 
have not been applied in practice yet. Similarly, creation of a body in charge of 
managing the entire civil service was still pending by late 2008. Some draft laws e.g. 
“On Access to Information About Government Activities” or “On Fighting 
Corruption” were prepared and even discussed in the Parliamentary commissions 
but later repeatedly pushed from one desk to another for several years without 
visible progress to final adoption.  
The precise extent of reform advance is difficult to judge as the reform 
programme (at least the variant accessible to the public) did not contain specific 
deadlines for implementing each of the defined tasks. Many tasks were not 
sufficiently detailed. Deadlines could be found in the reform action plans adopted by 
some of the federal ministries. However, there does not seem to exist any document 
comprising results of regular monitoring of the progress made in reform 
implementation across the entire federal government.      
Up to date major outputs of civil service reform in the Czech Republic 
(called reform of the central state administration in Prague) incorporate: adoption of 
the Civil service Act; establishment of the General Directorate for Civil Service (so 
far understaffed and lacking support to its mission) which was supposed to be 
responsible in future for management of the entire civil service; creation of the 
Institute of Public Administration; increase in the number of civil servants who has 
been trained; and wider use of IT technologies.  
Looking at the reform from a wider perspective one should add here also 
establishment of Administrative Judiciary, adoption of the Act on Access to 
Information, approval of the Code of Ethics for government officials.   
So far the reform process has focused chiefly on the improvement of 
performance of central state administration, regulatory reform and strengthening 
financial control in central state administration. The tangible results of the projects 
implemented within the framework of the reform programme are mainly 
methodological instructions and manuals on how to introduce various types of 
innovations and improvements e.g. CAF quality assurance (Vidlakova, 2006). 
Information about wide dissemination of the project outputs and deliverables across 
entire government is not available. Subsequent developments, namely actual 
suspension of the reform by 2007 provide sound ground for argument that this 
dissemination has hardly taken place on any noticeable scale.     
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8.4.4  Two Civil Service Reforms in Mirror Comparison   
The results of comparison of current experiences of civil service reforms in 
Russia and the Czech Republic are summarized in Table 8.2 and are reflected in 
certain conclusions that follow the table:  
 
 
Table 8.2    Comparison of Civil Service Reforms in the Russian     
                   Federation and the Czech Republic  
 
Characteristics 
of reform  
 
Russian Federation  Czech Republic 
Type and 
model of 
reform  
 
Structural and procedural -technical   
Elements of governance and 
management models, the latter 
generally dominating in reform 
practical activities   
 
Structural and procedural -technical  
Elements of governance and 
management models, the latter 
prevailing in the reform strategy and 
practice 
 
Reform 
objectives  
 
Creation of an integrated civil service 
system; Increase of the efficiency of 
activities of civil service; Formation 
of highly skilful and competent 
personnel; Creation of modern system 
of civil service management. 
 
 The reform top priority - improving 
performance of civil service, 
optimizing civil service maintenance 
costs and developing resources 
required for civil service activities. 
 
Legal establishment of civil service as 
such; De-politicization of civil service; 
Enhancing stability and 
professionalism; Raising efficiency of 
civil servants’ activities; Introducing 
proper management of civil service.  
 
The reform top priority – enhancing 
efficiency and quality of services 
rendered by civil servants to the state, 
business and citizens  
 
Approach to 
reform  
 
Top down  
 
Top down  
Managing 
authority  
 
Inter-Agency  Commission on 
Improvement of State Governance 
headed at first by the Prime 
Minister, later by the Head of the 
Presidential Administration. 
Coordination – by the Department 
of Civil Service in the Presidential 
administration. Operational 
management at the level of 
designated ministries. 
 
Overall Prime Minister.  
Coordination and supervision by the 
Head of the Office of the Government 
who is supported by the Department of 
the Regulatory Reform and Central 
State Administration Reform. 
Operational management - by the 
Reform steering committee 
(management team).   
 
Reform 
concept and 
programme  
 
Concept (2001) and Programme 
(2002) approved by the RF 
President, the Programme extended 
in 2005 for another two years. Draft 
Programme for the years 2008-2013 
was submitted for discussion. 
 
Concept (2001) and Programme (2004) 
approved by the government, later the 
programme underwent several 
modifications.    
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Extent of 
reform  
 
Generally across all levels of 
government including federal and 
regional levels   
 
Encompassing only central 
government structural units  
Civil 
service 
legislation 
 
The first law approved in 1995 but a 
number of its provisions were 
enforced only partly. New laws on 
civil service were adopted 
respectively in May 2003 and July 
2004.   
 
Civil service law (Act) – adopted in 
April 2002, few provisions valid since 
2004, full enforcement several times 
put off, latest deadline fixed for 2009. 
Finally cancelled in August 2007. 
 
Reform 
main 
instruments  
 
Federal targeted programmes  
 
Project management method   
 
Impl-n tools 
 
Definite priority given to 
legislation, less attention to best 
practice diffusion and fiscal 
incentive instruments, networking 
and coalition building have been  
practically disregarded  
 
Prevailing accent on legislation, less 
attention to best practice diffusion and 
training; fiscal incentive schemes, 
networking and coalition building 
have been  practically disregarded  
 
Reform 
status  
 
Reform Programme extended till 
2008 by a Presidential decree. 
Draft Programme of civil service 
reform and development for the 
period 2008-2013 submitted for 
consideration. 
In October 2006 reform management 
was formally passed back to the 
Ministry of Interior, reform scope and 
contents have been considerably 
reduced and modified, in essence 
reform implementation was put on 
hold.  
 
Original time 
frame of 
reform impl-n
 
From 2003 till 2005 and  
further to 2008  
From 2004 until 2010 
 
Impact of 
diffusion  
 
Overall considerable, at 
the level of design and 
implementation  
 
Considerable, at the level of planning 
and  implementation    
 
Intensity of 
reform  
 
Rather high at the start 
but later slowed down  
 
Never high, rather slow advance with 
small steps   
“Active” 
and 
“passive” 
internal and 
external 
stakeholders  
 
“Active” – Mr. Putin, President of 
the Russian Federation; “passive” -  
business  community, civil society.  
“Active” – Mr. Havel, President of the 
Czech Republic, European 
Commission; “passive” – business 
community, civil society.   
Achievements 
to date 
 
New legislation, reorganization of the 
government, higher compensation 
package for civil servants, 
methodological guidelines for the 
introduction of new approaches and 
innovations, experiments on 
Legal status of civil servants 
established, Institute of Public 
Administration set up, methodological 
guidelines for the introduction of 
various innovations developed, IT 
technologies used on a wider scale, 
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introducing performance based pay 
and standards of service, more funds 
allocated for civil servants’ training  
expanded programmes of civil 
servants’ retraining.     
  
 
Prospects for 
reform 
continuous 
advance and 
reaching its 
principal 
objectives   
 
In the medium term overall positive, 
in the long term risk of loosing 
political support after Presidential 
elections in 2008 and in case of 
economic recession  
Rather dim and uncertain, since in late 
2006 the reform appears to have been 
removed from the list of Government 
priorities and seriously emasculated.  
Further undermined by abolition of 
Civil service Act in 2007. 
 
Unforeseen  
outcomes 
and side 
effects  
 
Considerable increase in budgetary 
spending on state bureaucracy and 
in the number of civil servants at the 
federal and regional level; 
Expansion of privileges and bonuses 
granted to middle and high level 
civil servants;  
Emasculation of some innovative 
reform proposals producing often 
opposite than expected effect;  
     
Increasing concern of the politicians 
that they may lose control over the 
state bureaucracy led to actual 
suspension of most reform activities;   
Considerable reduction of the contents 
and scope of reform.  
Eventual dissolution of reform’s  
original management organs and 
structures.  
Abolition of Civil service Act in 2007.  
 
 
On the positive side it should be stressed that after a long period of 
uncertainty and hesitation civil service reforms in both Russia and the Czech 
Republic were actually launched and achieved certain results. In the process they 
drew attention to the existing in public administration problems, contributed to 
widening of cooperation in this field with international organizations and donor 
community, raised the number of qualified local experts and increased the number of 
civil servants who have been trained at home and abroad.  
A number of pilots and experiments were initiated, some of them 
successfully implemented.    
Both reforms are distinguished for their focus on enhancing efficiency and 
performance which have been declared the principal objectives and appear to have 
been pursued in practice (at least at the start).  
At the same time careful study of the processes of reforms’ preparation and 
implementation reveals that up to date there has been no real ownership of reform in 
both countries. Reforms were viewed as something imposed externally, either by top 
authority (the President in the Russian case) or by foreign community (European 
Commission in the Czech case). This lack of ownership was reflected also in the 
actual absence of influential reform stakeholders. For example, neither business 
community nor civil society appear to have played any prominent role in voicing 
their support to reform and determining its pace and contents. Lack of ownership in 
both countries was also manifested in the sheer shortage of leaders who could move 
beyond traditional perceptions of management and display resoluteness and 
consistency in driving innovative approaches.   
The reforms did not succeed so far in gaining broad support from civil 
servants, citizens and political parties. At least partly this can be explained by the 
fact that in both countries programmes of civil service reform and respective 
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legislation on civil service were prepared in the atmosphere of strict confidentiality. 
In practical terms reform strategy lacked such important elements as raising 
awareness, explaining benefits, rewarding active participation etc.   
Both reforms were not sufficiently civil service staff focused and were 
relying mainly on changes driven externally. In particular, the announced 
development of modern HR management systems and introduction of performance 
based incentives remained until present at the stage of elaboration of methodological 
support and narrow scale experiments. Most importantly the reforms failed so far to 
create motivation among the majority of civil servants and politicians to support 
new policies and changes.  
The weakest point of reform management and strategic approach in both 
cases turned out to be excessive and even exclusive reliance on legislation as the 
main instrument of reform implementation. Passing laws achieves little if there is no 
effective mechanism for its enforcement and no programme to reach strategic 
objectives. In fact, the Russian and Czech cases both provide good examples of how 
law making was disconnected from its implementation. It appears that authors of 
numerous laws and normative acts were convinced that their enforcement would 
take place automatically. Little attention has been paid to developing specific 
mechanisms and methodologies for implementing adopted legislation and reform 
programme. The situation appears to be even worse when enforcement of adopted 
legislation is permanently put off as has been the case in the Czech Republic.  
Comparing further various aspects of reform preparation and 
implementation in the two countries we may conclude that the Czech civil service 
reform programme of 2004 (though heavily emasculated by 2007) appears to have 
been from the very beginning more result oriented. The programme of reform of the 
Russian civil service was supposed to be broken down into programmes in each 
ministry, agency, and regional administration. In each domain particular 
responsibility and deadlines for meeting specific objectives were as a rule defined.  
In contrast the Czech reform programme from the very outset comprised specific 
outputs and deadlines (applicable for the entire central administration), references to 
responsible persons, regular reporting and monitoring procedures, and actions to be 
taken should implementation be delayed or encounter serious problem.  
Therefore it appears at first sight illogical that by late 2006 the civil service 
reform in the Czech Republic had been virtually scale downed and put on hold after 
approximately just two years of implementation. No other conclusion, except 
suspension of reform, can be drawn after overall management of the reform was 
passed over back to the Ministry of Interior, existing reform management structures 
disbanded and the original contents of the programme considerably reduced. Out of 
the original list of 17 reform projects 5-6 were announced terminated (but no 
account of their impact released) and only three projects (considerably modified) 
appeared to be in process of implementation at early 2007. The new Institute of 
Public Administration initially created within the structure of the Office of the 
Government was also transferred to the Ministry of Interior.  
The Civil Service Directorate (key management structure for the entire civil 
service created in June 2002) by 2006 seems to have lost any support for its mission 
with its staff reduced from 65 to 22 persons (Landova, 2006:60).     
This is even more bewildering since before the reform was launched in 
2004 its preparation had been managed by the Ministry of Interior. The continuation 
of this practice was declared by the Czech authorities to be unacceptable because 
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any single ministry is not in an appropriate position to lead reform efforts targeted at 
the entire government structure.    
Taking into account the repeated postponement of the enforcement of the 
Civil service Act one cannot help concluding that by late 2006 remnants of any 
formal commitment of the country’s leadership to civil service reform in the Czech 
Republic had disappeared. This conclusion was further reaffirmed in August 2007 
when the Czech Government decided to abolish the Civil service Act all together.  
Therefore, one of the greatest variances between the civil service reforms in 
the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic relates to their status by late 2006 
and early 2007.  Contrary to the situation in Russia the civil service reform in the 
Czech Republic had actually stalled by early 2007.    
 Among other significant distinctions between the two reforms the following 
should be mentioned:  
a) contrary to the Czech civil service which formally and legally had not existed 
before 2002, the Russian civil service was established in 1993;  
b) in contrast to the Russian Federation, public administration reform in the 
Czech Republic was viewed until late 1990s exclusively as a reform of 
territorial government;  
c) our analysis revealed that by the early 2000s overall capacity for civil service 
reform was relatively greater in the Russian Federation;  
d) the major driving force of the reform in Russia was the RF President elected 
in 2000 whereas in the Czech Republic it turned out to be external factor - the 
European Commission;  
e) civil service reform in the Russian Federation extended also to the regional 
level whereas in the Czech Republic it has been limited so far to the central 
state administration only;  
f) irrespective of the eventual results of enforcement of civil service related 
legislation, the original objective of the Russian Laws (2003 and 2004) was to 
develop further a career based civil service, whereas the Czech Civil service Act 
was designed to introduce a sort of mixed career and position based civil service 
system;  
g) there appears to be a marked difference in the pace of reform advance at least 
during its start up phase -  slow and cautious, bordering on “no movement at 
all” approach to reform of the central state administration in the Czech Republic 
(2004 – 2005) and rather “big bang”, “shock like” approach in restructuring the 
Russian Government in 2004. Later this approach turned into relatively more 
gradual intervention as far as implementation of the rest of the Russian civil 
service and administrative reform programmes is concerned;   
j) contrary to the situation in the Czech Republic, starting from the early 2000s 
there has been notable relaxation of fiscal pressures on the civil service reform 
in Russia resulting mainly from the considerable increase of oil prices on the 
world markets, contributing to high rate of economic growth and soaring state 
budget revenues and hence better opportunities of funding reform activities. 
A number of additional observations should be made with regard to reform  
implementation in Russia and the Czech Republic. It appears that implementation of 
reforms have contributed to the appearance of a number of distinct side effects and 
unforeseen results. Reorganization of the Russian Government in 2004 virtually 
paralyzed the activities of the executive branch for at least half a year. It also 
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resulted in exodus of a notable number of professionals from the civil service. A 
number of other developments cannot be directly attributed to the impact of reform 
but they were against its spirit and purpose; the reformers could not prevent the 
developments happening. The glaring example in Russia is the considerable increase 
in budgetary spending on state bureaucracy and in the number of civil servants, 
particularly at the regional level, that happened in the years 2002–2006. Another 
case relates to expansion of privileges and bonuses especially for top level civil 
servants. For instance, in 2006 Russian civil servants occupying positions of Deputy 
Head of Department and upwards were granted the right to business class travel by 
air and first class travel by railway.         
As far as the Czech Republic is concerned the major “unforeseen” result 
(from the point of view of the reform logic but of course not quite unexpected from 
the point of view of many experts studying the Czech political scene and 
administrative traditions) is the suspension of civil service reform before any 
principal outputs have been produced.   
Also typical of both reforms was the fact that issues of fighting corruption 
turned out to be at the periphery of attention of reform managers. There has been 
much rhetoric about the need to eradicate fraud and conflict of interest but very little 
(if anything) has been done so far in terms of achieving practical tangible results.    
 
Table 8.3   Priorities of Civil Service (administrative) Reform Programmes in Russia 
and the Czech Republic and Extent of Their Implementation (by September 2007)  
 
Some of the priorities of 
the reform programmes  
 
Up to date results Russian 
Federation  
Up to date results Czech 
Republic  
Implementation of functional 
analysis (identifications of 
missions, functions and 
analysis of processes) in the 
government agencies   
Identification of overlapping 
and excessive functions 
largely carried out, but 
liquidation of these 
redundant functions turned 
to be extremely difficult.  
Auditing of processes is in 
pilot phase    
Identification of missions 
and functions was done in 
2005 but analysis of 
processes (project C2 -
process audits) failed, since 
it was carried out only in one 
ministry and later declared 
no longer compulsory  
Defining standards of 
services rendered to citizens 
and legal entities  
 
Limited number of standards 
introduced in a few regions, 
overall at the experimental 
stage  
Pilot experiments in selected 
agencies  
Reorganization of central 
government   
 
Carried out in 2004  Cancelled (project A4)  
Depoliticizing civil services  
 
No tangible progress apart 
from generally more clear 
distinction between political 
and administrative posts  
Largely depended on full 
enforcement of the Civil 
service Act; following 
cancellation of the Act the 
prospects are quite obscure   
   
Introduction of merit based 
principles of service  
(open and fair competition,  
performance based pay, 
Stipulated by the Law but 
cases of open and fair 
competition and pay directly 
linked to performance are 
Open and fair competition 
exercised in a number of  
government agencies, wide  
application of other 
 
 213
resulted in exodus of a notable number of professionals from the civil service. A 
number of other developments cannot be directly attributed to the impact of reform 
but they were against its spirit and purpose; the reformers could not prevent the 
developments happening. The glaring example in Russia is the considerable increase 
in budgetary spending on state bureaucracy and in the number of civil servants, 
particularly at the regional level, that happened in the years 2002–2006. Another 
case relates to expansion of privileges and bonuses especially for top level civil 
servants. For instance, in 2006 Russian civil servants occupying positions of Deputy 
Head of Department and upwards were granted the right to business class travel by 
air and first class travel by railway.         
As far as the Czech Republic is concerned the major “unforeseen” result 
(from the point of view of the reform logic but of course not quite unexpected from 
the point of view of many experts studying the Czech political scene and 
administrative traditions) is the suspension of civil service reform before any 
principal outputs have been produced.   
Also typical of both reforms was the fact that issues of fighting corruption 
turned out to be at the periphery of attention of reform managers. There has been 
much rhetoric about the need to eradicate fraud and conflict of interest but very little 
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modern job descriptions)   
 
still rare, whereas modern 
job descriptions are more 
widely used  
    
principles is questioned 
following abolition of the 
Civil service Act      
Adoption of civil service 
laws and other relevant 
legislation  
 
New Laws adopted in 2003 
and 2004, more than 20 
Presidential decrees on civil 
service issues signed since 
the start of reform   
Civil service Act adopted in 
2002, more than a dozen 
amendments since then, but 
its full enforcement 
postponed several times, 
until the Act was abolished 
in 2007  
  
Remuneration of civil 
servants  
 
Since the start of reform was 
regularly increased at the 
rate higher than average for 
other groups of employees, 
particularly large for top 
level civil servants  
 
More or less regularly  
adjusted to the level of 
inflation  
Establishment of central 
body/unit for  management of 
civil service 
 
Still pending although 
stipulated by the Law  
General Directorate of Civil 
Service was established in 
the Office of the 
Government in 2002 but 
failed to function properly 
because of lack of support to 
its mission and still pending 
appointment of its Head.    
 
 
 
The analysis of the recently adopted laws on civil service in the Russian 
Federation (2003 and 2004) and the Czech Republic (2002) done in the previous 
chapters shows that they have much in common, though the Czech Civil service Act 
appears to be considerably larger in size and generally more complicated in 
perception. 
The Czech law has 254 articles and three annexes. But only 15 articles and 
one annex was enforced upon promulgation (Vidlakova, 2006: 2). By the year 2006, 
thus even before full enforcement of the Law it had been amended seven times! 
(ibid). By comparison the draft law from 1993 contained almost 400 pages (275 
articles) plus attachments (Cebisova, 1996:136). The respective Russian laws were 
more compact, for example the one adopted in 2004 contained 74 articles and 65 
pages.   
Comparison of the new laws reveals that they:  
a)   establish the fundamental legal framework for civil service activities;  
b) comprise detailed provisions with respect to definition of civil servants, their 
rights and obligations, restrictions and benefits, conflict of interest, admission 
requirements, discipline and penalties, job classification and duties, ranks and 
grades, training and professional development, performance evaluation, 
compensation and service termination; but are much less clear and specific with 
regard to civil servants’ responsibilities and external accountability, introduction of 
competitive practices, exercising transparency and openness; 
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c) are largely oriented towards meeting corporate interests of civil servants and 
ambitions of political elite to the detriment of their commitment to the state and 
citizens;  
d) the Russian Law creates the basis for the development of a career based civil 
service whereas the Czech Act introduces a sort of mixed – career and position (at 
least on paper) civil service system.   
The greatest difficulty concerning new civil service legislation in both 
countries rests in the problems of their effective enforcement.  
 
 
8.4.5   Key Variables and Determining Factors    
At the start of our analysis (Chapter II) we asserted that our selected 
variables may be directly or indirectly linked to the character and essence of the 
political regime and development of political institutions, resoluteness of political 
leadership to launch reform and be a driving force for changes, type of relations 
between the policy makers and top civil servants, extent of domination of interest 
groups, prevailing behavioral patterns, traditions, informal norms and rules, maturity 
of civil society, extent of internal and external pressure, and available resources. 
Having finalized our research we can make the following conclusions.   
Our study allowed to confirm the impact of these variables (though to a 
varying extent) on the development and reform of administrative institutions in 
Russia and the Czech Republic. 
In pursuit of answers to the research questions we have found out that 
clientelistic and patronage networks (widespread in the former communist countries) 
survived political upheavals and have remained the base of relations across state 
administrative institutions in the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic. These 
networks are “reinforced” by high degree of politicisation of the Russian and the 
Czech civil services. Political parties and leaders view state administration as an 
instrument of their personal power. In most instances members of such networks 
tend to maintain mutually beneficial status quo, support broad opportunities for 
discretion and resist any change.  
These features, tendencies and behaviour are rather common and can be 
found in other countries. However they “flourish” only under specific conditions. 
The best and well known “remedy” to treat such “deviations” is to foster political 
competition and accountability. The latter is effective only where there exist 
transparent and fair rules of competition and genuine responsibility. One of the 
conclusions reached in this study is that the rules of political competition and 
accountability, though generally proclaimed in the constitutions and other laws, have 
not been appropriately enforced in Russia and Czechia. This appears to be one of the 
key factors that “contributed” to delays in launching civil service reforms, virtually 
uncontrolled growth of the number of civil servants and achievement so far of rather 
modest results in the reform implementation in both Russia and the Czech Republic.  
The prospects for successful reform depend to a large degree on the 
availability of political will to effectively tackle the problems of civil service 
development. However, even of greater significance is the appropriate political and 
institutional framework that ensures timely adoption of required polices and 
decisions even in cases when such political will is missing. Also critical for success 
of reforms is the existence of a mature civil society and independent media.   
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The analysis revealed both similarities and differences between the Russian 
Federation and the Czech Republic in the ways reforms were prepared, launched and 
implemented.   
Similarities in reform preparation and implementation can be in particular 
attributed to the largely common roots of administrative culture and mentality which 
can be traced to the heritage of monarchist (Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires) 
and recent communist regimes.  
 The causes of major differences between the two countries in the civil 
service reform processes and current outcomes, above all suspension by 2007 of the 
reform in the Czech Republic and continuation of the reform in the Russian 
Federation, are largely rooted in the distinctions in the existing institutional 
configurations of the two states.  
Our study also confirms that the role of leadership is crucial for the success 
of civil service reform. It is even more important when reforms follow a top down 
scenario. Therefore preferences and personal qualities of politicians (who act under 
specific conditions and whose discretional power is often limited) do matter. 
Following our analysis we may conclude that the largely uncompetitive political 
environment that existed in Russia and the Czech Republic throughout most of the 
1990s reduced to minimum opportunities for correcting the policies of the political 
leadership (to be more precise absence of such policies) regarding reform of civil 
services. 
There is sufficient evidence to claim that these policies were eventually 
“corrected” by: a) the pressure from the European Commission in case of the Czech 
Republic; and b) the election of the new President in 2000 in case of the Russian 
Federation.   
 Our study has also reaffirmed our assertion that no matter how radical and 
innovative declarations of reforms in Russia and the Czech Republic could be (under 
the influence of either internal or external factors), the extent of their 
implementation may substantially deviate from proclaimed intentions. In particular 
we realized that the political and bureaucratic elites in the two countries had largely 
simulated and distorted the essence of civil service reform that could limit their 
discretion. There has been strong tendency to confine civil service reform to purely 
legal and organizational (technical) issues and to make adoption of civil service law 
the starting and finishing point of the reform.  
  
 
8.5  Conclusions   
 
The outcomes of the theoretical and methodological analysis (Chapter II) 
and the inferences made in subsequent country specific chapters (Chapters III-VI) 
have allowed us to distinguish factors and forces (variables) that have exerted 
serious influence on the processes of civil service reform preparation and 
implementation in the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic.  
Within the identified set of variables certain factors appear to have played a 
decisive role in defining the actual direction and pace of reforms as well as 
determining the results achieved so far. These are excessive politicization of the 
respective civil services, wide spread patronage networks, and the administrative 
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culture and leadership factors. A distinct feature of these key variables is that their 
origin is heavily influenced by historical legacy and path dependence.   
By matching the two civil service reforms we were able to define 
commonalities and distinctions in their contents, driving forces, rate of advance and 
outcomes. Analysis of the impact of the above mentioned set of variables on the 
processes of civil service reform preparation and implementation in Russia and the 
Czech Republic and comparison of this impact in these countries allowed us to trace 
the roots and to identify basic causes of the reform related developments and 
constraints.   
In brief, the cumulative effect of the long term impact of the identified 
variables resulted in the overall weakened reform capacity in Russia and the Czech 
Republic throughout the 1990s though this capacity was relatively higher in Russia. 
This impact led to a situation where clientelistic networks (widespread in the former 
communist countries) survived political upheavals and remained the basis of 
relations across state administrative institutions in the Russian Federation and the 
Czech Republic. These networks were “reinforced” by high degree of politicisation 
of the Russian and the Czech civil services. In most instances members of such 
network tended to maintain a mutually beneficial status quo and resist any change. 
Political parties and its leaders continued to view state administration as an 
instrument of their personalistic power. The existing administrative culture was 
hostile to the principles of merit based career advancement and compensation giving 
preferences to the principles based on length of service and loyalty to the superior 
management.   
 The impact of the same variables determined the emergence of many 
weaknesses and constraints in the processes of implementing civil service reforms in 
Russia and the Czech Republic and hence appearance of many similarities in these 
processes and their results. There are also differences, some of them essential. For 
instance, there are differences in the reform driving forces and in the status of reform 
implementation by 2007. Our analysis revealed that these differences largely stem 
from the distinctions in the existing institutional configurations of the two states.   
 As an illustration one can consider the peculiarities of the constitutional 
framework and political regimes in Russia and the Czech Republic. On the one side, 
the Russian President, the major driving force of the reform, with relatively more 
powers (compared to the Czech executive authorities) in enforcing his policies, and 
political parties in Russia with a largely symbolic role in the formation of the 
government and hence making virtually no claim for the right to “spoils”. On the 
other side, the ruling coalitions in the Czech Republic, frequently torn by internal 
contradictions and conflicts, clearly interested in preserving the right to “spoils”, 
often constrained in policy implementation by the need to push even minor 
organisational decisions through the Parliament, and finally no longer heavily 
pressed by the European Commission to keep civil service reform going.  
 These systemic and situation specific peculiarities of the institutional 
configurations in the two countries largely explain the difference in the status of the 
reform by 2008, i.e. continuation of civil service reform in Russia and its suspension 
in the Czech Republic. 
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CHAPTER  IX   
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
9.1  Introduction 
In the theoretical and methodological part of our research we have 
demonstrated that civil service reform is a complex process which cannot be studied 
in isolation from its environment and existing institutional configurations. Therefore 
we considered it most appropriate to apply institutional analysis in the study of the 
development of civil service systems which constitutes the core of this research. It 
implies that study of existing rules, norms, values and authority relationships which 
exert significant influence on civil servants’ behavior and persist in time is a 
necessary precondition for proper understanding of civil service systems, their 
reform and evolution over time. 
It also implies that various institutions define and limit choices available for 
policy-makers. At the same time the role of individual and collective human action 
should not be underestimated.  
In the early 1990s in the atmosphere of overall fascination with market 
reforms in Central and Eastern Europe there was general lack of apprehension of the 
importance of creating professional, efficient and accountable state administration. 
This initial underestimation extended also to donor agencies and technical assistance 
providers. The objective of building up a modern and effective system of 
governance, complemented by checks and balances, control and supervision, 
ensuring stability and performance orientation of the civil service was largely 
neglected.  
Until the early 2000s the highest authorities in Russia and the Czech 
Republic effectively ignored civil service reform in terms of its practical 
implementation. During the decade that followed the demise of communism 
practically all political, economic, social and other institutions, except state 
administration, have undergone profound changes in both Russia (see e.g. 
Aarrevaara, 1999; Kotchegura, 1999) and the Czech Republic (see e.g. NTF 1998; 
Potucek, 1999). It is true that some structural alterations took place for example in 
the Russian and Czech governments. However, as we have shown in the previous 
chapters, the rigid bureaucratic spirit, outdated administrative practices, patronage 
based networks remained largely untouched.  
In essence, a kind of contradiction has gradually built up in both Russia and 
the Czech Republic. The political and economic systems of both countries have 
drastically changed but the way these countries had been managed administratively 
was largely retained.  
The civil service reforms that were finally launched in Russia and the Czech 
Republic in the early 2000s are distinguished by both differences and similarities.  
Identification and comparison of the determining factors that affected reform 
preparation and implementation in the two countries led us to the following 
conclusions.  
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9.2  Current Reform Results and Explanatory Factors   
         Our analysis demonstrated that various forces, factors, tensions and constraints 
have influenced the process of civil service reform initiation and implementation in 
Russia and the Czech Republic.  
          Throughout the 1990s the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic were 
demonstrating overall low capacity for civil service reform across all of three major 
parameters:   
 a)     institutional space (framework) - formal and informal institutions 
(combination/set of rules, norms, traditions and values) existing at present 
and historically;  
b)     collective or individual human action ( willingness and readiness of the key 
agents – policy makers and stakeholders to undertake action in the desired 
direction);  
c)      resources available (funds and expertise). 
             The low reform capacity was to a considerable extent predetermined by the 
historical development and legacy, national and administrative traditions and “path 
dependency” factors. Widespread patronage and clientelistic networks, excessive 
politicization of civil services, clear deficit of meritocratic principles, prevailing 
culture and mentality rooted in the communist and pre-communist past, insufficient 
external accountability – all this reduced considerably the internal potential for civil 
service reform in both countries. 
In Russia and Czechia the development of new political and state 
institutions in the late 1980s to early 1990s was happening not in a “bottom up” 
mode as a result of systematic and consistent struggle of large groups of society for 
their rights and freedoms (e.g. Solidarity in Poland), but mostly in a “top down” 
fashion, through “imposition” or “implantation” of these institutions by the post-
communist elites. To a considerable extent this situation explains the slow 
development of civil societies in these countries and wide opportunities for 
discretion of their political elites.   
The inherited and deeply rooted habit of the Russian and Czech political 
elites to treat the state institutions and civil service as the instrument of their 
personal power appears to have survived the political turbulence of the 1990s and to 
have influenced the development of the civil services in these countries.  
             The situation was further compounded by lack of political will (at least until 
the early 2000s) of the ruling elites to implement civil service reforms and virtual 
absence of committed reform stakeholders. Finally, throughout the 1990s Russia and 
the Czech Republic experienced severe budgetary constraints and shortage of home 
based expertise.                        
             Having compared the two cases we may conclude that the capacity for civil 
service reform has been initially relatively higher in Russia than in the Czech 
Republic for a number of reasons: 
a) contrary to the situation in the Czech Republic, where reform was driven 
mainly by the external factor of pressure from the European Commission, in 
Russia the reform’s driving force was the RF President elected in 2000; 
b) from the legal point of view the Russian civil service was established much 
earlier - in 1993, whereas the Czech civil service only in 2002;   
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c) from the early 2000s Russia was no longer experiencing tight budget 
constraints and could allocate considerably more funds for civil service 
development and reform.  
Civil service reforms in Russia and the Czech Republic were launched after 
the long delays of over a decade following collapse of the communist regimes in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the formation of the Czech Republic and the Russian 
Federation as sovereign states. This fact distinguishes Russia and the Czech Republic 
from the majority of other CEE countries where civil service reform was initiated 
much earlier.  
To a considerable extent implementation of civil service reforms in the 
Czech Republic and in the Russian Federation was based on the assumption that the 
reforms constitute mainly legal and organizational (technical) undertakings. In 
contrast to the Russian Federation, public administration reform in the Czech 
Republic was viewed until the early 2000s exclusively as reform of territorial 
government.   
Civil service reform agendas in both countries were largely formulated on 
the basis of information derived from the study of modern trends in administrative 
and civil service reforms and other countries’ experiences in this field. 
Comprehensive analysis of the problems and shortcomings inherent to the Czech and 
Russian state administrations was carried out respectively by the Czech National 
Training Foundation in 1998 and by the group of President Yeltsin’s advisors and 
experts in the same year. However, the results of these analyses were not always 
appropriately reclaimed later in further work on determining reform’s objectives, 
directions, approaches and results to be achieved.   
  The reform priorities in Russia and the Czech Republic were marked by 
clear orientation towards efficiency and performance. Additionally, the reform 
agendas   comprised measures aimed at reorganising central government, introducing 
new regulatory and institutional framework, creating professional civil service cadre, 
promoting client orientation, decentralisation and downsizing. Regretfully, 
orientation towards higher performance and efficiency was not always backed up in 
either case by consistent practical efforts to reach this objective.  
At the same time the civil service reform programmes were distinguished 
by a certain measure of eclecticism and compromise. This can be explained by weak 
coordination of donor assistance, general shortage of home based expertise, and 
influence of corporate and vested interests.  
The analysis of the objectives of civil service reform programmes (and of 
the wider administrative reforms) in the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic 
shows that these reforms fall mainly into two categories: structural (e.g. 
reorganisation of central government, decentralisation, privatization, size reduction) 
and procedural/ technical (e.g. simplification of procedures, more flexible 
recruitment, performance related pay). Elements of budgetary reforms were also 
present to a certain extent in the civil service reform programmes but this issue was 
addressed in a more focused manner within broader administrative reforms.  
The reform element of making the bureaucracy more responsive to the 
public and civil societies, and enhancing transparency and accountability was not 
sufficiently accentuated and pursued in both Russia and the Czech Republic. 
Fighting corruption has been also at the periphery of attention of reform managers in 
practical terms.   
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It should be remarked that in Russia the civil service reform was 
implemented at both federal and regional levels, whereas in the Czech Republic the 
reform encompassed only central state administration.   
In terms of pace of reform, we can speak about slow and cautious bordering 
into a “no movement at all” approach to reform of the central state administration in 
the Czech Republic (2004 – 2006) and a rather “big bang”, “hasty” approach in 
restructuring the Russian Government in 2004 and relatively more gradual 
intervention for implementation of the Russian civil service reform programme 
(2003–2007).     
The following features of civil service reforms in Russia and the Czech 
Republic determined largely their current advance and results:  
 the reforms were designed and prepared in a confidential non-transparent 
manner (no real involvement of citizens, business, non-government 
organisations and civil servants themselves);  
 they have been prepared and implemented in a top-down fashion (orders 
and instructions) leaving little or no place for  “grass root” initiative;  
 there has been no real ownership of reform and this complemented by utter 
shortage of committed stakeholders;  
 as a rule criteria of reform effectiveness and achievement of its results have 
been either vague and general or absent all together leading to a situation 
when  matching them against practice was hardly possible;  
 civil society and business community were not invited to monitor the 
advancement and progress of reform; 
 operational management of the reforms appears to have been overall weak.  
The main reform instruments turned out to be project management in the 
Czech Republic and federal targeted programmes in the Russian Federation. Both 
instruments have been known for the high emphasis placed on result orientation 
provided these instruments are appropriately applied.       
Typical of the reform approaches in Russia and the Czech Republic has 
been reliance on legislation as the main implementation tool. This rather one sided 
approach reduced the potential for advance of reforms, particularly in view of a 
notable discrepancy between civil service law’s prescription and manner of 
enforcement. There has been an obvious “law enforcement” problem in both Russia 
and the Czech Republic.   
Further constraint to reform implementation has been associated with lack 
of effective management structures guiding and supervising reform implementation 
and respective law enforcement in the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic. 
Although formally these structures were created - the General Directorate of Civil 
Service in the Czech Republic and Commission on Improvement of State 
Governance in Russia  - they could not effectively perform their functions. The 
former lacked support to its mission and was eventually disbanded in 2006 and the 
latter turned out to be an ad-hoc structure convened too seldom in order to be able to 
act as a central point of operational management.      
In practice both reforms were not sufficiently focused on rank and file civil 
servants and were relying mainly on changes driven externally. The reforms largely 
failed to induce support of reform efforts among the majority of civil servants and 
politicians or at least to win their loyalty. As a result one could observe either lack of 
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interest at best or passive resistance to reform at worst on the part of the majority of 
civil servants.   
In terms of results of civil service reforms reached so far in Russia and the 
Czech Republic, it is necessary to underline their major achievement i.e. civil service 
reforms actually have been launched. This fact entailed a number of positive 
developments. In particular, the Czech civil service has been finally “legalized” and 
the Russian civil servants obtained relatively sizable increases to their previously 
“bare subsistence” salaries.   
However, both reforms have been characterized by an overall wide 
mismatch between intentions and real results so far. Specific improvements in the 
two civil services and their environment have been so far modest.    
With no real ownership and leadership in place and no effective approaches 
to overcome an existing administrative culture (which remained hostile to the goals 
and spirit of reform), reform implementation turned out to be in many ways formal 
and the scope of real tangible changes minimal in practice. It is true that two or three 
years of reform implementation is not a long enough period to expect cardinal 
changes to materialize, and even less so to become firmly embedded in the existing 
structures, habits and practices. However, reform’s steady progress and prospects for 
achieving its main results are largely determined by the existing tendencies in reform 
implementation, commitment of major stakeholders, support from the politicians and 
the society, correctness of the selected strategies and methods, sound enforcement 
and monitoring mechanisms. From these points of view civil service reform capacity 
in Russia and the Czech Republic continues to be low.   
As far as major outputs of civil service reform are concerned they have been 
identified mainly in the following areas: 
- adoption of new legislation and other normative acts (RF & CZ); 
- implementation of pilots (experiments) in selected areas, e.g. performance 
management,  result oriented budgeting, greater transparency (RF & CZ);  
- wider application of IT technologies (RF & CZ);   
- training programmes for civil servants implemented on a greater scale (RF 
& CZ);  
- considerable increase in monetary compensation to civil servants (RF);  
- establishment of the High Administrative Court (CZ);  
- reduction of administrative barriers for businesses (RF & CZ);   
- adoption of standards of quality for services in selected areas (RF & CZ);  
- creation of the Institute of Public Administration (CZ);  
- specification of the “conflict of interest” in the normative documents 
(RF&CZ).  
For the first time in modern history of Russia experimental introduction of 
performance related pay took place in 20 government agencies and offices rendering 
services to citizens and businesses in 2006 (Sharov, 2007). The experiment 
envisaged considerable bonuses to the staff where the customers were satisfied with 
the quality of services. Another “innovative” Presidential decree signed in late 2006 
allowed the financial benefit from reduction of staff in a public office to be 
distributed among the best remaining civil servants. (ibid)     
In the Czech Republic experiments to enhance quality management – 
Common Assessment Framework model (CAF) – were carried out in the Office of 
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the Government and the Ministry of Finance in 2006. Information on their impact is 
not available.  
In both Russia and the Czech Republic the reforms have failed so far to 
introduce changes in the internal incentive mechanism of the civil service and its 
orientation, as well as to establish effective external control over the service.   
The reforms have been also marked by the emergence of certain side effects 
and unforeseen results. In Russia the unforeseen results include (in spite of the 
reform’s declared goals) considerable increase in budget spending on state 
administration and substantial growth of the number of civil servants at both federal 
and regional levels in the years 2002–2007. This increase is estimated to be around 
20–25% of the entire number of civil servants.   
In the Czech Republic unforeseen results were manifested above all in the 
regular postponement of “validity” of the Civil service Act (except for few 
provisions) since its adoption in 2002, in the actual suspension of the reform by late 
2006 and in the eventual abolition of Civil service Act in August 2007.  
 
 
9.3 Major Findings of the Research  
On the basis of our analysis it may be concluded that the overall need for 
civil service reform in Russia and the Czech Republic was brought to prominence by 
the profound transformation of the political and economic systems of these countries 
in the early 1990s. The decade that followed dissolution of the communist regimes in 
Central and Eastern Europe witnessed growing contradiction between drastic 
changes taking place in the political and economic systems of Russia and the Czech 
Republic and the outdated methods used for managing these countries 
administratively.  
Attempts undertaken in the 1990s to “modernize” the Russian and Czech 
state administrations failed to eradicate the practices of replacing personal networks 
of political influence and economic exchange with impartiality, strict rules of 
professional behavior, and compliance with laws. As in earlier times, a high level of 
politicization of civil services has been exerting a serious impeding influence on 
shaping and generating preferred conduct, attitudes, values and objectives of 
politicians and civil servants in both countries. 
The largely uncompetitive political environment that existed in Russia and 
the Czech Republic throughout most of the 1990s reduced to a minimum 
opportunities for “correcting” the policies of “little or no interest at all” in launching 
reform of civil services. In essence the Czech Prime Minister V. Klaus and the 
Russian President B. Yeltsin (who both were reluctant to start serious reform of state 
administration) were under no effective pressure (that should usually come from the 
political opposition, parliament or civil society) to modernize and reform the existing 
system of state administration.  
Ten years after collapse of the communist system the introduction of 
essential changes into the Russian and Czech state administrations still remained an 
unfulfilled promise of the political leadership. In these countries many outdated 
norms and informal rules were still in place, external accountability mechanisms 
were virtually lacking, corruption and low service capacity remained a serious 
problem, and transparency was largely discretional. A culture of patronage based 
relations within which loyalty to the “patron” was the most important prerequisite for 
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a successful civil service career still prevailed. This period also witnessed lack of 
unity of political and social forces that could introduce and implement genuine civil 
service reform. Their capacity to influence political decision-making process was 
also weak. 
By the late 1990s pressure for initiation of reform coming from various 
sources was heightened further by the negative tendencies in the economic and social 
development of both countries, worsening of practically all parameters of 
performance of the government and state agencies and, especially in case of Russia, 
lowering of living standards of the majority of the population. These tendencies had 
to be taken into account by politicians who wished to count on any respect and 
support of the electorate.  
The civil service reforms in the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic 
were eventually launched in the early 2000s. Initially, an overall comprehensive 
approach to reform of state institutions was adopted in both countries, which 
envisaged combined implementation of a number of reforms - civil service, 
administrative, regulatory, fiscal management (budgetary), judiciary and others.    
Our findings allow conclude that the reform measures undertaken in the two 
countries, though generally appropriate, have not been sufficiently focused and 
consistent in addressing the problems of civil service development. Further, the 
reforms in both countries have been running counter to the prevailing bureaucratic 
and administrative culture and practices and therefore met with “silent” but overall 
notable resistance. Finally, support to the reform from the political and 
administrative elite has been so far largely superficial and conditional. The further 
the reform implementation proceeded, the less convincing this support appeared to 
be.  
Analysis of the two cases confirmed the significant role played by national 
leadership in deciding on the issues of initiating and implementing civil service 
reform. As we could see from the examples of the two countries, there was hardly 
any advancement in the preparations for reform of civil service during the period 
when the political leadership was exercised by politicians (B.Yeltsin and V.Klaus), 
who did not consider such reform a priority.   
            However, reference to mere absence of political will can hardly help to 
understand the real causes of lack of or insufficient progress in reforming the 
Russian and Czech civil services in the 1990s and later. As we emphasized above the 
institutional framework defines and limits choices available for policy-makers. There 
should be sound reasons explaining this lack of political will. In search of these 
reasons it is critical to study the main characteristics of the civil services in question. 
It is no less important to explore the principal features of the political and economic 
setting as well as peculiarities of existing mentality, traditions, culture and historical 
development.   
Of primary importance here are low extent of political competition among 
various parties and coalitions and the high level of politicisation of the Czech and 
Russian state administrations noted by many experts and confirmed by the results of 
surveys amongst civil servants in both countries. For obvious reasons the Czech and 
Russian state administrations were predominantly politicized during communist rule. 
But little has changed in this respect after “perestroika” and the “velvet revolution”.  
Identification of key characteristics of the civil service systems in question 
through the application of framework research protocol for comparative studies 
allowed us to conclude that the basic features of merit based civil service systems 
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(appointment and promotion based on open competition, impartiality and 
performance based remuneration, developed system of job descriptions etc) were 
largely absent in both Russia and the Czech Republic. In particular we pointed to 
wide discretionary power of superiors in deciding on civil servants’ promotion as 
well as in determining the size of take home pay of their subordinates.  
The persistent elements of the patrimonial bureaucracy present in both civil 
service systems constituted a serious obstacle to successful implementation of civil 
service reforms. The situation was further compounded by the weakness of civil 
service external accountability mechanisms in both countries.  
The analysis carried out has enabled us to find answers to the research 
questions formulated at the very start of the research. The main research question 
was defined as follows: 
What have been the experiences with the preparation, launching and 
implementation of national civil service reform in the Russian Federation and the 
Czech Republic following the fall of communist regimes and which factors can 
explain the relative success or failure of the reform proposals. 
 
After lengthy and difficult periods of delay and uncertainty, civil service 
reforms in the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic were eventually launched 
in 2003-2004. Out of a whole number of reasons explaining these delays and 
difficulties two major interrelated factors have served as key constraints in launching 
civil service reform: a) high level of politicization of both civil services 
complemented by widespread clientelistic and patronage networks; and b) seriously 
weakened political competition between main political parties/coalitions both in the 
Czech Republic and Russia.   
Notable factors, differing in each country, played a decisive role in 
triggering civil service reforms. In the Czech case it was permanent pressure applied 
by the European Commission in view of the planned accession of the Czech 
Republic to the European Union. In the Russian case it was the election of a new 
President who committed himself to reform the state bureaucracy.  
There has been a general tendency in both Russia and the Czech Republic to 
maintain confidentiality around reform preparation efforts and to view civil service 
reform as a primarily legal and technical matter. Within the framework of the 
launched reforms introduction of the principles of meritocratic, efficient, 
performance oriented, accountable and corruption immune civil service has not been 
sufficiently consistent and result oriented both in Russia and the Czech Republic. 
Hidden resistance to reform has been noted at practically all levels of state 
administration.  
In view of rather limited time that has passed since the start of reforms one 
can speak only of intermediary results achieved by the reformers. These appear to be 
rather modest.   
Within the framework of the preparation and implementation of reform of 
the Czech central state administration the results achieved so far are manifested 
mainly in: the adoption of Civil service Act; creation of the Institute of Public 
Administration; elaboration of methodological approaches for introduction of the 
planned innovations in civil service and HR management; pilot application of CAF 
model in central government; expanded programmes of civil servants’ post-entry 
training; and wider IT application in the Czech ministries.  
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By 2007 civil service reform in the Czech Republic had been virtually put 
on hold. This fact was largely pre-determined by a combination of factors including: 
overall initial low capacity for civil service reform; inertia and resistance of political 
and bureaucratic elites fearing that upcoming changes would undermine their 
privileged position and existing clientelistic networks (right for “spoils”); 
administrative traditions and culture rooted in the communist and pre-communist 
past; failure to win broad support for reform from civil servants, businesses and civil 
society; and virtual cessation of the pressure coming from the European Commission 
following accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union in 2004.  
By 2007 the civil service reform in Russia appeared to be advancing further 
albeit at a slower rate with a number of principal outcomes and outputs still 
outstanding. Major up to date achievements were confined mainly to the adoption of 
new civil service legislation; restructuring of the government (as part of 
administrative reform); development and adoption of modern job descriptions; 
implementation of pilots in such areas as introduction of performance based pay and 
standards of services; elaboration of methodological tools for introducing other 
planned innovations; and increased remuneration of civil servants.  
In spite of certain setbacks in reform implementation the civil service 
reform remains an important issue of the government agenda in Russia. The driving 
force of the reform continues to be the Russian President who in 2005 extended 
implementation of the civil service reform programme for another two years. Draft 
programme of civil service reform and development for the period 2008-2013 has 
been submitted for consideration of the Russian Government.  
The prospects for success of civil service reform in Russia depend to a 
considerable extent on the continuity of the reform policies after completion of the 
President Putin’s term in office in 2008. Should the reform be suspended or fail to 
reach its major objectives, the current trends in the country’s political and economic 
development may lead to eventual ‘privatisation of the Russian state by its 
bureaucracy’.    
  
Our research led to the identification of answers to research sub questions, 
which are provided below: 
 
1) What were the main characteristics and prevailing features of each of the two 
civil service systems (Russian and Czech) before the reform was designed and 
launched?   
During most of the 1990s the civil service systems in the Russian 
Federation and the Czech Republic were characterized by: the persistence of the 
elements of patrimonial bureaucracy to the detriment of wide application of 
meritocratic principles; domination of informal clientelistic, patronage networks; 
weak external accountability; low efficiency; discretional transparency; and 
increasing level of corruption. The combination of these features complemented by 
excessive politicization of civil services, weakness of appropriate regulatory and 
institutional framework, shortage of relevant expertise and tight fiscal constraints 
determined overall low reform capacity of the Russian and Czech civil services. 
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2) What are the dynamics of change and contents of reform of the Russian and Czech 
civil services?  
It had taken over a decade since the demise of the communist system in the 
two countries before some real steps to implement effective civil service reform were 
made. Reform agendas in both countries were largely formulated on the basis of 
information derived from the study of modern trends in administrative and civil 
service reforms and other countries’ administrative experiences (mainly EU 
members).   
Civil service reforms in Russia and the Czech Republic have been 
distinguished by their focus on enhancing efficiency and performance which have 
been declared the principal objectives of the reforms. Overall the reform agendas in 
both cases prioritized the management tradition (emphasis above all on efficiency 
and economic rationality). Considerably less attention has been paid to the 
governance tradition (treatment of civil service as primarily a mechanism for 
effective governability and political legitimacy). The analysis of the reform 
programmes and new legislation also allows us to conclude that general orientation 
of civil service reform in Russia has been towards creating a career (tenure) system, 
whereas the reform in the Czech Republic has been geared to build up a mixed 
system (position/career).   
The contents and main directions of the reforms comprised a certain 
measure of eclecticism and compromise, explained above all by sheer shortage of 
national expertise, weak coordination of donor assistance, and strong impact of 
vested and corporate interests.       
One of the major paradoxes of civil service reforms in Russia and the Czech 
Republic was that although practical introduction and application of performance 
and results oriented management were declared as one of the principal objectives of 
administrative transformation, in managing the reforms themselves these objectives 
were de facto largely ignored. Out of a variety of available implementation tools 
exclusive preference was given to legislation. Other tools such as training and best 
practice diffusion were applied but in a rather fragmented and not always consistent 
manner. Fiscal incentive instruments, networking and coalition building have been 
practically disregarded.   
The reform objectives of making the bureaucracy more responsive and 
accountable to the public and civil society, distinct in many EU countries, have not 
been sufficiently accentuated and appropriately addressed yet in the Czech and 
Russian cases. Little attention, if any, has been paid to the issues of capacity building 
and reducing opportunities for corruptive behaviour.  
Intensity of reform policies and efforts varied between the two countries at 
different stages of their development. At the start up stage we can speak about slow 
and cautious, bordering to “no movement at all” approach to reform of the central 
state administration in the Czech Republic (2004 – 2005). This is in comparison to a 
“big bang”, “shock like” approach in restructuring the Russian Government in 2004 
with a relatively more gradual intervention as far as subsequent changes in the 
Russian civil service itself are concerned (2004 – 2007).     
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3) What are the essential factors that influenced the pace and current results of 
reform?  
 The analysis confirmed significant impact of the existing institutional 
setting and legacies on the process of civil service reform. As we have shown, 
throughout the 1990s the prevailing institutional environment in the Russian 
Federation and the Czech Republic was characterized by weakened political 
competition, entrenched clientelism, excessive politicization, immature civil society, 
and shortage of funding and expertise. All these factors considerably reduced 
capacity for reform of the Russian and the Czech civil services.  
 Under such conditions the driving momentum for launching reform could 
come either from outside pressure or from a charismatic leader. Eventually this is 
what happened in the Czech Republic where major factor to launch and sustain 
reform was permanent pressure applied by the European Commission; and in Russia 
where the main driving force is associated with the President elected in 2000 and 
who committed himself to reform the state bureaucracy.  
Apart from low reform capacity described above the pace and results of the 
reforms have been affected by other factors. In particular, the reforms suffered from 
actual absence of committed reform stakeholders and hence lack of real reform 
ownership. Reforms were predominantly viewed as something imposed externally, 
either by top authority (the President in the Russian case) or by a foreign community 
(European Commission in the Czech case). Lack of ownership was also manifested 
in the shortage of leaders who could move beyond traditional perceptions of 
management and display resoluteness and consistency in driving innovative 
approaches.   
Reform implementation was also influenced by unpredictability and 
uncertainty of political and economic situation in both Russia and the Czech 
Republic (e.g. frequent change of governments, political and economic crisis, 
unstable coalitions, etc).   
Most importantly, in both Russia and the Czech Republic the reforms failed 
so far to introduce changes in the internal incentive mechanism of the civil service 
and its orientation, as well as to establish effective external control over civil service. 
The reforms neither succeeded in attracting broad support from civil servants, 
citizens and prominent politicians, nor made them at least loyal to the reform 
policies. Civil society, public organizations and businesses have not been 
appropriately involved in the preparation and implementation of the reform and 
hence neither provided required backing, nor acted as effective monitoring and 
control mechanism of the reform advancement. These factors reduced considerably 
the possiblities of effective and timely implementation of the reforms’ programmes.   
The weakest point of reform management and strategic approach in both 
cases was excessive and even exclusive reliance on legislation as the main 
instrument of reform implementation and absence of permanent and effective 
management structures enjoying broad support to their mission. This situation was 
further compounded by the problem of weak law enforcement in both countries.    
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4) How can the differences and similarities in the development and reform of the two 
civil services be explained in order to define possible causes of similarities and 
variations?  
Apart from weak reform capacity which determined the existence of many 
commonalities in the reforms of the Russian and the Czech civil services, similarities 
in reform preparation and implementation are in particular attributed to the largely 
common roots of administrative culture and mentality. The latter can be traced to the 
heritage of monarchist (Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires) and recent 
communist regimes. The political and administrative systems in the former 
communist countries constituted the extreme case of the development of 
uncontrolled and unaccountable bureaucracy. The political regime in Czechoslovakia 
before the “velvet revolution” was one of the most orthodox and ideologically rigid 
in Eastern Europe. In this respect it was very similar to the political regime in the 
Soviet Union. This similarity has been one of the important factors explaining many 
common traits of civil service development and reform in both countries.   
 In the early 1990s both states underwent the so called “triple 
transformation” - a unique form of de-institutionalization in the politics, economy 
and nationhood which distinguished them from most other post-communist 
countries. In addition, the reformers in both Russia and the Czech Republic have 
been using largely the same sources of inspiration (in particular, experience of 
advanced EU member states) in the elaboration of the reform programmes. 
In spite of a considerable number of similarities the reforms in the Russian 
Federation and the Czech Republic were distinguished by a number of significant 
differences. The variance is manifested above all in the major driving forces of 
reform (European Commission in the Czech case and new President in the Russian 
case) and in the current status of reforms. Contrary to the situation in the Czech 
Republic where the declared process of accession to EU entailed a considerable 
pressure on the Czech authorities from Brussels to implement genuine civil service 
reform there was no such external pressure experienced by the Russian authorities.  
 The causes of major differences between the two countries in the civil 
service reform processes and current outcomes (above all suspension by 2007 of the 
reform in the Czech Republic and continuation of the reform in the Russian 
Federation) are largely rooted in the distinctions in the existing institutional 
configurations of the two states. As we have shown in our study, this difference in 
particular stems from: relatively greater initial civil service reform capacity in Russia 
(e.g. legal existence of civil service in Russia since 1993 and in the Czech Republic 
only since 2002); major driving forces for reform (European Commission which 
virtually ceased its pressure after the Czech Republic joined EU; and the RF 
President who committed himself to reform the Russian bureaucracy); peculiarities 
of the constitutional framework and political regime (in the Czech Republic - 
rotating political coalitions concerned to preserve the right to “spoils”; in the Russian 
Federation - the President with relatively more powers in enforcing his policies and 
much less dependent on the narrow interests of political parties); and finally lack  of 
commitment of the Czech political elite to civil service reform.    
The early 2000s saw the emergence of another distinction affecting civil 
service reforms in Russia and the Czech Republic – continuing budgetary constraints 
in the Czech Republic and notable relaxation of fiscal pressures on the reform in 
Russia resulting mainly from the considerable increase of oil and gas prices on the 
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world markets. Growing budgetary revenues in Russia facilitated continuation of 
civil service reform (the reform in the Czech Republic had no such benefits), though 
this factor appears to have contributed to the emergence of certain side effects, in 
particular, marked growth of the number of civil and municipal servants and large 
increase in the allocation of state budget funds to support the state bureaucratic 
establishment.     
 
Our analysis has demonstrated that economic and social development of 
post-communist countries is contingent upon the process of successful reformation 
of their state administrative systems. 
The research findings have illuminated the problems that continue to 
impede or delay civil service reforms in the Russian Federation and the Czech 
Republic. Understanding of these problems is important for the identification of the 
appropriate remedial actions and their consistent application in practice.  
The research conclusions suggest important lessons for the reformers in 
those post-communist countries which have embarked on the road of transformation 
of their civil services and would like to avoid mistakes and difficulties experienced 
by their Russian and Czech colleagues.   
The existence at present of more favourable conditions for continuation of 
civil service reform in the Russian Federation does not necessarily mean that in the 
medium and long-term perspective the demands for administrative change in Russia 
will continue to be sufficiently strong and that the reform in the end is likely to be 
more successful than in the Czech Republic. The experience shows that the reforms, 
which depend mostly on personalities, are not sufficiently sustained and may be put 
on hold when a new leader comes to power. In this respect the prospects for 
successful implementation of civil service reform in the Czech Republic, which is 
obliged to conform to EU standards, look in the long term more favorable than in 
Russia.  
 
 
9.4  Theoretical Conclusions and Implications  
Apart from specific findings linked to the particular research question and 
sub-questions our comparative study allows us to draw certain conclusions as far as 
theoretical and methodological approaches and assumptions in comparative research 
of administrative systems are concerned.  
To illuminate these conclusions it is worth returning shortly to the start of 
the study and recalling its basic methodological cornerstone – the institutional 
analysis. As stressed more than once in chapters I and II and also later, the 
institutional analysis implies that development of civil service system should be 
studied above all from the point of view of existing traditions, rules, culture and 
authority relationships which persist in time and exert significant influence on the 
evolution of the entire civil service system, civil servants’ conduct and attitudes, and 
prospects of civil service reform.  
 Having finalized our study we may confidently argue that it has reaffirmed 
the basic postulate i.e. in order to understand processes of civil service reform, 
distinctions and similarities between reforms in different countries “…we need to 
search for explanatory factors, not only directly given from within civil service 
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by their Russian and Czech colleagues.   
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more successful than in the Czech Republic. The experience shows that the reforms, 
which depend mostly on personalities, are not sufficiently sustained and may be put 
on hold when a new leader comes to power. In this respect the prospects for 
successful implementation of civil service reform in the Czech Republic, which is 
obliged to conform to EU standards, look in the long term more favorable than in 
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9.4  Theoretical Conclusions and Implications  
Apart from specific findings linked to the particular research question and 
sub-questions our comparative study allows us to draw certain conclusions as far as 
theoretical and methodological approaches and assumptions in comparative research 
of administrative systems are concerned.  
To illuminate these conclusions it is worth returning shortly to the start of 
the study and recalling its basic methodological cornerstone – the institutional 
analysis. As stressed more than once in chapters I and II and also later, the 
institutional analysis implies that development of civil service system should be 
studied above all from the point of view of existing traditions, rules, culture and 
authority relationships which persist in time and exert significant influence on the 
evolution of the entire civil service system, civil servants’ conduct and attitudes, and 
prospects of civil service reform.  
 Having finalized our study we may confidently argue that it has reaffirmed 
the basic postulate i.e. in order to understand processes of civil service reform, 
distinctions and similarities between reforms in different countries “…we need to 
search for explanatory factors, not only directly given from within civil service 
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systems as such, but also – and probably mainly – derived from the political and 
societal environment of the civil service system in question” (Bekke, 1999: 11). 
In particular, the study has demonstrated that problems and constraints in 
the development of civil service systems are largely rooted in specific political 
arrangements, social norms, traditions and patterns of behaviour rather than 
administrative structures. The studied cases show for example, that cardinal re-
structuring of the Russian Government in 2004 has not led to any noticeable increase 
in efficiency of state administration, shift in attitudes of civil servants or their greater 
accountability. Furthermore, subsequent developments disclosed certain retreat from 
at least some of the declared principles of the reform of the Russian Government.   
 This and many other examples taken from our study point to an enduring 
impact of traditions and path dependence on the processes and contents of civil 
service reforms. The analysis reaffirmed, in particular, remarkable capability of the 
state bureaucracies in these countries to withstand large scale transformation in the 
political, economic and social spheres. Our study has shown that informal rules, 
traditions and behavioral patterns rooted in the communist and pre-communist past 
have been constantly reproducing themselves in the new environment. As an 
example we can refer to the deeply entrenched habit of the Russian and Czech 
political elites to treat the state institutions and civil service as the instrument of their 
personal power.  
 The influence of path dependence largely explains the persistence of 
irrational and outdated systems (in our case administrative systems in post- 
communist countries) that have been rendered obsolete by new social, economic and 
political circumstances in societies undergoing rapid and profound modernization.  
However, that does not mean that we should view the path dependence 
concept as an instrument of re-inventing a notion of causality in administrative 
science. Our analysis can conclude that a particular path of civil service reform and 
success or failure of reform strategies have been the result of impact of a 
combination of institutional and leadership factors. We also acknowledge that 
contingent events may play a distinct role in the development and reform of 
administrative systems.   
 The study demonstrated that differences and similarities in civil service 
reform processes and results originate largely from variance and commonalities in 
the key elements of institutional architecture in the countries concerned. In this 
connection the study also affirmed the importance and usefulness of the concept 
‘capacity of civil service reform’ and its three major parameters (widely used in our 
study). The concept and parameters provide general guidelines for assessing the 
reform potential of a given country and explaining successes and failures of reform 
processes.    
 The research revealed that tradition appears to have played so far mostly a 
restrictive role in the reform of the Russian and Czech state administrations serving 
as an impediment to change (e.g. legalistic approach to reform, wide-spread 
patronage networks, etc) and not leading to change. However, at least one case 
demonstrated a somewhat positive (though temporary) role of tradition - tradition of 
a strong centralised power in Russia seems to have facilitated launching and 
powering civil service reform by a new President. This notwithstanding, the same 
tradition may have also negative implications as it eventually constrains local 
initiative and discourages a “bottom up” approach.  
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 The study showed that there are more similarities than differences in the 
reforms of the Russian and Czech civil services. In other words the conclusion made 
over 15 years ago that “…all the same, public administration across these (post-
communist-A.K.) countries is more notable for similarities than differences both in 
its shortcomings and the stages of reform” (Rice, 1992: 117) retains its validity.     
 The study allowed the tracing of an interesting dependency – the higher 
world oil prices and hence revenues of the state budget are, the more the Russian 
state administration expands and consumes resources. There are sufficient grounds to 
assert that this phenomenon may also emerge in a similar situation in other countries 
where there exist insufficient external accountability of bureaucracy, weak 
enforcement of meritocratic principles, high level of politicization of the state 
administration and wide spread corruption.  
The processes of reform preparation and implementation in the selected 
post-communist countries witnessed at times dramatic episodes. It is enough to recall 
that the Civil service Act was pushed through the Czech Parliament by a majority of 
only one vote and following numerous postponements of full enforcement was 
abolished all together five years later. In Russia the full text of the concept of civil 
service reform was kept confidential for over a year after approval by the Russian 
President. In one interview President Putin admitted that the main lesson he had 
learnt was “the extreme difficulty of fighting bureaucracy” (The Observer, 8 June 
2003). These and many other examples from this study provide enough evidence of 
the existence of the forces of strong opposition to civil service reform in each of the 
countries concerned.   
 Finally, the findings of our study demonstrate that the major problems of 
civil services in post-communist countries are not so much those of low efficiency 
and effectiveness, weak legal framework and poor quality of rendered services 
(though they all are important). More significant are the problems directly linked to 
the relations and interface of the state bureaucracies with the political, societal and 
cultural environment i.e. genuine commitment to democratic values and service to 
citizens, genuine impartiality and accountability, high ethical and professional 
standards. Effective remedies to treat these “diseases” are well known: above all 
developed and well functioning democratic institutions, mature civil society and 
strict abidance by the rule of law. However, as our analysis of the two post-
communist states demonstrates it is rather easy to prescribe a “medicine”, whereas it 
is much more difficult and problematic to apply it in an appropriate and sustained 
fashion adjusted to a specific situation.    
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Summary 
 
Unprecedented changes in the political and economic systems of the Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries in the late eighties and early nineties of the 20th 
century highlighted the necessity of transformation of their state administrations and 
overall systems of governance.  
The preparation of civil service reforms in the Russian Federation and the 
Czech Republic took an extensive period – over a decade after collapse of the 
communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and dissolution of the former 
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Until the early 2000s the highest authorities in 
Russia and the Czech Republic effectively ignored civil service reform in terms of its 
practical implementation. In essence, a kind of contradiction has gradually built up in 
both Russia and the Czech Republic. The political and economic systems of both 
countries have drastically changed but the way these countries had previously been 
administratively managed was largely retained.  
 The focus of this research is on the identification, analysis and comparison 
of civil service reform initiatives and processes in the two selected countries – the 
Russian Federation and the Czech Republic and finding answers to the following 
major research question: ‘What have been the experiences with the preparation, 
launching and implementation of national civil service reform in the Russian 
Federation and the Czech Republic following the fall of the communist regimes and 
which factors can explain the relative success or failure of the reform proposals’. 
The methodology applied in the research is largely based on institutional 
analysis, which implies "...the notion of systems ruled by norms, culture and 
traditions rather than by organizational goals and rational perspectives" (Bekke 1999: 
4). It thus attaches high importance to the environment in which any institution, 
including civil service, is embedded. More specifically the methodological approach 
proceeds from the assumption that existing traditions, values, culture and authority 
relationships persist through time and exert significant influence on the evolution of 
the entire civil service system, civil servants’ conduct and attitudes, and prospects of 
civil service reform. 
The study draws widely upon the theory, methods and experience of 
comparative administration accumulated in the works of most prominent scholars 
and experts in the field. In particular, extensively used were the methodological 
recommendations contained in the Protocol (guidelines) for Comparative Studies of 
National Civil Service Systems. The Protocol was designed by academics and 
experts from Leiden (the Netherlands) and Indiana (USA) Universities and 
constitutes a common methodological platform (framework) for making meaningful 
international comparisons of these systems. The research widely applies an inductive 
method that relies heavily on descriptive data about actual situations and behaviour. 
It presupposes advance from specific observation to identify differences and 
commonalities and then progressing to explanations and interpretations. 
 The choice of the institutional concept as the methodological base of the 
study determined the overall structure of the research. It incorporates three major 
interrelated themes: civil service reform capacity; civil service reform 
implementation; and civil service reform comparison. They are addressed in separate 
clusters of chapters.  
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The outcomes of the theoretical and methodological analysis (chapter II) 
and the inferences made in subsequent country specific chapters (chapters III-VII) 
allowed identification of factors and forces (variables) that have exerted serious 
influences on the processes of civil service reform preparation and implementation in 
the selected countries.  
            Throughout the 1990s the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic were 
demonstrating overall low capacity for civil service reform across all of three major 
parameters:   
a)     institutional space (framework) - formal and informal institutions 
(combination/set of rules, norms, traditions and values) prevailing and historical; 
 b)   collective or individual human action ( willingness and readiness of the key 
agents – policy makers and stakeholders to undertake action in the desired direction);  
c)     resources available (funds and expertise). 
            The low reform capacity was to a considerable extent predetermined by the 
historical development and legacy, national and administrative traditions and “path 
dependency” factors. Widespread patronage and clientilistic networks, excessive 
politicization of civil services, clear deficit of meritocratic principles, prevailing 
culture and mentality rooted in the communist and pre-communist past, and 
insufficient external accountability – all these influences reduced considerably the 
internal potential for civil service reform in both countries. 
             Having compared the two cases it was concluded that the capacity for reform 
had been initially relatively higher in Russia than in the Czech Republic for a 
number of reasons. Contrary to the situation in the Czech Republic, where reform 
was driven mainly by external pressure from the European Commission, in Russia 
the reform’s driving force was the President elected in 2000. From the legal point of 
view the Russian civil service was established in 1993, much earlier than the Czech 
civil service in 2002. Finally, starting from the early 2000s Russia was no longer 
experiencing tight budget constraints and could allocate considerably more funds for 
civil service development and reform.  
The identification of key characteristics of the civil service systems in 
question through the application of the framework research protocol for comparative 
studies allowed us to conclude that the basic features of merit based civil service 
systems (appointment and promotion based on open competition, impartiality and 
performance based remuneration, developed system of job descriptions etc) were 
largely absent in both Russia and the Czech Republic. In particular we pointed to 
wide discretionary power of superiors in deciding on civil servants’ promotion as 
well as in determining the size of take home pay of their subordinates.  
After lengthy and difficult periods of delay and uncertainty, civil service 
reforms in the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic were eventually launched 
in 2003-2004. Out of a whole number of reasons explaining these delays and 
difficulties two major interrelated factors have served as key constraints in launching 
civil service reform: a) high level of politicization of both civil services 
complemented by widespread clientilistic and patronage networks; and b) seriously 
weakened political competition between main political parties/coalitions both in the 
Czech Republic and Russia.   
Notable factors, differing in each country, played a decisive role in 
triggering civil service reforms. In the Czech case it was permanent pressure applied 
by the European Commission in view of the planned accession of the Czech 
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Republic to the European Union. In the Russian case it was the election of a new 
President who committed himself to reform the state bureaucracy.  
The civil service reform agendas in the two countries were formulated 
mainly on the basis of information derived from the study of modern trends in 
administrative reforms and other countries’ experiences in this field. Overall the 
reform agendas appear to be mixed containing priorities adhering to traditions of 
both governance (civil service is primarily a mechanism for effective governability 
and political legitimacy) and management (attention above all to efficiency and 
economic rationality). However, in practical implementation of reform in both 
countries distinct priorities were given to the measures directed at strengthening 
aspects of efficiency of civil services. Issues of legitimacy, accountability and 
transparency in their practical enforcement turned out to be quite “unpopular” among 
bureaucratic officialdom in both Russia and the Czech Republic.  
The following features of civil service reforms in Russia and the Czech 
Republic determined largely their current level of advance and results:  
- the reforms were designed and prepared in a confidential non-transparent 
manner (no real involvement of citizens, business, non-government 
organisations and civil servants themselves);  
- they have been prepared and implemented in a top-down fashion (orders 
and instructions) leaving little or no place for  “grass root” initiative;  
- there has been no real ownership of reform and this complemented by a 
dearth of committed stakeholders;  
- as a rule, criteria of reform effectiveness and achievement of its results have 
been either vague and general or totally absent leading to a situation when  
matching them against practice was extremely difficult;  
- civil society and the business community were not invited to monitor the 
advancement and progress of reform; 
- operational management of the reforms appears to have been overall weak.  
In terms of results of civil service reforms achieved so far in Russia and the 
Czech Republic, it is necessary to underline the major achievement that the reforms 
have actually been launched. However, reforms in both cases have been 
characterized by a wide mismatch between intentions and results so far. Specific 
improvements in the two civil services and their environment overall have been 
modest.    
Development of reform of the Czech central state administration has so far 
resulted in: adoption of the Civil service Act; creation of the Institute of Public 
Administration; elaboration of methodological approaches for introduction of the 
planned innovations in civil service and HR management; pilot application of the 
CAF model in central government; expanded programmes of civil servants’ post-
entry training; and wider application of IT in the Czech ministries.  
Major current achievements of the civil service reform in Russia are 
confined essentially to: the adoption of new civil service legislation; restructuring of 
the government (as part of administrative reform); development and adoption of 
modern job descriptions; implementation of pilots in such areas as introduction of 
performance based pay and standards of services; elaboration of methodological 
tools for introducing other planned innovations; and increased remuneration of civil 
servants.  
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In terms of pace of reform, we can speak about a slow and cautious 
bordering into a “no movement at all” approach to reform of the central state 
administration in the Czech Republic (2004 – 2006) and a rather “big bang”, “hasty” 
approach in restructuring the Russian Government in 2004 and relatively more 
gradual intervention for implementation of the Russian civil service reform 
programme (2003–2007).     
Our findings conclude that the reform measures undertaken in the two 
countries, though generally appropriate, have not been sufficiently focused and 
consistent in addressing the problems of civil service development. Further, the 
reforms in both countries have been running counter to the prevailing bureaucratic 
and administrative culture and practices and therefore met with “silent” but overall 
significant resistance. Finally, support to the reform from the political and 
administrative elite has been so far largely superficial and conditional. The further 
the reform implementation proceeded, the less convincing this support appeared to 
be.  
Most importantly, in both Russia and the Czech Republic the reforms have 
failed so far to introduce changes in the internal incentive mechanism of the civil 
service and its orientation, as well as to establish effective external control over the 
service. The weakest point of reform management and strategic approach in both 
cases was excessive and even exclusive reliance on legislation as the main 
instrument of reform implementation and the absence of permanent and effective 
management structures enjoying broad support to their mission. This situation was 
further compounded by the problem of generally weak law enforcement in both 
countries.    
Within the identified set of variables certain factors appear to have played a 
decisive role in defining the actual direction and pace of reforms as well as 
determining the results achieved so far. These are excessive politicization of the civil 
services, wide spread patronage networks, and the administrative culture and 
leadership factors. A distinct feature of these key variables is that their origin is 
heavily influenced by historical legacy and path dependence.   
In pursuit of answers to the research question and sub-questions we have 
established that clientilistic and patronage networks (widespread in the former 
communist countries) have survived political upheavals and remain the basis of 
relationships across state administrative institutions in the Russian Federation and 
the Czech Republic. These networks are “reinforced” by the high degree of 
politicisation of the Russian and the Czech civil services. Political parties and leaders 
view state administration as an instrument of their personal power. In most instances 
members of such networks tend to maintain a mutually beneficial status quo, support 
broad opportunities for discretion and resist any change.  
The largely uncompetitive political environment that existed in Russia and 
the Czech Republic throughout most of the 1990s reduced to a minimum 
opportunities for “correcting” the policies of “little or no interest at all” in launching 
reform of civil services. In essence the Czech Prime Minister V. Klaus and the 
Russian President B. Yeltsin (who both were reluctant to start serious reform of state 
administration) were under no effective pressure (which would usually come from 
the political opposition, parliament or civil society) to modernize and reform the 
existing system of state administration.  
By matching the two civil service reforms and the impact of the same set of 
variables we were able to define commonalities and distinctions in their contents, 
 
248
In terms of pace of reform, we can speak about a slow and cautious 
bordering into a “no movement at all” approach to reform of the central state 
administration in the Czech Republic (2004 – 2006) and a rather “big bang”, “hasty” 
approach in restructuring the Russian Government in 2004 and relatively more 
gradual intervention for implementation of the Russian civil service reform 
programme (2003–2007).     
Our findings conclude that the reform measures undertaken in the two 
countries, though generally appropriate, have not been sufficiently focused and 
consistent in addressing the problems of civil service development. Further, the 
reforms in both countries have been running counter to the prevailing bureaucratic 
and administrative culture and practices and therefore met with “silent” but overall 
significant resistance. Finally, support to the reform from the political and 
administrative elite has been so far largely superficial and conditional. The further 
the reform implementation proceeded, the less convincing this support appeared to 
be.  
Most importantly, in both Russia and the Czech Republic the reforms have 
failed so far to introduce changes in the internal incentive mechanism of the civil 
service and its orientation, as well as to establish effective external control over the 
service. The weakest point of reform management and strategic approach in both 
cases was excessive and even exclusive reliance on legislation as the main 
instrument of reform implementation and the absence of permanent and effective 
management structures enjoying broad support to their mission. This situation was 
further compounded by the problem of generally weak law enforcement in both 
countries.    
Within the identified set of variables certain factors appear to have played a 
decisive role in defining the actual direction and pace of reforms as well as 
determining the results achieved so far. These are excessive politicization of the civil 
services, wide spread patronage networks, and the administrative culture and 
leadership factors. A distinct feature of these key variables is that their origin is 
heavily influenced by historical legacy and path dependence.   
In pursuit of answers to the research question and sub-questions we have 
established that clientilistic and patronage networks (widespread in the former 
communist countries) have survived political upheavals and remain the basis of 
relationships across state administrative institutions in the Russian Federation and 
the Czech Republic. These networks are “reinforced” by the high degree of 
politicisation of the Russian and the Czech civil services. Political parties and leaders 
view state administration as an instrument of their personal power. In most instances 
members of such networks tend to maintain a mutually beneficial status quo, support 
broad opportunities for discretion and resist any change.  
The largely uncompetitive political environment that existed in Russia and 
the Czech Republic throughout most of the 1990s reduced to a minimum 
opportunities for “correcting” the policies of “little or no interest at all” in launching 
reform of civil services. In essence the Czech Prime Minister V. Klaus and the 
Russian President B. Yeltsin (who both were reluctant to start serious reform of state 
administration) were under no effective pressure (which would usually come from 
the political opposition, parliament or civil society) to modernize and reform the 
existing system of state administration.  
By matching the two civil service reforms and the impact of the same set of 
variables we were able to define commonalities and distinctions in their contents, 
 249
driving forces, rate of advance and outcomes. Similarities in reform preparation and 
implementation can be in particular attributed to the largely common roots of 
administrative culture and mentality which can be traced to the heritage of 
monarchist (Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires) and recent communist regimes.  
In spite of a considerable number of similarities the reforms in the Russian 
Federation and the Czech Republic were distinguished by a number of significant 
differences. The variance is manifested above all in the major driving forces of 
reform (European Commission in the Czech case and new President in the Russian 
case) and in the status of reforms by 2008 (continuation of civil service reform in 
Russia and its suspension in the Czech Republic).  
The causes of major differences between the two countries in the civil 
service reform processes and current outcomes largely stem from the distinctions in 
the existing institutional configurations of the two states. As an example, one can 
refer to the peculiarities of their constitutional framework and political regime: in the 
Czech Republic - rotating political coalitions concerned to preserve the right to 
“spoils”; in the Russian Federation - the President with relatively more powers in 
enforcing his policies and much less dependent on the narrow interests of political 
parties.    
 Our study has also reaffirmed our assertion that no matter how radical and 
innovative declarations of reforms in Russia and the Czech Republic could be (under 
the influence of either internal or external factors), the extent of their implementation 
may deviate considerably from proclaimed intentions. In particular we realized that 
the political and bureaucratic elites in the two countries had largely simulated and 
distorted the essence of civil service reform that could limit their discretion. There 
has been strong tendency to confine civil service reform to purely legal and 
organizational (technical) issues and to make adoption of civil service law the 
starting and finishing point of the reform.  
By 2007 civil service reform in the Czech Republic had been virtually put 
on hold. This fact was largely pre-determined by a combination of factors including: 
overall initial low capacity for civil service reform; inertia and resistance of political 
and bureaucratic elites fearing that upcoming changes would undermine their 
privileged position and existing clientilistic networks (right for “spoils”); 
administrative traditions and culture rooted in the communist and pre-communist 
past; failure to win broad support for reform from civil servants, businesses and civil 
society; and virtual cessation of the pressure coming from the European Commission 
following accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union in 2004.  
By 2007 the civil service reform in Russia appeared to be advancing further 
albeit at a slower rate with a number of principal outcomes and outputs still 
outstanding. In spite of certain setbacks in its implementation the civil service reform 
remains an important issue of the government agenda in Russia. The prospects for 
success of civil service reform in Russia depend to a considerable extent on the 
continuity of the reform policies after completion of the President Putin’s term in 
office in 2008. Should the reform be suspended or fail to reach its major objectives, 
the current trends in the country’s political and economic development may lead to 
eventual ‘privatization of the Russian state by its bureaucracy’.    
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Samenvatting 
 
 
De zeer omvangrijke veranderingen in de politieke en economische systemen van 
Centraal- en Oost-Europese (COE) landen, die later in de jaren ’80 en vroeg in de 
jaren ’90 van de twintigste eeuw zin opgetreden, vormen een uitdrukking van de toen 
gepercipieerde urgentie om de respectievelijke staatsbesturen en het daarbij 
behorende bestuurssystemen te hervormen. 
          De aanloop van de ambtelijke hervormingen in de Russische Federatie en de 
Tsjechische Republiek heeft een aanzienlijke tijd in beslag genomen; langer dan een 
decennium na het ineenstorten van de communistische regimes in Centraal- en Oost-
Europa en het uiteenvallen van de voormalige Sovjet Unie en Tsjecho-Slowakije. 
Tot in het begin van het eerste decennium van dit millennium hebben de hoogste 
gezagsdragers in Rusland en Tsjechië ambtelijke hervormingen in termen van een 
daadwerkelijke implementatie genegeerd. In wezen is geleidelijk aan zowel in 
Rusland als Tsjechië een contradictie binnen de veranderingsprocessen ontstaan. De 
politieke en economische systemen van beide landen zijn drastisch veranderd, maar 
de manier waarop deze landen worden bestuurd, is voor een groot deel gelijk 
gebleven. 
         De focus van dit onderzoek is gericht op de vaststelling, de analyse en de 
vergelijking van initiatieven en processen in beide landen waar het de hervorming 
van het ambtelijke systeem betreft. Daarbij wordt een antwoord gezocht op de 
volgende onderzoeksvraag: ‘Wat zijn de ervaringen met de voorbereiding, de start 
en de implementatie van hervormingen binnen de nationale ambtelijke dienst in de 
Russische Federatie en de Tsjechische Republiek na de val van de communistische 
regimes en welke factoren kunnen het relatieve succes of falen van de 
hervormingsvoorstellen verklaren?’. 
        De aanpak gebruikt in dit onderzoek, sluit aan bij de neo-institutionele 
benaderingswijzes. Dit impliceert de veronderstelling ”…dat systemen eerder 
worden beheerst door normen, cultuur en tradities dan door doelen van organisaties 
en rationele perspectieven” (Bekke 1999:4). Belang wordt hecht aan de omgeving, 
waarin een institutie, inclusief het ambtelijk apparaat, is ingebed. Meer specifiek gaat 
deze benadering uit van de veronderstelling dat bestaande tradities, waarden, cultuur 
en autoritaire relaties grotendeels overeind blijven staan bij het verstrijken van tijd en 
een belangrijke invloed kunnen uitoefenen op de ontwikkeling van het ambtelijk 
systeem, het gedrag en de opvattingen van ambtenaren en de realisering van 
ambtelijke hervormingen. 
      In dit onderzoek wordt gebruik gemaakt van de theoretische en methodische 
inzichten van de vergelijkende bestuurskunde. In het bijzonder wordt benadering 
neer gelegd in het “Protocol for Comparative studies of national civil services”in 
deze studie gevolgd. Dit protocol is geformuleerd door onderzoekers van de 
universiteiten van Leiden (Nederland) en Indiana (VS) en vormt een 
gemeenschappelijk methodologisch kader om systematische internationale 
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De zeer omvangrijke veranderingen in de politieke en economische systemen van 
Centraal- en Oost-Europese (COE) landen, die later in de jaren ’80 en vroeg in de 
jaren ’90 van de twintigste eeuw zin opgetreden, vormen een uitdrukking van de toen 
gepercipieerde urgentie om de respectievelijke staatsbesturen en het daarbij 
behorende bestuurssystemen te hervormen. 
          De aanloop van de ambtelijke hervormingen in de Russische Federatie en de 
Tsjechische Republiek heeft een aanzienlijke tijd in beslag genomen; langer dan een 
decennium na het ineenstorten van de communistische regimes in Centraal- en Oost-
Europa en het uiteenvallen van de voormalige Sovjet Unie en Tsjecho-Slowakije. 
Tot in het begin van het eerste decennium van dit millennium hebben de hoogste 
gezagsdragers in Rusland en Tsjechië ambtelijke hervormingen in termen van een 
daadwerkelijke implementatie genegeerd. In wezen is geleidelijk aan zowel in 
Rusland als Tsjechië een contradictie binnen de veranderingsprocessen ontstaan. De 
politieke en economische systemen van beide landen zijn drastisch veranderd, maar 
de manier waarop deze landen worden bestuurd, is voor een groot deel gelijk 
gebleven. 
         De focus van dit onderzoek is gericht op de vaststelling, de analyse en de 
vergelijking van initiatieven en processen in beide landen waar het de hervorming 
van het ambtelijke systeem betreft. Daarbij wordt een antwoord gezocht op de 
volgende onderzoeksvraag: ‘Wat zijn de ervaringen met de voorbereiding, de start 
en de implementatie van hervormingen binnen de nationale ambtelijke dienst in de 
Russische Federatie en de Tsjechische Republiek na de val van de communistische 
regimes en welke factoren kunnen het relatieve succes of falen van de 
hervormingsvoorstellen verklaren?’. 
        De aanpak gebruikt in dit onderzoek, sluit aan bij de neo-institutionele 
benaderingswijzes. Dit impliceert de veronderstelling ”…dat systemen eerder 
worden beheerst door normen, cultuur en tradities dan door doelen van organisaties 
en rationele perspectieven” (Bekke 1999:4). Belang wordt hecht aan de omgeving, 
waarin een institutie, inclusief het ambtelijk apparaat, is ingebed. Meer specifiek gaat 
deze benadering uit van de veronderstelling dat bestaande tradities, waarden, cultuur 
en autoritaire relaties grotendeels overeind blijven staan bij het verstrijken van tijd en 
een belangrijke invloed kunnen uitoefenen op de ontwikkeling van het ambtelijk 
systeem, het gedrag en de opvattingen van ambtenaren en de realisering van 
ambtelijke hervormingen. 
      In dit onderzoek wordt gebruik gemaakt van de theoretische en methodische 
inzichten van de vergelijkende bestuurskunde. In het bijzonder wordt benadering 
neer gelegd in het “Protocol for Comparative studies of national civil services”in 
deze studie gevolgd. Dit protocol is geformuleerd door onderzoekers van de 
universiteiten van Leiden (Nederland) en Indiana (VS) en vormt een 
gemeenschappelijk methodologisch kader om systematische internationale 
vergelijkingen tussen deze ambtelijke systemen mogelijk te maken. 
         De keuze voor de institutionele theorie als basis van de studie heeft de structuur 
van dit onderzoek in sterke mate bepaald. Er zijn drie onderling verbonden thema’s 
vastgesteld: de capaciteit tot ambtelijke hervorming, de implementatie van 
 251
hervorming van de ambtelijke dienst; en vergelijking van ambtelijke hervormingen. 
Deze zijn behandeld in aparte clusters van hoofdstukken. 
         De uitkomsten van de theoretische analyse (hoofdstuk II) en de conclusies 
getrokken in de daarop volgende landspecifieke hoofdstukken (hoofdstukken III-VII) 
hebben geleid tot de vaststelling van factoren, die belangrijke invloed hebben 
uitgeoefend op de voorbereiding op en implementatie van hervormingen binnen de 
publieke sector van de Russische Federatie en de Tsjechische Republiek. Gedurende 
de jaren ’90 toonden de Russische Federatie en de Tsjechische Republiek een 
geringe capaciteit ambtelijke hervormingen op drie parameters te realiseren te weten: 
 
a) institutionele ruimte (kader) – formele en informele instituties 
(combinatie/set van regels, normen, tradities en waarden) bestaand in heden 
en verleden; 
b) collectieve of individuele menselijke actie (wil en bereidheid van sleutel 
actoren – beleidsmakers en belanghebbenden om actie te ondernemen in de 
gewilde richting); 
c) beschikbare middelen (fondsen en expertise) 
 
De geringe hervormingscapaciteit wordt voor een belangrijk deel bepaald door de 
eigen historische ontwikkeling en erfenis, de nationale en bestuurlijke tradities en 
“pad afhankelijke” factoren. Wijdverspreide patronage en cliëntelistische netwerken, 
een sterke mate van politisering van het ambtelijk apparaat, een gebrek aan 
meritocratische principes, de heersende cultuur en mentaliteit geworteld in het 
communistische en precommunistische verleden, onvoldoende externe 
verantwoordelijkheid—dit alles verminderde het potentieel tot ambtelijke 
hervorming in beide landen aanzienlijk. 
         Nadat de twee cases zijn vergeleken, is geconcludeerd dat de 
hervormingscapaciteit in Rusland bij aanvang relatief hoger is geweest dan in 
Tsjechië. Een aantal redenen is daarbij van belang geweest. In tegenstelling tot de 
situatie in Tsjechië, waar de hervormingen voornamelijk gedreven werd door druk 
van de Europese Commissie, was in Rusland de in 2000 verkozen president de 
drijvende kracht. Vanuit een juridisch oogpunt is in Rusland de ambtelijke dienst 
(1993), eerder ontstaan dan de Tsjechische ambtelijke dienst (2002). Vanaf het begin 
van de 21e eeuw heeft Rusland niet meer te maken gehad met de beperking van een 
krap budget. Men kon aanzienlijk meer middelen voor ontwikkeling en hervorming 
van de ambtelijke dienst toewijzen. 
        De bepaling van de basiskenmerken van de respectievelijke ambtelijke 
systemen door middel van de toepassing van het eerder genoemde 
onderzoeksprotocol heeft als conclusie opgeleverd dat criteria als benoeming en 
promotie gebaseerd op open competitie, onpartijdigheid en beloning op basis van 
prestaties, een ontwikkeld systeem van baanbeschrijvingen etc.) grotendeels zowel in 
Rusland als Tsjechië afwezig zijn geweest. In het bijzonder is gewezen op de ruime 
mate van beleidsvrijheid van superieuren bij hert nemen van beslissingen over de 
promotie van ambtenaren en de bepaling van het loon dat onderschikten mee naar 
huis mochten nemen. 
         Na een lange en moeizame periode van vertraging en onzekerheid, zijn de 
ambtelijke hervormingen in Rusland en Tsjechië uiteindelijk gestart in de jaren 2003 
en 2004. Van het aanzienlijke aantal factoren dat verantwoordelijk voor deze 
vertraging kan worden gesteld, zijn er twee gemeenschappelijke factoren in het 
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bijzonder als belangrijkste obstakels te beschouwen: a) een grote mate van 
politisering van beide ambtelijke diensten gecombineerd met wijdverspreide 
cliëntelistische en patronage netwerken; en b) geringe mate van politieke competitie 
tussen belangrijke politieke partijen/coalities. Er zijn ook verschillen tussen beide 
landen waar te nemen. In de Tsjechische casus was er een permanente druk van de 
Europese Commissie aanwezig gegeven de geplande toetreding van Tsjechië tot de 
Europese Unie. In de Russische casus is de verkiezing van een nieuwe president 
belangrijk geweest, die zichzelf heeft gecommitteerd aan de hervorming van de 
nationale bureaucratie. 
       De agenda’s van de ambtelijke hervormingen in de twee landen zijn vooral 
geformuleerd op grond van onderzoek naar nieuwe trends in bestuurlijke 
hervormingen en aan de hand van ervaringen op dit gebied van andere landen. Over 
het algemeen blijken de hervormingsagenda’s te bestaan uit een mengsel van 
prioriteiten behorend tot zowel de governance (het ambtelijk apparaat wordt 
voornamelijk gezien als een instrument voor effectieve bestuurbaarheid en politieke 
legitimiteit) en management (er is vooral aandacht voor efficiëntie en economische 
rationaliteit) tradities. Echter, bij de feitelijke implementatie van hervormingen in 
beide landen is prioriteit gegeven aan de maatregelen die gericht waren op een 
versterking van de efficiëntie van het ambtelijk apparaat. Onderwerpen als 
legitimiteit, aansprakelijkheid en transparantie kunnen zowel binnen bureaucratische 
kringen in Rusland als Tsjechië op weinig populariteit rekenen. 
       De volgende kenmerken hebben in grote mate de (geringe) mate voortgang en 
succes van de hervormingen bepaald: 
 
- de hervormingen zijn ontworpen en voorbereid in een vertrouwelijke non-
transparante manier (geen werkelijke betrokkenheid van burgers, 
bedrijfsleven, niet-overheidsorganisaties en ambtenaren zelf);  
- ze zijn op een top-down wijze voorbereid en geïmplementeerd zonder veel 
ruimte te laten voor initiatieven van onderaf;  
- de belanghebbenden hebben de hervorming niet gezien als hun eigendom, 
waardoor er geen steun onder de betrokkenen is gegenereerd;  
- als regel zijn de criteria voor effectiviteit van hervorming en het behalen 
van resultaten ofwel vaag en algemeen van aard of zelfs afwezig waardoor 
de implementatie uitermate moeizaam wordt; 
- het maatschappelijk middenveld en het bedrijfsleven zijn niet uitgenodigd 
om te participeren in de bepaling en monitoring van de voortgang van de 
hervormingen; 
- het operationeel management van de hervormingen blijkt in het algemeen 
zwak ontwikkeld te zijn geweest. 
 
In termen van resultaten van ambtelijke hervormingen die tot op heden zijn bereikt in 
Rusland en Tsjechië, is het nodig het belangrijkste succes, dat wil zeggen dat er 
hervormingen van de ambtelijke dienst zijn gestart, te onderstrepen. Echter, er 
bestaat een tegenstelling tussen de intenties en de bereikte resultaten. Specifieke 
verbeteringen in de beide ambtelijke apparaten zijn tot dusverre bescheiden te 
noemen. 
       In het kader van de voorbereiding en implementatie van hervormingen in het 
Tsjechische centrale staatsbestuur hebben de bereikte resultaten zich voornamelijk 
geuit in de vorm van: het aannemen van een ambtenarenwet; het creëren van een 
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Instituut voor het Openbaar Bestuur; het uitwerken van methodologische 
benaderingen voor de introductie van voorgenomen verbeteringen van de ambtelijke 
dienst en Human Resource Management initiatieven; een proeftoepassing van het 
CAF-model binnen de centrale overheid; uitgebreidere trainingsprogramma’s van 
ambtenaren; en bredere toepassing van IT in Tsjechische ministeries. 
         Resultaten tot nu toe in de hervormingen van het ambtelijk systeem in Rusland 
zijn beperkt gebleven tot: het aannemen van wetgeving voor de ambtelijke dienst; 
een herstructurering van de overheid (als onderdeel van bestuurlijke hervormingen); 
de ontwikkeling en opnemen van moderne functiebeschrijvingen; de implementatie 
van pilots als de introductie van prestatiegericht belonen en standaarden voor 
dienstverlening; de uitwerking van een instrumentarium om andere voorgenomen 
innovaties te introduceren en een hogere beloning voor ambtenaren. 
         In termen van de snelheid van hervormingen, kunnen we spreken van een 
langzame en voorzichtige (grenzend aan een “helemaal geen beweging”) benadering 
in het geval van de hervorming van het centrale staatsapparaat in Tsjechië (2004-
2006) en een “big bang” en bijna “gehaaste’ benadering van de Russische overheid 
om het ambtelijk systeem te herstructureren in 2004 en een relatief meer geleidelijke 
implementatie van het Russische hervormingsprogramma van de ambtelijke dienst 
daarna. 
         Deze bevindingen leiden tot de conclusie dat de genomen 
hervormingsmaatregelen in de twee onderzoekslanden, hoewel over het algemeen 
passend, niet genoeg gefocust en consistent zijn geweest om de problemen van de 
ambtelijke dienst aan te pakken. Daarnaast staan de hervormingen in beide landen 
haaks op de bestaande bureaucratische en bestuurlijke cultuur en praktijk. Ze hadden 
daarom te maken met “stille” maar overal merkbare weerstand. Tenslotte, is de steun 
voor de hervorming van de politieke en bestuurlijke elite tot op heden voornamelijk 
oppervlakkig en conditioneel van aard gebleken. Hoe verder de implementatie van 
de hervorming vorderde, hoe minder overtuigend de steun lijkt te zijn geweest. 
         Zowel in Rusland als Tsjechië hebben de hervormingen tot dusver geen 
daadwerkelijke veranderingen tot stand gebracht in de intrinsieke 
motivatiemechanismen binnen de ambtelijke dienst. Evenmin is er een effectieve 
externe controle over het ambtelijk apparaat gerealiseerd. Het zwakste punt van het 
management van de hervormingsprogramma’s is de overmatige en het bijna 
exclusieve vertrouwen in wetgeving als belangrijkste instrument voor de 
implementatie van hervormingen geweest en de afwezigheid van permanente en 
effectieve managementstructuren gericht op het genereren van een brede steun voor 
de projecten Deze situatie wordt nog verder gecompliceerd door het probleem van 
zwakke wetshandhaving in beide landen. 
        Binnen de in het onderzoek benoemde verklarende variabelen blijken de 
volgende factoren een beslissende rol te hebben gespeeld bij de richting en snelheid 
van de hervormingen en de behaalde resultaten. Deze cruciale factoren zijn de sterke 
mate van politisering van het ambtelijk apparaat, de wijdverspreide 
patronagenetwerken, en de vigerende bestuurscultuur en het aanwezige leiderschap. 
Deze factoren hebben een worteling in de nationale historie en bepalen daarmee de 
padafhankelijkheid van ontwikkelingen. In speurtocht naar antwoorden op de 
onderzoeksvraag en deelvragen hebben we gezien dat de cliëntelistische- en 
patronagenetwerken de politieke omwentelingen hebben overleefd en het fundament 
zijn blijven vormen van de bestuurlijke staatsinstituties zowel in Rusland als 
Tsjechië. Deze netwerken worden “versterkt” door een hoge graad van politisering 
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van de Russische en Tsjechische ambtelijke diensten. Politieke partijen en leiders 
zien het staatsbestuur als een instrument van hun persoonlijke macht. In de meeste 
gevallen willen de leden van zulke netwerken de gunstige status quo  behouden en 
daarmee hun ruime eigen beleidsvrijheid. Vandaar verzet men zich tegen 
voorgenomen veranderingen. 
         De geringe mate van politieke concurrentie in zowel Rusland als Tsjechië 
gedurende het grootste deel van de jaren ’90 heeft de mogelijkheden om de 
desinteresse in het hervormingsbeleid te verminderen. In essentie stonden de 
Tsjechische Minister-President V. Klaus en de Russische President B. Yeltsin - die 
beiden terughoudend waren bij het entameren van een serieuze hervorming van het 
staatsbestuur - niet onder daadwerkelijke druk van de politieke oppositie, het 
parlement of het maatschappelijk middenveld om het bestaande systeem van 
staatsbestuur te moderniseren en hervormen. 
         Door de ambtelijke hervormingen en de effecten van de zelfde set variabelen in 
beide landen te vergelijken, is het mogelijk geweest de overeenkomsten en 
verschillen te bepalen voor wat betreft de inhoud, stuwende krachten, vooruitgang en 
uitkomsten. Overeenkomsten in hervormingsvoorbereiding en –implementatie 
kunnen in het bijzonder worden toegeschreven aan de grotendeels overeenkomstige 
bestuurscultuur en mentaliteit die teruggevoerd kan worden op de erfenis van 
monarchistische (het Oostenrijks-Hongaarse Rijk en het Tsaristische Rusland ) en 
recente communistische regimes. 
         Naast een aanzienlijk aantal overeenkomsten zijn er ook een aantal belangrijke 
verschillen tussen de hervormingen in Rusland en Tsjechië te constateren. De 
variatie doet zich vooral voor in de aard van de belangrijkste stuwende krachten 
achter de hervorming (de Europese Commissie in de Tsjechische casus en de nieuwe 
president in de Russische casus) en daarnaast in de recente status (2008) van de 
hervormingen; namelijk een continuering van ambtelijke hervormingen in Rusland 
en de vertraging daarvan in Tsjechië. 
         De verklaring van de verschillen tussen beide landen voor wat betreft de 
processen en uitkomsten van de hervormingen in het ambtelijk systeem zijn gelegen 
in de onderscheiden institutionele configuraties. Bij wijze van voorbeeld kan 
gerefereerd worden aan de kenmerken van het vigerende constitutionele kader en het 
politieke regime. In Tsjechië kan gewezen worden op de wisselende politieke 
coalities die hun recht op “spoil” benoemingen wensen te behouden en in Rusland op 
de aanwezigheid van een president die beschikt over relatief meer machtsmiddelen 
om zijn beleid af te dwingen en daarom minder afhankelijk is van de belangen van 
politieke partijen. 
        Deze studie heeft aangetoond dat, hoe radicaal en innovatief 
hervormingsintenties in Rusland en Tsjechië ook kunnen zijn, de mate van hun 
implementatie substantieel kan afwijken van de voorgenomen plannen. In het 
bijzonder is naar voren gekomen dat de politieke en bureaucratische elites in beide 
landen de kern van de ambtelijke hervormingenvoorstellen, die hun beleidsvrijheid 
zouden hebben kunnen beperken, voor een groot deel hebben tegengehouden. Er 
bestaat een tendens om hervormingen van het ambtelijk apparaat te beperken tot 
puur juridische en organisatorische (technische) aspecten en het aannemen van de 
ambtenarenwet te beschouwen als start- en eindpunt van de hervormingen. 
        Tegen 2007 is de ambtelijke hervorming in Tsjechië praktisch tot stilstand 
gekomen. Dit wordt veroorzaakt door een combinatie van factoren zoals: een lage 
initiële hervormingscapaciteit; de traagheid van en weerstand aanwezig bij politieke 
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en bureaucratische elites die vrezen dat toekomstige veranderingen hun bevoorrechte 
positie en bestaande cliëntelistische netwerken (en hun recht op “spoils”) zouden 
ondermijnen; bestuurlijke tradities en cultuur geworteld in het communistische en 
precommunistische verleden; het falen om brede steun voor hervorming te winnen 
bij ambtenaren, bedrijven en het maatschappelijk middenveld en de verminderde 
druk van de Europese Commissie volgend op de toetreding van Tsjechië tot de 
Europese Unie in 2004. 
        In 2007 lijkt de ambtelijke hervorming in Rusland verder te gaan. Ook al 
gebeurt het langzamer, er liggen een aantal resultaten in het vooruitzicht. Ondanks 
enkele tegenvallers in de uitvoering blijft de hervorming van de ambtelijke dienst 
een belangrijke plaats op de overheidsagenda in Rusland innemen. De vooruitzichten 
voor succes van de ambtelijke hervorming in Rusland hangt voor een aanzienlijk 
deel af van de continuïteit van het hervormingsbeleid nu de termijn van president 
Poetin in 2008 versteken is. Als de hervorming faalt, waar dit het behalen van de 
belangrijkste doelen betreft, dan kunnen huidige trends in de politieke en 
economische ontwikkeling van het land eventueel leiden tot ‘privatisering van de 
Russische staat door zijn bureaucratie’. 
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Annex 1 
 
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation 
No. 1336 of November 19, 2002 
 
ON FEDERAL PROGRAM 
"REFORM OF THE CIVIL SERVICE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
(2003-2005)"
1 
 
For the purpose of improving the efficiency of the civil service in order to strengthen 
the state and develop the civic society, I hereby decree as follows: 
1. To consider it necessary to implement in 2003-2005 a set of measures aimed at 
improving legal, organizational, financial, and methodological framework of the 
civil service of the Russian Federation. 
2. To establish the following main areas of reform of the civil service of the Russian 
Federation: 
- Creating a comprehensive normative and legal framework governing the 
civil  service of the Russian Federation; 
- Developing efficient mechanisms for implementing a personnel policy with 
regard to the civil service of the Russian Federation for the purpose of 
optimizing the structure of civil service personnel; 
- Developing measures aimed at improving compensation of civil servants 
and financial, economic, and logistic support of the civil service of the 
Russian Federation, and at using advanced information technology in the 
civil service system in a rational manner; 
- Implementing staff training programs for the civil service of the Russian 
Federation and professional development programs for public servants; 
- Forming a system of administration of the civil service of the Russian 
Federation. 
3. To approve the attached Federal Program “Reform of the Civil Service of the 
Russian Federation (2003 – 2005)” (hereinafter referred to as the Program). 
4. To appoint the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation as the 
Program Coordinator. 
5. The Government of the Russian Federation shall provide funding for the Program 
when developing draft federal budgets through the year 2005. 
6. The Chief of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation shall: 
                                                 
1 Source: Rossiyskaya Gazeta No. 223 of November 23, 2002 
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Designate a person responsible for implementing the measures envisaged by the 
Program; 
Update the President of the Russian Federation on an annual basis on the progress in 
implementing the measures envisaged by the Program. 
7. To advise the state bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, 
within the limits of their budget funds: 
To participate in implementing the measures envisaged by the Program; 
To develop and approve programs of reform of the civil service in the constituent 
entities of the Russian Federation. 
8. This Decree shall enter into force at the date of its official publication. 
Vladimir Putin 
President of the Russian Federation 
 
 
FEDERAL PROGRAM 
"REFORM OF THE CIVIL SERVICE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
(2003-2005)" 
Approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation 
No. 1336 of November 19, 2002 
Passport of Federal Program “Reform of the Civil Service of the Russian Federation 
(2003 – 2005)” 
Program name – Federal Program “Reform of the Civil Service of the Russian 
Federation (2003 – 2005)”. 
Name, number, and date of the decision to develop the Program – Instruction of the 
President of the Russian Federation No. Pr-1496 of August 15, 2001. 
Program Coordinator – Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. 
State customers of the Program – Ministry of Labor and Social Development of the 
Russian Federation, Ministry of Trade and Economic Development of the Russian 
Federation, Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Internal 
Affairs of the Russian Federation, and Ministry of Defense of the Russian 
Federation. 
Principal Program implementers – Ministry of Labor and Social Development of the 
Russian Federation, Ministry of Trade and Economic Development of the Russian 
Federation, Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Ministry of 
Defense of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Property Relations of the Russian 
Federation, Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Justice of the 
Russian Federation, State Committee for Construction and Housing of the Russian 
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Federation, research and development, educational, and other entities to be 
determined on a tender basis according to the established procedure. 
Program goal – improving the efficiency of the civil service as a whole and of its 
types and levels, optimizing civil servant maintenance costs, and developing civil 
service resources. 
Program objectives – 
- Creating conditions for optimal organizational and legal support of the civil 
service; 
- Defining roles, powers, and responsibilities of civil servants on the basis of job 
(service) descriptions; 
- Implementing new techniques for planning, financing, stimulating, and 
assessing civil servants’ activities, and using civil service system resources in a 
rational manner; 
- Ensuring openness of the civil service for the benefit of civic society 
development and strengthening of the state; 
- Applying efficient methods for selecting qualified personnel for the civil 
service and for assessing professional performance of civil servants, as well as 
creating conditions for their job (service) promotion; 
- Implementing staff training programs for the civil service and professional 
development programs for civil servants; 
- Implementing mechanisms for identifying and solving public service-related 
conflicts of interest, as well as introducing a legal regulation of professional 
ethics of civil servants; 
- Creating an optimal material and technical environment for efficient 
functioning of the federal civil service and for performance by civil servants of 
their official (service) duties; 
- Ensuring the development of a civil service management system. 
Program time-frame – 2003–2005 
Principal measures envisaged by the Program – 
- Improving the legislative and regulatory framework for civil service reform 
issues; 
- Experimenting and implementing pilot projects aimed at applying new 
approaches to federal civil service organization and support of federal public 
servants’ activities; 
- Improving training, retraining, and professional development of federal civil 
servants; 
- Creating a material and technical environment for efficient functioning of the 
federal civil service; 
- Forming a civil service management system. 
Program funding volumes and sources - federal budget funds of RUR 539.1 million 
for the entire period of the Program implementation, including: 
Research and development work – RUR 296.1 million; 
Other – RUR 243 million. 
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Program deliverables – 
- Harmonizing the regulatory framework of the civil service with the existing 
social relations and new economic environment; 
- Establishing a professional civil service based on the principles of taking into 
account and assessing civil servants’ performance; 
- Implementing job (service) descriptions for civil servants; 
- Achieving a high-quality level of performance by civil servants of their official 
(service) duties and of provision by them of public services to citizens and 
organizations; 
- Creating conditions for openness and accountability of state bodies’ 
administrations and civil servants to the civic society; 
- Creating a framework for improving financial and economic support of the 
federal civil service; 
- Improving the efficiency of personnel policy within the civil service system in 
order to improve the quality of civil service employee structure; 
- Implementing mechanisms for identifying and solving public service-related 
conflicts of interest, as well as introducing a legal regulation of professional 
ethics of civil servants; 
- Raising the professional level of civil servants; 
- Optimizing the federal civil servant headcount; 
- Creating a material and technical environment for efficient performance by 
civil servants of their official (service) duties; 
- Forming a civil service management system. 
Program implementation control system – the Program Coordinator shall be 
responsible for monitoring Program implementation. 
1. Problem description and substantiation of the need to solve it using the 
methods envisaged by the Program 
The civil service’s constitutional framework developed in the Russian Federation 
defines it as a state government mechanism that is thoroughly different from the 
previous administrative system. 
A host of public service-related laws and regulations were developed in 1992–2002. 
Federal Law On the Fundamentals of the Public Service of the Russian Federation, 
statutes and other regulations of the Russian Federation governing various types of 
the federal civil service as well as the civil service of constituent entities of the 
Russian Federation were enacted. 
The total number of civil servants and other employees of federal state bodies, state 
bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, and other state bodies 
established under the Constitution of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to 
as the state bodies), as well as municipal servants and other employees of local self-
government bodies at the beginning of 2002 amounted to 1,053.1 thousand, 
including a verified 315.1 thousand public servants and other employees of federal 
executive bodies. For the period of 1992 to 2002, the number of civil servants and 
other employees of these bodies grew by a factor of 1.8, primarily at the regional 
level. This growth was due to the establishment under the Constitution of the 
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The total number of civil servants and other employees of federal state bodies, state 
bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, and other state bodies 
established under the Constitution of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to 
as the state bodies), as well as municipal servants and other employees of local self-
government bodies at the beginning of 2002 amounted to 1,053.1 thousand, 
including a verified 315.1 thousand public servants and other employees of federal 
executive bodies. For the period of 1992 to 2002, the number of civil servants and 
other employees of these bodies grew by a factor of 1.8, primarily at the regional 
level. This growth was due to the establishment under the Constitution of the 
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Russian Federation of state bodies responsible for the development of the market 
economy, including tax, finance, employment, migration, and other bodies, as well 
as local self-government bodies. 
Civil servants and other employees of executive state bodies, as well as municipal 
servants and other employees of local self-government bodies (925.1 thousand) 
accounted for 89 percent of the total number of civil servants and other employees 
of state bodies, municipal servants, and other employees of local self-government 
bodies; 30 percent of them were employed in federal executive bodies, including 28 
percent employed in territorial bodies of federal executive bodies. 
The verified number of federal civil servants of central administrations of federal 
executive bodies amounted to 24.9 thousand, and of territorial bodies thereof, to 
290.2 thousand. 
State bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation employed 153.3 
thousand civil servants, while local self-government bodies employed 283.7 
thousand municipal servants. 
A decrease in the number of civil servants of federal executive bodies has been 
noted since 1998. In 2001, the number of civil servants of federal executive bodies 
decreased by 4.9 percent compared to 1995. At the same time, the number of civil  
servants of state bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and 
municipal servants of local self-government bodies is on the rise. 
In 1999, Russia had 2.8 civil servants of federal executive bodies per 1,000 people 
of total population, while the UK had 5.2, and the U.S. had 3.9; the ratios per 1,000 
people of employed population amounted to 6.4, 11.3, and 7.9, respectively. 
In the process of civil service reform, it is envisaged to optimize the number of civil 
servants by implementing new civil service administration techniques. 
The existing gender and age structure of the civil service does not match the gender 
and age structure of Russia’s employed population. 
Thus, at the beginning of 2002 women accounted for over 70 percent of all civil  
servants employed in public positions, including 71.8 percent in executive bodies, 
67.6 percent in administrations of judicial bodies and prosecutors’ offices, 55.8 
percent in administrations of legislative bodies, and 55.4 percent in administrations 
of other state bodies. The relatively high percentage of women in administrations of 
state bodies is due to the prevalence of women in public offices classified as senior 
and junior position groups. 
The average age of civil servants employed in public positions was 40 years. 
Administrations of federal courts and prosecutors’ offices of the Russian Federation 
employed somewhat younger personnel (average age 37). 
Persons in retirement age accounted for 3.5 percent of all civil servants. Over 30 
percent of civil servants employed in administrations of legislative and other state 
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bodies were 50 years old and older, including 11.1 percent and 6.9 percent 
respectively of those in retirement age. 
Most civil servants aged up to 30 were employed in public offices classified as 
senior and junior groups of positions (49.6 and 38.7 percent, respectively), while 0.6 
percent of civil servants aged up to 30 were employed in B-category highest and 
principal public positions. 
Among civil servants employed in B-category highest and principal public positions, 
the age group up of to 30 was most widely represented in administrations of federal 
courts and prosecutors’ offices of the Russian Federation, where over a third of civil 
servants belonged to this age group. 
Most civil servants employed in public positions (29.9 percent) had a length of 
service working in state bodies ranging from 5 to 10 years, while approximately 25 
percent had a length of service in excess of 15 years. 42 percent of those employed 
in public positions in administrations of legislative bodies, 24 percent of those 
employed in executive bodies, judicial bodies and prosecutors’ offices, and 38 
percent of those employed in other state bodies had a length of service in excess of 
15 years. 
Thus, within the next 10 years over half of civil servants employed in key positions 
will retire, whereas it will be impossible to fill these positions with civil servants of 
a next generation with sufficient track record working in the civil service and 
possessing necessary professional skills. 
The educational level of civil servants is characterized by the following parameters. 
73 percent of civil servants had higher professional education at the beginning of 
2002, with 40 percent of civil servants having higher economic and management 
education, 22 percent having legal education, and 18 percent having higher technical 
education. To compare, at January 1, 1999 civil servants having higher professional 
education in these areas accounted for 35.4, 19.6, and 21.2 percent, respectively. 
The number of civil servants whose professional education does not match 
qualification requirements of their positions tends to grow. 
Thus, 26.7 thousand people, or 4.6 percent of all civil servants, who are employed in 
positions that are often of a support nature have no professional education. 
Retraining and professional development of federal civil servants is currently being 
funded from the federal budget. Under Federal Law On the Federal Budget for 2002, 
RUR 417.5 million was appropriated for this purpose, including RUR 68.5 million 
allocated for the state order that serves as a basis for retraining and professional 
development of federal civil servants of central administrations of federal executive 
bodies. At the same time, the federal budget does not provide funds for retraining 
and professional development of civil servants of territorial bodies of federal 
executive bodies. 
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The average accrued monthly salary (including base compensation and social 
benefits) of civil servants at all levels amounted to RUR 4.8 thousand in 2001. 
The average monthly salary level of civil servants of executive bodies of the 
constituent entities of the Russian Federation was 1.4 times higher in 2001 than the 
average monthly salary level of civil servants of territorial bodies of federal 
executive bodies. 
Civil servants are underpaid in comparison to managers and specialists of 
management bodies in the non-state sector of the economy. A narrow differentiation 
in compensation levels of civil servants provides little incentive for them to improve 
their professional performance. 
According to experts’ estimates, civil servants employed in comparable-level 
positions are paid 10–15 times less than executives (CEOs and deputy CEOs), 7-10 
times less than senior managers (division heads), 3-7 times less than managers 
(specialists, project managers), and 1.5-3 times less than administrators (project 
implementers) [in the non-state sector of the economy]. 
The vast discrepancy in compensation levels between civil and municipal servants 
on the one hand and employees in the non-state sector of the economy on the other 
hand hampers recruitment of skilled specialists and managers to the civil and 
municipal service, leads to outflow of civil servants into the non-state sector of the 
economy (particularly affecting occupations and age categories that are in strongest 
demand), resulting in reduced performance of state bodies and in impaired 
professional, gender, and age civil servant structure. 
In the process of harmonizing the regulatory framework of the civil service with the 
existing social relations and new economic environment, it is envisaged to optimize 
the compensation of civil servants in order to bring its level closer to compensation 
levels of managers and specialists of management bodies in the non-state sector of 
the economy, thereby making the state a competitive employer and improving the 
professional, gender, and age public servant structure. 
The existing state of the civil service leads to the emergence of the following 
negative development trends. 
The professional civil servant structure is deteriorating due to low average salary 
levels and significant salary differences between various state bodies. There is a 
growing shortage of civil servants younger than 45 who are experienced in working 
within the modern economic environment. At the same time, the prestige of the civil  
service as a profession is declining. Civil servants with non-applicable education 
credentials continue to prevail. Men prevail in management positions, while women 
prevail in specialist positions. The shortage of skilled personnel is compounded with 
the existence of vacancies that are hard to fill primarily because of low pay of civil  
servants. 
Joining the civil service by citizens and job (service) promotion of civil servants are 
contingent on personal attitudes of state body heads towards them rather than on 
their professional skills and abilities. Frequent replacement of state body heads often 
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leads to numerous changes in the structure of these bodies and unwarranted firings 
of civil servants. 
The quality of documents prepared is often substandard. The activities of state 
bodies are insufficiently regulated and barely controlled by the civic society. 
Outdated moral standards and ideological controls that used to regulate the behavior 
of employees of state and government bodies and to prevent abuse, corruption, and 
arbitrariness in these bodies have ceased to apply. Neither new rules for official 
behavior (professional ethics) of civil servants nor legal mechanisms for 
implementation thereof have been developed so far. 
Shortcomings in the area of staff training for the civil service and professional 
development of civil servants have not been eliminated. The existing educational 
institutions in general fail to provide the required level of professional training for 
civil servants. 
Positive foreign experience in the field of civil service development is not applied to 
a sufficient extent. 
In order to overcome the aforementioned negative trends, it is necessary to solve the 
following problems facing the civil service: 
- Violation of the principle of uniformity of the civil service and the civil service 
administration system at the federal and regional levels; 
- Lack of developed legislative mechanisms of interaction between the civil and 
municipal services; 
- Contradictions and gaps in the legislation of the Russian Federation on the civil  
service; 
- Mismatch of the social and legal status of civil servants and the degree of their 
responsibility; 
- Low performance efficiency of state bodies; 
- Insufficient use of advanced state government techniques, including those that 
are consistent with the task of implementing large-scale state programs and 
projects; 
- Low efficiency of legal and organizational controls over the activities of state 
bodies by the civic society; 
- Low efficiency of civil service personnel policy; 
- Preservation of a conservative system of civil servant training and professional 
development; 
- Insufficient civil service resources. 
All of the above problems are closely interrelated and cannot be solved separately 
from one another. The civil service reform should be implemented within the 
framework of a balanced development concept and should not consist of one-off 
radical changes in the existing civil service. A consistent and gradual approach is the 
underlying principle of modern civil service reform. 
In order to solve the aforementioned problems, in accordance with the Instruction of 
the President of the Russian Federation No. Пр-2331 of November 24, 2000, a 
Concept of the Reform of the Civil Service of the Russian Federation was developed 
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and approved on August 15, 2001 under No. Пр-1496, serving as a basis for 
developing this Program. 
2. Program goal, objectives, time frame, and main implementation stages 
Program goal – improving the efficiency of the civil service as a whole and of its 
types and levels, optimizing civil servant maintenance costs, and developing civil  
service resources. 
To achieve this goal, the following objectives need to be implemented: 
- Creating conditions for optimal organizational and legal support of the civil  
service; 
- Defining roles, powers, and responsibilities of civil servants based on job 
(service) descriptions; 
- Implementing new techniques for planning, financing, stimulating, and 
assessing civil servants’ activities, and using civil service system resources in a 
rational manner; 
- Ensuring openness of the civil service for the benefit of civic society 
development and strengthening of the state; 
- Applying efficient methods for selecting skilled personnel for the civil service 
and for assessing service performance of civil servants, as well as creating 
conditions for civil servant job (service) promotion; 
- Implementing staff training programs for the civil service and professional 
development programs for civil servants; 
- Implementing mechanisms for identifying and solving civil service-related 
conflicts of interest, as well as introducing a legal regulation of professional 
ethics of civil servants; 
- Creating optimal material and technical conditions for efficient functioning of 
the federal civil service and performance by civil servants of their official 
(service) duties; 
- Ensuring the development of a public service management system. 
The Program is medium-term and shall be implemented over the years 2003–2005. 
Program implementation stages: 
2002 – Preparations for Program implementation; 
2003 – 2005 – Creating a regulatory framework for the civil service system, 
implementing financial and economic measures, experiments and pilot projects 
aimed at applying new approaches to federal civil service organization, monitoring 
civil  service reform, as well as applying positive outcomes of these experiments and 
pilot projects in the activities of state bodies and local self-government bodies. 
3. System of measures envisaged by the Program 
The Program envisages a set of specific measures listed in the Appendix and main 
areas in which these shall be implemented. 
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In order to achieve the objectives set out in the Program, measures in the following 
areas are envisaged: 
- Improving the legislative and regulatory framework for civil service reform; 
- Experimenting and implementing pilot projects aimed at applying new 
approaches to federal civil service organization and support of federal civil 
servants’ activities; 
- Improving training, retraining, and professional development of federal civil  
servants; 
- Creating a material and technical basis for efficient functioning of the federal 
civil  service; 
- Forming a civil service management system. 
- Improving the legislative and regulatory framework for civil service reform 
The need for legislative regulation of civil service issues is stipulated in the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation. However, no comprehensive and integral 
legal framework for civil service support exists in the Russian Federation. 
The legal regulation of the civil service in the Russian Federation is deficient in that 
it does not provide a complete legislative regulation of civil service relations. 
Legal frameworks for various types of the federal civil service are subject to various 
regulations of the Russian Federation, which contradict to one another. 
The constituent entities of the Russian Federation have enacted various civil  service 
regulations, which in certain cases are at odds with the legislation of the Russian 
Federation. 
Therefore, no comprehensive regulatory framework exists that would ensure a 
complete implementation of objectives and functions assigned to the civil service 
under the Constitution of the Russian Federation and generally recognized principles 
and norms of international law. 
In order to establish a comprehensive civil service system, the need has arisen to 
legislate a uniform legal framework for it. 
It is necessary to develop and enact priority federal laws and other regulations on the 
civil service system of the Russian Federation, on types of the civil service, on local 
self-government, and on municipal service. 
These laws and regulations shall provide a uniform approach to legal regulation and 
organization of the civil and municipal service, improvement of compensation 
system for civil and municipal servants, openness of the civil service for the benefit 
of civic society development and strengthening of the state, implementation of 
advanced techniques for forecasting, financing, assessing, stimulating, and providing 
logistic support to the civil service, and civil service administration. 
An expert study of the existing regulatory framework of the civil service is also 
required, in addition to harmonizing it with the existing social relations and new 
economic environment. 
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Experimenting and implementing pilot projects aimed at applying new approaches 
to federal civil service organization and support of federal civil servants’ activities. 
The Russian Federation retains conservative approaches to federal civil service 
organization, which fail to ensure efficient functioning of the federal civil service 
and appropriate quality of provision by civil servants of public services to citizens 
and organizations. 
Improving federal civil service organization and providing support to federal civil  
servants’ activities require the implementation of advanced management 
technologies, including new methods for planning and financing federal state 
bodies’ activities and stimulating federal civil servants, as well as of a system of 
indicators and criteria for assessing activities of administrations of federal state 
bodies and divisions thereof. 
Solving these tasks requires experimenting and implementing pilot projects 
involving the application of new approaches to federal civil service organization in 
selected federal state bodies. The monitoring of the results of these experiments and 
pilot projects will be used as a basis for implementing advanced management 
technologies in the civil service system as a whole. 
As part of the Program implementation, the following experiments and pilot projects 
are envisaged: 
- Testing new methods for planning federal state bodies’ activities, and a system 
of indicators and performance assessment criteria for federal civil servants; 
- Implementing methods of targeted program financing of selected federal state 
bodies aimed at improving efficiency of these bodies and federal civil servants; 
- Implementing the balance method of resource accounting and advanced forms 
of federal state bodies’ budget spending efficiency assessment; 
- Applying service contracts; 
- Creating and using a system for federal civil servant professional development, 
training and retraining; 
- Developing mechanisms for identifying and solving civil service-related 
conflicts of interest, as well as introducing a legal regulation of professional 
ethics of civil servants. 
- Improving training, retraining, and professional development of federal civil  
servants 
The main goal of improving training, retraining, and professional development of 
federal civil servants is to raise their professional level. 
In order to achieve this goal, the following is required: 
- Developing an efficient mechanism for selecting personnel for the civil service 
and for job (service) promotion of federal civil servants on the basis of their 
professional achievements and capabilities; 
- Raising the prestige of the federal civil service and the authority of federal civil  
servants; 
- Establishing a system of continuous professional education of federal civil  
servants, improving standards and training and professional development 
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programs for federal civil service employees on the basis of open tenders for 
such programs, as well as educational institutions; 
- Managing the development of professional qualities of federal civil servants; 
- Ensuring a renewal and scheduled rotation of federal civil service personnel; 
- Forming a reserve of federal civil servants on a competitive basis and ensuring 
it is used efficiently; 
- Assessing federal civil servants’ performance in an objective manner at 
attestation or qualification examinations. 
- Creating a material and technical environment for efficient functioning of the 
federal civil service 
The main goal of this area is ensuring the use of civil service system resources in a 
rational manner, as well as creating an appropriate environment for high-quality 
performance by civil servants of their official (service) duties and provision by them 
of civil services to citizens and organizations. 
In order to achieve this goal, the following objectives shall be implemented: 
- Analyzing the existing material and technical base of the federal civil service; 
- Developing workplace and accommodation standards for federal civil servants, 
as well as standards regulating logistical support of the federal civil service; 
- Developing proposals on the construction, reconstruction, and technical 
outfitting of buildings and premises housing central administrations of federal 
state bodies. 
- Forming a civil service management system 
A civil service management system is required for ensuring the uniformity of the 
civil service of the Russian Federation, interaction of state bodies with civic society 
entities, coordination of state bodies’ activities involving recruitment into the civil 
service, working in and termination from the civil service, as well as the 
professional development of civil servants. 
This goal shall be achieved on the basis of: 
- Uniformity of the administration system of the civil service of the Russian 
Federation and its division into the federal level and level of the constituent 
entities of the Russian Federation; 
- Coordination of activities of state bodies’ divisions involving civil service and 
personnel issues; 
- Interaction with local self-government bodies; 
- Openness of the civil service system for the citizens and civic society. 
4. Program resources 
The amount of Program funding in 2003–2005 shall be RUR 539.1 million, 
including: 
in 2003 – RUR 231.7 million; 
in 2004 – RUR 164 million; 
in 2005 – RUR 143.4 million. 
It is envisaged that federal budget funds appropriated for implementing the Program 
shall be allocated to the Administrative Department of the President of the Russian 
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Federation (to the Program Coordinator – Administration of the President of the 
Russian Federation) and subsequently transferred to the state customers. 
Program implementation expenses shall be specified upon preparation of a draft 
federal budget for the relevant year. 
In order to implement the measures envisaged by the Program, it will be possible to 
attract World Bank funds, as well as funds obtained via technical assistance 
programs provided by foreign countries and international organizations. Technical 
assistance may be used for advisory support of research and development measures 
envisaged by the Program in accordance with the legislation of the Russian 
Federation on foreign technical assistance. 
Upon obtaining positive results of individual measures envisaged by the Program, 
funds required for the implementation thereof shall be allocated with account taken 
of capabilities of budgets at all levels for the relevant year. 
5. Program implementation and monitoring progress in carrying out its 
measures 
The Program shall be implemented using federal budget funds on the basis of state 
contracts (agreements) concluded according to the established procedure by state 
customers with implementers of the measures envisaged by the Program, and on the 
basis of agreements concluded with relevant constituent entities of the Russian 
Federation or municipalities. 
Implementers of the measures envisaged by Program – Ministry of Labor and Social 
Development of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Trade and Economic 
Development of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian 
Federation, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Property 
Relations of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, 
Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, State Committee for Construction and 
Housing of the Russian Federation, research and development, educational, and 
other entities to be determined on a tender basis according to the established 
procedure. 
The Program Coordinator shall be responsible for organizing the Program 
implementation and monitoring progress in carrying out the measures envisaged 
therein. 
The Program Coordinator shall ensure the implementation of the state policy in the 
area of civil service reform by coordinating approved federal and regional programs 
related to civil service development, and ensuring interaction between state bodies 
and local self-government bodies in implementing the Program. 
The Program Coordinator shall review materials pertaining to the Program 
implementation progress, specify, on an annual basis, measures envisaged by the 
Program and related funding amounts, and approve a detailed list of measures to be 
implemented. 
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In order to ensure the Program implementation, state customers shall submit to the 
Program Coordinator their proposals and substantiation on the most urgent measures 
to be financed in the following financial year, as well as proposals concerning the 
use of funds obtained via foreign technical assistance. 
State customers shall be responsible for developing terms of reference for 
competitions and tenders for implementing the measures envisaged by the Program. 
Tender committees formed according to the established procedure shall perform the 
tender selection. 
The Program Coordinator shall be responsible for monitoring the Program 
implementation. 
6. Program implementation deliverables 
As a result of the Program implementation, the following results shall be achieved: 
- Harmonizing the regulatory framework of the civil service with the existing 
social relations and new economic environment; 
- Establishing a professional civil service based on the principles of taking into 
account and assessing civil servants’ performance; 
- Implementing job (service) descriptions for civil servants; 
- Achieving a high-quality level of performance by civil servants of their official 
(service) duties and provision by them of civil services to citizens and 
organizations; 
- Creating conditions for openness and accountability of state bodies’ 
administrations and civil servants to the civic society; 
- Creating a framework for improving financial and economic support of the 
federal civil service; 
- Improving the efficiency of personnel policy within the civil service system in 
order to improve the quality of civil service employee structure; 
- Implementing mechanisms for identifying and solving civil service-related 
conflicts of interest, as well as introducing a legal regulation of professional 
ethics of civil servants; 
- Raising the professional level of federal civil servants; 
- Optimizing the number of federal civil servants 
- Creating a material and technical environment for efficient performance by 
civil  servants of their official (service) duties; 
- Establishing a civil service management system. 
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     Annex 2 
 
 
Concept and Main Directions of Reform and Modernization of 
Central State Administration 
 
Extracts form a strategic document approved by the Czech Government  
in its Resolution N 237 of 17 March 20041 
 
Vision of the Reform  
Flexible and better functioning central state administration responding better to 
global challenges and cross-cutting issues. 
 
Why Central State Administration Reform? 
The aim of reform is to ensure, through intervention into the current system, better 
enforcement of law and more effective services provided by the central state 
administration serving the Government and society. Central state administration 
authorities should be focused more on the quality of their services and outputs they 
provide and react in a better and more flexible way on demand expressed by 
citizens. Tools providing for systematic use of cost-benefit analysis on public 
finance to economize central state administration operational expenditure should be 
introduced. Implementation of Government policies should be enhanced, as well as 
background information submitted to the Government for its decision-making. The 
reform should also support wider use of modern technologies and managerial 
techniques and enhance horizontal co-ordination and communication among central 
state administration authorities. 
Project management tool is being used for the implementation of the whole reform 
process. 
 
Why Project Management? 
Exploitation of the project management is appropriate mainly because of the 
following attributes: 
• higher flexibility 
• suppression of departments´ own preferences 
• better targets orientation 
• greater team co-operation 
• greater transparency 
• increased responsibility for outputs 
Project management consists of five main activities with their internal order of 
sequence, however, these activities do not have to be always implemented 
separately: 
• project targets definition 
• planning 
• management 
                                                 
1 Source: www.vlada.cz   
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• monitoring 
• project termination 
 
Reform Co-ordination 
The main responsibility for the reform falls within the duties of the Prime Minister.  
Co-ordination of activities within project management and respective tasks in the 
reform falls within duties of the Head of the Office of the Government. For this 
purpose, Department of Regulatory Reform and Central State Administration 
Reform within the Office of the Government is charged with implementation of 
particular tasks.  
Top level operational body of the reform is the Central State Administration Reform 
Steering Committee which monitors work on the reform and approves its further 
progress. All project outputs are submitted to this Steering Committee in order to 
express its opinion on it. 
Project teams are established to provide implementation of separate projects headed 
by appointed project managers. Practical implementation of tasks is assigned to 
project teams which are created to each project. A project manager is appointed as a 
head of each project team as the responsible person for the progress of a respective 
project. Among others, to his / her duty belongs e.g. keeping the records of project 
documentation. 
 
 
DIRECTIONS OF REFORM    
 
A. Rationalization of processes in central state administration 
 
Project A.1 Identification of the mission statement (and targets) of central state 
administration authorities 
The purpose of this project is to define mission statements of all central state 
administration authorities and determine their responsibility for social values. In 
accordance with the mission statements and priorities of the 
government, departments will define their own mid-term priorities and targets. On 
the basis of submitted materials, the Office of the Government of the Czech 
Republic elaborates the summary document which will be submitted to the 
Government for discussion. 
This project has a key role for further continuation of the reform towards 
rationalization of processes in the central state administration. On the basis of the 
outputs of this project current processes in central state administration will be 
defined and described. Subsequently, the rationalization of processes with the aim to 
increase effectiveness and quality of services in the central state administration will 
follow. 
Time framework - till 31 December 2004 
Output - Mission statements and mid-term targets of central state administration 
authorities 
Responsible authority - Office of the Government - Department of Regulatory 
Reform and Central State Administration Reform 
Co-responsible authorities - all central state administration authorities 
Project Manager - Zuzana Rusňáková 
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Project A.2 Process description and analysis in central state administration 
authorities 
The aim of the project is to implement process audits in all central administration 
authorities. Detailed mapping and analysis of current processes will enhance 
definition of those ones which have a key role for fulfillment of the mission 
statement and mid-term targets of a particular central administration authority, and 
their distinguishing from those identified as duplicitous, unproductive, or having 
nothing in common with the mission of such authority. 
Time framework - till 31 December 2006 
Input - outputs of the project A.1 Identification of the mission statement (and 
targets) of central state administration authorities 
Outputs 
1. detailed process description implemented in central state adminitration 
authorities  
2. definition of "candidates" for transfer 
Responsible authority - Office of the Government - Department of Regulatory 
Reform and Central State Administration Reform 
Co-responsible authorities - all central state administration authorities 
Project Manager - Aleš Pecka 
 
Project A.3 Elaboration of general rules of operation for agencies 
The aim of this project is to define common standard rules of the way how services 
to central administration authorities should be provided. It concerns those services 
which are not related to the mission statements of the central state administration 
authorities and are of supporting and operational nature. The fact that elaboration of 
the above-mentioned rule does not necessarily have to lead to creation of e new legal 
entity is important. Unification of existing conditions for establishment and 
operation of current bodies ensuring this kind of services to the central state 
administration should be the target of this project. 
Time framework - till 30 June 2005 
Output - Rules of operation for so-called "agencies"  
Responsible authority - Office of the Government - Department of Regulatory 
Reform and Central State Administration Reform 
Co-responsible authority - Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Finance 
Project Manager - Štěpánka Steinbachová 
 
Project A.4 Reorganization of central state administration 
The aim of this project is to set the rules for the "new" central state administration 
functioning, as well as embodying into the legislation the previous solutions which 
proved to be effective. The project should describe a final solution and provide the 
Government with background materials for its final decision. 
Inputs 
1. Output of the project A.1 Identification of the mission statement (and 
targets) of central state administration authorities  
2. Output of the project A.2 Process description and analysis in central state 
administration authorities  
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3. Output of the project A.3 Elaboration of the general rules of operation for 
agencies 
Time framework and outputs 
1. Proposal for launching of operation of agencies - till 30 June 2006  
2. New Draft Competence Law - till 30 June 2006  
3. New central state administration and effectively performing agencies - till 1 
January 2007 
Responsible authority - Office of the Government - Department of Regulatory 
Reform and Central State Administration Reform 
Co-responsible authority - all central state administration authorities 
Project Manager - Luděk Tesař 
 
B. Improvement of management in central state administration 
 
Project B.1 Effective horizontal communication and support of nationwide 
strategies 
Balance between a certain level of autonomy of central state administration 
authorities on the one hand, and demand for their co-ordinated operation on the 
other, is a necessary precondition for effective performance of the central state 
administration as a whole. Definition of rules for horizontal communication among 
central state administration authorities, and reduction of the inter-departmental 
administrative work as well as decrease of ´communication overload´ of ministries 
and Government is, therefore, the aim of this project. 
Time framework - till 31 December 2005 
Input - Analysis of foreign experiences with the inter-departmental coordination 
and functioning of the offices of the government or prime minister 
Outputs 
1. Draft rules and institutional framework for effective horizontal 
communication  
2. Elaboration of the system supporting the creation of nationwide strategies 
and cross-cutting solutions 
Responsible authority - Office of the Government - Department of Regulatory 
Reform and Central State Administration Reform 
Co-responsible authority - Ministry of the Interior  
Project Manager - Martina Jalovecká 
 
Project B.2 Modern managerial techniques in central state administration  
This project is focused on implementation of a training system providing for a 
support and creation of a skilled top management in central state administration 
authorities capable of use of modern managerial tools. For this purpose, managerial 
capacities will be systematically built and promoted in central authorities with the 
aim to introduce and further disseminate the skills of e.g. performance management; 
strategic management; performance (output) focused budgeting; human resources 
management etc. 
Time framework and outputs  
- Preparation and implementation of a pilot project on output focused 
management - till 31 December 2004  
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- Implementation of the training project form managers focused on output 
focused management - till 31 December 2005  
- Processing of the Strategic paper on the development of management in central 
state administration authorities for the period 2006 till 2010 - till 31 
December 2005 
Responsible authority - Office of the Government - Directorate General of the Civil 
Service 
Project Manager - Zuzana Beránková 
 
Project B.3 Better co-ordination of central state administration towards 
territorial public administration 
The aim of this project is an identification of optimal co-ordination mechanism of 
communication towards territorial public administration and improvement of co-
ordination and communication interface between central administration authorities 
and other entities in the public sector (municipalities, business sector, associations 
etc.). 
Time framework and outputs 
- Analysis of co-ordination mechanisms of central state administration towards 
territorial public administration - till 31 December 2004  
- Proposal of the co-coordinated approach of central state administration towards 
territorial public administration - till 31 December 2005 
Responsible authority - Ministry of the Interior 
Co-responsible authority  - Office of the Government - Department of Regulatory 
Reform and Central State Administration Reform, Ministry of Informatics 
Project Manager - Jaroslav Maršík 
 
Project B.4 Knowledge management 
Knowledge management is mainly related to acquiring, processing, transmission, 
recording and sharing of knowledge. However, this issue does not concern only 
technical aspects. The project will mainly follow the outputs of information audits 
realized within the framework of the project A.2. The stress will be put mostly on 
information sharing among central state administration authorities, as well as 
keeping the "institution memory" - knowledge management within those authorities 
despite existing high fluctuation of employees. 
Input 
- Output of the project A.2 Process description and analysis in central state 
administration bodies  
- OECD documents  
- Strategy of the development of human resources in the Czech Republic 
- Time framework and outputs  
- Specification concerning the intent of knowledge management system adapted 
in relation to parameters and assumptions for use of the outputs from the 
process analysis - til 31 December 2004  
- Launching of a pilot project to verify the knowledge management model - till 
31 December 2006  
- Creation of the knowledge management system - till 31 December 2007 
Responsible authority - Office of the Government 
Co-responsible authority - Office of the Government - Directorate General of the 
Civil Service, Ministry of Informatics 
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- Implementation of the training project form managers focused on output 
focused management - till 31 December 2005  
- Processing of the Strategic paper on the development of management in central 
state administration authorities for the period 2006 till 2010 - till 31 
December 2005 
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Service 
Project Manager - Zuzana Beránková 
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Project Manager - Jaroslav Hrubý 
 
C. Improvement of quality in central state administration 
 
Project C.1 Introduction and development of quality management in central 
state administration 
The aim of the first stage of this project is to train management of central state 
administration authorities in quality management issues. This will enable general 
application of chosen quality method in central state administration authorities. The 
second stage shall consist of pilot project implementation of quality monitoring, 
application of CAF (Common Assessment Framework), as well as benchmarking 
method. 
Input  - output of the project A.2 Process description and analysis in central state 
administration authorities 
Time framework and outputs  
- Initiation of training, support and creation of quality management in central 
state administration - 2005 to 2006  
- Pilot project on introduction of quality monitoring into central state 
administration - 2007  
- Application of CAF model benchmarking method into central state 
administration - 2008 to 2010 
Responsible authority - Office of the Government - Department of Regulatory 
Reform and Central State Administration Reform  
Projekt Manager - Štěpánka Steinbachová 
  
Project C.2 Regulatory reform in central state administration  
The process of modernizing regulation should contribute to enhancing preparation 
and implementation of laws and by-laws issued by state administration. Primary tool 
for better regulation agenda in the Czech Republic will be the implementation of 
Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) to the legislation-making process. 
Time framework and outputs 
- Draft rules for functioning of state regulatory authorities (Unified Model of 
State Regulatory Authorities) - till 31 December 2004  
- Draft guidelines for Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) - do 31. December 
2005  
- Pilot project of RIA implementation on preparation of selected draft laws - 
2006 to 2007  
- Implementation of full RIA for all Government draft laws - since 2007 
Responsible authority - Office of the Government - Department of Regulatory 
Reform and Central State Administration Reform 
Project Manager - Daniel Trnka 
  
Project C.3 E-government  
The central state administration modernization should be supported by promoting 
the e-government tools. The aim of e-government implementation is to enable 
citizens and businesses to simply and quickly communicate with administrative 
authorities on all levels of public administration. 
Time framework and outputs 
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- Preparation of project specification and launch of the second phase of the 
Public Administration Portal - till 31 December 2004  
- Creation of basic exchange format for communication between public 
administration authorities - till 31 December 2004  
- Implementation of basic electronic on-line public service through the Public 
Administration Portal - till 31 December 2005  
- Implementation of basic exchange format for communication between public 
administration authorities - till 31 December 2006  
- Creation of basic exchange format for communication between citizens and 
public administration authorities - 2004 to 2007 
Responsible authority - Office of the Government - Department of Regulatory 
Reform and Central State Administration Reform 
Project Manager - Daniel Trnka 
 
D. Implementation and improvement of civil service 
 
Project D.1 Civil service Act implementation 
Human resources management in central state administration has not been unified 
yet. The implementation of the Act No. 218/2002 Coll., on service of civil servants 
in administrative authorities and on remuneration of civil servants and other 
employees in administrative authorities (The Civil Service Act) will be solved 
within the framework of the project. The project will progress in line with the Civil 
Service Act and priorities chosen for the period before the Act come fully into force. 
Time framework and outputs 
- Creation of personal departments according to the Civil Service Act - till 31 
December 2004  
- Preparation of draft systemization and organizational structure of 
administrative authorities for the year 2005 - till 1 September 2004  
- Preparation of the Institute of State Administration transformation into a state 
contributory organisation according to the Civil Service Act - till 30 September 
2004  
- Issue of service regulation by the Director General of the Civil Service - till 31 
December 2004  
- Creation of guidelines for training of civil servants and candidates - till 31 
December 2004  
- Creation of the plan of supervisory activities for Directorate General of the 
Civil Service for the year 2005 - till 31 December 2004  
- Creation of principles for the service appraisal of civil servants - till 31 
December 2005 
Responsible authority - Office of the Government - Directorate General of the Civil 
Service 
Project Manager - Ivana Nemeškalová 
 
E. Rationalisation of the finance and budgetary procedures in central 
state administration 
 
Project E.1 Development of financial and performance management 
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The aim of the project is to prepare top management in central state administration 
for wide economic reforms. That particularly means to provide them with 
knowledge  and skills enabling them to create a strong expert backround for further 
changes in economic management of central state administration. The Institute of 
State Administration will ensure realisation of educational and training programmes 
according to the content prepared by the responsible authority (MoF). 
Time framework and outputs 
- Plan on promotion and creation of performance and financial management in 
central state administration - till 31 December 2004  
- Performance and financial management in central state administration - 2006 to 
2008 
Responsible authority - Ministry of Finance 
Co-responsible authority - Office of the Government - Directorate General of the 
Civil Service  
Project Manager - Bohdan Hejduk 
 
Project E.2 Public Private Partnership 
There are many investment projects which are of the interest of businesess as well as 
public sector. The aim is to find the rules for using both financial resources - public 
and private sector - in such a way that the businesses would be motivated to take 
part in public investments and to initiate them and also to guarantee that public 
resources will not be abused. 
Time framework and outputs 
- Draft guidelines for common public / private investment - till 31 
December 2005  
- Pilot projects on public investments and their evaluation - 2006 to 2010 
Responsible authority - Ministry of Finance 
Co-responsible authorities 
Ministry of the Interior, Office of the Government - Department of Regulatory 
Reform and Central State Administration Reform, Ministry of Industry and Trade 
Project Manager - Kateřina Helikarová 
 
Project E.3 Unification and enhancement of control in central state 
administration 
The project focuses on control in central state administration from the systematic 
point of view. The aim is to unify control into a wider framework and to promote the 
links among control, effectiveness and performance of central state administration 
authorities, in connection with their missions and mid-term targets. The issue of the 
body or department in charge of the complex policy co-ordination and methodical 
management of control will be solved as well. 
Time framework and outputs 
- Analysis of the current system of control in state administration - till 31 
December 2004  
- Strategy of control in state administration with focus on control of targets 
(objectives) and performance of central state administration authorities - till 31 
December 2004  
- Identification of the body co-ordinating and methodically managing control in 
state administration as a whole - till 31 December 2005 
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Responsible authority - Ministry of Finance 
Co-responsible authority - Office of the Government - Directorate General of the 
Civil Service 
Ministry of the Interior 
Project Manager - Josef Svoboda 
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Responsible authority - Ministry of Finance 
Co-responsible authority - Office of the Government - Directorate General of the 
Civil Service 
Ministry of the Interior 
Project Manager - Josef Svoboda 
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Annex 3  
 
 
Standardized Interview: Questions and Responses  
of Russian and Czech Civil Servants  
 
 
A standardized structured interview of the Czech and Russian civil servants took 
place in the Czech Republic in 2002 and in Russia in 2004. The interview was 
carried out in the Czech Republic by V. King and her team (King, 2003)1 as part of 
the research project funded by CERGE-EI Foundation (Prague). In the Russian 
Federation the interview was conducted by the author of this study using the same 
questions. All in all 19 Russian and 19 Czech senior and middle level civil servants 
were interviewed, who represented various government ministries and agencies. 
 
Provided below are the responses to 24 questions put to the interviewees: 
 
1. What is the lowest position 
status, in which people in your 
ministry sign important letters in 
their own name?  
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Minister or his Deputy  5  
Director of Department 2 3 
Deputy Director of  Department  11  
Non-respondents  1 16 
 
 
2. Do you find decision-making  
at your ministry too centralized, 
too decentralized, or just right? 
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Too centralized  6 4 
Too decentralized  1 - 
Just right 12 15 
 
 
3. Do you have enough creative 
space? 
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Yes   13 19 
No  6 - 
                                                 
1
 King V., (2003), ‘What Kind of Civil Service? Trends in Public Administration 
Reform in Eastern Europe’, in   NEBI Yearbook 2003, Springer., pp. 55-66  
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4. Do you feel too restricted by 
rules? 
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Yes  6 - 
No  13 19 
 
 
5. Do you want more rules? 
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Yes  14 13 
No  5 6 
 
 
6. Do you feel burdened by 
having to make too many 
decisions on your own? 
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Yes  1 - 
No  18 19 
 
 
7. Is there a strong sense of 
teamwork at your ministry or do 
people act individualistically? 
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Strong teamwork  3 13 
Weak teamwork 16 6 
 
 
8. Is it easy to find qualified 
employees for your ministry 
(department)? 
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Yes  1 7 
No  18 12 
 
 
9. What motivates young people 
to come and work at your 
ministry?  
In brackets ranked as most 
important  - (1), ranked 2nd - (2),  
ranked 3rd  -(3) 
 
Russian Federation  
 
  Czech Republic  
 
Opportunity to make good 14 (1);  4 (2);    1 (3)   15 (1);  2(2);  2 (3) 
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contacts  
Challenge of the task              1 (2);     7 (3) 3 (1);  9 (2);   3 (3) 
Status   2 (1);   9 (2);    3 (3) 1 (1);  3 (2);   8 (3) 
Policy design                            3 (3)           2 (2);    1 (3) 
Job security  3 (1);   5 (2);      2 (3)                        5 (3) 
Could not find another job                            3 (3)            3 (2)    
Attractive pay    
 
 
10. What motivates employees to 
stay at your ministry for a longer 
time?  
 In brackets ranked as most 
important  - (1), ranked 2nd - (2),  
ranked 3rd  -(3)  
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Long term career opportunity  10 (1);     4 (2);      5 (3) 18 (1);               1 (3) 
Challenge of the task  3  (1);      3 (2);      2 (3) 1  (1);   5 (2);    3 (3) 
Status                  5 (2);     7 (3)            10 (2);    3 (3) 
Policy design                                3 (3)              1 (2);    3 (3) 
Job security  6 (1);       6 (2);                           7 (3) 
Loyalty to the group               3 (2);     2 (3) 
Attractive pay                  1 (2);      2 (3)  
 
 
11. What kinds of things give 
you the most professional 
satisfaction?  
 In brackets ranked as most 
important  - (1), ranked 2nd - (2), 
ranked 3rd  -(3)  
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Creative design of policy    9  (1);      4 (2);        6 (3) 18 (1);             1 (3) 
Respect of the public and 
colleagues   
 9  (1);       5 (2);       1 (3) 1 (1);   5(2);    3 (3) 
Feeling of authority                   2 (2);       6 (3)           10 (2);   3 (3) 
Providing good service                    8 (2);       6 (3)            1 (2);    3 (3)  
 
 
12. How do you evaluate the 
quality of a completed task or the 
quality of a performance?  
 In brackets ranked as most 
important  - (1), ranked 2nd - (2),  
ranked 3rd  -(3)  
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
How well accepted by the public 
at large 
 6 (1);       9 (2);    4 (3)   12 (1);    5 (2)      2 (3) 
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True to plan  12 (1);      7 (2);    2 (3)  6 (1);    1(2);      
What percent of the target  
group did it reach  
1   (1);      3 (2);  11 (3)  1 (1)     7(2);      3 (3) 
Cost effectiveness                                2 (3)               3 (2)      5 (3)  
 
 
13. Are there overlapping 
jurisdictions between your 
ministry and other ministries?    
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Yes  18 19 
No   1 - 
 
 
14. Should there be more 
coordination between the 
activities of ministries and 
government agencies in this 
country? 
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Yes  18 11 
No   1 8 
 
 
15. Do you think that your 
country in general has the right 
mix of what the public sector 
does and what the private sector 
does?  
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Yes  7 18 
No  12 1 
 
 
16. Should there be a strict 
separation between Civil Service 
and Politics?    
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Yes  17 19 
No  2 - 
 
 
17. In your country civil service 
and politics are kept separate?    
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Yes  2 - 
No  17 19 
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18. In your country change in 
Government entails replacement 
of some career civil servants? 
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Yes  19 19 
No  - - 
 
 
19. Has the organization of your 
ministry been designed by 
following a model of some 
particular country? 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Yes  4 8 
No  15 11 
 
 
20. Is it more important for your 
ministry (department) to achieve 
results or to guarantee the 
integrity of important on-going 
processes? 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Results more important  5 5 
Integrity of processes 
more important 
4 7 
Both are important 10 7 
 
 
21. Is there sufficient dialog 
between policy makers and those 
affected by the policies ? 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Yes  1 1 
No  14 15 
No response 4 3 
 
 
22. How important is shielding of 
civil service from direct political 
influence?  
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Very important 16 19  
Important   3 - 
Not important   - - 
 
 
23. How important is a culture of 
civil service impartial 
professionalism?  
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Very important 18 18 
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18. In your country change in 
Government entails replacement 
of some career civil servants? 
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Yes  19 19 
No  - - 
 
 
19. Has the organization of your 
ministry been designed by 
following a model of some 
particular country? 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Yes  4 8 
No  15 11 
 
 
20. Is it more important for your 
ministry (department) to achieve 
results or to guarantee the 
integrity of important on-going 
processes? 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Results more important  5 5 
Integrity of processes 
more important 
4 7 
Both are important 10 7 
 
 
21. Is there sufficient dialog 
between policy makers and those 
affected by the policies ? 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Yes  1 1 
No  14 15 
No response 4 3 
 
 
22. How important is shielding of 
civil service from direct political 
influence?  
 
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Very important 16 19  
Important   3 - 
Not important   - - 
 
 
23. How important is a culture of 
civil service impartial 
professionalism?  
Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Very important 18 18 
 285
Important   1 1 
Not important   - - 
 
 
24. How important is the 
attainment of administrative 
stability? 
    
 Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Very important  14 17 
Important  5 2 
Not important - - 
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Important   1 1 
Not important   - - 
 
 
24. How important is the 
attainment of administrative 
stability? 
    
 Russian Federation  
 
Czech Republic  
 
Very important  14 17 
Important  5 2 
Not important - - 
 
